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OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OFF I CE OF THE GENERAL (X)UNSEL 
FACSIMILE 
Date: , o I lR L r1 
To: l~~(,._J~ 'tt- f)~--\-e_ 
Location: ~ LL '-f) (<. l2, IVVf: C,,l>u..ie..\ 
Facsimile No., "1 { t./] 1/ 6L "t'J I 
Te 1 ephone No. : 
From: 8tLL ,8tt.'l<_c.t-l \ LL 
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Fax No. : 
FTS:~ 
Ol\1:~)27 
F'fS: 786-6018 or FTS: 786-6099 
a:N: 202-786-6018 or Ol\1: 202-786-6099 




1ease cal 1 97 upon receipt. 
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, .... . ,_. ' "---9 ._. . ...,,... . . .... 
OCT.04 '89 1S: 14 HQLOWAY, CHIEF ~:.,vt0ll:J 1CIES.,., 
• , 4 .,. 
Ronorable L. Ralph M~cham, Secretary 
Judioial Conference of the United States 
Administrative Offie~ of the u. s. Courts 
Washington, o. c. 20544 
Dear Director Mecham: 
P.01 
On September 20, 1989, the Judicial Conference received the Report 
of the Ad Hoc Committee on Habe~s Corpus in Capital Cases. Because the 
Report was released to us as conference members shortly before the 
Conference and becauge it included fundamental new proposals relating 
to hab~as corpus and capit~l cases, the Conference voted to withhold 
final discussion and approval on the Report until such time as 
Conference members could study the details of the Report. As you know, 
further conferertce diacussion was deemed necessary because of the 
import~nce of the subj~ct matter and concerns expressed about the 
important proposed rules relating to capital punishment litigation. 
Pursuant to P.L. 100-690, Section 7323, 102 Stat. ~467 (1988), the 
Report of the Powell Comrttittee has now bee n forwarded to Congress by 
the Chief Justice of the United Stat~s. As members of the Conference 
we respectfully ask that you transmit to the Chairmen of the senate ~nd 
House Judiciary Committees a request that hearings be held so that the 
recommendations of tha Judicial Conference, which will be adopted at 
its next meeting, can be considered as to such legislation deemed 
necessary for the effici ent conduct of the public business. 
In addi t ion to the undersigned Members of the Conference, other 
Conference M~mbers, whose names ar~ listed below, have ~uthori2ed us to 
gtate that they join in this request. 
Sincerely, 
c h t'i f J tJ. d 9j, 3 r d C 1 r e u i t 
~~_¥ t, <%AA.k le.~(8 ~ J 
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Hon. L. Ralph Mecham, Secretary 
Judicial Conference of the United States 
October 4, 1989 
Page 2 
(The following Judges have authorized the listing 
of their names as joining in this letter request) 
Honor.able William J. Ne~lon, Jr. 
u~ited States Olstrict Judge 
Middle Oietrict of Pennsylvania 
Honorable Robert F. Peckham 
United States District Judge 
~) cthetn Oiatrict California 
Ronorable James P. Churchill 
Chief Judge 
Eastern District of Michigan 
cc: The Chief JUetice 
All Judicial Conferenc~ Members 
P.02 
October 16, 1989 
Testimony Before Senate Judicial Committee 
MEMO TO HEW: 
Senator Biden, by one of his staff, has invited me 
to testify before the Senate Judicial Committee in support 
of the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee. 
I have agreed to do this at 10:00 a.m.L November 8. 
If convenient for Justice Kennedy, I would like for you as 
well as Al Pearson to accompany me. Also, please take a 
look at the statement I made to the Judicial Conference. In 
light of subsequent developments, do you think changes would 
be desirable. 
l _1. <1 
L.F.P., Jr. 
ss 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pea~son 
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Mrs. Hatzipetrou is a 50 year old 
Greek national. She has a life-threat-
ening . case of cervical cancer and in 
need of U.S. medical treatment. 
She first came to the United States 
for medical treatment in 1986. She 
then returned to Greece where her 
treatment results were less than satis-
factory. Currently, she is receiving 
medical treatment at the University of 
Pennsylvania Medical Center where 
her doctors feel she must stay for opti-
mal medical care . . However, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service has 
given her until October 25 to return to 
Greece. This is her final extension. 
Many on Capitol Hill have known 
Mrs. Hatzipetrou's 'sister, Ms. Liria 
Vouzikas as the owner of the Senate 
Hair Salon for a number of years. She, 
along with the rest of Mrs. Hatzipe-
trou's siblings, now reside in the 
United States. Only her parents, aged 
69 and 74, still reside in Greece. Her 
family has suffered one tragedy after 
another, with a seriously ill brother 
and the recent loss of a niece. Now, as 
the family struggles with Amalia Hat-
zipetrou's health problems, they are 
fighting to permit her to stay with 
them in the United States to receive 
the treatment she needs.e 
By Mr. THURMOND: 
S. 1760. A bill to amend title 28, 
United States Code, to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures in capital 
cases; to the Committee on the Judici-
ary. 
PROVISION OP SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS 
PROCEDURZS IR CAPITAL CASES 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
rise today to Introduce the legislative 
recommendations of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
Capital Cases chaired by former Asso-
ciate SUpreme Court Justice Lewis 
Powell. This committee, commonly re-
ferred to as the Powell committee, was 
formed by the Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist in June of 1988. The Powell 
committee was charged with inquiring 
into the "necessity and disirability of 
legislation directed toward avoiding 
delay and the lack. of finality" in cap-
ital cases in which the prisoner had or 
had not been offered counsel. Pursu-
ant to the Chief Justice's request. the 
Powell committee has made its recom-
mendations and has proposed a legisla-
t ive remedy to the problem of habeas 
corpus review in capital cases. It 1s 
these recommendations I introduce 
today. 
This Nation is facing a crisis in its 
criminal Justice system. Federal 
habeas corpus· and collateral attack 
procedures are in dire need of reform. 
This is evidenced by the glut of habeas 
petitions in the Federal system. The 
Iarce increases in the number of 
habeas corpus filings, many of which 
are frivolous and used as a delaying 
tactic, require that legialation be en-
acted to address this problem. 
Habeas petitions have grown by vast 
numbers in recent years. Last year, 
Federal district courts received an in-
credible 9,880 habeas petitions. The 
problem of these numerous filings is 
compounded by the extraordinary 
delay in habeas corpus filings. The 
result is a criminal Justice system 
which is overburdened with piecemeal 
and repetitious litigation and yea.rs of 
delay between sentencing and a final 
Judicial resolution of the criminal 
matter. 
Mr. President, on August 3 of this 
year I took the floor and made a state-
ment regarding the need for habeas 
corpus reform. In that statement I dis-
cussed a particular case which exem-
plifies the problem of habeas corpus 
abuse. In February of 1979, Ronald 
Wommer went on an 8-hour crime 
spree in South Carolina. By the time 
he was finished, four people were mur-
dered. Woomer, who has never disput-
ed his guilt, was convicted of murder 
and sentenced to death that summer. 
He was first sentenced on July 18, 
1979-over 10 years ago-to die in the 
electric chair. He is still on South 
Carolina's death row. The Woomer 
case is a prime example of the obstruc-
tion of Justice and inordinate delay 
surrounding these habeas corpus 
cases. 
On the first day of this Congress, I 
introduced legislation, as I have since 
the 97th Congress, which would appro-
priately address this problem. My bill, 
S. 88, · is a much broader bill than the 
legislation I am introducing today as it 
applies to all criminal cases, no.t Just 
capital offenses. 
Pursuant to law, Senator BIDBN in-
troduced legislation which embodies a 
modified version of the Powell recom-
mendations. Yet, since the Powell 
committee spent a significant time for-
mulating its recommendations and the 
Chief Justice has expressed a belief 
that the need for strong habeas 
reform is urgently needed, I believe 
there should be a Senate vehicle 
which fully embodies the Powell com-
mittee recommendations. As the Judi-
ciary Committee prepares to hold 
hearings on habeas corpus reform, I 
look forward to working with Senator 
BIDEN on S. 88 and the bills we intro-
duce today in an effort to formulate 
the best legislative solution. 
Mr. President, it is appropriate that 
the Powell committee recommenda-
tions be before the Senate for consid-
eration. This legislation I am introduc-
ing today proposes new statutory pro-
cedures for Federal habeas corpus 
review of capital sentences. The 
Powell committee proposal is aimed at 
achieving the following goal: capital 
cases should be subject to one com-
plete and fair course of collateral 
review in the- State and Federal 
system, free from the time of impend-
ing execution, and with the assistance 
of competent counsel for the defend-
ant. Once this appropriate, fair review 
is completed, the criminal process 
should be brought to a conclusion. 
This proposal allows a State to bring 
capital litigation by it.a prisoners 
within the. new statute by providing 
competent counsel for inmates on 
State collateral review. Participation 
in the new procedures is optional with 
the States. This legislation also pro-
vides for a 6-month period within 
which a Federal habeas petition must 
be filed. This 6-month period begins to 
run on the appaintment of counsel for 
the prisoner and is tolled during the 
pendency of all State court proceed-
ings. In addition, this legislation pro-
vides for an automatic stay of execu-
tion, which is to remain in place until 
Federal habeas proceedings are com-
pleted. This provision ensures that 
habeas claims not be considere(j by a 
court under the time pressure of an 
impending execution. 
In svmn.iary, this proposal balances 
the need for finality in death penalty 
cases with the requirement that a de-
fendant have a fair examination of his 
claims. Therefore, if the conviction 
and sentence are found to be appropri-
ate, judicial proceedings will be at an 
end, absent any exceptional develop-
ments in the defendants case. 
In closing, we cannot continue to 
delay action on legislation to correct 
the growing problem in habeas corpus 
cases. Criminal cases must be brought 
to a close. Endless consideration of 
issues that have no merit in criminal 
cases and are filed only for purposes of 
delay must be eliminated from our Ju-
dicial system. The principles of Justice, 
upan which our criminal system is 
based, demands that we take action to 
address the habeas problem. 
For these reasons I urge my col-
leagues to carefully consider this 
measure. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the full text of the bill and a 
copy of the Powell committee report 
be printed 1n the RECORD immediately 
following my remarks. 
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
S.1760 
Be it enacted bJI ~ Senate and Hoiue of 
Repreaentaive.s of tJI£ United Statu of Amer-
tea in Con{l1Us a.uembled, 
SPECIAL HABSAS CORPUS PROCEDURES I1'I 
CAPITAL CASES 
(a) Title 28, United States. Gode, is amend-
ed by inserting the following new chapter 
immediately following chapter 153: 
"CHAPI'ER 154-SPECIAL HABEAS 
CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
CASES 
"Sec. 
"2256. Prisoners in state custody subject to 
capital sentence; appointment 
of counsel; requirement of rule 
of court or attute; procedures 
for appointment. · 
"2257. Mandatory stay of execution; dura-
tion; llm1ts on stays of execu-
tion; successive petitions. 
"2258. Filing of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements; tolling rules. 
"2259. Evidentia.ry hearinp; scope of Feder-
al review; district court adjudi-
cation. • 
"2260. Certificate of Pl!Obable cause inappli-
cable. 
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§§ 2256. Prisonen In State custody subject to cap-
Ital entence; appointment of counsel; require-
ment of rule of court or statute; proceduree for 
appointment 
"(a) This chapter shall apply to cases aris-
ing under section 2254 of this title brought 
by prisoners in State custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only 
If subsections <b> and <c> are satisfied. 
"(b) This chapter Is applicable If a State 
establishes by rule of Its court of last resort 
or by statute a mechanism for the appoint-
ment, compensation, and payment of re&-
sonable litigation expenses of competent 
counsel in State post-conviction proceedings 
brought by indigent prisoners whose capital 
convictions and sentences have been upheld 
on direct appeal to the court of last resort 
in the State to have otherwise become final 
for State law purposes. The rule of court or 
statute must provide standards of compe-
tency for the appointment of such counsel. 
"<c> Any mechanism for the appointment, 
compensation, and reimbursement of coun-
sel as provided in subsection <b> must offer 
counsel to all State prisoners under capital 
sentence and must provide for the entry of 
an order by a court of record-
"(l) appointing one or more counsel to 
represent the prisoner upon a finding that 
the prlsoner-
"(A) Is indigent and has accepted the 
offer; or 
"<B> Is unable competently to decide 
whether to accept or reject the offer; 
"(2) finding, after a hearing, If necessary, 
that the prisoner has rejected the offer of 
counsel and made the decision with an un-
derstanding of Its legal consequences; or 
"(3) denying the appointment of counsel 
upon a finding that the prisoner Is not indi-
gent. 
"(d) No counsel appointed pursuant to 
subsections (b) and <c> to represent a State 
prisoner under capital sentence shall have 
previously represented the prisoner at trial 
or on direct appeal In the case for which the 
appointment la made unless the prisoner 
and counsel expressly request continued 
representation. 
"<e> The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence 
of counsel during State or Federal collateral 
post-conviction proceedings In a capital case 
shall not be a ground for relief In a proceed-
Ing arising under this chapter or section 
2254 of this title. This subsection shall not 
preclude the appointment of different coun-
sel at any phase of State or Federal post-
conviction proceedings. 
"II %257. Mandatory ltay of riecution; duration; 
limit. Oil ata;ra of execution; MICCffSlve peti-
tions 
"<a> Upon the entry In the appropriate 
State Court of record of an order pursuant 
to section 2256<c> of this title, a warrant or 
order setting an execution date for a State 
prisoner shall be stayed upon application of 
any court that would have Jurisdiction over 
any proceedings filed pursuant to section 
2254 of this title. The application must 
recite that the State has Invoked the post. 
conviction review procedures of this chapter 
and that the scheduled execution Is subject 
to stay. 
"<b> A stay of execution granted pursuant 
to subsection <a> shall expire lf-
"(1) a State prisoner falls to file a habeas 
corpus petition under section 2254 of this 
title within the time required In section 
2258 of this title; or 
"(2) upon completion of district court and 
court of appeals review under section 2254 
of this title, the petition for relief Is denied 
and-
"(A) the time for filing a petition for certi-
orari has expired and no petition has been 
filed. the petition for reflief Is denied and-
"<A> the time for filing a petition for cert!• 
orarl has expired and no petition has been 
filed; 
"(B) a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and the Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition; or 
"<C> a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposed of It In a manner 
that left the capital sentence undisturbed; 
or 
"(3) before a court of competent Jurisdic-
tion, a State prisoner under capital sentence 
waives the right to pursue habeas corpus 
review under Section 2254 of this title, In 
the presence of counsel and after having 
been advised of the consequences of making 
the waiver. 
"(c) If one of the conditions In subsection 
<b> has occurred, no Federal court thereaf-
ter shall have the authority to enter a stay 
of execution or grant relief In a capital case 
unless-
"(l) the basis for the stay and request for 
relief Is a claim not previously presented In 
the State or Federal courts; 
"(2) the failure to raise the clalm-
"<A> was the result of State action In vio-
lation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; 
"<B> was the result of a recognition by the 
Supreme Court of a new Federal right that 
la retroactively applicable; or 
"(C) Is due to the fact that the claim Is 
based on facts that could not have been dis-
covered through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence In time to prevent the claim for 
State or Federal post-conviction review; and 
"<3> the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient, If proven, to undermine the 
court's confidence In the Jury's determln&-
tlon of gullt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was Imposed. 
"II %258. Filing of habeaa corpua petition; time re-
quirement.; tolling rules 
"(a) Any petition for habeas corpus relief 
under section 2254 of this title must be filed 
In the appropriate district court not later 
than 180 days after the filing In the appro-
priate State court of record of an order 
issued In compliance with section 2256(c) of 
this title. The time requirements estab-
lished by this section shall be tolled-
"(l) from the date that a petition forcer-
tiorari Is filed In the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the petition 
If a State prisoner seeks review of a capital 
sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the 
State or has otherwise become final for 
State law purposes; 
"(2) subject to subsection <b>, during any 
period In which a State prisoner under cap-
Ital sentence has a properly filed request for 
post.conviction review pending before a 
State court of competent Jurisdiction; and 
"(3) during an additional period not to 
exceed 60 days, If counsel for the State pris-
oner-
"(A) moves for an extension of time In the 
Federal district court that would have Juris-
diction over the case upon the filing of a 
habeas corpus ~ltlon under section 2254 of 
this title; and 
"<B> makes a showing of good cause for 
counsel's Inability to file the habeas corpus 
petition within the 180-day period estab-
lished by this section. 
"(b)(l) The time requirement established 
by subsection <a> shall be continuously 
tolled under paragraph (2) of that subsec-
tion from the date the State prisoner Initial-
ly files for post-conviction review until the 
date of final disposition of the case by the 
highest court of the State 10 long as all 
State filing rules are timely met. 
"<2> Tolling shall not occur under subsec-
tion (aX2> during the pendency of a petition 
for certiorari before the Supreme Court fol-
lowing State post-conviction review. 
"II 2259. Evidentlary hearings; scope of Federal 
review; district court adjudication 
"<a> When a State prisoner under a cap-
Ital sentence files a petition for habeas 
corpus relief to which this chapter applies, 
the district court shall-
"(l) determine the sufficiency of the evl-
dentlary record for habeas corpus review 
based on the claims actually presented and 
litigated In the State courts, unless the pris-
oner shows that the failure to raise or devel-
op a claim In the State courts-
"CA> was the result of State action In vio-
lation of the Constitution or laws of the 
United States; 
"(B) was the result of a recognition by the 
Supreme Court of a new Federal right that 
Is retroactively applicable; or 
"<C> Is due to the fact that the claim Is 
based on facts that could not have been dis-
covered through the execlse of reasonable 
diligence In time to present the claim for 
State post-conviction review; and 
"(2) conduct any requested evldentiary 
hearing necessary to complete the record 
for habeas corpus review. 
"(b) Upon the development of a complete 
evldentlary record, the district court shall 
rule on the merits of the claims properly 
before It. 
"II %260. Certificate of probable caue inapplicable 
"The requirement of a certificate of prob-
able cause In order to appeal from the dis-
trict court to the court of appeals does not 
apply to habeas corpus cases subject to this 
chapter except when a second or successive 
petition Is filed.". 
SUPREIII: COURT or THI UNITED STATES, 
Waahington, DC, September 22, 1989. 
Hon. JOSEPH R. Bmo, Ja.. 
Chairman, Senate Jud.ici41'11 Committee, 
U.S. Senate, Waahington, DC. 
DEA1t Ma. CBAilUIAN: I forward herewith 
the report and proposal received by the Ju-
dicial Conference of the United States on 
September 20, 1989, from Its Ad Hoc Com-
mittee on Federal Habeas Corpus In Capital 
Cases. The Ad Hoc Committee, chaired by 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., has given care-
ful consideration to this subject over the 
past year. 
In receiving this report, the Judicial Con-
ference determined to discharge Justice 
Powell's committee, to make the report pub-
licly available, and to defer any further con-
sideration of the report until Its next meet-
ing, scheduled for March 13, 1990. I shall 
advise you at that time as to any additional 
action the Conference might take with re-
spect to the report. · 
Slncerly, 
WILLIAK H. REHNQUIST. 
[Committee report and proposal from the 
Judicial Conference of the United States 
ad hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
Corpus In Capital Cases. Aug. 23, 1989] 
AD Hoc COIIKITTD ON F'EDDAL HAuAs 
CoRPUS IN CAPITAL CASES ColllllITTD 
Rs:PoRT 
L IlffllODUCTION 
Studies of public opinion establish that 
an overwhelming majority of our citizens 
favors the death penalty for certain mur-
ders. The Supreme Court has made clear 
that the evolving standards of decency em-
bodied In the Eighth Amendment permit 
Imposition of this punlshlment for 10me of-
fenders. Of course, both the Court and soci-
ety have recognized that, because It Is irre-
~ 
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<2> on e mem ber appointed from 8.lnOn K 
recom mendations submitted by the Speaker 
or the House of R epresenLatives of the 
State of Maine; 
( 3 ) one m ember appointed from among 
recommendations submi ~ted by th e Pres i-
dent of the Senate of t he State of Maine; 
<4) one member appointed from among 
recommendations submitted by t he Chan-
cellor of the University of Maine System; 
C5l three members appoin ted from among 
recommendations submitted by State and 
local h istoric, culture.I or h istoric preserva-
tion organizations; and 
( 6 ) one additional m ember appointed by 
the Secretary. 
(b) TERMS.-(ll Members of the Commis-
sion shall be appointed for tenns not to 
exceed 3 years. 
(2) The Secretary may stagger the tenns 
of Initial appointments to the Cornmlsions 
in order to assure continuity In operation. 
(C) VOTING.-The Commission shall act 
and advise by affirmative vote of a majority 
of its members. 
(d ) COMPOISATION.-Members of the Com-
mission shall receive no pay on account of 
t heir service on the Commission, but while 
away from their homes or regular places of 
business in the performance of services for 
the Commission. members of the Commis-
sion shall be allowed travel expenses. Includ-
ing per diem in lieu of subsistence, In the 
same manner as persons employed Intermit-
tently In Government service are allowed 
expenses under section 5703 of title 5, 
United States Code. 
(e) ExEMPTION FROM CHARTER RENEWAL 
REQurru:MENTS.-Sectlon H<b> of.the Feder-
al Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) 
shall not apply to the Commission. 
(f) 'l'ERIIIINATION.-The Commission shall 
terminate 20 years from the date of enact-
ment of this Act. 
(g) SUPPORT.-The Director of the Nation-
al Park Service shall provide such staff sup-
port and technical services as may be neces-
sary to carry out the functions of the Com-
mission. 
SEC. 4. DUTIES OF TIIE COMMISSION. 
The Commission shall advise the Secre-
tary \I.1th respect to-
(1) the selection of sites for Interpreta-
tion, preservation, and development by 
means of cooperative agreements pursuant 
to section 5; and 
(2) the development and Implementation 
of a comprehensive Interpretive program of 
the Acadian culture In the state of Maine 
pursuant to section 6<d). • 
SEC. 5. COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS. 
<a> IN GmERAL.-ln furtherance of the 
purposes of this Act. the Secretary Is au-
thorized. after consultation with the Com-
mission, to enter Into cooperative agree-
ments with the owners of properties of nat-
ural, historical, or cultural significance asso-
ciated '11,ith the Acadian people In the State 
of Maine, pursuant to which agreements the 
Secretary may provide management services 
and program Implementation. 
(b) RIGHT OF AccESS.-Each cooperative 
agreement shall provide that the Secretary, 
through the National Park Service, shall 
have the right of access at all reasonable 
times to all public portions of the property 
covered by the agreement for the purpose of 
conducting visitors through such properties 
and Interpreting them to the public. 
(C) ALTERATION OF PROPERTIES.-Each CO· 
1..1peratlve agreement shall provide that no 
changes or alterations shall be made In the 
property covered by the agreement except 
by mutual agreement between the Secretary 
and the other party to the agreement. 
St C. , . ACADI A.', lt;LTl ' RAL n:~n :R. 
( a ) IN OENERAL.- The Secretary ls author-
ized, after consultation with the Commis-
sion, t.o establ ish a center fo r the presen:a-
tlon, pe rpetuation, and Interpreta tion of 
Acadlan culture within thf' State of Maine. 
(b) ACQUISITION or LAND.-The Secretary 
Is authorized to acquire lands and interests 
therein, not to exceed 20 acres In total, by 
purchase, donation, or exchange, and to de-
velop, operate, and maintain Interpretive 
and preservation facili ties and programs at 
the center In furtherance of the purposes of 
this Act. 
(c) OPERATIO N.-The Secretary may con-
tract with public and private entities for the 
operation of the cent er In accordance with 
program standards approved by the Secre-
tary. 
(d) INTERPRETIVE PROGRAM.-In connection 
with center operations the Secretary shall 
develop and Implement a compreh ensive In-
terpretive program of the Acadian culture 
In the State of Maine, Including preparation 
of Interpretive and Informational materials, 
exhibits, films, lectures, and ot h er educa-
tional materials. 
(e) STATUTORY AUTHORITY.-The S ecretary 
shall administer properties acquired and co-
operative agreements entered Into pursuant 
to this Act In accordance with the Act enti-
tled "An Act to establish a National Park 
Service, and for other purposes", approved 
August 25, 1916 (16 U.S .C. 1 et seq.) and 
other statutory authority for the conserva-
tion and management of natural, historical. 
and cultural resources. 
SEC. 7. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIO!'IS. 
(a) AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS TO 
THE COIIIIIIISSION.-There are authorized to 
be appropriated to the Commission such 
sums of money as may be necessary for the 
performance of Its duties under this Act. 
(b) LIMIT ON Exn:NDITURES BY THE SECRE-
TARY.-The Secretary Is authorized to 
expend annually, In the performance of the 
Secretary's functions under sections 5 and 6, 
amounts equal to 50 percent of the aggre-
gate cost of performing those functions, the 
remainder of such cost to be paid with non-
Federal funds. 
SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS OF nu; BILL 
FOR MAIN!: AcADIAN CuLTURAL CENTER 
Section 1: titles the bill as the "Maine 
Acadian Culture Preservation Act. 
Section 2: expresses the legislation's pur-
poses: to recognize the contributions of Aca-
dian Immigrants to this country and assist 
efforts at preserving, perpetuating and In-
terpreting that culture In Maine. 
Section 3: establishes a "Maine Acadian 
Culture Preservation Commission" for 20 
years. The Commission will have eight 
members appointed by the Secretary <from 
nominations submitted by specified groups 
or Individuals>. Commission members shall 
serve three-year terms. They will receive no 
compensation. but will be paid a per diem. 
The National Park Service will provide the 
Commission staff support and technical 
services. 
Section <i: proscribes the duties of the 
Commission: to advise the Secretary of the 
Interior In siting, establishing and Imple-
menting the cooperative agreements and 
the Maine Acadian Cultural Center author-
ized In the legislation. 
Section 5: authorizes the Secretary to 
enter Into cooperative agreements with 
owners of properties associated with the 
Acadian people In Maine. Under the agree-
ments. the Secretary may provide manage-
ment services, program Implementation and 
financial assistance. The only restrictions 
on the property owners will be the require-
ments for the National Park Service to have 
access to the public portions of the property 
ln orde r to conduct visitors through the 
pro;;ierties. In addition, no changes or al ter-
ations could be made to the properties with-
out the agreement of t he Secretary. 
Section 6: au thorizes the Park S en ·lce to 
acquire up to 20 acres of land, by purchase, 
donation or exchange for a Center for the 
Interpretat ion and preservation or Acadian 
culture within the State of Maine. The Park 
Service Is authorized to develop, operate , 
and maintain Interpretive facilities and pro-
grams at the Center. alt hough public and 
priva te entities could be contracted to oper-
ate the center In accordance with program 
standards approved by the S ecretary. · 
Section 7: autho:-!zes such sums as may be 
n ecessary to carry out sections 5 and 6. Fed-
eral support Is limited to 50% of the total 
costs. 
By Mr. BIDEN: 
· S. 1757. A bill to amend title 28, 
United States Code, to provide special 
habeas corpus procedures In capital 
cases; to the Committee on the Judici-
ary. 
HABEAS CORPUS REFOP.M ACT 
Mr. BIDEN. Mr. President, for some 
time now the Senate, on both sides of 
the aisle, has expressed its •"ispleasure 
over the way our Federal courts review 
death penalty sentences imposed In 
State criminal trials. Some Senators 
have complained about the delays In-
volved In these Federal habeas corpus 
actions, as they are known, and others 
have complained about the lack of 
adequate coW1Sel available to capital 
prisoners who are seeking full and fair 
review of their claims; that is, people 
who have been convicted of a capital 
offense. 
Last year's drug bi::, the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988, set out a procedure 
to consider legislation or for consider-
ing legislation to reform the habeas 
corpus actions ln capital cases. The act 
provided that, following the report of 
the special committee on habeas 
corpus reform. chaired by now retired 
Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis F. 
Powell, I was Instructed, as chairman 
of the Judiciary Committee, to "Intro-
duce a bill to modify Federal habeas 
corpus procedures after having falth-
fully considered the report and recom-
mendations of the special committee." 
As required by law, I have studied 
the report of the Powell committee 
and today, within the provisions pro-
vided by the act, I am Introducing a 
habeas corpus reform bill. 
Before I explain some of the particu-
lars of my bill, let me examine the 
basic principle of the Powell Commis· 
sion's report on habeas corpus. · 
·The Powell Committee studies the 
issue that we have debated for many, 
many years here In the Senate. It ha.! 
been the issue of debate, I know thE 
Presiding Officer knows, at least fo1 
the 17 years that I have been a Sena· 
tor and I suspect for the many mon 
years that the Presiding Officer ha: 
been In the U.S. Senate. We founc 
that much of the delay In capital case: 
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tions for habeas corpus review 1n Fed-
eral courts. 
In response, the Powell committee 
recommended that a special procedure 
be created for capital cases that would 
provide each State prisoner with a 
single opportunity to litigate all avail-
Rble claims available to him or her In 
1-'ederal court. In other words. the 
committee recommended that the 
State prlsor.er get Just one bite out of 
the apple. · 
The committee recognized, however, 
that review of death sentences is an 
enormously serious and Important un-
dertaking and that If there were to be 
onJy a single opportunity for Federal 
review of the State death cases, the 
procedure would have to provide the 
prfson.?.r in question new safeguards, 
52.!eguards that do not now exist. 
Nothing less would be sufficient to 
guard against the possibility of mis-
take or prejudice in carrying- out the 
death sentence, according to the 
Powell committee. 
Therefore, the Powell committee 
proposed that the one-bite-at-the-
apple rule would apply but only if the 
prisoner had been afforded court-ap-
pointed counsel at every st~p of the 
proceedings for them to be able to 
make this habeas corpus one-bite-at-
the-apple procedure. If the State pro-
vides such counsel-that is; court-ap-
pomted counsel-to capital prfaoners, 
the Powell committee prox,osed they 
could limit those pruoners to a single 
round of litigation fn Federal court. 
This quid pro quo Is the essence of 
the Powell plan. The bill I am intro-
ducing today adopts this quid pro quo 
approach. It provides that Stare pris-
oners who are afforded qua.I'ified coun-
sel at trial and throughout State 
death penalty proceedin~ shall have 
only a. single opportunity to litigate 
their habe..s corpus claim in Federal 
court. 
Mr. President, some may think this 
odd for the Senator from Delaware, 
who apposed the changes- m this rule 
on past occasions, largely due to the 
risk of error in the applica.tions to be 
proposing legislation that will. to use 
the common description given by 
some. speed UJ> executioo. But I see no 
irony in this proposal. Delay for 
delay's sake serves no one in the ~.ap-
.. al punishment system-a system that 
I do not oppose on moral grounds, 
have occasionally supported for specif-
ic death penalty cases, and generally 
have argued more safeguards should 
be built into the system when there Is 
iroing to be a capital offense avatlable 
to the progecutlon. 
It is, obviously, harmful to the 
system ftsel! and to the families o! 
crime victims and to all if, in fact, the 
system Is allowed to be, shall we say, 
prostituted; allowed to be used and 
manipula.ted in a way that was never 
intended. But, less obviously, it does 
nothing for the capital prisoner, 
either. 
The current system does much to 
delay the inevi~ble and does too little 
to help the prisoner with legitimate 
challenges to their sentences brought 
before the Supreme Court through 
habeas corpus. 
The Powell quid pro quo, which I 
support, recognizes this. With some 
simple, but essential, changes, it 
should result in a system that Is an im-
provement over the present system in 
ail respects. 
My bill adopts the structure and 
text of the legislation reccmmcnded 
by the Powell committee in many re-
s;:>ects, but there are a nwnber of 
areas in which I have made changes 
r.eces.sary, in my view, to ensure that 
tMs streamlined procedure is as fair as 
possible. 
First, it Ls essential to the success of 
the Powell committee's approach that 
the counsel a.ppainted to represent the 
defendant in State proceedings be 
Qualified counsel. The Powell report 
included no standards governing the 
qualifications of attorneys appointed 
in capital cases, but yet spoke to the 
need for qualified counsel. My bill in-
cludes such standards, adopting the 
minimums enacted by Congress in the 
1988 drug bill as part of the appoint-
ment of counsel requirement made ap-
plicable by that law. 
In other words,. we have already set 
the standards 1n the 1988 drug bill 
~here we call for the appointment of 
counsel in specific circumstances and 
we set out criteria for that counsel 
that that counsel must meet. Essen-
tially what I do, Mr. President, is take 
that. standard and apply it to the 
habeas corpus cases, as well. 
Second, the Powell repart provides 
for a second Federal habeas corpus ap-
pHcation in only the most narrow cir-
cumstances, when the claim of factual 
innocence was not previously present-
ed due to State action or fa.ct& not 
available at the time. I believe that 
this safety valve provision should be 
broader than that recommended by 
the Powell Committee. 
For example, in my bilL a prisoner 
can bring & second habeas corpus ap-
plication in Federal court if--&nd I say 
if-it is necessary to avoid a miscar-
riage of Justice, l1ol1 established legal 
standard currently in place that en-
sures that in extraordinary cases Jus-
tice will be done. The Powell plan re-
peals this miscarriage of Justice excep-
tion. I believe it is necessary to provide 
the Federal court with the power to 
prevent unjust executions. 
Third. the Powell report limit.! 
claims prisoners can raise in Federal 
court to thoae claims raised earl'ier in 
state court proceedings. While I un-
derstand the principles motivating this 
proposal. I believe that. if we are going 
to adopt the one-bite-out-of-the-apple 
approach, the single review provided 
In Federal court must be a., thorough 
as possible. Keep in mind, Mr. Presi-
dent, what I am proposing here and 
what the Powell eommission fl5 propos-
ing is a significant change in what Is 
presently available. 
There is no one-bite-out-o!-the-
apple. You can take, 3, 2, 10, 9,000, if 
possible, bites out of the apple. That is 
the reason for the reform. 
The bill I am proposing and what 
the Powell commission propcsed is 
only one shot in Federal court. And 
my view, Mr. President, is that we 
should, in fact, not limit that one bite 
out of the apple to only issues raised 
In State courts If there is good reason 
for there to be additional issues raised. 
Therefore, my bill would allow a. 
prisoner to present in Federal court 
any claim that bears on the legality of 
his death sentence, as long as the rea-
sons that this claim was not presented 
In State court was due to ignorance or 
neglect of his attorney, or, again, if 
the court's failure to consider such 
claim would result in the miscarriage 
of justice. 
So, notwithstanding the fact, Mr. 
President, I propose a claim may be 
brought that was not raised In State 
court in this one chance in Federal 
court, even under those circumstances 
I limit it, as does the Powell commis-
sion. It is limited only to circum-
stances where there was ignorance on 
the part of the attorney representing 
the person sftting on death row, and 
therefore it did not get raised, or, the 
second pmvision I put in my bill, there 
would be a miscarriage of justice re-
sulting. Obviously, that is a judgment 
for the court to make, If there would 
be a miscarriage of justice. 
Fourth, the Powell committee . .::c-
ommended that the time period for 
filing habeas corpus petitions shnuld 
be limited to 6 IIl(!nths. Currently 
there Is no time limit whatsoever. I 
agree that there should be some time 
limit on filing such petitions for other· 
wise a prisoner with no incentive to 
speed the arrival his State execution 
might delay the filing of his claim in-
definitely. Six months, however, is too 
short a time for a qualifled and pre-
sumably very busy attorney to drop 
what other work he or she might be 
doing, conduct a thorough investiga-
tion of the case, and prepare an appro-
priate filing for this one bite out of 
tne apple. 
For that reason. Mr. President, my 
bill would require the State habeas 
corpus petition to be filed within 1 
year. 
Finally, Mr. President, the Powell 
committee made no provision for cap-
ital prisoners who have the benefit of 
favorable Supreme Court rulings de-
cided after their trial and direct ap-
peals. My bill remedies this a,nd In-
structs the court to apply the most 
recent Supreme Court ruling to the 
claims brought by capital prisoners 
where appropriate. Again, if we are 
going to speed the process under 
which the death sentences are re-
viewed, then it seems to me we must 
do all we can to ensure the review pro-
ceedings are complete. 
Again, we are making a. significant 
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limits on the number of times a pris-
oner can seek habeas corpus in a Fed-
eral court. We are limiting that to one 
time. 
In sum, I believe the proposal I am 
Introducing today is a reasonable com-
promise among the competing con-
cerns in this area, balancing a prison-
er's right to have full review of his 
claims with the State's interest in 
ending delay in capital sentences. 
Hopefully it will give us a system that 
is both faster and fairer for all con-
erned. 
Mr. President, In closing I commend 
the Powell committee for its thorough 
work and thoughtful recommenda-
tions. I am pleased to announce today 
our first hearing on habeas corpus 
reform will be held on November 8, 
and our first \\itness at that hearing 
will be the distinguished Justice 
Powell himself. 
I look forward to havir1g his insights 
on his proposal and the bill that I am 
introducing today. The President's 
plan, and any other alternatives that 
may be proposed in the coming weeks, 
will also be considered at that time. 
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that the text of the bill and a 
side-by-side comparison of my bill and 
the Powell committee's recommenda-
tions be printed in the RECORD. ·_ .·· 
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the 
RECORD, as follows: 
s. 1757 
Be it enacted bl/ the Senate and Howie of 
RP't'resenta.tives of the United States of 
America in Congrus assemb~d, 
SECTION I. SHORT Tl11.E. 
This Act may qe cited as the "Habeas 
Corpus Reform Act of 1989". 
SEC. Z. SPECIAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES IN 
CAPITAL CASES. 
T!Ue 28, United States Code, Is amended 
by Inserting the following new chapter Im-
mediately following chapter 153: 
"CHAPTER 154-SPECIAL HABEAS 
CORPUS PROCEDURES IN CAPITAL 
CASES 
"Sec. 
"2256. Prisoners in State custody subject to 
capital sentence; appointment 
of counsel; requirement of rule 
of court or statute; procedures 
for appointment. 
"2257. Mandatory stay of execution; dun, .. 
tlon; llmits on stays of execu-
tion: successive petitions. 
"2258. Flllng of habeas corpus petition; time 
requirements; tolling rules. 
"2259. Evidentlary hearings; scope of Feder-
al review; district court adjudi-
cation. 
"2260. Certificate of probable cause lnappll-
cable. 
"2261. Counsel in capital cases; trial and 
post-conviction; standards. 
"2262. Law controlling In Federal habeas 
corpus proceedings; retroactiv-
ity. 
"§ %256. Priaonen In State <"uotody oubjt"ct to cap. 
Ital oentence; appointment of counoel; requltt-
ffil'ftl of rule of court or ,tatute; proceduru for 
appointmN1t 
'"<a) This chapter shill! apply to cases aris-
ing under section 2254 of this title brought 
by prisoners In State custody who are sub-
ject to a capital sentence. It shall apply only 
II sub6ectlons <bl and (cl are satisfied. 
'"(bl This chapter Is applicable If a Stale 
establishes by rule of Its court of last resort 
or by statute a mechanism for the appoint-
ment. compensation. and payment of rea-
sonable fees and litigation expenses of com-
petent counsel consistent with section 2261 
of this tit.le. 
"(c)(l) Upon receipt of notice that counsel 
has been appointed to represent a prisoner 
under sentence of death after the prisoner's 
conviction and sentence have been upheld 
on direct review in a State court of !!1st 
resort and In the Supreme Court of the 
United States If application Is made to that 
court, the State court of last resort shall 
enter an order confirming the appointment 
and shall direct its clerk to forward the 
record of the case to the attorney appoint-
ed. 
"(2) Upon receipt of notice that counsel 
has been offered to, but declined by, such a 
prisoner, the State court of last resort shall 
direct an appropriate court or Judge to hold 
a hearing, at which the prisoner and the at-
torney offered to the prisoner shall be 
present, to determine whether the prisoner 
Is competent to decide whether to accept or 
reject the appointment of counsel and 
whether, if competent, the prisoner know-
ingly and intelligently waives the appoint-
ment of coW1Sel. The court or judge shall 
report Its determinations to the State court 
of last resort, which shall review the deter-
minations for error. If the State court of 
last resort concludes that the prisoner Is In-
competent and does not waive coW1Sel, the 
court shall enter an order confirming the 
appointment of the attorney assigned to the 
prisoner by the appointing authority and 
shall direct the clerk to forward the record 
to the attorney appointed. If the court con-
cludes that the prisoner is competent and 
waives counsel, the court shall enter an 
order that counsel need not be appointed 
and shall direct the clerk to forward the 
record to the prisoner; provided that noth-
ing ln this section requ.lres the appointment 
of counsel to a prisoner who Is not Indigent. 
"(d) No counsel appcinted pursuant to 
subsections (bl and <c) to represent a State 
prisoner in State collateral proceedings 
shall have previously represented the pris-
oner at trial or on direct appeal In the case 
for which the appointment Is made unless 
the prisoner snd counsel expressly request 
continued representation. 
"(el The Ineffectiveness or Incompetence 
of counsel appointed under this chapter 
during State or Federal collateral post-con-
viction proceedings shall not be a ·ground 
for relief In a proceeding arising under this 
chapter or section 2254 of this title. This 
limitation shall not preclude the appoint-
ment of different counsel at any phase of 
State or Federal post-conviction proceed-
ings. 
MIi Z%57. Mandatory stay of eucution; duration; 
limit& on •taya of execution; oucce .. i•e peti-
tions 
"(al Upon the entry In the State court of 
last resort of an order pursuant to section 
2256<c> of this title, a ,r;arrant or order set-
ting an execution date for a State prisoner 
shall be stayed upon appllcation to any 
court that would have Jurisdiction over any 
proceedings filed pursuant to section 2254 of 
this tiUe. The appllcation must recite that 
the State has invoked the post-conviction 
review procedures of this chapter and that 
the scheduled execution ls subject to stay. 
"(bl A stay of execution granted pursuant 
to subsection ca> shall exptre lf-
"(l) a State prisoner fails to file a habeas 
corpua petition under section 2254 of this 
title within the time required In section 
2258 of this title; or 
"(2> upon completion of district court and 
court of appeals review under section 2254 
of this lltle the petition for relit! Is denied 
and-
'"(A) the time for filing a petition for certi -
orari has expired and no petition has been 
filed; 
'"(Bl a timely petition for certiorari was 
fil ed and the Supreme Court denied the pe-
tition; or 
"(Cl a timely petition for certiorari was 
filed and upon consideration of the case, the 
Supreme Court disposed of it In a manner 
that left the capital sentence undisturbed; 
or 
"(3) before a court of competent Jurisdtc· 
tion, in the presence of counsel and after 
having been advised of the consequences of 
his decision, a State prisoner under capital 
sentence waives the right to pursue habeas 
corpus review under section 2254 of this 
title. 
"(cl If one of the conditions In subsection 
<bl has occurred, no Federal court thereaf-
ter shall ha\·e the authority to enter a stay 
of execution or grant relief in a capital case 
unless-
"(l) the basis for the stay and request for 
relief Is a claim not previously presented by 
the prisoner In the State or Federal courts, 
and the failure to raise the claim is-
"(A) the result of State action In violation 
of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States; "(B) the result of the Supreme 
Court recognition of a new Federal right 
that Is retroactively applicable; or "(Cl 
based on a factual predicate that could not 
have been discovered through the exercise 
of reasonable diligence; or 
"(2) the facts underlying the claim would 
be sufficient, II proven, to undermine the 
court's confidence In the Jury's determina-
tion of guilt on the offense or offenses for 
which the death penalty was imposed; or 
"(3l a stay and consideration of the re-
quested relief are necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of Justice. 
MIi 2258. Filing of habeas corpuo petition; time r • · 
quirements; tolling rules 
"Any petition for habeas corpus relief 
under section 2254 of this title must be filed 
in the appropriate district court not later 
than 365 days after the date of filing In the 
State court of last resort of an order Issued 
In compliance with section 2256<c> of this 
title. The time requirements established by 
this section shall be tolled-
"( l) from the date that a petition forcer-
tiorari is filed In the Supreme Court until 
the date of final disposition of the petition 
II a State prisoner seeks review of a capital 
sentence that has been affirmed on direct 
appeal by the court of last resort of the 
State or has otherwise become final for 
State Jaw purposes; 
"(2) during any period In which a State 
prisoner under capital sentence has a prop-
erly flled request for post-conviction review 
pending before a State court of competent 
Jurisdiction; If all State filing rules are met 
In a timely manner, this period shall run 
continuously from the date that the State 
prisoner Initially files for post-conviction 
review untll final disposition of the case by · 
the State court of last resort. and further 
until final disposition of the matter by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, II a 
timely petition for review Is filed; and 
"<3l during an additional period not to 
exceed 90 days, If counsel for the State pris-
oner-
"(A) moves for an extension of time In the 
United States district court that would ha\·e 
proper Jurisdiction over the case upon the 
filing of a habeas corpus petition under sec-
tion 2254 of this title; and 
"{Bl makes a showing of ,:ood cause for 
counsel's lnabillty to file the habeas corpus 
. . 
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petition within the 365-day pe riod estab-
lished by this section. 
"§ 2159. Evidentiary hearlnp; scope or Federal 
re..-lew; district court adjudication 
.. ( 11.) Whenever a State prisoner ander a 
capital sentence flies a petition tor habeas 
corpus relief to which this chapter applies. 
the di5trlct court shall-
"(!) determine the sufficiency of the evl-
dentiary record for h&beu corpus review; 
and 
.. (2) conduct any requested evldentiary 
hearing necessary to complete the record 
for habeas corpus review. 
"(bl Upon the development of a complete 
evldenti&ry record. the clistrld: court shall 
rule on the merits of the claims properly 
before It. 
"(c)(l) Except as provided In paragraph 
< 2 >, a district court may refuse to coosider a 
claim under thls section lf-
"(Al the prisoner previously failed to raise 
the claim In state court at the time and in 
the manner prescribed by State law; 
"(Bl the State courts, for that reason, re-
fused or would refuse to entertain the claim; 
and 
"<C> such refusal would-consiltute an ade-
quate &nd Independent St.ate l&w ground 
that would foreclose direct review of the 
State court Judgment rn the United States 
Supreme Court. 
"(2) A district court shall consider a claim 
under this sectfon if the prisoner shows that 
the f!ltlun to raise Ule claim In a Sta&e 
court was d-.e to the Ignorance or neglect of 
the prisoner or eounsel or If the faliure to 
consider auch a claim woul.d result. I.D a m.ls-
~e of justice. ·· · 
"~%268. Certiricate ol probable cauK inapplicable 
"The_ requirement of a cerU!icue of prob-
able cause In order to appeal from the dis-
Sodilll . l'aloellllll 
trlct court to the court of appeals does not 
aP1'>1Y to habeas corpus cases subject to this 
chapter except when a second or successive 
petition Is filed. 
"!! %%61. Counsel In capital caoes; trial and post-
con,1ction; standard• 
"(a) A mechanlsm for the provision of 
co=el services to Indigents ru!!lclent to 
bvoke the provisions of this chapter under 
sedlon 2256(b) of this title shall provide for 
coUilllel to Indigents charged with offenses 
for which capital punishment Is sought, to 
Indigents who have been sentenced to death 
and who seek appellate or colla.teral review 
In State court. and to Indigents who have 
been. sentenced to death and who seek certl-
orart review In the United States Supreme 
Court. 
"(b-l<ll ID the case or an appointment 
made before trial, at least one attorney ap-
pointed under this chapter ml:l6t have been 
admitted to practice In the c011rt In which 
the prosecution Is to be tried for not less 
than 5 years, and must have had not less 
than 3 years' experience In the trial of 
felony prosecutions In tm.t court. 
"<2> In the C88e of an appointment made 
after trial, ai least one attorney appointed 
under tb.ia chapter must have been admitted 
to practice In the court of last resort of Ute 
State for not less than 5 yea.rs. and mw.t 
have had not le.i.6 than 3 years' eiq:>erlence 
In the handling ot aI)peali In that State 
courts In felony C&l!eS. 
"(3) Notwithstanding this subeectlon. a · 
court. for good c&Ulle, may appoint Mother 
attorney whose bal:ken>und. knowle~ or 
experlenee would otherwise enable the at-
torney to properly repi:e.wnt. the defendant, 
with due consideration of the serlowme.ss of 
the possible penalty and the unique and 
complex nature of the Htigatfon. 
S10£-BY-SIDECOMPARISOK OF POWfil ANO BIDEH 8lllS 
"(c) Upon a finding In ex parte proceed-
ings that Investigative, expert or other sen'-
lces are reasonably necess».rY for the repre-
sentation of the defendant, whether 1n con-
nection wfth Issues relating to guilt or Issues 
relating to sentence, the court shall author-
ize the defendant"s attorney to obtain such 
services on behalf of the defendant and 
shall order the payment of fees and ex-
penses therefor, under sub6ectlon Cd>. Upon 
finding that timely procurement of such 
services could not practicably await prior 
authorization, the court may authorize the 
provision of and payment of such services 
mwc pro tune. 
" (d) Notwithstanding the rates and maxi-
mum limits generally applicable to criminal 
Cl!Ses and any other provision of law to the 
contrary, the court shall fix the compensa-
tion to be paid to an attorney appointed 
under this subsection and the fees and ex-
penses iO be pa:ld tor Investigative, expert. 
and other reasonably- necessary services au-
thorized under subsection <c>, at such rates 
or amowits as the court determines to be 
reasonably necessary to carry out the re-
quirement.s of t.hlssubsectlon. 
"§ %2112. Law coatrolling m Federal habeas corptlR 
pro<eedinp~ retroactim:,y 
"In cases subject to this chapter, all 
claims shall be governed by the law u It was 
when the petitioner's sentence became final, 
supplemented by any interim change in the 
Ia.w, If the CO\lrt. detennines. In light of the 
purpose to be serYed by the chllllite, ~he 
extent of reliallce on previous law by law en-
forcement authorities. and the effect on the 
administration of Justice, that rt would be 
Just to give the prisoner the benefit of the 
Interim change In the Ia.w.". 
Bidenbill 
2256(a} __ Tbiumd1aplaeslalishaa ._ prmm.n llr hdlnlllabscasetiMlllil ~C3!litatllfffflm _____ Slfflt. 
225i(b•- illis ,:S::!.:lllle ..Ir Uie :II.lit ii ll1idt a. ddeaillt ii allMdld ~ ~ CNml ii s-. but• ~ -al Qllalifiod Cllil!lSOI ~ al trial Ml 1G' cnm miew a..«;• L'lt sianda:e, 
Stair ~ al qlYlification n !NIie e,plicit in Sec. 226 l. _ _ 
Z256"~ Tlwt --llt. • PIIICldlR a ~ Clllllllf or IStlllisiill lilt tlie ...._ lilt wliwd CIMl!lt .. ______ Sime, ID1'f !lie p,adlm f<r dtte<mining compe1ency to wa,w a>unse ft mn- !J<!)lm 
mf __ CNaef--'lrlld----.-Mw•llle'-•Wt..i _______ s-_ 
2256 ~atmalaM • ........ ~ _. llll bl I pnl tor reill ii ledeta haa. Same. 
Z?57(a) ______  111111 be slJ)l!d I die SIJ!e 1111 dml! t:Rlh-• l)IValllll!S,itllis ,._. ___________ S.. 
225100 - lill llJf •----~-ll •--- llill lo ClllQ wit11 t11t time requnmem; (ZJ die Hldera Sama. illlu petitioa is eild;.Gl (3( llit dllilldalt _,. ftdllJf .,_ ,-.illp. 
ns7fe•----- 11D-. Filllnl'lllflel! 1111!!1:- (I) dlecbiol was""' lllMlUSlr jm,oted: (2) lam to r1ise Th•uetlloe llllmalivlfl"JOdslor aiJwi11 a..:imift politilft (1) t Rt2f'nn 1ht Pawell IJ,I; • (2) 3 
lledaim llr,_.al ~--..--flctslllatcllllid aliMbeeftlisaMredplffl)USly; f11111IIIIP-iibill;.ar (J) t11atrmewis~lomd1~afjusta. 
and llJ Illa aaill SIIQl!D facllal -mf ______ ,_..ll!liM lerClllaln"'""' llbt flilld'in I~------------ ~ -petlbs far oaflallnf rMW ID bt filatwitlilr 12 _._ ~m-= t=i::s•.~~=.=:i-~111t~CiiiiNili--al KIi coilaltAi .. ~- periat ii tollod ~riot~ cdlatffli MW, ind\dnr C!ftim MW al !IIC!! Olllalml,...,.... --225ilt!---Tbrcaltilpnili.·D--llrlillels ... r...llllieas!Jl6Ddlysb'p!C311Sf, _____ nie cwt rs pemwtlod 1o exteoo 111e tilllt 1or filin& Ftdera halleas. 11!1. 90 da)IS 1or aood = 22~ a - 1111 ftdlnl lllbm,c:Mt ...... lli.cmidll a.claim llll rJilal •Stall CNt ~die~- IIIR h>· n. -.11aas ell.ff 11111' consider "'t dainl. is llmilld IJf 2259\C) baow: 
f1}-ldiM;-(2)-la;• (3!'-fads"lllltClllllddllM_,.,._.~-------- _____ _ S.. 
2ffl(bt_ 111 ca1••• 111:..a • ~ae • ...,., rant · s-. 1259(.) ___ No pr .... .._ ________________________ 111r Ftderal 111111m am may r!lim to- consm I cl3i!n not rm in Sutt OJU!t. 11u1 may nor re1~ ,..,.. ...,. •c111•- due loipaaa, 111f8C1. •, lllf faiue lo- >ci,a ....iclo&lt io • 
1260 -~a1. ~~jllstica. , ------- ...., • ..._... l)RJllabll cane a 11111 "'""'far ~al ftderJI iubm ________ ..... 5ame. _ _ 
2,61... _________ No P"tlffll0lf•--------------- --------·--· SlaoiMds 11r ~ ,t COlll!li: 111! s1alAldl .... - 1$ tlklso -- • tt,e, 1981 drug bit lo< 
. =-=casa(ll U.S.C. &4i(qlt4)), IKl9t tWIIIINtl for colllletal _....,.. btiilleftflt m 
m2 _________ No pr<MSioft~- ----___________________ 1111 rarar lllbels -i: CIUld dll!minl. 111 ~ basis "a baanciof 11st, wll<IINr' cblteS it !fie 1aw """'1 
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I 
commend the distfnguished Senator 
from Delaware _ for his interest in 
habeascorpusmat~ We hadahear-
lng L coople of weeks ago ln which the 
distinguished chairman presided. We 
had a lady there whose fa.ce had been 
dJsfigured. A defendant killed three 
people and he tried to kill her and 
thought he killed her and he left her 
111PY retr~ 1o ..s ,..i llalloacas. 
for dead. Anyway, she was- abie to 
come to testily. 
This defendant was tried and con-
victed 10 years ago, and he was sen-
tenced to the electric chair. And he 
has had his fourth appeal to the su-
preme Court of the United States_ His 
fourth appeal Is pending now. 
This is utterly ridiculous. It brings 
the criminal Justice llYitem fn disre-
pute and we mll£t take steps to PlUl& a 
habeas corpus bill that remedies this 
situation. . 
I am glad the distinguished Senator 
ha.s Introduced a bill on this subject 
and I shall introduce the recommenda-
tion of the Powell committee. We will 
have those two bills before the com-
mittee. I have already Introduced a. bill 
now before the committee, which I 
think is a. good bill. But we will have 
all three there as we consider the 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, .JR. 
RETIREO 
)Ullfttnt (!Jon.rt qf tltt ~~ ~ta.tt• 
Jiu~~- <q. 2ltffe'l' 
October 24, 1989 
Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas 
MEMORANDUM TO MEMBERS: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter of the 
23rd inviting me to testify at 10:00 a.m., on November 8, in 
support of our recommendation, and copies of proposed bills 
by Senators Biden and Thurmond. Al Pearson and Hew Pate 
will be with me. 
Of course, I would be happy if all or any of you 
also conveniently could be with me. I would welcome your 
comments on the changes proposed by Senator Biden. They 
differ in a number of respects from ours. 
It is now evident that the Chief Justice gave us a 
difficult assignment, and one not easy to bring to a conclu-
sion - even though our Committee was discharged. 
ss 
Enc. 
t. 1._ rJ, 
L.F.P., Jr. 
cc: Professor Albert M. Pearson 
William R. Burchill, Jr., Esquire 











October 28, 1989 
Senator Biden's Habeas Proposal 
Introduction 
Senator Biden has recently introduced legislation, Bill 
S. 1757, that purports to be based on your proposed statute 
(S. 1760, introduced by Senator Thurmond) with "minor" al-
terations. These alterations are major, and passage of no 
legislation at all would be preferable to passage of the 
Biden Bill . I think that it is vital you make this clear in 
your testimony. Your proposal is bas e d on a "quid pro quo." 
The Biden Bill appears aimed at making the ''quid pro quo" so 
unfavorable to the States that they will have no incentive 
to opt for the new statute. The Biden Bill has the effect 
of removing any chance of finality, doubling the limitations 
period, and overruling Supreme Court cases on procedural 
default and retroactivity. A point by point discussion fol-
lows. 
1. Qualifications and Payment of Counsel 
Your proposal requires States tha t would opt in to p r o -
vide qualified counsel in state collateral proceedings. It 
would leave to the States the initial responsibility to set 





The Biden Bill expands these provisions, setting specific 
standards for appointment and unlimited compensation. 
a. Standards for Appointment 
Unlike your proposal, which would allow the States to 
devise standards and procedures for the appointment of coun-
sel, the Biden Bill sets forth a uniform fede r al standard 
that the States must meet. Post-conviction lawyers must 
court of last have been admitted to practice in the 
resort for at least five years, and 
state 
have at least three 
years experience in felony appeals. The statute allows for 
appointment of an attorney who does not meet these qualifi-
cations if the attorney has special "background, knowledge, 
or experience." 
b. Trial Counsel 
The Biden Bill would also r equi r e states to provide 
counsel who meet specified criteria f or trial in all capital 
cases. The trial attorney must h a ve been admitted to prac-
tice in the trial court for at least five years, and have at 
least three years experience in trying felonies. The stat-
ute allows for appointment of an attorney who does not meet 
these qualifications if the attorney has special "back-
ground, knowledge, or experience." 
c. Level of Compensation 
The Biden Bill also includes a p r ovision for compensa-
tion, but it does not set a schedule of fee rates. Rather, 
it commands that "Notwithstanding the rates and maximum lim-





provision of law to the contrary," the court shall set fees 
and expenses at whatever level is necessary to "carry out 
the requirements of the subsection." Biden §2261. This 
section leaves the amount of compensation to the discretion 
of the appointing judge. Importantly, it preempts all state 
law limits on the amount of fees, leaving the size of the 
potential fee award subject to no limit whatever. 
d. Investigative and Expert Services 
The Biden Bill requires that expert and investigative 
services be provided to the defendant upon a finding in an 
ex parte hearing that such services would be reasonably nec-
essary. As with compensation of counsel, the Biden Bill 
places no limits on the amount that a state may be required 
to spend for these services, as long as a court finds them 
to be reasonably necessary. Biden §2261(c). 
Analysis: Senator Biden may have admirable goals, but 
the attempt to impose such expensive requirements of counsel 
on the States may make the statute unattractive to them. If 
the States see the statute as too expensive, they will not 
use it and it will accomplish nothing. The idea of stand-
ards for the appointment of counsel may in fact be a good 
one. But as Judge Clark argued, there is a great federalism 
value in allowing the States to take the first crack at de-
veloping standards. In sum, the standards for appointment 
are an area where you might express some qualified support 
for the Biden proposal despite the fact that the Committee 
reached a different conclusion. The requirement for counsel 
• 
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at trial is another area where you might express approval of 
Biden's goal of improving the quality of counsel. But 
changing the state law governing appointment of counsel at 
trial is highly intrusive. This is an area where the Biden 
Bill may be so unattractive to the States that they will not 
opt in. 
The Bi den Bill's funding provisions are the biggest 
problem in this section. They make the amount that States 
must pay for defense counsel unlimited. Most States now 
place strict limits on the amount that may be spent by ap-
pointed criminal defense counsel, and the Biden Bill's fund-
ing provision may entail a huge expense for the States. The 
investigative and expert services provision only adds to 
• this high expense. Moreover, the Biden Bill sets absolutely 
no standards for the amount of compensation -- it will vary 
from case to case depending solely on the discretion of the 
trial judge. The provision thus ensures that defendants 
will not be treated equally. I think 
strongly oppose this funding provision. 
proposed statute a dead letter. 
2. Waiver of Counsel 
that you should 
It will make the 
Your proposal provides that the appointing court must 
make findings of competency and knowing waiver where the 
defendant declines an offer of counsel. Powell §2256 ( c). 
The Biden Bill expands on this, requiring that the appoint-
ing court conduct a hearing. More important, the Biden Bill 




counsel by the 
§2256(c). 
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State's court of last resort. Biden 
Analysis: This provision clarifies the procedure to be 
followed in determining competence to waive counsel. But it 
imposes an additional layer of appellate review, and there-
fore more delay. Moreover, this federal statute would dis-
place state law governing appellate review of the competency 
decision. Although this provision seems unnecessarily in-
trusive on the States, I do not recommend you spend much 
energy criticizing it. There are more important problems 
with the Biden Bill that should receive top priority. 
3 • Successive Petitions -- "Miscarriage of Justice" 
Your proposal would allow subsequent petitions 1 for 
claims that could not have been raised due to unconsti tu-
tional state action, new retroactive law, or newly discov-
ered facts, if the claims go to factual innocence of the 
crime itself. Powell §2257(c). The Biden Bill alters your 
approach entirely. First, new claims that could not have 
been raised due to unconstitutional state action, new retro-
active law, or newly discovered facts come in regardless of 
1Note the difference bewtween a "successive" petititon 
and a "subsequent" petition. A successive petition raises 
claims that have already been adjudicated in an earlier ha-
beas proceeding. A subsequent petition raises new claims. 
A subsequent petition may be barred as an "abuse of the 
writ" under Rule 9(b) if the petitioner should have raised 
the new claims in the first petition. See generally 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (opinion of 
Powe 11 , J. ) . 
• 
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whether they involve factual innocence. Second, claims that 
involve factual innocence come in regardless of whether they 
involve any new facts or law. This means that successive 
petitions come in so long as they involve factual innocence, 
even though they have al ready been adjudicated. Finally, 
the Biden Bill adds on a new provision, allowing subsequent 
or successive petitions any time they are needed to prevent 
"a miscarriage of justice." Biden §2257(c). 
Analysis: This change is intended to gut the finality 
mechanism of your proposal. The major goal of Biden's 
changes is to allow challenges to the sentence as well as to 
guilt of the crime. As we have discussed, limiting subse-
quent petitions to claims of factual innocence is fair in 
• light of the fact that prisoners will have had counsel to 
present challenges to the sentence at trial and on their 
• 
first habeas petition. In view of 
dence that can be mi ti gating, see, 
Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. 
the wide range of evi-
e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 
Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 109 S. 
(1982), defendants can easily "discover" new ev i dence after 
the first habeas proceeding, or have new testimony fabricat-
ed by paid experts. Affording additional opportunities to 
challenge the sentencing hearing alone also comes at a great 
cost to the State, and to the families of the murdered vic-
tims. Because the Court has required that the evidence al-
lowed at sentencing be unlimited, the sentencing hearing 
involves placing almost the entire record before another 





fendant has not bothered -- despite the assistance of coun-
sel -- to raise the claim the first time around is not fair 
or necessary to prevent injustice. 
The Biden Bill would allow successive petitions on the 
basis that the claim raised relates to factual innocence. 
Be aware that this test is similar to the one you proposed 
for a plurality of the Court in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
836 (1986). But your Kuhlmann test was to apply to all ha-
beas petitions, not just capital petitions where the pros-
pect for delay is greatest. Also in capital cases delay by 
definition frustrates implementation of the penalty. And 
Kuhlmann had nothing to do with a "quid pro quo" involving 
counsel and automatic stays of execution. 
The "miscarriage of justice" standard of the Biden Bill 
is vague and open-ended, and unless it is subsequently lim-
ited by the Supreme Court it could provide a wide - open door 
for successive petitions in every case. The "miscarriage of 
justice" language appears to come from discussions of proce-
dural default (not subsequent petitions) in Harris v. Reed, 
109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 478 
(1986). The meaning of the term is not clear, but the Court 
will soon hear a case on the issue. Selvage v. Lynaugh, No. 
87-7600 (no argument date set). 
In sum, these changes alter the balance of the "quid 
pro quo" offered to the States. If they can expect the cur-
rent waive of meritless subsequent petitions to continue, 




4. Limitations Period -- One Year 
As we expected, the Bi den Bill lengthens the limi ta-
t ions period from six months to one year. It also allows a 
90-day extension for good cause instead of a 60-day exten-
sion. 
Analysis: There is not much to add here except to say 
that 6 months is longer than provided for any appeal in our 
legal system. No more than 6 months is needed for fairness. 
a. Cert Petitions from State Habeas 
Your proposal would not toll the limitations period 
while the petitioner seeks cert in the United States Supreme 
Court from state collateral proceedings. Powell §2258(b). 
The Biden Bill would. Biden §2258(b). 
Analysis: As the Committee report stated, only two of 
the over 100 modern capital cases decided by the Court came 
from state habeas. And the Supreme Court can always address 
any claims on review of the federal habeas proceeding. The 
Biden change produces needless delay. But this is not a 
major point, and I would not spend much time on it. 
5. Procedural Default and Exhaustion 
Under your proposal, the federal habeas court will hear 
only claims that were raised in the state proceeding. Your 
proposal does al low a federal habeas court to immediately 
hear claims not presented in state court where the failure 
to develop a claim in the state courts was due to unconsti-
tutional state action, the recognition of a retroactively 
• applicable new federal right, or new facts that could not 
• 
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have been discovered previously. But for claims that do not 
fall within these categories, the prisoner cannot return to 
state court for exhaustion in the hope of raising the claims 
in a subsequent federal petition. Powell §2259. Your pro-
posal thus changes the current law with respect to exhaus-
tion, which does not allow a federal habeas court to hear 
claims not presented to the state courts in any circum-
stances, but allows a prisoner to exhaust the claims and 
then return to federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 
(1982). 
Your proposal does not alter the present rules concern-
ing procedurally defaulted claims. Under Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 ( 1977), a claim that is procedurally 
• barred under state law will not be heard on federal habeas 
unless the prisoner shows "cause and prejudice" as defined 
in cases such as Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) and 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
The Biden Bill changes §2259 in an effort to alter the 
law of procedural default in favor of prisoners. [Oddly, 
the Biden change does not address exhaustion at all. Per-
haps the staffer who drafted the change did not understand 
the difference between the two.] Under the Biden Bill, the 
federal court "may" refuse to consider a claim that has been 
procedurally defaulted in state court. But the federal 
court "shall" hear the claim regardless of the default if 
the prisoner shows that "the failure to raise the claim in a 




oner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a claim 
would result in a miscarriage of justice." See Biden 
§2259(c). As discussed above, the "miscarriage of jutice" 
language is drawn from recent procedural default cases, but 
has not been defined. 
Analysis: Again, the Biden change substantially disfa-
vors the States, giving them a further disincentive to use 
the new statute. The Biden change would appear to resurrect 
the "knowing bypass" rule of ~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). Under ~, a procedurally defaulted claim will be 
heard in federal court unless it can be shown the prisoner 
knew of the claim and deliberately chose not to present it. 
The Biden Bill achieves the same result by making "ignorance 
or neglect" a basis for avoiding the State's procedural de-
fault rule. For the reasons stated in the Wainwright v. 
Sykes opinion that you joined, resurrection of the ~ v. 
Noia standard would be a disaster in terms of finality and 
judicial efficiency. This change would leave a State that 
opts into the "reform" statute worse off than it is under 
current law. Again, Biden's change makes the statute worth-
less from the State's point of view. 
6. Retroactivity -- Repealing Teague 
As you know, the Court last term adopted Justice Har-
lan's approach to retroactivity. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989). Under this approach, new constitutional rules 
will not (with narrow e x ceptions) be applied on federal ha-
• beas where the petitioner's conviction became final before 
• 
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the new rule was adopted. 
465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) 
As you said in Solem v. Stumes, 
(Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment), "Review on habeas to determine that the conviction 
rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the 
time of conviction is all that is required to 'forc[e] trial 
and appellate courts . . . to toe the constitutional mark.'" 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, the Court held that Teague ap-
plies to capital cases. 
The Biden Bill gratuitously adds a new §2262 that would 
repeal Teague in capital cases. 
tioners will get the advantage 
Under §2262, habeas peti-
of new rules if the court 
finds "in light of the purpose to be served by the change, 
the extent of reliance on previous law by law enforcement 
• authorities, and the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, that it would be just to give the prisoner the benefit 
of the interim change in the law." 
Analysis: Section 2262 would essentially restore the 
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
( 1965). I will not recount all the reasons that you have 
previously given for the superiority of Justice Harlan's 
rule. The main point is that habeas should not become a 
"time machine" by which the prisoner constantly brings the 
legality of his sentence "up to date" by challenging it on 
the basis of new law made long after his conviction became 
final. Moreover, there is no reason for a statutory change 
in the retroactivi ty rule. Courts have long administered 





what works and what doesn't. The Biden change needlessly 
overrules a new decision that is important to the States. 
Capital cases are the most important area for application of 
Teague, as prisoners attempt to frustrate execution of the 
sentence every year by obtaining "holds" for Supreme Court 
cases that may establish new rules. Again, this makes the 
proposed statute less attractive to the States, and more 
likely to remain on the books unused. 
Conclusion 
Ron Klain, Biden's Chief Counsel, tells me that Biden's 
changes will look "minor" compared to those the ACLU and ABA 
have in mind. But that is no reason to support these 
changes. The danger here is that Congress will pass a di-
luted "Biden Bill," and then pat itself on the back for hav-
ing reformed capital habeas. There will not be sufficient 
political pressure to do anything more for years to come. 
But the Biden Bill will be unattractive to the States, and 
will bring no change to the present situation. In fact, a 
State that opted in to the Biden statute would find itself 
in a worse situation than exists today. I urge that you 
tactfully convey the message to Senator Biden that his 
changes will "kill the goose that lays the golden egg" by 
taking away all benefit for the States. It would be far 













October 30, 1989 
Senator Biden's Habeas Proposal 
Introduction 
Senator Biden has recently introduced legislation, Bill 
s. 1757, 
(S. 1760, 
that purports to be based on your proposed statute 
introduced by Senator Thurmond) with "minor" al-
terations. These alterations are major, and passage of no 
legislation at all would be preferable to passage of the 
Biden Bill . I think that it is vital you make this clear in 
your testimony. Your proposal is based on a "quid pro quo." 
The Biden Bill appears aimed at making the "quid pro quo" so 
unfavorable to the States that they will have no incentive 
to opt for the new statute. The Biden Bill has the effect 
of removing any chance of finality, doubling the limitations 
period, and overruling Supreme Cou r t cases on procedural 
default and retroactivity. A point by point discussion fol -
lows. 
1. Qualifications and Payment of Counsel 
Your proposal requires States that would opt in to pro-
vide qualified counsel in state collateral proceedings. It 
would leave to the States the initial responsibility to set 





The Biden Bill expands these provisions, setting specific 
standards for appointment and unlimited compensation. 
a. Standards for Appointment 
Unlike your proposal, which would allow the States to 
devise standards and procedures for the appointment of coun-
sel, the Biden Bill sets forth a uniform federal standard 
that the States must meet. Post-convict ion lawyers must 
have been admitted to practice in the state court of last 
resort for at least five years, and have at least three 
years experience in felony appeals. The statute allows for 
appointment of an attorney who does not meet these qualifi-
cations if the attorney has special "background, knowledge, 
or experience." 
b. Trial Counsel 
The Biden Bill would also require states to provide 
counsel who meet specified criteria for trial in all capital 
cases. The trial attorney must have been admitted to prac-
tice in the trial court for at least five years, and have at 
least three years experience in trying felonies. The stat-
ute allows for appointment of an attorney who does not meet 
these qualifications if the attorney has special "back-
ground, knowledge, or experience." 
c. Level of Compensation 
The Biden Bill also includes a provision for compensa-
tion, but it does not set a schedule of fee rates. Rather, 
it commands that "Notwithstanding the rates and maximum lim-





provision of law to the contrary," the court shall set fees 
and expenses at whatever level is necessary to "carry out 
the requirements of the subsection." Eiden §2261. This 
section leaves the amount of compensation to the discretion 
of the appointing judge. Importantly, it preempts all state 
law limits on the amount of fees, leaving the size of the 
potential fee award subject to no limit whatever. 
d. Investigative and Expert Services 
The Eiden Bill requires that e xper t and investigative 
services be provided to the defendant upon a finding in an 
ex parte hearing that such services would be reasonably nec-
essary. As with compensation of counsel, the Eiden Bill 
places no limits on the amount that a state may be required 
to spend for these services, as long as a court finds them 
to be reasonably necessary. Eiden §2261(c). 
Analysis: Senator Eiden may have admirable goals, but 
the attempt to impose such expensive requirements of counsel 
on the States may make the statute unattractive to them. If 
the States see the statute as too expensive, they will not 
use it and it will accomplish nothing. The idea of stand-
ards for the appointment of counsel may in fact be a good 
one. But as Judge Clark argued, there is a great federalism 
value in allowing the States to take the first crack at de-
veloping standards. In sum, the standards for appointment 
are an area where you might express some qualified support 
for the Eiden proposal despite the fact that the Committee 




at trial is another area where you might express approval of 
Biden's goal of improving the quality of counsel. But 
changing the state law governing appointment of counsel at 
trial is highly intrusive. This is an area where the Biden 
Bill may be so unattractive to the States that they will not 
opt in. 
The Bi den Bill's funding provisions are the biggest 
problem in this section. They make the amount that States 
must pay for defense counsel unlimited. Most States now 
place strict limits on the amount that may be spent by ap-
pointed criminal defense counsel, and the Biden Bill's fund-
ing provision may entail a huge expense for the States. The 
investigative and expert services provision only adds to 
this high expense. Moreover, the Biden Bill sets absolutely 
no standards for the amount of compensation -- it will vary 
from case to case depending solely on the discretion of the 
trial judge. The provision thus ensures that defendants 
will not be treated equally. I think that you should 
strongly oppose this funding provision. 
proposed statute a dead letter. 
2. Waiver of Counsel 
It will make the 
Your proposal provides that the appointing court must 
make findings of competency and knowing waiver where the 
defendant declines an offer of counsel. Powell §2256 ( c). 
The Biden Bill expands on this, requiring that the appoint-
ing court conduct a hearing. More important, the Biden Bill 




counsel by the 
§2256(c). 
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State's court of last resort. Biden 
Analysis: This provision clarifies the procedure to be 
followed in determining competence to waive counsel. But it 
imposes an additional layer of appellate review, and there-
fore more delay. · Moreover, this federal statute would dis-
place state law governing appellate review of the competency 
decision. Although this provision seems unnecessarily in-
trusi ve on the States, I do not recommend you spend much 
energy criticizing it. There are more important problems 
with the Biden Bill that should receive top priority. 
3 . Successive Petitions - - "Miscarriage of Justice" 
Your proposal would allow subsequent petitions 1 for 
claims that could not have been raised due to unconsti tu-
tional state action, new retroactive law, or newly discov-
ered facts, if the claims go to factual innocence of the 
crime itself. Powell §2257(c). The Biden Bill alters your 
approach entirely. First, new claims that could not have 
been raised due to unconstitutional state action, new retro-
active law, or newly discovered facts come in regardless of 
1Note the difference bewtween a "successive" petititon 
and a "subsequent" petition. A successive petition raises 
claims that have already been adjudicated in an earlier ha-
beas proceeding. A subsequent petition raises new claims. 
A subsequent petition may be barred as an "abuse of the 
writ" under Rule 9(b) if the petitioner should have raised 
the new claims in the first petition. See generally 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 444 n.6 (1986) (opinion of 
Powe 11 , J. ) . 
• 
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whether they involve factual innocence. Second, claims that 
involve factual innocence come in regardless of whether they 
involve any new facts or law. This means that successive 
petitions come in so long as they involve factual innocence, 
even though they have al ready been adjudicated. Finally, 
the Biden Bill adds on a new provision, allowing subsequent 
or successive petitions any time they are needed to prevent 
"a miscarriage of justice." Biden §2257(c). 
Analysis: This change is intended to gut the finality 
mechanism of your proposal. The major goal of Biden's 
changes is to allow challenges to the sentence as well as to 
guilt of the crime. As we have discussed, limiting subse-
quent petitions to claims of factual innocence is fair in 
• light of the fact that prisoners will have had counsel to 
pre sent challenges to the sentence at trial and on their 
• 
first habeas petition. In view of the wide range of evi-
dence that can be mitigating, see, e.g., Penry v. Lynaugh, 
109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 
(1982), defendants can easily "discover" new evidence after 
the first habeas proceeding, or have new testimony fabricat-
ed by paid experts. Affording additional opportunities to 
challenge the sentencing hearing alone also comes at a great 
cost to the State, and to the families of the murdered vic-
tims. Because the Court has required that the evidence al-
lowed at sentencing be unlimited, the sentencing hearing 
involves placing almost the entire record before another 




fendant has not bothered -- despite the assistance of coun-
sel -- to raise the claim the first time around is not fair 
or necessary to prevent injustice. 
The Biden Bill would allow successive petitions on the 
basis that the claim raised relates to factual innocence. 
Be aware that this test is similar to the one you proposed 
for a plurality of the Court in Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 
836 (1986). But your Kuhlmann test was to apply to all ha-
beas petitions, not just capital petitions where the pros-
pect for delay is greatest. Also in capital cases delay by 
definition frustrates implementation of the penalty. And 
Kuhlmann had nothing to do with a "quid pro quo" involving 
counsel and automatic stays of execution. 
The "miscarriage of justice" standard of the Biden Bill 
is vague and open-ended, and unless it is subsequently lim-
ited by the Supreme Court it could provide a wide - open door 
for successive petitions in every case. The "miscarriage of 
justice" language appears to come from discussions of proce-
dural default (not subsequent petitions) in Harris v. Reed, 
109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989) and Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 478 
(1986). The meaning of the term is not clear, but the Court 
will soon hear a case on the issue. Selvage v. Lynaugh, No. 
87-7600 (no argument date set). 
In sum, these changes alter the balance of the "quid 
pro quo" offered to the States. If they can expect the cur -
rent waive of meritless subsequent petitions to continue, 





4 . Limitations Period -- One Year 
As we expected, the Bi den Bi 11 lengthens the 1 imi ta-
tions period from six months to one year. It also allows a 
90-day extension for good cause instead of a 60-day exten-
sion. 
Analysis: There is not much to add he r e e x cept to say 
that 6 months is longer than provided for any appeal in our 
legal system. No more than 6 months is needed for fairness. 
a. Cert Petitions from State Habeas 
Your proposal would not toll the limitations period 
while the petitioner seeks cert in the United States Supreme 
Court from state collateral proceedings. Powell §2258(b). 
The Biden Bill would. Biden §2 25 8(b). 
Analysis: As the Committee report stated, only two of 
the over 100 modern capital cases decided by the Court came 
from state habeas. And the Supreme Court can always address 
any claims on review of the federal habeas proceeding. The 
Biden change produces needless delay. But this is not a 
major point, and I would not spend much time on it. 
5. Procedural Default and Exhaustion 
Under your proposal, the federal habeas court will hear 
only claims that were raised in the state proceeding. Your 
proposal does allow a federal habe a s court to immediately 
hear claims not presented in state court where the failure 
to develop a claim in the state cou r ts was due to unconsti-
tutional state action, the recognition of a r etroactively 
applicable new federal right, or new facts that could not 
• 
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have been discovered previously. But for claims that do not 
fall within these categories, the prisoner cannot return to 
state court for exhaustion in the hope of raising the claims 
in a subsequent federal petition. Powell §2259. Your pro-
posal thus changes the current law with respect to exhaus-
tion, which does not allow a federal habeas court to hear 
claims not presented to the state courts 
stances, but allows a prisoner to exhaust 
in any circum-
the claims and 
then return to federal court. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U. s. 509 
(1982). 
Your proposal does not alter the present rules concern-
ing procedurally defaulted claims. Under Wainwright v. 
Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), a claim that is procedurally 
• barred under state law will not be heard on federal habeas 
unless the prisoner shows "cause and prejudice" as defined 
in cases such as Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) and 
Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1 (1984). 
The Biden Bill changes §2259 in an effort to alter the 
law of procedural default in favor of prisoners. [Oddly, 
the Biden change does not address exhaustion at all. Per-
haps the staffer who drafted the change did not understand 
the difference between the two.] Under the Biden Bill, the 
federal court "may" refuse to consider a claim that has been 
procedurally defaulted in state court. But the federal 
court "shall" hear the claim regardless of the default if 
the prisoner shows that "the failure to raise the claim in a 




oner or counsel or if the failure to consider such a claim 
would result in a miscarriage of justice." See Biden 
§2259(c). As discussed above, the "miscarriage of jutice" 
language is drawn from recent procedural default cases, but 
has not been defined. 
Analysis: Again, the Biden change substantially disfa-
vors the States, giving them a further disincentive to use 
the new statute. The Biden change would appear to resurrect 
the "knowing bypass" rule of ~ v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 
(1963). Under ~' a procedurally defaulted claim will be 
heard in federal court unless it can be shown the prisoner 
knew of the claim and deliberately chose not to present it. 
The Biden Bill achieves the same result by making "ignorance 
or neglect" a basis for avoiding the State's procedural de-
fault rule. For the reasons stated in the Wainwright v. 
Sykes opinion that you joined, resurrection of the ~ v. 
Noia standard would be a disaster in terms of finality and 
judicial efficiency. This change would leave a State that 
opts into the "reform" statute worse off than it is under 
current law. Again, Biden's change makes the statute worth-
less from the State's point of view. 
6. Retroactivity -- Repealing Teague 
As you know, the Court last term adopted Justice Har-
lan's approach to retroactivity. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 
1060 (1989). Under this approach, new constitutional rules 
will not (with narrow exceptions) be applied on federal ha-




the new rule was adopted. 
465 U.S. 638, 653 (1984) 
- 11 -
As you said in Solem v. Stumes, 
(Powell, J., concurring in judg-
ment), "Review on habeas to determine that the conviction 
rests upon correct application of the law in effect at the 
time of conviction is all that is required to 'forc[e] trial 
and appellate courts to toe the constitutional mark.'" 
In Penry v. Lynaugh, supra, the Court held that Teague ap-
plies to capital cases. 
The Biden Bill gratuitously adds a new §2262 that would 
repeal Teague in capital cases. Under §2262, habeas peti-
tioners will get the advantage of new rules if the court 
finds "in light of the purpose to be served by the change, 
the extent of reliance on previous law by law enforcement 
authorities, and the effect on the administration of jus-
tice, that it would be just to give the prisoner the benefit 
of the interim change in the law." 
Analysis: Section 2262 would essentially restore the 
retroactivity analysis of Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 
( 1965). I will not recount all the reasons that you have 
previously given for the superiority of Justice Harlan's 
rule. The main point is that habeas should not become a 
"time machine" by which the prisoner constantly brings the 
legality of his sentence "up to date" by challenging it on 
the basis of new law made long afte r his conviction became 
final. Moreover, there is no reason for a statutory change 
in the retroactivity rule. Courts have long administered 





what works and what doesn't. The Biden change needlessly 
overrules a new decision that is important to the States. 
Capital cases are the most important area for application of 
Teague, as prisoners attempt to frustrate execution of the 
sentence every year by obtaining "holds" for Supreme Court 
cases that may establish new rules. Again, this makes the 
proposed statute less attractive to the States, and more 
likely to remain on the books unused. 
Conclusion 
Ron Klain, Biden's Chief Counsel, tells me that Biden's 
changes will look "minor" compared to those the ACLU and ABA 
have in mind. But that is no reason to support these 
changes. The danger here is that Congress will pass a di-
luted "Biden Bill," and then pat itself on the back for hav-
ing reformed capital habeas. There will not be sufficient 
political pressure to do anything more for years to come. 
But the Biden Bill will be unattractive to the States, and 
will bring no change to the present situation. In fact, a 
State that opted in to the Biden statute would find itself 
in a worse situation than exists today. I urge that you 
tactfully convey the message to Senator Biden that his 
changes will "kill the goose that lays the golden egg" by 
taking away all benefit for the States. It would be far 





lfp/ss 10/31/89 HEWAD SALLY-POW 
Ad Hoc Committee - Testimony before Judiciary Committee 
MEMO TO HEW: 
In addition to the draft statement that you are 
preparing and that I know will be excellent, I would welcome 
help from you or Mike on some miscellaneous points including 
the following: 
1. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 requires ap-
pointment of counsel in capital federal habeas cases. The 
Act also provides standards. How do these compare with Sen-
ator Biden's rather strict standards in his proposed bill? 
2. See page 6 of the Report of the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee. Our statute provides a six-months' period within which 
federal habeas petitions must be filed. This period begins 
to run only on the appointment of counsel for state collat-
eral review. The six-months period is "tolled" - and this 
is important - during the pendency of state collateral re-
view. Our report then states: 
"In view of the provision for counsel, the 
tolling provisions, and the fact that the 
exhaustion requirement mandates that the 
prisoner's federal petition present the same 
claims contained in the state petition, the 
six-months' period insures adequate time for 
the presentation of claims." 
How does this compare with the Biden bill? 
" 
As I do not have clearly in mind the "exhaustion 
requirement", and how it operates in a capital case, a memo 
would be helpful. 
I should mention in my testimony (having in mind 
that Biden would provide a one-year time period) that six 
months is longer than the time provided for appeals in both 
state and federal systems. 
3. I should keep in mind, and emphasize that our 
statute - in addition to providing for a six months period 
within which to file a federal habeas petition - also pro-
vides for an automatic stay of execution. The stay would 
remain in effect until all federal habeas proceedings are 
completed, or until the prisoner fails to file a habeas pe-
tition within the six-months period. 
The merit of these provisions is that they would 
largely eliminate the last minute filing of stay motions. I 
am probably more familiar with these than any Justice on the 
Court. 
4. On p. 7 of our statement, we say: 
"Federal habeas proceedings under our propos-
al will encompass only claims that have been 
exhausted in state court. We note that when 
counsel is provided, as would be required by 
our statute, there should be no excuse for 
failure to raise claims in state court." 
There are exceptions, permitting unexhausted claims 
in certain extraordinary circumstances. (I'd like some ex-
2 . 
,. 
amples of what might constitute extraordinary circum-
stances.) 
Our discussion concludes with the statement that 
subsequent and successive habeas petitions no longer would 
be the basis for a stay of execution in the absence of "ex-
traordinary circumstances" and a colorable showing of factu-
al innocence. (Report, p. 7). 
* * * 
I should include in my statement to the Judiciary 
Committee all, or at least the substance, of the conclusion 
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MEMORANDUM ~ ~~~"--
TO: Justice Powell October 31, 1989 t- ?-P 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Judiciary Committee Testimony 
Here is a proposed draft of testimony for the Judiciary 
Committee. If you approve the subs tan ti ve content, I can 
incorporate your changes and add appropriate footnotes and 
case citations for the written testimony. I think we can 
probably wait until mid-day Monday to submit it, so you can 
take a look at the final product on Monday morning. Of 
course, you will have plenty of time to prepare a speaking 
draft on Monday and Tuesday. I will prepare a memo for you-
on likely questions that may come from the Senators. 
R.H.P . 
'--/ 
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE, CHAIRMAN 
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, MASSACHUSETTS STROM THURMOND, SOUTH CAROLINA 
HOWARD M . METZENBAUM, OHIO ORRIN G. HATCH, UTAH 
DENNIS DeCONCINI, ARIZONA ALAN K. SIMPSON, WYOMING 
PATRICK J . LEAHY. VERMONT CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, IOWA 
HOWELL HEFLIN, ALABAMA ARLEN SPECTER, PENNSYLVANIA 
PAUL SIMON. ILLINOIS GORDON J . HUMPHREY, NEW HAMPSHIRE 
HERBERT KOHL, WISCONSIN 
HEW 
RONALD A. KLAIN, CHIEF COUNSEL 
DIANA HUFFMAN, STAFF DIRECTOR 
JEFFREY J . PECK, GENERAL COUNSEL 
TERRY L. WOOTEN, MINORITY CHIEF COUNSEL 
AND STAFF DIRECTOR 
Lc,v~,, I fl);) 
~nittd £,tatts £,matt 
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 
WASHINGTON, DC 20510-6275 
Here are the two latest entries in the Habeas Derbv: 
Biden's Bill (S. 1757) and Thurmond's (S. 1760). Thurmond's 
earlier Bill is S. 88, which the Library should have. v,Te 'd 
obviously like to have Justice Powell's corrunents on all of 
it -- or at the least, on the two most recent "habeas in 
capital case" proposals -- when he appears next month. 
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NOIITHIIIIN DISTlllCT o, TIUtA• 
1100 COMMIIICI •THIT 
DALL.A• , n:xAa 7•a41 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
u.s. Supreme court 
1 First st., NE 
Washington, o.c. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
o !Nov 1sas 
This is a hurried response to your October 30 Memo and to Hew Pate's 
attached memorandum re the Biden bill. 
First, as to the Biden provi sions for competency of counsel. These 
are the same standards now set by federal statute (Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act Amendments of 1988, 21 u.s.c. § 848{q), (4) through (10)), for 
counsel appointed in the federal court in death penalty cases. 
While__ I agree that our approach is better and more pragmatic, ·viz., 
the states to set standards of competency, I do not believe that we 
should criticize the Biden approach tor setting impossibly high 
standards. 
I agree that hearing and appellate review where defendant declines 
counsel, as proposed by Chairman Biden, is unnecessary; and I also 
agree that it is not worth much comment, if any. 
I turn next to Hew's comments regarding "successive petitions 
'misc.a-rriage ot justice"'. Pate Memorandum at 5-8. I agree 
generally with Hew's coml!lents that the Biden proposal would certainly 
dilute the finality mechanism. However, I am not as disturbed as he 
is about th~ · use of -the phras~ "miscarria~e of justiceh. -Although · 
the phrase is vague·, it will have appeal to many. 
I agree with Hew's comments regarding the one-year limitation period. 
I also agree with his comments regarding procedural default and 
exhaustion. However, I question whether the proposed standard of 
"ignorance or neglect" equates with "knowing :bypass". I think our 
~approach should be that the states are unlikely to adopt "ignorance 
or neglect" for the obvious reAson that it weakens procedural default 
rules. 
Finally, the Biden approach to retroactivity is simply unrealistic. 
Perhaps the best approach would be to point out that Teague is fairly 
recent and is still being fleshed out by the court. 
I suspect that the comments which Hew attributes to Biden's Chief 
Counsel -- that Biden•s changes are minor compared to those which 
will be recommended by the ACLU and ABA -- are correct. (I found out 
this morning that the Chiet Counsel has a copy of the ABA Report. I 
have aaked the ABA to send Bill Burchill a copy of the Report today.) 
It is my hope that somewhere between the Biden bill and our bill a 
COJ!IJJlon ground can be tound; I am not prepared to define what that is 
at this time; I think the door to compromise should be expressly left 
open. 
Of course, I would rather have our bill in the !orm proposed but that 
is not usually the nature ot the legislative process. 
I hope these comments will be helpful and I certainly wish you every 
success in your November 8 appearance. 
Sincerely, 
cc: Honorable Charles Clark 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable William Terrell Hodges 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 








Preparation for Test 
Committee -- Summary 
1060 (1989) 
~ 
November 6, 1989 
v. 
In Teague, petitioner had filed a federal habeas peti-
tion that sought, inter alia, to apply the Sixth Amendment's 
"fair cross section" requirement to the petit jury. Al-




venir~"' (Taylor v. Louisiana), it had never been applied to 
~\ \, \ 
the petit jury. The Court declined to address petitioner's --
contention, holding that the rule he urged, even if it were 
accepted by the Court, could not be applied retroactively to -------------cases on collateral rather than direct review. Thus, the 
~ -------------
Court treated retroacti vi ty as a threshold issue. Because 
petitioner could not benefit from the rule he was proposing, 
the Court refused to issue an advisory opinion on the merits 
of petitioner's Sixth Amendment claim. 
A plurality (O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and Kennedy) adopted a modified version of 
the retroactivity approach initially proposed by Justice 
Harlan. A "new" constitutional rule of criminal procedure 
must be applied retroactively to cases on direct 
review at the time of the announcement of the new rule. See 
- 1 -
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). With two excep-
tions, new rules should not, however, be applied retroac-__________, ------tively to cases that have become final before the new rules 
-- -
are announced. See Teague, 109 s. Ct. at 1075. The first 
exception is that a new rule should be applied retroactive-
ly, even on collateral review, "if it places 'certain kinds 
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe.'" Id. The 
plurality modified Justice Harlan's second exception and 
found that a new rule should also apply retroactively on 
collateral rev i ew if the failure to apply the rule would 
undermine fundamental fairness or seriously diminish the 
likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction. See id. at 
1077. 
Justice White did not explicitly join this portion of 
the plurality opinion, but wrote rather crypticly that the 
retroactivity approach proposed by ' the plurality "is an ac-
ceptable application in collateral proceedings of the theo-
ries embraced by the Court in cases dealing with direct re-
view, and I concur in that result." Id. at 1079 (White, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
Teague was ( not a capital cas.ft , and the plurality ex-
pressly declined to address whether the same retroactivity 
approach should apply in capital cases. See id. at 1077 
n.3. However, later last Term, in Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. 
Ct. 2934 (1989), a majority of the Court adopted the Teague 
- 2 -
-· 
retroactivity test without separate concurrence and applied 
the test to capital cases on collateral review. 
2944. 
See id. at 
Teague and Penry leave somewhat open the question of 
exactly what constitutes a "new" rule of criminal procedure 
that cannot be applied retroactively on collateral review. 
The Court has granted cert on several cases this Term that 
may shed some light on the definition of a "new" rule (e.g., 
Butler v. McKellar, argued Oct. 31), but it may be best not 








lfp/ss 11/06/89 Rider A, p. 1 (Statement) 
RIDER! SALLY-POW 
Copies of my statement on this subject were filed 
with your Committee Monday morning of this week. My 
statement ft;_~ ng - in the interest of brevity - will 
be a good deal shorter. The -~ one familiar to this 
~~ 
Committee: ) ..t::rse of federal habeas corpus in capital cases. 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial 
--~ ~ ~ . 
Conference formed to consid~ p-r-oblem of -mul.ti..p l--ij ied •¥s 
- a.-~~~ 
~hat h;./; wfrustrated the enforcement of the laws of 37 
"" 
states ~ We had an experienced committee of able judges from 
both the trial and appellate level ~oi our federal courtsr 
The members were Chief Judges Clark and Roney, District 
Judges Hodges and Barefoot Sanders - all four of these 
~ 
judge9 from states in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits with 
, ~ 
exte nsive experience in capital cases. 
2 • 
Contrary to what many people assume, federal habeas 
corpus review of state convictions is not required by the 
Constitution. The reference in it applies only to federal 
courts, and - when the Constitution was adopted - ~ the 
~ ~ 
ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus;fvailableA to challenge 
executive detention without trial fJ The procedures before 
this Committee, by contrast, were created by Congress in 
1867. Of course, Congress is free to alter or revise ~ 
I think it is of interest to note the situation 
here in the District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress 
eliminated federal court (Article III courts) habeas corpus 
d.-~ WIA-- ~ ~'=- . 
W hii:J¥i .. f hus, while a prisoner across the river in Virginia 
how may bring multiple petitions for habeas review in 
federal court after exhausting state remedies, a District of 
Columbia prisoner has no such right~-l 9Q a /4:Y f::-rc le, 
J,,.,,,,_ ,~g~ 1/ Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now deceased) reviewed the 
(\ 
experience in the District in a scholarly article.~ 
3 . 
He concluded that the DC system had worked well, and that 
the redundancy of dual review existing in the states is not 
necessary to protect constitutional rights. 
$°~)~ 
(copy pages 3-~ ) 
I\ 
07( 
lfp/ss 11/07/89 Rider A, p. 3 (Statement) F 
RIDER3 SALLY-POW 
The Chief Justice has filed with your Judiciary 
Committee the report and proposal_ of th~ A9 Hoc Commi} t j e , 
1 ~,J u..~ll t.~ ,£_ ~~ k_ ,~ Ill r4 rtu-n13/ ~ ~· 
that I chaired. A.The proposal would add a new Subchapter B 
to present Chapter 153 that deals with habeas corpus. We 
would add new §§2256-2260. 
The texts of the new statutes, of course, are set 
forth in our report. We particularly call attention to the 
explanatory "Comments" that follow each of the new sections. 
lfp/ss 11/06/89 Rider A, p. 9 (Statement) 
RIDER9 SALLY-POW 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating 
evidence, relevant to sentencing , can be virtually unlimited. 
In Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) we held that any relevant 
mitigating evidence~ e admitted in determining the 
A 
sentence in a capital case. In identifying types of 
~ 
mt"t:~ g evidence, the Court stated that "evidence of a 
/I 
difficult family history, and of emotional disturbance, is 
typically introduced by defendants in mitigation." In a 
word, there is no limit to evidence that arguably may be 
1-f..-t.__.~~<<- ~ 




lfp/ss 11/06/89 Rider A, p. 11 (Statement) 
RIDERll SALLY-POW 
As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing 
law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee and by S. 1757 will 
become effective only in states that agree to the changes. 
My concern is that the provisions of S. 1757 that I have 
briefly identified would discourage state acceptance1J"r t is 
not at all clear - at least to me - that the provisions of 
S. 1757 would limit repetitive habeas review. Indeed, they 
could increase it. 
k 
Before closing, I want to emphasize that it is 
~ 
' ' 17 t>c) clear from s. 1757, as well as S. -------r -- H,Lrom 'fhui:mtln's 
'---
;, ( ~/-
~ ~here is general agreement as to the need for reform 
in this important area. 
\ ____ ,-A 
The Supreme Court has stated that the 
justifications for capital punishment a r e retribution and 
deterrence. Neither purpose is served by repetitive review 
/ 
f 
\ ,, ~~ 
2 • 
of every capital case. Delay robs the penalty 
its deterrent value~ s s_;ated at the 
murders are committed each year in our 
for a critical reexamination of our system of review.~ 
~ .<{/we hope we have made a contribution to ~ 
/ ~ ~ 
consideration of this extremely important 





lfp/ ss 11/07/89 Rider A, p. 3 (Statement) 
RIDER3 SALLY-POW 
The Chief Justice has filed with your Judiciary 
Committee the report and proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee 
that I chaired. The proposal would add a new Subchapter B 
to present Chapter 153 that deals with habeas corpus. We 
would add new §§2256-2260. 
The texts of the new statutes, of course, are set 
forth in our report. We particularly call attention to the 
explanatory "Comments" that follow each of the new sections. 
/~ fr~ ;-r), I / J.-.,, ~•'-(. ~ (. 
.Ir / '~ J, 
;. ...... l~ .r I 
lfp/ss 11/07/89 
RIDERS SALLY-POW 
Rider A, p. 5 (Statement) 
~- fvl' w¼e,,~ 
Ma,,I{uj (l'n !- ,;;--
I can speak personally as to the way the present 
system is abused. Each Justice of the Supreme Court is 
designated as "Circuit Justice" for a particular federal 
circuit. When I was active on the Court I was the Circuit 
' 
Justice initially for the old Fif ~h that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. When 
this Circuit was divided, my responsibility included 
Florida, Georgia and Alabama. 
Petitions for emergency relief, as contrasted with 
the normal petition for certiorari, are filed initially with 
the Circuit Justice. He may refer them to the entire Court 
with a recommendation. 
Typically, a capital case goes through the 
following process: State trial and conviction, review by 
the intermediate appellate state court and then by the state 
2 . 
supreme court. This is usually followed by state collateral 
review, again through three levels of state courts. 
At this point, usually after substantial delay -
the prisoner will file a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
This goes through the federal system, District Court, Court 
of Appeals, and finally a petition for cert to the Supreme 
Court. 
At this point, the capital defendant's claims of 
error by the trial court will have been reviewed as many as 
11 times. 
Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel - will 
seek a new trial. When this is denied , the appeal and 
review process I have described will be repeated - often for 
a third time. More frequently than not the Supreme Court 
will have considered a capital case three times. 
~\)ft. '"ftte--.pcace s s also i nv o l ves l ast minute fi lings with _.9---




these filed in a y resourceful counsel the day 
Sometimes a petition is 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the present 
system as "chaotic". I emphasize, however, that no one 
doubts the seriousness of execution - however horrible the 
crime may have been. My own experience with state and 
federal judges enables me to say that we act on capital 
cases with the greatest concern and care. 
IL~~ 
~ ./-o ~ 
lfp/ss 11/07/89 Rider A, p. 5 (Statement) /2.I-~ .... 
RIDERS SALLY-POW 
I can speak personally as to the way the present 
system is abused. Each Justice of the Supreme Court is 
designated as "Circuit Justice" for a particular federal 
circuit. When I was active on the Court I was the Circuit 
Justice initially for the old Fifth that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. When 
this Circuit was divided, my responsibility included 
Florida, Georgia and Alabama. 
Petitions for emergency relief, as contrasted with 
the normal petition for certiorari, are filed initially with 
the Circuit Justice. He may refer them to the entire Court 
with a recommendation. 
Typically, a capital case goes through the 
following process: State trial and conviction, review by 
the intermediate appellate state court and then by the state 
2 • 
supreme court. This is usually followed by state collateral 
review, again through three levels of state courts. 
At this point, usually after substantial delay -
the prisoner will file a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
This goes through the federal system, District Court, Court 
of Appeals, and finally a petition for cert to the Supreme 
Court. 
At this point, the capital defendant's claims of 
error by the trial court will have been reviewed as many as 
11 times. 
Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel - will 
seek a new trial. When this is denied, the appeal and 
review process I have described will be repeated - often for 
a third time. More frequently than not the Supreme Court 
will have considered a capital case three times. 
The process also involves last minute filings with 
a Justice of the Supreme Court seeking delay of execution. 
3. 
Again, speaking personally, I have had as many as three of 
these filed in a single case by resourceful counsel the day 
before execution is scheduled. Sometimes a petition is 
filed only a few hours before execution. 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the present 
system as "chaotic''. I emphasize, however, that no one 
doubts the seriousness of execution - however horrible the 
crime may have been. My own experience with state and 
federal judges enables me to say that we act on capital 
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MEMORANDUM 
TO: Justice Powell November 7, 1989 
FROM: Hew 
RE: Judiciary Committee -- Possible Questions 
This memo responds to questions set forth in your memo 
of October 31, 1989. In addition, I have covered a few 
areas where questions from Senators are likely. 
1. Counsel Standards: The Biden Bill (S. 1757) adopts 
the same standards for appointment of counsel contained in 
~
the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 . If you are asked about 
counsel standards, or about the need for quality trial coun------------ - -
s el, make the following point: Provision of quality counsel 
is an important goal, both for trial and post-conviction 
stages. The aims of the Biden Bi ll on this point a r e good. 
But there is a risk of making the r e for m propo s al too expen-
sive for the States to accept it. This is especially 
of the provision for unlimited fees. 
-~ 
2. Limitations Period: Your proposal allows six 
months for filing a federal habeas petition. The period is 
tolled while the petitioner is litigating in state court. 
The Biden proposal uses the same tolling mechanism. But it 
provides for one year. The Bide n Bill also allows a longer 









3 . The Exhaustion Regui rement: The exhaustion re-
quirement simply commands that before a prisoner may bring a 
federal habeas petition, he must first attempt to present 
his claims to any available state forum. In capital cases, 
a prisoner will often try to present unexhausted claims to 
federal court. He will then be sent back to state court for 
exhaustion. This causes delay. 
Your proposal changes current law by permitting unex-
hausted claims to be heard in extraordinary circumstances. 
These are (1) if evidence for the claim is concealed by the 
State; (2) if the claim is based on new law that is retroac-
tively applicable; and (3) if the claim is based on new evi-
dence that could not have been discovered before. Your pro-
posal also changes current law by providing that where the 3 
extraordinary circumstances are not present, the prisoner is 
not allowed to return to state court to attempt to exhaust 
remedies. The prisoner must put a ll his cla i ms to the state - - - .........__.,.. ___ ..., ___ '"'"'~-,._ ______ _ 
court the first time a~un;. ~} ~J. 4'"4A t::, ,,_,,, -"'i:..5 
--... a • • - - -= 11,-. A-t..t... "- ~ 4,l.r<.., t ~ ..-...t.. )'1-~ • ,d11ir:1u,.- ,,._, 
4. Procedural Default: It i s vital to distinguish 
between "exhaustion" and "procedural d e fault." Exhaustion 
merely means that the prisoner must go to state court before ,, 
coming to federal. hstate procedural default rules require 
that claims be raised in state court at certain times (i.e., ---------.........._ ------------- -- ~~,,,....._ 
objection at trial). If not timely raised, they may not be 
brought later. A federal court will not hear a claim that 
is procedurally defaulted under state rules unless the pris-
oner shows "cause and prejudi c e." Wainwright v. Sykes. 
~ J_'- tJ ~~ V. S 'J J,w_,.,_ J a.ti. dd ~~-.A-I M'1 ..._..i.. 
~ .,...~--!.• c..i.. ~ s 4 6... ~(-. J /- M.a f H, ~ ~ 
ft~~ d.c ~,- -~~ ""1 '~~44~ 





Your proposal does not change the law of procedural default . 
The Biden Bill does: it overrules Wainwright. The Biden 
Bill makes it easier for prisoners to present claims not 
raised at trial. This will not be acceptable to the States, 
'"== ,,,...,~ ~ima:cl -- --




5. Graham Bill: Senator Graham will ask you about his ~f-
Bill. I s:~ges: the following answer: The Graham proposal A,/.,..1.I.,~-./, 
is aimed at achieving some of the same goals, but is differ-C.d,,,1,,,1,,,/,a~L'v. 
ent. The statute of limitations in the two Bills are dif-'ft>-~ 
4,Jrf.; 
ferent. The Graham Bill's statute runs from the date of~ :LA..,. 
exhaustion. The Powell provision runs from the time counsel 
is appointed. The Powell mechanism prompts the prisoner to 
move quickly into 
Graham Bill does not provide for counsel or 
stay. Unlike the Biden Bill, which overrules 
cases, the Graham Bill and Powell Bill are both 
,,,,.,, awwws ~ ,,,,.___,,,,... itWWWl2 ,,,,...is ~ ,,,,,,,-
with Supreme Court cases. 
~
6. Racial Quotas: Senator Kennedy has introduced a 
bill that would overrule your decision in McKlesky v. Kemp. 
It would provide a statutory claim for defendants based on 
statistics and racial quotas. If you are asked any question 
about the role of race in capital punishment, I suggest the 
you make the following point: Your 
Kentucky recognizes that race must be 
., :w....- ,,,...,,___a ..,,_ ~ ...-, ,,,,,,.,,..., 
opinion in ~ v. 
kept out of the jus--
tice system. Where racial motives are shown in individual 








- 4 - ~ 
is based on individ-
The reversal rate in death penalty 
4 0 % ) • 
he re is a suggested answer: 
If you are asked about this, 
The reversal rate is high. 
That is why the Committee proposal fully preserves the right 
to post-conviction review in both state and federal systems. 
It provides counsel. Contrary to popular belief, the high-
.,, ~ 
est number of reversals has come in state courts, not feder-
..--, .._____.,._.,,,,...__.~ --= ~ -_,. ____, 
al. The Cammi t tee only at tempts to eliminate repeat peti-
tions. We do not have exact figures, but the reversal rate \ 
for repeat petitions is extremely low. 
8. Challen_g_es The Cammi t tee proposal to Sentence: 
6- - ' 
does not allow repeat petitions to challenge sentence. Re-
peat petitions may be used only to challenge factual inno-
cence. This is important because evidence concerning sen-
S'6,l,f 
~ 
£ 1 1 c.., -i-,,, 
~ 
tence is unlimited. Eddings. It is easy to create "new" 
VI 
claims regarding sentence. These are usually meri tle~~ 
c..l'<ta They seek only delay. Repeat challenges to sentence imposes •¼ 
high costs on society and on the families of crime victims. 
The prisoner should be limited to making challenges to the 
sentence the first time around. 
R.H.P . 
• 
~~ C-!-~) ~ 5 7>-f ~-~ 
~ November 7, 1989 
().J.- ,Y .,.~ Copies of my statement on this subjec1/ 
,~ were filed with your Committee Monday morning of -
this week. My statement today )- in the interest 
of brevity ~ will be a good deal shorter. The 
~/ J f1-4f1,.,,... 
roblem is familiar to this Committee: Repetitive 
----.;\ I\ 
~ of federal habeas corpus/ in capital cases. 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the 
Judicial Conference/ formed to consider this 
problem / a problem that has f ~ trated the 
enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
We had an experienced committee/o f able 
judges from both the trial and appellate level. 
The members were Chief Judges Clark and Roney / and -
District Judges Hodges and Barefoot Sanders - all -f ~ of these judges are from states in the Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuits /with extensive experience in --
capital cases. 
~d--
Judges Clar~ Roney an d S:r,ns:le-T s are here 
today. Professor Al Pearson / of the University of 
Georgia Law School,) served as Reporter. He also 





The Chief Justice has filed with your 
Judiciary Committee/ the ~ ort and proposal of the 
Ad Hoc Committee that I chaired. I would ask that 
the Report be included in the record of the 
hearing. The proposal would add a new Subchapter - -f o present Chapter 153/ that deals with habeas 
corpus. We would add ~ w §§2256-2260 , ~
The t ~ of the new statutes .--=t lb a.. 
are set forth in our report. We particularly call 
attention/ to the explanatory "Comments" that 
follow each of the new sections. 
Contrary to what many people assume, 
f ~deral habeas corpus review of state conviction( 
is l!.2! required by the Constitution. The -
Constitution i tfm.if refers, Si to the ancient 
Writ of Habeas Corpus/ that was available pnly to 
challenge execu~ ·ve detentioi without trial. 
JI C ; · Th/\ rocedures before this Committee, by 
contrast, / were created by Congress in 1867. Of 
course, Congress is free to alter/ or revise them. 
is of interest to note the 
situation ~ e/ in the District of Columbia. In 
1970/ Congress eliminated federal court r:=:-• 
~GAP>~ ~.aA-





III courts) habeas corpus review in the District. 
Thus / while a prisoner across the river in 
Virginia new may bring multiple petitions for 
habeas review in federal court/after exhausting 
state remedies / a District of Columbia prisoner 
has no such right . 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now 
deceased), / in a scholarly article/ reviewed the t~ ~ 
experience in the District. He concluded that the 
DC system had w~ ell, / and that the r~ dundancy 
of dual review existing in the statesf. s ~ 
essential to protect constitutional rights. 
It has - also been suggested that federal 
habeas jurisdiction/should be exercised Qnlx where 
a prisoner is unable to secure a "full and fair 
adjudication" of his claims) n state court.<// In 
~~ 
this approach, the federal courts r-eme i n as a 
" A. 
backstop to ensure protection of rights. This 
approach to reform/ is before the Committee in S . 
88. 
This was the only role of federal habeas 
corpus ) or many years 
the Supreme Court. 
prior to its expansion by 
~~UL 





~ /\ not here today/ to advocate broad 
.I 
reforms. I do emphasize that our system of :c--dual 
collateral review of criminal convictiono/'is 
unique. Also there are no time limits whatl!ft'>ever 
on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may challenge a 
convictioo/years after it has become final/ and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. 
Nor is res judicata applicable. Claims 
may be brought again and again. Neither the 
Constitution nor common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee I 
1/ ~ d- vi.-o--r-,~, 
chaired/ is a limited one. I\ It is aimed 
specifically at the single area/ where the e_roble~s 
presented by repetitive habeas corpus litigation 
are most acute -- in capital cas~-
I can speak personally as to the way the 
present system is abused. Each Justice of the 
Supreme Court is designated as "Circuit Justice" 
for a particular federal circuit. When I was 
active on the Court/I was the Circuit Justice 
initially for the old Fifth that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and 





~ ~A-. ~1~· / 
~ 
responsibility included Florida, Georgia and 
Alabama. 
Petitions for e ~ lief/as 
contrasted with the normal petition for 
certiorari,/ are filed initially with the Circuit 
Justice. He may refer them to the entire Court 
with a recommendation. 
5. 
Typically/ a capital case goes through 
the following process: State trial and 
conviction~ evie~ S¥) U1e- iAte-£me <H-at::8- cl9Mlra-t-e--
-6 A . I\ 
' " ~to :aeur• anti t.i,.e¥1 by the ~tate supre1J1e court. 
This is 
review, 
UfM:tif'.N.y followed by state collateral 
again through ~ levels of state 
~kc' s j f,,·<.,c. 
At;.Et¾-i s i ·Mt.,. , U ually after substantial 
delay - the prisoner will file a petition for 
federal habeas corpus. This goes through the 
i::,, 
federal system, District Court, Court of Appeals, 
a-J,1A)~ 




claims of court ~ have been 
I\ 









Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel 
~ seek a new trial. When this is denied/ the 
appeal and review process I have described will be 
repeated/ often for a third time. More 
frequently than not/ the Supreme Court will have 
considered a capital case three times. 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the 
present system as "chaotic". I emphasize, 
however, that no one doubts the seriousness of 
execut ;wn - however horrible the crime may have 
been. My o~ e ;(,ith state and federal 
judges f nables me to say that ~ t on capital 
cases with the greatest concern and ~ e. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for -~ 
capital cases/ because the incentives in these 
c ~ :---exacUly the opposite/ ~ se involving 
imprisonment. - -, The prisoner serving a term of 
yearf eeks to have his case reviewed SEeedily in 
the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate/ delay is the overriding objective. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our 
country each year. Only a fraction of the worst 
~ a..-,1--L-
murderers~ convicte1/are sentenced to die. 
11~~ ~ 






There are now approximately 2,200 
convicted murderer f n de~ iting 
execution. Since the Supreme Court's 1972 Furman 
decision,/ only 116 execu~ ons have taken place. 
The average length of time between convictio~ and 
execution/ has been more than eight years. Delay 
of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairnesf 
or for thorough re~ iew. 
I respect those who argue for outright 
abolition of capital punishment. But it seems 
irrational to retain the penalty, / and frustrate 
its fair implementation. 
x K' ><' 
A major problem with the present system 
is the need for qualified counsel/ to represent 
indigent prisoners at all stages. The 
Constitution requires counsel for the trial and 
L1 '-' _ J. 
direct review . A new federal statuto/ requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in 
capital cases. But this leaves a serious gap in 
state systemsf hat do not provide counsel for 
post-conviction review. 
The objective of our proposal is this: 








complete course/of collateral review through the 
state and federal systems. This review should be 
free from the time pressure of an impending 
e--:::cution,/ and wi~ ance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has 
concluded /i itigation should end . 
It is important to understand that this 
proposal is optional. It would not be binding on 
a State. It would allow a State to elect to bring 
collatera~ litigatiof nvolving its capital 
prisoner{within the scope of the new federal 
statute. A State could do !_!!is/ by providing 
competent cou 
~
1 in state post-conviction review . 
The reduction of unnecessary repe~ition / 
increased order ;/ and enhanced finality,/ are the 
benefits to a State that adopts our proposal. But 
a State would h_ave to provide increased saf~ ard1/ 
for the rights of prisoners. These would include 
(i) comp:_::nt counsel / (ii) an automatic stay of 
execution so that the prisoner need not scramble 
for his lifef n order to have his claim heard, / and 
(iii) a new automatic right of appeal from the 





federal district court to the federal court of 
appeals. 
In sum,/ the purpose of the Committee's 
proposal is to advance the fundamental requirement 
of a justice system -- fairness. Where the death 
penalty is involved,/ fairness means ~--:.earching 
and impartial review of the propriety of the -------
sentence. Fairness also requires/ that if a 
prisoner's claims are found to be without merit/ 
J 
s ~ ty; ' is entitled to have a lawful penalty 
carried out without unreasonable delay. --------------~------
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the 
IA,,t_~ c:,__. ~ -.::;-~ 
Committee specifically a~ that I alsd address 
~ alternative propos: l, s. 1757,/ introduced by 
your Chairman. Testifying on proposed legislation 
is an u..Efamilia 7 and !!9Comfortable role for a 
judge. But I will,/ of course / honor your request. 
s. 1757 is based on the structure of our -pr~ l, f hich Senator Thurmond has introduced as 
S. 1760 . But S. 1757 contains several major 
alterations. Some of these are aimed at achieving 
admirable goals -- particula r ly the assurance that ,-~~f~ 
• 
• 
~ nself. s provided at j,oth t ~ al and 
appellate stages. 
10. 
But some of the changes proposed by S. 
1757 are ~ stly, and - if I understand them -
could result in increased repetition and last 
minute appeals, not fewer. 
s. 1757 would provide uniform national 
standards for the qualification of appointed 
counsel both in collateral review and at trial. 
These are the same standards in the Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here is an admirable 
-g JA..1- ~ ~ h ~ .S ./-d.t,, ~~ one. 
----- J 
Our Committee considered including such 
standards. We concluded, however, that the States 
should have the first opportunity to devise 
standards ,-- ~ ~ ~ ~ • 
S. 1757 would not allow the States to 
regulate counsel fees,/ o ~ fees for investigators 
and expert witnesses. This could impose an 
~ 




S. 1757 -EHCpaads the limitations period 
" 
in our proposal from six months to one year. Six 
~7~~1~~ 
 Sf-a-G.- ~~~a,J 









months is longer/ than the time for appeal in other 
areas of law. It was the Committee's judgment 
that six months ,nrs~ n ample period/ where counsel 
is provided r- e1,.A._, ~ ~ ~ ' 
With respect to finality and repetition,/ 
there are three areas of some concern. First, s. 
1757 expands the 
bring repetitive 
-=-------------
si tuationsf n 
petiti ons. 
which prisoners may 
Under our proposal, / a prisoner can bring 
a r ~Q~at petition where there is any question as 
to his innocence. This is fair and necessary . 
But S. 1757 would go well beyond this. 
__..../ 
Repetitive petitions would b~~~l ~~0 ven where 
innocence was not an issue. 
LAA--~<==-~ 
the crime-'\rarely is an issue. 
Indeed, innocence of 
As I understands. 1757, it would allow 
~epe~t challenges to the s~ ence / as well as to 
g~ t of the crime. This would invite repetitive 
litigation. 
Our Committee concluded that it was fair 
to ;\~ ~ er,f ho has counsel / to raise all 
challenges to sente__nce the first time around. 
" 11 10-- s/~1-.,,k.~~ 










The Supreme Court has held that 
mitigating evidence, / relevant to s ~ tencing, can 
be virtually unlimited. In Eddings v. Oklahoma 
~ 
(1982) we held that any relevant mitigating 
evidence may be admitted in determining the 
sentence in a capital case. In identifying types 
ed-~ 
of such evidence, the Court -:::t;fi.a-t "evidence of a 
difficult family history/ and of emotional 
disturbance"/ as 'fli&... example: of mitigating 
evidence. 
In a word, there would be no limit to 
arguably may be relevantj'with 
respect to t ~ entence in capital cases. This 
~~a..f ~ r ~d-. 
means that last mirm.te . claims C'ft1'l~ be constructed 
• iY"' 9 v,r'-" ~•~< very easily in 
'~:~ Another area of concern is 
a.tr~;' ,, AL #-tCJEk--§ =-- . 
~.,... J~_,,,t. lt ,, 
~ pr.o ~ t. The rules of "procedural 
1--£> o/ 1 default" involve state requirements/that a 
~ -
~~ y defendant raise an objection to errors at the time 
,!;,-,~ , of trial,/ when the error may he corrected, If the 
~ defense does not raise the objection, the . , 
opp~ unity to raise it have been waived, Th-<- -6,~ *fY1 ~ nwright v, ~ es~ ~ U-L--~ 
• 
13. 
This serves the purpose /o f seeing that u~ 
errors are poin~ed-eet when something can be don'l 
~ t . years later in attempt to win a new trial. 
1[ ~ 1'he changes proposed in S. 1757 are contrary to 
several Supreme Cour.t cases. [ See footnote in 
<fl 9 ,,,._,..,:t,-, 
4---
written testimony. 
Engle v. Isaac. J 
prisoner to raise 
~ 
~ after trial. 
Wainwright, Smith v. Murray, 
..s . /7 f7 
Ttrey would make it easier for a 
I\ 
claims for the first time~ 
Finally, S. 1757 adds a new section to 
our proposal that would overrule recent Supreme 
ourt de : isions/ that 
v . \ Lane (1989) Penry 
' 
promote finality. 





~ sente~ e is usually ~ ned by the law in ,µ;c~ e ~ t 
decisions,/ the legality of a prisoner's 
the time of his trial and direct appeal. 
1757 changes this,/ and would allow 
many cases to challenge their ~~; isoners 
5}~  convictio sentences/ on the basis of law that 
~ f\.i vV'""' r:::· , _ was not t e ks/ when they were tried. 
i '; v_-~ ~ x ")(. J ~ -AY As I have noted earlier, the changes in 
p· /f/4- ,yr ,J existing law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee .fil!d 
VVJ~::d-,· -
V by S. 1757 will become effective ~ in states 
H,c_a_/ -"-'--4-cJ- hJ 




that agree to the changes / My concern is that the 
provisions of S. 1757, I have briefly identifier 
would discourage state acceptance. 
* * * 
Before closing, I do want to emphasize __ __, 
that it is clear from S. 1757, / as well as S. 1760/ 
th~ there is general agreement as to the need 
for reform/ in this important area .<j?The Supreme 
Court has stated that the justifications for 
capital punishment are retribution and deterrence. 
Neither purpose is ~ a/ by repetitive review of 
every capital case. Del ~ / robs the penaltf of 
much of its deterrent value. 
As stated at the outset,/ some 20,000 
murders are committed each year in our country/ 
Your Committee recognizes the need for a critical 
~ 
__ .... 
~ examination of our open ended system of review..,-
~~---~ 4 
r ~acd J e s e= of;\ innocence. 1'11Mljue to be 





we have made a contributio3/to 
of this extremely i mportant 
~ ~~ 
h:,do~· 
Lewis F . Powell, Jr . 
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JUDCIARY COMMITTEE TESTIMONY 
Senator Biden, Members of the Judiciary Committee, 
thank you for allowing me to appear here today to testify on 
the important subject of habeas corpus in capital cases. As 
you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference that was formed to study this topic. I served with 
distinguished judges from both the trial and appellate level 
of our federal courts. Each of these judges has had exten-
sive experience with the habeas corpus statute as it applies 
to capital cases. 
The Chief Justice has transmitted the full Report of 
our Commit tee and our statutory proposal to the Congress. 
If you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I request that 
both our Committee Report, and the full written version of 
my testimony today, be made part of the formal record of 
this hearing. ~ (d_@ Ll;Nf) - ~~'MN\ 
in 
I am pleased to see that Congress is taking an interest 
~ 
the subject of habeas corpus. It is appropriate that it 
should do so. Although habeas corpus is a legal procedure 
that allows prisoners to assert constitutional rights, the 
procedure itself is not required or controlled by the Con-
stitution. "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the Constitu-
tion, but that is a reference to the ancient writ of habeas 
corpus available to challenge executive detention without 
• 
- 2 -
trial. The procedures we discuss today, in contrast, were 
created by Congress in 1867. 
alter them. 
Congress is of course free to 
Suggestions for radical change have been made. A 1988 
report by the Justice Department Office of Legal Policy con-
cluded that much could be said for the abolition of federal 
habeas corpus for prisoners tried and convicted by a court 
of competent jurisdiction© This would leave a single state 
system of collateral review in place, and eliminate the du-
plication of an overlapping federal system. 
The Committee should note that this is the very situa-
tion here in Washington, D.C. Congress eliminated federal 
habeas corpus in the District of Columbia in 1970 ~ Thus, 
• while a prisoner across the river in Virginia has a second 
chance for habeas review in federal court after exhaustion 
• 
of state court remedies, t of Columbia prisoner has 
the distinguished Judge 
have known, delivered a 
no 
Carl McGowan, 
favorable repo~ f this system. My understanding is that 
it has continued to work well ~ My point is that the redun-
dancy of a dual system of collateral review is not necessary 
to assure that constitutional rights are fully protected. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas juris-
diction should be exercised only where a prisoner is unable 
to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his claims in 
state court. In this approach the federal courts remain as 
a backstop to ensure protection of rights. This was the 
1. us &pJ. ~ s, ol~, ~rt fo ~ lk~ ~ -· reJuJ t½:<6 c. (lvJ, 1 k ~, 
J O,)~ ~kwb (JJ{~ f½{ I C<1itl ~ro IJ'1t vnv fvb c /'Jo. 11-Jsi, g4 )M. 4rJ, 




role that federal habeas corpus played for many years prior 
to its expansion by the Supreme Court. You have a bill of-
fering this approach to reform in s. 88, that has been in-
troduced by Senator Thurmond. 
I am not here today to advocate these broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
criminal convictions is unique in the world. There are no 
time limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, an~~ 
after witnesses and records are long gone. Nor is there an'-6/ 
res judicata. Claims may be brought again and again. Nei-
ther the Constitution nor common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee is a limited one . 
It is aimed specifically at the single area where the prob-
!ems 
most 
presented by unlirni ted ~ beas corpus ~ igation are 
t · ·t 1 • ~Ji ~ tct a~d th acu e -- 1n cap1 a cases. (flour Cornrn1 ee receive e 
views of numerous groups_~.-~T~h~e•s~e .... ~g~r~o~u~p~s-'"'."d~i ~s~a. g~r ~e~e~d;...~a~b~o~u;..;;,t _ rn~a•n• y~-----_.~ .. ' things, but there was 9 a1rnost unanimous agreement that 
the present system is unsatisfactory. It neither provides 
sufficient protections for prisoners nor adequately recog-
nizes the public's interest in enforcement of the law. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are corn-
rnitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers .... ~ -- even thos convicted -- are sentenced to • die. There are now approximately 2,200 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. 
• 
- 4 -
Since the Supreme Court's 1972 
executions have taken place. The 
Furman decision, only -i-:1:-6 11i 
average length of time 
between conviction and execution has been more than eight 
years. Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for 
fairness or for thorough review. I respect those who argue 
for outright abolition of death punishment. But it sz ems 
irrational to retain the penalty(" and ~ sf r:f:/'tt(]ai r 
implementation. -~ A major problem with the present system is . the need -qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners at for all 
stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the trial and 
direct review. 
of counsel on 
A new federal 
federal habeas 
statute requires @)ppointment 
in capital cases. But this 
• leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not provide 
counsel for post-conviction review. 
Another aspect of the pr e se nt sys tern c a uses several 
difficulties. In most States the setting of an execution 
date now provides the only incentive for the condemned pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review. As a result, noth-
ing happens until a date is set. Then counsel is appointed 
or found, and efforts are made to stay the execution. 
Capital litigation is therefore distinctly different 
from other criminal cases. Typically, there are long peri-
ads of inactivity, followed by hurried eleventh-hour activi-
ty. Last-minute litigation tak e s place under tremendous 
time pressure. It is a disservi ce to the prisoner, to law-
• yers, and to the courts. 





set ~ ute 
subject. 
- 7 -
the Chairman's interest in this important 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the as-
surance that ~ quality counsel is provided. I note that 
S. 1757 proposes clarifications to our section concerning 
waiver of counsel. These merit careful consideration. 
Some of the changes in the Bill ~ ~imposev expense on 
~J~ 
the States. And changes in the mechanisms for finality 
could well produce more repetition and last minute appeals, 
not fewer. ')tSt a.Jt ~ >~ rtaM<¼Actt ;,. ~ A-.t1-; -~ /II.we, lk::;_ 
s. 1757 would pr6vide uniform national standards for 
the qualification of !appointed counsel both in collateral 
review and at trial. The goal he re is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such standards. We con-
eluded that the States should have the first opportunity to 
1 ,t-0/e rt~ ti~ 
devise standards. S. 1757's
11
p -r-ov fl sion would not allow the 
Jl 
States to regulate counsel fees, or new fees for investiga-
tors and expert witnesses. This could impose an expense on 
the States that will make the reform package unattractive. 
s. 1757 expands the limitations period in our proposal 
from six months to one year. 
time for appeal in ~ other 
Six months is 
- s ~ 
area11 of ,1 law. 
longer than the 
It was the Com-
mittee's judgment that six months was an ample period where 
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DRAFT 
JUDCIARY COMMITTEE TESTIMONY 
Senator Biden, Members of the Judiciary Committee, 
thank you for allowing me to appear here today to testify on 
the important subject of habeas corpus in capital cases. As 
you know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial Con-
ference that was formed to study this topic. I served with 
distinguished judges from both the trial and appellate level 
of our federal courts. 
,£c;..d tr{,, ~~~ ~ ~ kt~ 
~_;rl1ese judges A ha.v-e :v-a-s-t. I\ experience 
with the habeas corpus statute as it applies to capital 
cases.J!The Chief Justice has transmitted the full Report of 
our Cammi t tee and our statutory proposal to the Congress. 
If you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, 
rt-e-1~ 
I ~ k that 
- " 
both our Committee Report and the full written version of my 
) 
testimony today be made part of the fo r mal record of this 
) 
hearing. 
I am pleased to see that Congress is taking an interest 










should do so.  habeas corpus is a ~ l procedure that 
I ;'\ 4 ~ ----' . 1-'-d.. 
{allows ~ ~~rt constitutional rights, the proce-
dure itself is not re qui red or control led by' the Cons ti tu-
tion. "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the Constitution, but 
that is a reference to the ancient writ of habeas corpus 
I 
lava i labl e to challenge executive detention without trial. 
The procedures we discuss today, in contrast, we re created 
I 
I 
by Congress in 1867. 
them. 




M~§uggested ti:{- radical 
~~?-t..<~ 
change is aeces s-a-.y. ,.., 
A 1988 report by the Justice Department Office of Legal Pol-
icy concluded that ~ tim~ -~ ~ -a~ w:0-w a ... b 
I\ 
the abolition of federal habeas corpus for prisoners t.h ri i- ~ 
tried and convicted by a court of competent juris-
diction. This would leave a single state system of collat -
eral review in place, and eliminate the duplication of an 






The Committee should note that this ~ situation ...,. 
0 --r-s--t~s., here in Washington, D.C. Congress eliminated federal 
habeas corpus in the District of Columbia in 1970. E.o-E--S-&~ 
~~ 
,---v-e-a-r~ 1-e a prisoner across the river in Virginia has 
A. 
~~~ 
a second chance for habeas review in federal court after h 
"' /'~,..- •-w .A~ a... 
c-0 1:1,.I;,,t, t)le. "District of Columbia prisoner 
does - no..t. a 1982 Article, the distinguished Judge Carl 
McGowan, who many of you may have known, delivered a favor-
able report of this system. My understanding is that it has 
continued to work well. My point is that the redundancy of 
a dual system of collateral review ~ unique to our countr0 
/~-
/1-4-, 
,/,A, r~ •~ ~ ~ / ' 
- -.:::..-~p.e.n..s.i-a-J:.e-e--l-ce-meoc~~ 
tional right ~ -~ ~~J_j,, 
A 
11~ 
f-e r cons ti tu-
0-&b.e--~ e suggested that federal habeas jurisdiction 
"\ 
should be exercised only where a prisoner is unable to se -
cure a "full and fair adjudication" of his claims in state 
court. In this approach the federal courts remain as a 








that federal habeas corpus played for many years prior to 
its expansion by the Supreme Cou r t. You have a bill offer-
ing this approach to reform in S. 88, that has been intro-
duced by Senator Thurmond. 
~Ml( 
~A~~ 
I w i 11 not add,i;..e~ ,.._w reform . 
J «Al /\_. 
Cf p ropo-srls..__ ,.S~ o- say that our system of dual col-
~ 
lateral review of criminal convict i ons is unique in the 
wo r 1 d # o-0 d f Q.Q.e r.a.J -b ~ s_c o.~~ 1:-10.-i-.que-t-e-eu "' 1 "', .~ 
There are no time limits whatsoever ~ ~~pus 
~ 
d'"" tem 
- prisone r" ma;:~ chall efnge a coh viction years after it has a-e>-
become final, and wi tnesse·s records are long gone. 
...-; 'l 
, ,~•r- : r; ~ ,._'1,. ...._ 
T0he i; e is" no., res judicAta,,, so s laims may be brought again and 
again. r.j_ g.ht s.. i s the f oundat-i on 
~ B ""- ""• -~I" C::. ~..A...Jl' I' 
u t this _n eed not entai 1 r ~dun- :,,7 ..__,,..,._,.,., 
M 
dancy and repetition. 
~vi--
~ ~ /+,j.e_ ~~ ~ A /4.fl ~, 
The proposal of my ,Cammi t t e.e-...i.s- - i:I".-e - mod e-s-t:- than 
those I .h~ _ j-u s.t ment honed. It is ~~~ 
/ /'. 







igation are most acute -- capital cases. 
~ 
Our Committee re-
ceived the views of numerous groups. These groups disagreed 
about many things, but there was was almost unanimous agree-
ment that the present system is unsatisfactory. It neither 
provides sufficient protections for prisoners nor adequately 
recognizes the public's interest in enforcement of the law. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers -- even those convicted -- are sentenced to 
7 
die. There are now approximately 2,200 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. f;£ ince the Supreme Court's 
? 
1972 Furman decision only 116 executions have taken place. 
The average length of time between conviction and execution 
b,een more than eight years. Delay of this magnitude is 
hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough review. I 
respect those who argue for outright abolition of death pun-
- 6 -
• ishment. But it seems irrational to retain the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the need for 
qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners at all 
stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the trial and 
direct review. A new federal statute requires appointment 
of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. But this 
leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not provide 
counsel for post-conviction review . 
• Another aspect of the present system causes several 
difficulties. In most States the setting of an execution 
date now provides the only incentive for the condemned pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review. As a result, noth-
ing happens until a date is set. Then counsel is appointed 
or found, efforts are made to stay execution. 
Capital litigation is therefore distinctly different from 
other criminal cases. Typically, there are long periods of 
• inactivity, followed by hurried eleventh-hour activity. 
- 7 -
• Last-minute litigation takes place under tremendous time pressure. I t i s a di s s e r vi c e to the p r i son e r , to 1 a wy e r s , 
and to the courts. 
The 
t"'d.,.., JIL_fw-,t. 
~~ ; four proposal is this: Capital cases should 
" 
be subject to one fair and complete course of collateral 
review through the state and federal systems. This review 
should be free from the time pressure of an impending execu-
✓ tion) and with the assistance of competent counsel for the 
prisoner. When this review has concluded, litigation should 
• end. 
It is vital to understand that this proposal is option-
al. It would not be binding on a State. It would allow a 
State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving its 
capital prisoners within the scope of the new s ta tu te. A 
State could do this by providing competent counsel in state 
post-conviction review. 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by 





tions. The time limit would have tolling rules that ensure 
ample time for the presentation and consideration of all 
claims. It is not possible to say how much delay might be 
reduced, for our proposal does not limit the amount of time 
that a claim may be pending before a court1'/ But reducing 
delay is not in itself the chief goal of our proposal. 
Rather, it seeks to eliminate the~:h~~caused by the lack 
~ 
of a limitations period to move p r isoners through the review 
system in an ~ orderly) and ~ 
T4 ~ , 
-0-u P proposal would enhance 
~ f 
finality ~ l jmitiQ.Q_ 
I\ 
the 
circumstances in which federal rel i ef may be sought after 
one full course of litigation up to the Supreme Court. The 
proposal would strictly limit subsequent and successive pe -
titions. That is, after having one full and fair course of 
review, a prisoner should not be allowed to return to court 
ain and again. 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
~ 






Ull,,8:e"r our proposal. t.J+e.s-~~,-th e S tat e 
A 
mwst increased safeguards for the rights of prison-
" 
t-r~ w~-- • ack.i IUL:.--~ this_I-m_ean competent counsel, 
an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner need not 
scramble for his life in order to have his claim heard, and 
~ ;..,,,_ ~.4.,,t:-_,1 
a new automatic right of appeal to the federal Circuit 
I\ - ~-
Court. s Senators have observed, the basic appr oaci1 i soi'ie 
"quid pro quo." I know this is a concept familiar to 
~~~ legislators. ---
In sum, ~~;;-- d hfd  proposal 1.-s-m-e-a-n-t to a vance t e un amen-
" 
tal requirement of a justice system -- fairness. Where the 
death penalty is involved, fairness means a searching and 
impartial review of the propriety of the sentence. Fairness 
also requires that if a prisoner's claims are found to be 
without merit, society is entitled to have a lawful penalty 
carried out without unreasonable delay. 
X ¥ X 
My invitation to appear before the Committee specifi -







1757, introduced by your Chairman. 
e-nis proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
J ~ J 
role for a judge. .o honor your 
I\ 
request. I ~ e r~t the outset that I salute the Chairman's 
interest in this important subject. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
J3 u f S. I 7 'f 7 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. :rtt con-
-1 
tains several major alterations. Some of these are aimed at 
achieving admirable goals -- particularly the assurance that 
top quality counsel is provided. I note that S. 1757 pro-
poses clarifications to our section concerning waiver of 
counsel. These merit careful consideration. 
(I wonder, however, whether many of the changes reflect-
,.,,,,....-
,,--... 
c r--ed in S. 1757 really take into account the "quid pro quo" 
s~ 









ns 1!-o the 
'\ 





- 11 - /~- --r ~ 4-,' c./4-µ -- L,cp-/e, ~~ ~t- t 
~ ~ ; ; " r 1 ~ 
and last minute appeals, not fewer. 
_.. - k-e-a_f.e,w_sp;, ..;> cJ,,,tvw 
.A..-c._ k) 
ci-f i c obs e rva""'t~i-ons-. 7)/ 
s. 1757 would provide uniform national standards for 
the qualification of appointed counsel both in collateral 
review and at trial. The goal he re is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such standards. We ~ ~""bi-
i -UJ1< l«-d.t d' ma,te1y---de-d .. de.d the States should have the first opportunity 
to devise standards~ b ~ na.t---ive-app~ ~ach 
e--I- mu.s-t- . oun-d 
vtff'' ~ ,-u,r;>-$ 
.o.t--e--g...f--.ea~ S . 1 7 5 7 ' s p r o v i s i on f o r 
)-t_, ~ ✓ t )' ~ r ~ ,( 'J c/ I-(,,, ( 'r I I( 
¥- unlimited counsel fe d s, as well as \ fees for in-, 
vestigators and expert witnesses. This could impose an 
expense on the States that will make the reform package un-
attractive. 
---0-t...-~-e, S. 1757 expands the limitations period in 
our proposal from six months to one year. ~~much_:::J 
~ 
(f'" to - say a b_p_\J..t..._t s . Six months is longer than the time for 












judgment that six months was an ample period where counsel 
is provided. 
With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of <g t concern. First, s. 1757 g-£ej;ly ex-
pands the situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive 
petitions -- where they may take more than one bite at the 
apple. Y/under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is 
't t.A-~ ,._ t i...· L 
t / as to his innocence. This is 
fair and necessary. But S. 
~e L ,.., , ~ ~ ./" ./ ~ j,J ..,1 ~ /-t...:v, 
1757 makes- a large expansion. ., 
1 
Repeat petitions would be allowed even where innocence was 
il t:-Lu..J..,) ~..L,.,o,,t,V ""'f l-C....<..r ~ '-1. -,L.µ.~ ~ 
not an issue. 
/\ 
S. 1757 includes a new exception for a 
"miscarriage of justice." This phrase is drawn from Supreme 
term is Court cases in an unrelated area of the law. The 
~v-. ..... -t_ 
I ...t.,G~ ',,.<,.,_,1, 'a.. yt- '/--~,-~ 
not yet well defined, and its --u-s-e--r ~ .th1s -new, context may 
/ 
-eEitt'Se confusion and an open door for abuse. 
These changes appear to be intended to allow repeat -
ft-,- I - ~ - ~- ~/ 
challenges to sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
~ 
The Committee concluded th a t it was fair to ask the prison-
~~ 
• 
I~ /4...itt..l 11v.., k 
- 13 -
lt ~h-14--t'4' • ~ 4.,,-1.-
1 ~ -• /' J v .J ., .0 11 ~ 
er, who has counsel, raise 
tr u~- .... ,. .,,_ '1. ... '1 ~ - (..)'-,,. 
challenges to sentence the !,J..,e,4-..
1
~ to 
first time around. In view of the unlimited evidence that 
may be relevant to sentencing under the Constitution, de-
fendants can easily manuf'&~ ture new evidence after the first 
habeas proceeding, or produce new last minute testimony from 
paid experts. 
A second area of concern is the law of procedural de-
fault. The rules of procedural default involve state re-




/),t, IA../. t.t 
-I-~ 
~~ 
• the time of trial, when it might be corrected. If the de-:i~ 
fense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to raise !"'~/ 
the claim will be waived. This serves the purpose of seeing 
that errors are pointed out when something can be done, not 
years later in attempt to win a whole new trial. The 
changes in S. 1757 would overrule a whole series of Supreme 
Court cases in this field. They would make it easier for a 
prisoner to raise claims for the first time long after 
• trial. 
- 14 -
• Finally, S. 1757 adds a new section to our proposal also aimed at overruling Supreme Court decisions that pro-
mote finality. Under these decisions, the legality of a 
prisoner's sentence is measured by the law in effect at the 
time of his trial and direct appeal. s. 1757 changes this, 
and would allow prisoners in many cases to challenge their 
convictions on the basis of new rules that are adopted long 
after their crime and trial. Essentially, it would allow 
prisoners to overturn their sentences on the basis of law 
• that was not even on the books when they were tried. This 
statutory change alters the area of constitutional criminal 
law known as retroacti vi ty. I note that this is an area 
traditionally handled by the courts, that have day-to-day 
experience. It is not one where the Congress has generally 
been involved. 
My concern with each of these three areas is that the 
changes may take away the incentive of the States to partic-
• ipate in reform. Under S. 1757, instead of getting a de-
- 15 -
• crease in repetition and delay, there would be an increase. The success of the quid pro quo approach assumes a trade 
that will be attractive to States that wish to administer 
their capital punishment statutes. The States agree to 
measures that will safeguard the rights of prisoners. These 
may be expensive and unpopular for the States. In return, 
the States are assured that the chaos, repetition, and delay 
are curtailed. 
If Congress is interested in the quid pro quo approach 
• ~ I ' offer, it must take care not the ''kill the goose that lays 
the golden egg." Amendments to the proposal such as those 
offered ins. 1757 would in fact offer States more delay, 
more repetition, and more last minute litigation. I fear 
that the States would have little incentive to opt for such 
a system. A reform statute cannot benefit anyone if it lays 
on the books unused. If this happens, an important opportu-
nity to provide needed safeguards for inmates, and to bring 
• sanity to our system of capital review, will have been lost. 
- 16 -
• I thank the Committee for inviting me to appear. I will be happy to answer questions from members. The Report-
er for our Committee, Professor Al Pearson of the University 
of Georgia, who has represented capital defendants, is here 








In introducing his proposed legis t a~ n,d n Biden 
articulated the Senate's two major concerns about existing 
habeas corpus procedures, delay attributable to repetitive 
applications and lack of competent counsel. The5e Bame con-
cerns were addressed by the Powell committee. We proposed a 
blended solution to the separate problems involving an ex-
change of compensations, If states would voluntarily 
provide competent counsel in state post-conviction 
review--counsel they were not constitutionally required to 
provide--they would be entitled to modified federal habeas 
corpus procedures which eliminated or controlled many 
presently available opportunities for delay and moBt 
successive petitions. The aim was to create for capital 
cases a procedure whereby the defendant would be represented 
at state expense by competent counsel at trial, on direct 
appeal, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United 
States from that direct appeal, on state collateral review 
't 
~ 
at trial and on appeal. The federal government would then 
provide counsel for federal habeas corpus review at trial, 
and appeal, and for a secon '· certiorari proceeding. The 
collateral procedures would be freed from time pressure of 
impending execution by automatic stays. 
In exchange, the state would be guaranteed that counsel 
would limit the ti.me when no proceeding was pending before a 
court in the state system to a total of six months, plus a 
good-cause savings period of an additional 60 days. 
Successive writs would be barred and the system would permit 
subsequent petitions raising new grounds only where factual 
innocence was asserted. 
Chairman Biden's proposed bill would add new costs, and 
in some cases unknown costs, to the price states would have 
to pay to opt in to thi~ system. It would also take away 
from states procedural rights they possess under present 




additional weights so freight the offer as to make it 
l 
unattractive to the states who are urged to assume hundreds 
of millions of dollars in litigation costs they are not 
constitutionally required to bear and whether adding such 
costs will have the effect of making the propo5ed 
legislation ineffective. 
In introducing his bill, the Chairman characterized the 
Powell committee's recommendations as limiting the capital 
case defendant to "one bite out of the apple," This 
characterization does not consider the Powell committee 
recommendations in context. Every defendant subject to a 
capital charge is now entitled to be represented at trial by 
competent counsel; most times two such attorneys are 
appointed. If convicted, he has a right of direct appeal, 
again with competent counsel and, under the law of many 
states, different counsel from those who represented him at 
trial, At the conclusion of this direct appeal, the 
- 3 -
1 
defendant has an opportunity to seek certiorari review of 
the state appellate court's decision in the United States 
Supreme Court, with, of course, the assistance of counsel 
for that purpose. If that fails to produce relief, the 
defendant may petition the state court for collateral 
review. The critic al ingredient of the Powell committee 
recommendation is to encourage states to furnish competent 
counsel to represent the defendant in all phaseB of this 
collateral attack. Most such procedures are now handled by 
the defendant h.imBelf without counsel and in many cases are 
concluded without a thorough presentation of potential legal 
issues. 
If counseled state collateral review proves ineffec-
tive, the defendant has three additional opportunities to 
seek relief. He has the opportunity to present to a United 
States district court a petition for habeas corpus relief 




proceeding. He has the right of appeal to a United States 
court of appeals and may seek certiorari review in the 
United States Supreme Court. Thus, under the Powell 
committee's recommendations, a defendant whose death penalty 
ultimately becomes final has had not one bite out of the 
apple, but a minimum of eight opportunities with the help of 
counsel to present issues relating to his guilt and 
punishment. It is only after this thoroughgoing check upon 
check upon countercheck that the committee recommends 
further litigation be limited - to new factual claims of 
innocence. 
A section-by-section tabulation of the specific 
changes made by the Chairman's bil 1, with the predicted 
effect of each, is attached to this statement. 
~~ .. 






Changes and Effects 
counsel appointment mechanism is governed by 
federal drug case standards and the appointment process is 
broadened to cover all trial and direct review proceedings 
and litigation expense. 
Effect: 
This incongruous regulation exceeds the bounds of 
the problem addressed--habeas corpus procedures. 
Legislatively-set state maximums on fees and expenses of 
trials and direct appeals would be preempted and left open-
ended. If states opt in to this amended scheme, they must 
anticipate that their present constitutionally imposed 
litigation expense will increase exponentially and they will 
still have the additional expense not now required of 
providing counsel for collateral proceedings. 
Section 2256(c) 
Change: 
A hearing is mandated on waiver of counsel at 
which competency as well as knowing voluntary waiver must be 
established. The prisoner and the attorney offered must be 
present. 
Effect: 
This change createB added expense and consumes 
time and judicial resources. It would only operate in a 





The conjunctive requirements of the Powell bill 
relating to new claims have been separated. No longer is 
the undermining of the court's confidence in guilt required. 
A new claim must be entertained if it was not raised as a 
result of unconstitutional state action or if it is based 
upon a new retroactive decision of the Supreme Court or on 
newly discovered evidence or would undermine confidence in 
guilt. A fifth basis is added--"necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice." 
Effect: 
In the broad scheme of the bill, eliminating the 
undermining of confidence in guilt as a requirement may 
withdraw little of substance from the states. Certainly it 
would add only minimal expense; however, the new requirement 
of allowing claims "necessary to prevent miscarriage of 
justice" opens a path of undefined breadth. While no one 
can favor a miscarriage of justice, the problem this 
amendment creates arises from the fact that it takes only a 
stroke of the pen to assert that a failure to relitigate an 
issue for a second or third time is necessary to prevent a 
miscarriage of justice. In this way, a prisoner may present 




Thie doubles the total time a habeas corpus 
petitioner represented by competent counsel can deliberately 
stay out of state court and still maintain a federal habeas 
corpus proceeding. 
Effect: 
No time during which a state judicial proceeding 
is pending would be counted against a petitioner under the 
Powell bill. The present average length of the "down time" 
is only a few days more than 12 months. This change 
effectively increases permissible delay to its present 
average. It not only defeats the purpose of minimizing 





Tolling of time limits for certiorari petition to 
the Supreme Court at the conclusion of state collateral 
proceedings. 
Effect: 
Less than 2% of such petitions for writs of 
certiorari are now granted. No issue which could be raised 
in such a petition is lost by waiting to seek the writ until 
after federal habeas corpus proceedings are concluded. 




A extension of time for good cause shown is 
enlarged from 60 to 90 days. 
Effect; 
The time allowed is court-controlled and the 




Federal courts must consider claims which would be 
barred for procedural default under existing Supreme Court 
precedent if the petitioner asserts the default occurred due 
to (1) ignorance or neglect by petitioner or counsel, or (2) 
would result in a miscarriage of justice. 
Effect: 
In addition to voluntarily furnishing counsel at 
state expense for habeas procedures, which is not now 
constitutionally required, the state is asked to give up a 
substantial part of its present right to invoke procedural 
defaults. There is a clear semantic appeal to avoiding 
defaults due to ignorance or neglect and avoiding defaults 
that would constitute a miscarriage of justice. The problem 
- 3 -
~ 
. .. ~ 
is that this semantic appeal is not matched by pragmatic 
persuasion for states to go beyond present constitutional 
requirements to enforce their law. Any persuasive effect is 
, , certainly offset by the uncertainty of terms used and by the 
opportunity created for abusive delay. 
Section 2261 
Change: 
This section sets the standard of experience which 
states must require appointed counsel to have. 
Effect: 
See comments under section 2256 above. 
Section 2262 
Change: 
Principles of law developed subsequent to the 
sentence are made applicable to habeas corpus cases. This 
creates another rule against finality which differs from 
current Supreme Court precedent. 
Effects 
Here, as in the change made by section 2259(c)(2), 
states are asked to give up presently established rights of 
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Mr. Chairman, Members of the Judiciary Committee, thank 
you for allowing me to appear here today to testify on the 
important subject of habeas corpus in capital cases. As you 
know, I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence that was formed to study this topic. I served with 
distinguished judges from both the trial and appellate level 
of our federal courts. Each of these judges has had exten-
sive experience with the habeas corpus statute as it applies 
to capital cases. The Chief Justice has transmitted the 
full Report of our Committee and our statutory proposal to 
the Congress. If you think it appropriate Mr. Chairman, I 
request that both our Committee Report, and the full written 
version of my testimony today, be made part of the formal 
record of this hearing. 
Judicial Conference interest in this subject is not 
new. In the early 1970's, the Judicial Conference appointed 
a committee to consider habeas corpus reform. Its members 
were Walter Hoffman, Wade Mccree, Alfonso Zipoli, William 
Webster, and Frank Johnson. These names may be familiar to 
you. That committee suggested many of the same reforms we 
advocate today. Most important, it emphasized the need to 
end unnecessary delay and repetition and the need for quali-
fied counsel. 
I am pleased to see that Congress too is taking renewed 
interest in the subject of habeas corpus. It is appropriate 
that it should do so. Although habeas corpus is a legal 
procedure that allows prisoners to assert constitutional 
- 2 -
rights, the procedure i tse 1 f is not re qui red or control led 
by the Constitution. "Habeas corpus" is mentioned in the 
Constitution, but that is a reference to the ancient writ of 
habeas corpus available to challenge executive detention 
without trial. The procedures we discuss today, in con-
trast, we re created by Congress in 186 7. 
course free to alter them. 
Congress is of 
Suggestions for radical change have been made. A 1988 
report by the Justice Department Office of Legal Policy con-
cluded that much could be said for the abolition of federal 
habeas corpus for prisoners tried and convicted by a court 
of competent jurisdiction. 1 This would leave a single state 
system of collateral review in place, and eliminate the du-
plication of an overlapping federal system. 
The Committee should note that this is the very situa-
tion here in Washington, D.C. Congress eliminated federal 
habeas corpus in the District of Columbia in 1970. 2 Thus, 
while a prisoner across the river in Virginia has a second 
chance for habeas review in federal court after exhaustion 
of state court remedies, a District of Columbia prisoner has 
no such rights. In a 1982 article, the distinguished Judge 
Carl McGowan, whom many of you may have known, delivered a 
1u.s. Department of Justice, 
port to the Attorney General: 
of State Judgments (1988). 
Office 
Federal 
of Legal Policy, Re-
Habeas Corpus Review 
2District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473. 
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favorable report of this system. 3 My understanding is that 
it has continued to work well. My point is that the redun-
dancy of a dual system of collateral review is not necessary 
to assure that constitutional rights are fully protected. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas juris-
diction should be exercised only where a prisoner is unable 
to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his claims in 
state court. In this approach the federal courts remain as 
a backstop to ensure protection of rights. This was the 
role that federal habeas corpus played for many years prior 
to its expansion by the Supreme Court. You have a bill of-
fering this approach to reform in S. 88, that has been in-
troduced by Senator Thurmond. 
I am not here today to advocate these broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
criminal convictions is unique in the world. The re are no 
time limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. Nor is there any 
res judicata. Claims may be brought again and again. Nei-
ther the Constitution nor common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee is a limited one. 
It is aimed specifically at the single area where the prob-
lems presented by unlimited habeas corpus litigation are 
3McGowan, The View From An Inferior Court, 19 San Diego 
L. Rev. 659, 667-669 (1982). 
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most acute -- in capital cases. Separate procedures are ap-
propriate for capital cases because the incentives in these 
cases are exactly the opposite of those involving imprison-
ment. The prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have 
his case reviewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. 
For the condemned inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
Our Committee received the views of numerous groups. 
These groups disagreed about many things, but there was al-
most unanimous agreement that the present system is unsatis-
factory. It neither provides sufficient protections for 
prisoners nor adequately recognizes the public's interest in 
enforcement of the law. 
The hard fact is that the laws of 37 States are not 
being enforced by the courts. About 20,000 murders are com-
mitted in our country each year. Only a fraction of the 
worst murderers -- even those convicted -- are sentenced to 
die. There are now approximately 2,200 convicted murderers 
on death row awaiting execution. Since the Supreme Court's 
1972 Furman decision only 116 executions have taken place. 
The average length of time between conviction and execution 
has been more than eight years. Delay of this magnitude is 
hardly necessary for fairness or for thorough review. I 
respect those who argue for outright abolition of capital 
punishment. But it seems irrational to retain the penalty, 
and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the need for 
qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners at all 
- 5 -
stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the trial and 
direct review. A new federal statute requires appointment 
of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 4 But this 
leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not provide 
counsel for post-conviction review. 
Another aspect of the present system causes several 
difficulties. In most States the setting of an execution 
date now provides the only incentive for the condemned pris-
oner to initiate post-conviction review. As a result, noth-
ing happens until a date is set. Then counsel is appointed 
or found, and efforts are made to stay the execution. 
Capital litigation is therefore distinctly different 
from other criminal cases. Typically, there are long peri-
ads of inactivity, followed by hurried eleventh-hour activi-
ty. Last-minute litigation takes place under tremendous 
time pressure. It is a disservice to the prisoner, to law-
yers, and to the courts. 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital cases 
should be subject to one fair and complete course of collat-
eral review through the state and federal systems. This 
review should be free from the time pressure of an impending 
execution, and with the assistance of competent counsel for 
the prisoner. 
should end. 
When this review has concluded, litigation 
4Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
Stat. 4181, 4393-4394. 
of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 
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It is vital to understand that this proposal is option-
al. It would not be binding on a State. It would allow a 
State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving its 
capital prisoners within the scope of the new federal stat-
ute. A State could do this by providing competent counsel 
in state post-conviction review. 
The proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by provid-
ing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas petitions. 
The time limit would have tolling rules that ensure ample 
time for the presentation and consideration of all claims. 
It is not possible to say how much delay might be reduced, 
for our proposal does not limit the amount of time that a 
claim may be pending before a court. But reducing delay is 
not in itself the chief goal of our proposal. Rather, it 
seeks to eliminate the legal chaos caused by the lack of a 
limitations period to move prisoners through the review sys-
tem in an orderly and meticulous way. And it seeks to reme-
dy the lack of finality that allows prisoners to file peti-
tions again and again. 
The Committee's proposal would enhance finality by lim-
iting the circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought after one full course of litigation up to the Supreme 
Court. The proposal would strictly limit subsequent and 
successive petitions. That is, after having one full and 
fair course of review, a prisoner should not be allowed to 
return to court to seek delay. 
- 7 -
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners: competent 
counsel, an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
need not scramble for his life in order to have his claim 
heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the federal 
district court to the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Cammi t tee's proposal is to 
advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, f ai rne s s 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee specifi-
cally asked that I address the alternative proposal, S. 
1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying on proposed 
legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable role for a 
judge. I will, of course, honor your request. At the out-
set I salute the Chairman's interest in this important sub-
ject. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
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aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the as-
surance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. I note that S. 1757 also proposes clari-
fications to our section concerning waiver of counsel. 
These merit careful consideration. Some of the changes in 
the S. 1757, however, would impose significant added expense 
on the States. And changes in the mechanisms for finality 
could well produce more repetition and last minute appeals, 
not less. 
S. 1757 would provide uniform national standards for 
the qualification of appointed counsel both in collateral 
review and at trial. These a re the same standards in the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here is an admirable 
one. Our Committee considered including such standards. We 
concluded that the States should have the first opportunity 
to devise standards. S. 1757's funding provision would not 
allow the States to regulate counsel fees, or new fees for 
investigators and expert witnesses. This could impose an 
expense on the States that will make the reform package un-
attractive. 
S. 1757 expands the limitations period in our proposal 
from six months to one year. Six months is longer than the 
time for appeal in other areas of law. It was the Commit-
tee's judgment that six months was an ample period where 
counsel is provided. The Judicial Conf ere nee commit tee of 
the 19 7 0' s that I have mentioned came to the same cone 1 u-
s ion. 
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With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of concern. First, S. 1757 expands the situa-
tions in which prisoners may bring repetitive petitions --
where they may take more than one bite at the apple. Under 
our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat petition where 
there is any question as to his innocence. This is fair and 
necessary. Buts. 1757 would go well beyond this. Repeat 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an 
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
S. 1757 also includes a new exception for a "miscarriage of 
justice." This phrase is drawn from Supreme Court cases in 
an unrelated area of the law. 5 The phrase is not yet well 
defined, and its use in this new context may produce confu-
sion and an open door for abuse. 
These changes appear to be intended to allow repeat 
challenges to the sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
This would invite repetitive litigation. The Committee con-
eluded that it was fair to ask the prisoner, who has coun-
sel, to raise challenges to sentence the first time around. 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating evidence relevant 
to sentencing can be 1 i te rally unlimited. For example, a 
prisoner will often introduce evidence concerning his child-
hood. The open-ended nature of sentencing evidence means 
that prisoners can easily claim to have new evidence after 
5see Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989); Smith v. 
Mu r ray , 4 7 7 U . S . 478( 19 8 6 ) . 
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the first habeas proceeding, or produce new last minute tes-
timony from paid experts. In sum, creating an exception for 
the rare case of a significant new claim creates a serious 
potential for abuse in all cases. 
A second area of concern is the law of procedural de-
fault. The rules of procedural default involve state re-
quirements that a defendant raise an objection to errors at 
the time of trial, when it might be corrected. If the de-
fense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to raise 
the claim will be waived. This serves the purpose of seeing 
that errors are pointed out when something can be done, not 
years later in attempt to win a whole new trial. The 
changes in S. 1757 would overrule a whole series of Supreme 
Court cases in this field. 6 They would make it easier for a 
prisoner to raise claims for the first time long after 
trial. 
Finally, S. 1757 adds a new section to our proposal 
also aimed at overruling Supreme Court decisions that pro-
mote finality. 7 Under these decisions, the legality of a 
prisoner's sentence is usually measured by the law in effect 
at the time of his trial and direct appeal. s. 1757 changes 
this, and would allow prisoners in many cases to challenge 
6 E.g. , Smith v. 
Carrier, 427 U.S. 
(1982); Wainwright 
Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986); Murray v. 
478 (1986); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977). 
7 See Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989); Penry v. 




their convictions and sentences on the basis of law that was 
not even on the books when they were tried. This statutory 
change alters the area of constitutional criminal law known 
as retroactivity. I note that this is an area traditionally 
handled by the courts, that have day-to-day experience. It 
is not one where the Congress has generally been involved. 
My concern is that the changes I have mentioned may 
take away the incentive of the States to participate in re-
form. Under S. 1757, instead of assuring a decrease in rep-
etition and delay, there could well be an increase. The 
success of the "quid pro quo" approach assumes a trade that 
will be attractive to States that wish to administer their 
capital punishment statutes. The States should, and in my 
view would, agree to measures that safeguard the rights of 
prisoners. In return, under our proposal, the States are 
assured that repetition and delay are curtailed. 
If Congress is interested in the quid pro quo approach 
offered by the Cornrni ttee, it must take care not to destroy 
the increased finality and order that will prompt the States 
to participate. I fear that the States would have little 
incentive to opt for a sys tern that does not recognize the 
St ates ' 1 e g i ti mate int e rest in fin a 1 i t y . I f th i s happens , 
an important opportunity to provide needed safeguards for 
inmates, and to bring sanity to our system of capital re-
view, will have been lost. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
-L. ~ (!. 
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I t i s ~ to understand that this proposal is option-
It would not be binding on a State. It would allow a 
State to elect to bring collateral litigation involving its 
capital prisoners within the scope of the new federal stat-
ute. A State could do this by providing competent counsel 
in state post-conviction review. 
/-Tne>--proposal would reduce unnecessary delay by provid- / 
ing a time limit on the filing of federal habeas petitions. 
The time limit would have tolling rules that ensure ample 
time for the presentation and consideration of all claims. 
It is not possible to say how much delay might be reduced, 
--for our proposal does not limit the amount of time that a 
claim may be pending before a court. But reducing delay is 
not in itself the chief goal of our proposal. Rather, it 
seeks to eliminate the legal chaos caused by the lack of a 
limitations period to move prisoners through the review sys-
tem in an orderly and meticulous way. And it seeks to reme-
y the lack of finality that allows prisoners to file peti-
tions again and again. ----- ---------- -The Committee's proposal would enhance finality by lim-
iting the circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought after one full course of litigation up to the Supreme 




successive petitions. That is, after having one full and 
fair course of review, a prisoner should n-ot be allowed to 
return to court to seek delay. 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners: competent 
counsel, an automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
need not s c r a mb 1 e f o r hi s 1 i f e i n o rd e r to have hi s c 1 a i m 
heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the federal 
district court to the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is to 
advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty 
delay. l?' 
\ 
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not even on the books when they we r e tri e d. statutory 
change alters the area of constitutional criminal law known 
as retroactivity . . I no1, that -~ i-s---a-R_, area tradj_t.i-e-nally 
hand 1 e d by ~ rt s , ba,<<av e da y-t o-d,;:y-- e xpe r i enc e . It 
is not one where the Congress has genera been involved. 
_._. ----
My concern is that the changes I have 
-~ 
~y the incentive of the States to participate i 
~ ~, 
form. Under S. 1757, instead of g.e.t,.-t.;i,Jl,g a decrease 
titian and delay, there ~ b ~ increase. Y The 
I\ I\ 
e "quid pro quo" approach assumes a t i:,ade that 
attractive to States that wish to admi ster their capita 
/),1~-i,o..~~~ ~ - ~~ 
statutes. to measures that oo i l o;I-. 
safeguard the rights '14W-s-e-ma.y-b.e exp e n-s i ~ e 
/ 
npgpular for the 
assured that t~~ 
~~};-, ~<Z In return, the States a rr e 
repetitionh and delay are curtaile 
If Congress the quid pro quo approa 
'---
offered by the ommi ttee, it must take care not to des tr 
the increased finality and order that will prompt 
to particj:pate. 
o f f e red/ i n S . 
Amendments 
(' 
1757 would in 
to the proposal such as 
fact offer States more 
I 
mo re / repetition, and mo re last minute 1 i ti ga ti on. I 
t7t the States would have little incentive to o p t.;for 
a system. AJ.e-f-o-HR- s~atute cannot benefit anyone if it 








and to bring 
will 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
/ 
/ 
'- ~ 4-f 
FuJ -. i-~ 
~~..t--i- ~~ 
~4'!4 
REFORM OF CAPITAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEDURES 
Oral Summary by 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, United States Supreme Court (Retired) 
Before 
United States Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary 
November 8, 1989 
Copies of my statement on this subject were filed 
with your Committee Monday morning of this week. My 
statement today - in the interest of brevity - will be a 
good deal shorter. The problem is familiar to this 
Committee: Repetitive use of federal habeas corpus in 
capital cases. 
2. 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial 
Conference formed to consider this problem - a problem that 
has frustrated the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
we had an experienced committee of able judges 
from both the trial and appellate level. The members were 
Chief Judges Clark and Roney, and District Judges Hodges and 
Barefoot Sanders - all four of these judges are from states 
in the Fifth and ElevPnth Circuits with extensive experience 
in capital cases. 
Judges Clark, Roney and Sanders are here today. 
Professor Al Pearson, of the University of Georgia Law 
School, served as Reporter. He also is here. 
The Chief Justice has filed with your Judiciary 
Committee the report and proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee 
that I chaired. I would ask that the Report be included in 
the record of the hearing. The proposal would add a new 
Subchapter B to present Chapter 153 that deals with habeas 
corpus. We would add new SS2256-2260. 
3. 
The texts of the new 1tatutes, of course, are set forth in our report. We partifularly call attention to the 
explanatory "Comments" that fo low each of the new sections. 
Contrary to what many people assume, federal habeas 
corpus review of state convict ons is not required by the 
Constitution. The ConstitutioI itself refers only to the 
ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus hat was available only to 
challenge executive detention 1 ithout trial. 
The procedures befor~ this Committee, by contrast, 
were created by Congress in 1867. Of course, Congress is 
free to alter or revise them. 
I think it is of interest to note the situation 
here in the District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress 
eliminated federal court (Article III ~ourts) habeas corpus 
review in the District. Thus, wh~le a p risoner across the 
river in Virginia now may bring multiple petitions for 
habeas review in federal court after exhausting state 
remedies, a District of Columbia prisoner has no such right. 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now deceased), 
in a scholarly article, reviewed the experience in the 
District. He concluded that the DC system had worked well, 
and that the redundancy of dual review existing in the 
states is not essential to protect constitutional rights. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas 
jurisdiction should be exercised only where a prisoner is 
unable to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his 
4. 
claims in state court. In this approach, the federal courts 
remain as a backstop to ensure protection of rights. This 
approach to reform is before the Committee ins. 88. 
This was the only role of federal habeas corpus for 
many years prior to its expansion by the Supreme Court. 
I am not here today to advocate broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
criminal convictions is unique. Also there are no time 
limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. 
Nor is res judicata applicable. Claims may be 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor 
common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee I chaired i s 
a limited one. It is aimed specifically at the single area 
where the problems presented by repetitive habeas corpus 
litigation are most acute -- in capital cases. 
I can speak personally as to the way the present 
system is abused. Each Justice of the Supreme Court is 
designated as "Circuit Justice" for a particular federal 
circuit. When I was active on the Court I was the Circuit 
Justice initially for the old Fifth that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. When 
this Circuit was divided, my responsibility included 
Florida, Georgia and Alabama. 
5. 
Petitions for emergency relief, as contrasted with 
the normal petition for certiorari, are filed initially with 
the Circuit Justice. He may refer them to the entire Court 
with a recommendation. 
Typically, a capital case goes through the 
following process: State trial and conviction, review by 
the intermediate appellate state court and then by the state 
supreme court. This is usually followed by state collateral 
review, again through three levels of state courts. 
At this point, usually after substantial delay -
the prisoner will file a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
This goes through the federal system, District Court, Court 
of Appeals, and finally a petition for cert to the Supreme 
Court. 
At this point, the capital defendant's claims of 
error by the trial court will have been reviewed as many as 
11 times. 
Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel - will 
seek a new trial. When this is denied, the appeal and 
review process I have described will be repeated - often for 
a third time. More frequently than not the Supreme Court 
will have considered a capital case three times. 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the present 
system as "chaotic". I emphasize, however, that no one 
doubts the seriousness of execution - however horrible the 
crime may have been. My own experience with state and 
6. 
federal judges enables me to say that we act on capital 
cases with the greatest concern and care. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for capital 
cases because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers convicted 
are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since the 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision, only 116 executions 
have taken place. The avera ~e length of time between 
conviction and execution has been more than eight years. 
Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
for thorough review. 
I respect those who argue for outright abolition 
of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to retain 
the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the 
need for qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners 
at all stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the 
trial and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 
But this leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not 
provide counsel for post-conviction review. 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital 
cases should be subject to one fair and complete course of 
collateral review through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
impending execution, and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 
litigation should end. 
7. 
It is important to understand that this proposal is 
optional. It would not be binding on a State. It would 
allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation 
involving its capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
federal statute. A State could do this by p roviding 
competent counsel in state post-convicti on rev i ew. 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners. These 
would include (i) competent counsel, (ii) an automatic stay 
of execution so that the prisoner need not scramble for his 
life in order to have his claim heard, and (iii) a new 
automatic right of appeal from the federal district court to 
the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
8. 
-- fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee 
specifically asked that I also address the alternative 
proposal, s. 1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying 
on proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
role for a judge. But I will, of course, honor your 
request. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the 
assurance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. 
But some of the changes proposed bys. 1757 are 
costly, and - if I understand them - could result in 
increased repetition and last minute appeals, not fewer. 
s. 1757 would provide uniform national standards 
for the qualification of appointed counsel both in 
collateral review and at trial. These are the same 
9. 
standards in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here 
is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such 
standards. We concluded, however, that the States should 
have the first opportunity to devise standards. 
s. 1757 would not allow the States to regulate 
counsel fees, or fees for investigators and expert 
witnesses. This could impose an expense on the States that 
will make the reform legislation unattractive. 
s. 1757 expands the limitations period in our 
proposal from six months to one year. Six months is longer 
than the time for appeal in other areas of law. It was the 
Committee's judgment that six months was an ample period 
where counsel i~ provided. 
Wi th rt ·pect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of some concern. First, S. 1757 expands the 
situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive 
petitions. 
Under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is any question as to his innocence. 
This is fair and necessary. 
But S. 1757 would go well beyond this. Repetitive 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an 
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
10. 
As I understand S. 1757, it would allow repeat 
challenges to the sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
This would invite repetitive litigation. 
Our Committee concluded that it was fair to ask the 
prisoner, who has counsel, to raise all challenges to 
sentence the first time around. 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating 
evidence, relevant to sentencing, can be virtually 
unlimited. In Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) my opinion for the 
Court held that any relevant mitigating evidence may be 
admitted in determining the sentence in a capital case. 
This is necessary for fairness. In identifying types of 
such evidence, the Court cited "evidence of a difficult 
family history, and of emotional d isturbance", as an example 
of mitigating evidence. 
In a word, there would be no limit to evidence 
that arguably may be relevant with respect to the sentence 
in capital cases. This means that last minute repeat claims 
can be constructed very easily in any case. We think all 
claims that go to the sentence should be raised the first 
time around. 
Another area of concern is the law of procedural 
default. The rules of "procedural default" involve state 
requirements that a defendant raise an objection to errors 
at the time of trial, when the error may be corrected. If 
11. 
the defense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to 
raise it is waived. Wainwright v. Sykes. 
This serves the purpose of seeing that errors are 
pointed out when something can be done, not years later in 
attempt to win a new trial. The changes proposed ins. 1757 
are contrary to several Supreme Court cases. [See footnote 
in written testimony. Wainwright, Smith v. Murray, Engle v. 
Isaac.] They would make it easier for a prisoner to raise 
claims for the first time long after trial. 
Finally, s. 1757 adds a new section to our proposal 
that would overrule recent Supreme Court decisions that 
promote finality. See Teague v. Lane (1989) Penry v. 
Lynauth (1989). Under these decisions, the legality of a 
prisoner's sentence is usually determined by the l a ~ in 
effect at the time of his . trial and direct appeal. 
S. 1757 changes this, and would allow prisoners in 
many cases to challenge their convictions and sentences on 
the basis of law that was not even on the books when they 
were tried. 
As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing 
law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee and by S. 1757 will 
become effective only in states that agree to the changes. 
My concern is that the provisions of S. 1757, I have briefly 
identified would discourage state acceptance. 
* * * 
12. 
Before closing, I do want to emphasize that it is 
clear from S. 1757, as well as S. 1760 that, there is 
general agreement as to the need for reform in this 
important area. The Supreme Court has stated that the 
justifications for capital punishment are retribution and 
deterrence. Neither purpose is served by repetitive review 
of every capital case. Delay robs the penalty of much of 
its deterrent value. 
As stated at the outset, some 20,000 murders are 
committed each year in our country. Your Committee 
recognizes the need for a critical reexamination of our open 
ended system of review, regardless of innocence. You are to 
be congratulated on undertaking this task. 
We hope we have made a contribution to the 
cons i oeration of this extremely important problem. 
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~ 
Copies of my statement on this subject were filed 
with your Committee Monday morning of this week. My 
-~ 
statement today the interest of brevity - will be a good 
j\, 
deal shorter. The problem is familiar to this Committee: 
Repetitive use of federal habeas corpus in capital cases. 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial 
2. 
Conference formed to consider this problem - a problem that 
has frustrated the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
We had an experienced committee of able judges 
from both the trial and appellate level. The members were 
~~ 
Chief Judges Clark and Roney, District Judges Hodges and 
~ 
Barefoot Sanders - all four of these judges are from states 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits with extensive experience 
<7(.7Jm.; ,-;=-£fl~ c.L~, ~ 
in capital cases. ;2:! -./:' ;s~ · 
~5ZP ze!-._2J§ t.-$, I ~ ~~ 
qJ Contrary to what many people assume, federal habeas · 
corpus review of state convictions is not required by the 
Constitution. The reference in it applies only to fede ~a-:t 
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courts, and - when the Constitution was adopted - the 
ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus was available only to 
challenge executive detention without trial. 
The procedures before this Committee, by contrast, 
were created by Congress in 1867. Of course, Congress is 
free to alter or revise them. 
I think it is of interest to note the situation 
here in the District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress 




Thus, while a prisonef cross the river in Virginia 
how may bring multiple petitions for habeas review in 
federal court after exhausting state remedies, a District of 
Columbia prisoner has no such right. 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now deceased 0 ---------..;;;c--
reviewed the experience in the a scholarly a,,,,/'r~/ 
article. He concluded that the DC system had worked well, 
4. 
and that the redundancy of dual review existing in the 
states is not necessary to protect constitutional rights. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas 
jurisdiction should be exercised ~nly where a prisoner is 
unable to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his 
claims in state court. In this approach/ the federal courts v 
remain as a backstop to ensure protection of rights. 
This was the~~ - 1 ederal habeas corpus ~ 
for many years prior to its expansion by the Supreme Court. 
You have a bill offering this approach to reform in S. 88 
that has been introduced by Senator Thurmond. 
I am not here today to advocate broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
criminal convictions is unique Li ~ ~ ) / here are no 
time limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. 
Nor is h 'd' ~ l' , b t ere 7 res JU 1cat~ . C aims may e 
5. 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor 
common sense supports this. 
9 ~~ 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee is a limited 
I\ 
one. It is aimed specifically at the single area where the 
problems presented by unlimited habeas corpus litigation are 
most acute -- in capital cases. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for capital 
cases because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers ~ 
convicted t are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since the 
~ 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision, only 116 executions 
6. 
have taken place. The average length of time between 
? --------
conviction and execution has been more than eight years. 
Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
for thorough review. 
I respect those who argue for outright abolition 
of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to retain 
the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the 
need for qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners 
at all stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the 
trial and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 
But this leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not 
provide counsel for post-conviction review. 
7 • 
is distinctly different from 
other criminal cases. Typically, there are long periods o 
inactivity, followed by h 
Last-minute litW ation takes place under tremendous time 
is a disservice to the prisoner, to lawyers 
and to the courts. -- --
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital 
cases should be subject to one fair and complete course of 
collate r al review through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
impending execution, and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 
litigation should end. 
It is important to understand that this proposal is 
optional. It would not be binding on a State. It would 
allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation 
involving its capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
8 • 
federal statute. A State could do this by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
The Committee's proposal would enhance finality by 
limiting the circumstances in which federal relief may be 
sought 1 af. ion up 
The proposal would limit subsequent and successive 
t2.f4-,,v- ~ ~ k.J.., ~~ 
petitions. , · one full and fair course ~~ 
~f-f> ~,s~~I 
of revi 1 , a prisoner should not be allowed to return to 
court to seekf;;:;_~ 
I\ 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of 
counsel 0 ~ ) automatic stay of execution so that the prisoner 
~~~ 
prisoners; competent ( 
,; (-< 
'\ 
need not scramble for his life in order to have his claim 
/_Ul) 
heard, and a new automatic right of appeal from the federal 
/\ 
district court to the federal court of appeals. 
9. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
-- fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee 
~ 
specifically asked that ! ~address the alternative proposal, 
S. 1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying on 
proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable role 
for a judge. But I will, of course, honor your request. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
10. 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the 
assurance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. 
I note that S. 1757 also proposes clarifications 
of our section concerning waiver of counsel. These merit 
careful consideration. But some of the changes proposed by 
s. 1757 - if I understand them - could resulted in increased 
repetition and last minute appeals, not ~~ 
" 
S. 1757 would provide uniform national standards 
for the qualification of appointed counsel both in 
collateral review and at trial. These are the same 
standards in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here 
is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such 
standards. We concluded, however, that the States should 
have the first opportunity to devise standards. 
11. 
S. 1757 would not allow the States to regulate 
counsel fees, or fees for investigators and expert 
witnesses. This could impose an expense on the States that 
~ will make the reform ~n-w.- unattractive. 
I\ 
S. 1757 expands the limitations period in our 
proposal from six months to one year. Six months is longer 
than the time for appeal in other areas of law. It was the 
Committee's judgment that six months was an ample period 
where counsel is provided. 
With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of some concern. First, S. 1757 expands the 
situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive petitions L 
~LA--
 they may take more than one bite at the apple. 
"" 
Under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is any question as to his innocence. 
This is fair and necessary. 
12. 
But S. 1757 would go well beyond this. Repeat 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an -
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
S. 1757 also includes a new exception for a 
"miscarriage of justice." I recall no use of this ill-
defined concept in capital cases. Its inclusion in the 
statute could produce confusion and open the door to abuse. 
As I understand S. 1757, it would allow repeat 
challenges to the sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
This would invite repetitive litigation. 
Our Committee concluded that it was fair to ask the 
t,.,U_ 
prisoner, who has counsel, to raise challenges to sentence 
~ 
the first time around. 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating 
✓ evidence, relevant to sentencing can be virtually unlimited. 
~ 
In Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) we held that any relevant 
mitigating evidence may be admitted in determining the 
~ fY'-/"~·HtJ..,--~ 
~~~ 
In identifyin1 , types of such sentence in a capital case. 
evidence, the Court "evidence of difficult 
\\. 
family history, and of emotional disturban c;1,~ ~s ty~i--eally 
~ - d-e.f.e-n-dan-t·s--~ 11 In a word , the re 
? ~ m~ o evidence that arguably may be relevant with 
respect to the sentence in capital cases. 
Another area of concern is the law of procedural 
default. The rules of "procedural default" involve state 
requirements that a defendant raise an objection to errors 
at the time of trial, when the error may be corrected. If 
the defense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to 
u~~~ 
raise) t-!ae cl a W wil l be ~ -
This serves the purpose of seeing that errors are 
pointed out when something can be done, not years later in 
attempt to win at e new trial. The changes proposed in 
/s~-
s . 1757 are contrary to several Supreme Court cases./ G a..--, /4_, J~ 
./,1>~~ 
c nwri: t ~Y I 
They would make it easie r fo r a ~) , 
14. 
prisoner to raise claims for the first time long after 
trial. 
,......--. 
Fin_ally, S. 1757 adds a new section to our 
~ 
proposal that would overrule Supreme Court decisions that 
A 
promote finality. See Teague v. Lane (1989) Penry v. 
Lynauth (1989). Under these decisions, the legality of a 
prisoner's sentence is usually determined by the law in 
effect at the time of his trial and direct appea1 1f s. 1757 
changes this, and would allow prisoners in many cases to 
challenge their convictions and sentences on the basis of 
law that was not T on the books when they were tried. 
As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing 
law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee and by S. 1757 will 
become effective only in states that agree to the changes. 
My concern is that the provisions of S. 1757 ~ ve 
) 
briefly identified would discourage state acceptance. 
-------- 15. It is all clear - at least to me - that 
provisions 0 757 
~ e..y_ ~~X-ea"S e-7: l- ----
X )< X ~ 
Before closing, I do want to emphasize that it is 
clear from s. 1757, as well ass. 1760) that there is general 
agreement as to the need for reform in this important area. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the justifications for 
capital punishment are retribution and deterrence. Neither 
purpose is served by repetitive review of every capital 
case. Delay robs the penalty of much of its deterrent 
value. 
As stated at the outset, some 20,000 murders are 
committed each - year in our country. Your Committee 
~-~ 
recognizes the need for a critical reexamination of our 
/'74-1~-f~ .. 
I\. 




We hope we have made a contribution to the 
consideration of this extremely important problem. 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
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Copies of my statement on this subject were filed 
with your Committee Monday morning of this week. My 
statement today - in the interest of brevity - will be a 
good deal shorter. The problem is familiar to this 
Committee: Repetitive use of £ederal habeas corpus in 
capital cases. 
2 . 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial 
Conference formed to consider this problem - a problem that 
has frustrated the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
We had an experienced committee of able judges 
from both the trial and appellate level. The members were 
Chief Judges Clark and Roney, and District Judges Hodges and 
Barefoot Sanders - all four of these judges are from states 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits with extensive experience 
in capital cases. 
Judges Clark, Roney and Sanders are here today. 
Professor Al Pearson, of the University of Georgia Law 
School, served as Reporter. He also is here. 
The Chief Justice has filed with your Judiciary 
Committee the report and proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee 
that I chaired. I would ask that the Report be included in 
the record of the hearing. The proposal would add a new 
Subchapter B to present Chapter 153 that deals with habeas 
corpus. We would add new §§2256-2260. 
3. 
The texts of the new statutes, of course, are set 
forth in our report. We particularly call attention to the 
explanatory "Comments" that follow each of the new sections. 
Contrary to what many people assume, federal habeas 
corpus review of state convictions is not required by the 
Constitution. The Constitution itself refers only to the 
ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus that was available only to 
challenge executive detention without trial. 
The procedures before this Committee, by contrast, 
were created by Congress in 1867. Of course, Congress is 
free to alter or revise them. 
I think it is of interest to note the situation 
here in the District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress 
eliminated federal court (Article III courts) habeas corpus 
review in the District. Thus, while a prisoner across the 
river in Virginia now may bring multiple petitions for 
habeas review in federal court after exhausting state 
remedies, a District of Columbia prisoner has no such right. ... 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGowf on CADC (now deceased), 
in a scholarly article, reviewed the experience in the 
District. He concluded that the DC system had worked well, 
and that the redundancy of dual review existing in the 
states is not essential to protect constitutional rights. 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas 
jurisdiction should be exercised only where a prisoner is 
unable to secure a "full and fair adjudication'' of his 
4 . 
claims in state court. In this approach, the federal courts 
remain as a backstop to ensure protection of rights. This 
approach to reform is before the Committee in S. 88. 
linRi& ,,s:e the una.•; ,ul e or inder aJ h abe a s @81iftll8 £01 
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I am not here today to advocate broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
criminal convictions is unique. Also there are no time 
limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. 
Nor is res judicata applicable. Claims may be 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor 
common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee I chaired is 
a limited one. It is aimed specifically at the single area 
where the problems presented by repetitive habeas corpus 
litigation are most acute -- in capital cases. 
I can speak personally as to the way the p r esent 
system is abused. Each Justice of the Supreme Court is 
designated as "Circuit Justice" for a particular federal 
circuit. When I was active on the Cou r t I was the Circuit 
Justice initially for the old Fifth that included Florida, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas. When 
this Circuit was divided, my responsibility included 
Florida, Georgia and Alabama. 
5. 
Petitions for emergency relief, as contrasted with 
the normal petition for certiorari, are filed initially with 
the Circuit Justice. He may refer them to the entire Court 
with a recommendation. 
Typically, a capital case goes through the I ~ 
~l~a 
foll~ wing process: State trial and conviction, Fe IE iew by 
• 
,-.v\e.-.) If\ . ~ ~ 8 uui 'el. c a Is} the &ia e tnt c rmod as t c appe ll a t e sac c o at state 
supreme court. This is ustt1 ly followed by state collateral 
review, again through *b?!e levels of state courts. 
At this point, usually after substantial delay -
the prisoner will file a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
This goes through the federal system, District Court, Court 
of Appeals, and finally a petition for cert to the Supreme 
Court. 
At this point, the capital defendant's claims of 
error by the trial court will have been reviewed as many as 
11 times. 
Resourceful counsel - usually new counsel - will 
seek a new trial. When this is denied, the appeal and 
review process I have described will be repeated - often for 
a third time. More frequently than noi the Supreme Court 
d~ 
will have considered a capital caseAthree times. 
The Chief Justice has aptly described the present 
system as "chaotic''. I emphasize, however, that no one 
doubts the seriousness of execution - however horrible the 
crime may have been. My own experienc e with state and 
federal judges enables me to say that we act on capital 
cases with the greatest concern and care. 
6. 
Separate procedures are appropriate for capital 
cases because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers convicted 
are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since the 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision, only 116 executions 
have taken place. The average length of time between 
conviction and execution has been more than eight years. 
Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
for thorough review. 
I respect those who argue for outright abolition 
of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to retain 
the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the 
need for qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners 
at all stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the 
trial and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 
But this leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not 
provide counsel for post-conviction review. 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital 
cases should be subject to one fair and complete course of 
collateral review through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
impending execution, and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 
litigation should end. 
7. 
It is important to understand that this proposal is 
optional. It would not be binding on a State. It would 
allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation 
involving its capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
federal statute. A State could do this by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal. But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners. These 
would include (i) competent counsel, (ii) an automatic stay 
of execution so that the prisoner need not scramble for his 
life in order to have his claim heard, and (iii) a new 
automatic right of appeal from the federal district court to 
the federal court of appeals. 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
8 • 
-- fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee 
specifically asked that I also address the alternative 
proposal, S. 1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying 
on proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
role for a judge. But I will, of course, honor your 
request. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced ass. 1760. But S. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the 
assurance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. 
But some of the changes proposed by S. 1757 are 
costly, and - if I understand them - could result in 
increased repetition and last minute appeals, not fewer . 
S. 1757 would provide uniform national standards 
for the qualification of appointed counsel both in 
collateral review and at trial. These are the same 
9. 
standards in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here 
is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such 
standards. We concluded, however, that the States should 
have the first opportunity to devise standards. 
S. 1757 would not allow the States to regulate 
counsel fees, or fees for investigators and expert 
witnesses. This could impose an expense on the States that 
will make the reform legislation unattractive. 
s. 1757 expands the limitations period in our 
proposal from six months to one year. Six months is longer 
than the time for appeal in other areas of law. It was the 
Committee's judgment that six months was an ample period 
where counsel is provided. 
With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of some concern. First, S. 1757 expands the 
situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive 
petitions. 
Under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is any question as to his innocence. 
This is fair and necessary. 
But S. 1757 would go well beyond this. Repetitive 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an 
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
,, 
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Copies of my statement on this subject were filed 
with your Committee Monday morning of this week. My 
statement today - in the interest of brevity - will be a 
good deal shorter. The problem is familiar to this 
Committee: Repetitive use of federal habeas corpus in 
capital cases. 
I chaired an Ad Hoc Committee of the Judicial 
Conference formed to consider this problem - a problem that 
has frustrated the enforcement of the laws of 37 states. 
We had an experienced committee of able judges 
from both the trial and appellate level. The members were 
Chief Judges Clark and Roney, and District Judges Hodges and 
Barefoot Sanders - all four of these judges are from states 
in the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits with extensive experience 
in capital cases. 
~ 
3. 
Judges Clark, Roney and Sanders are here today. 
Professor Al Pearson, of the University of Georgia Law 
School, served as Reporter. He also is here. 
T~ 
Contrary to what many people assume, federal habeas 
corpus review of state convictions is not required by the 
-Constitution . ~he ~£:!::eh~ j~ l~r,:~e~ ~ .}~te federal 
-sourts , and when the Constitution was adopted - the 
i~ ...... 
ancient Writ of Habeas Corpus ~was available only to 
challenge executive detention without trial. 
The procedures before this Committee, by contrast, 
were created by Congress in 1867. Of course, Congress is 
free to alter or revise them. 
I think it is of interest to note the situation 
here in the District of Columbia. In 1970, Congress 
eliminated federal court (Article III courts) habeas corpus 
review in the District. Thus, while a prisoner across the 
,,.,,.., 
r iver in Virginia ~ ow may bring multiple petitions for ✓ 
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habeas review in federal court after exhausting state 
remedies, a District of Columbia prisoner has no such right. 
In 1982 Judge Carl McGown on CADC (now deceased), 
in a scholarly article, reviewed the experience in the 
District. He concluded that the DC system had worked well ' o~J. ~ 
~ 
a-rg.. tw , t th o redundancy of dual review existing in the 
t. • <t ~ ft, " 
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states is not aecesoarv to protect constitutional rights. 
" 
It has also been suggested that federal habeas 
jurisdiction should be exercised only where a prisoner is 
unable to secure a "full and fair adjudication" of his 
claims in state court. In this approach, the federal courts 
remain as a backstop to ensure protection of rights. ~ 'ff{V"t:lvk 
,(o ~ is ~Cwt ~ ~ ~I\ S. ft. " 
This was the only role of federal habeas corpus 
~ for many years prior to its expansion by the Supreme ✓ 
Court. 
I am not here today to advocate broad reforms. I 
do emphasize that our system of dual collateral review of 
5. 
criminal convictions is unique. Also there are no time 
limits whatsoever on habeas corpus -- a prisoner may 
challenge a conviction years after it has become final, and 
after witnesses and records are long gone. 
Nor is res judicata applicable. Claims may be 
brought again and again. Neither the Constitution nor 
common sense supports this. 
The proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee I chaired is 
a limited one. It is aimed specifically at the single area 
~.k.~ 
where the problems presented by u-alim4t ed habeas corpus --- - ~ '\ 
~~ f),A- J /.A 't-1 "/ . I' 1/_/ 
litigation are most acute -- in capital cases. 
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Separate procedures are appropriate for capital 
cases because the incentives in these cases are exactly the 
opposite of those involving imprisonment. The prisoner 
serving a term of years seeks to have his case reviewed 
speedily in the hope of gaining release. For the condemned 
inmate, delay is the ove r riding object ive. 
6. 
About 20,000 murders are committed in our country 
each year. Only a fraction of the worst murderers convicted 
are sentenced to die. 
There are now approximately 2,200 convicted 
murderers on death row awaiting execution. Since the 
Supreme Court's 1972 Furman decision, only 116 executions 
have taken place. The average length of time between 
conviction and execution has been more than eight years. 
Delay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
for thorough review. 
I respect those who argue for outright abolition 
of capital punishment. But it seems irrational to retain 
the penalty, and frustrate its fair implementation. 
A major problem with the present system is the 
need for qualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners 
at all stages. The Constitution requires counsel for the 
trial and direct review. A new federal statute requires 
7 • 
appointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases. 
But this leaves a serious gap in state systems that do not 
provide counsel for post-conviction review. 
The objective of our proposal is this: Capital 
cases should be subject to one fair and complete course of 
collateral review through the state and federal systems. 
This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
impending execution, and with the assistance of competent 
counsel for the prisoner. When this review has concluded, 
litigation should end. 
It is important to understand that this proposal is 
optional. It would not be binding on a State. It would 
allow a State to elect to bring collateral litigation 
involving its capital prisoners within the scope of the new 
federal statute. A State could do this by providing 
competent counsel in state post-conviction review. 
8 • 
Comm17: tee's proposal would enhance finality by 
l [ miting the circumstances · / 
up to the Supreme Court, a prisone 
should not be allowed to return to court to seek further 
:ray. 
The reduction of unnecessary repetition, increased 
order, and enhanced finality, are the benefits to a State 
that adopts our proposal . But a State would have to provide 
increased safeguards for the rights of prisoners. These 
would include (i) competent counsel, (ii) an automatic stay 
of execution so that the prisoner need not scramble for his 
life in order to have his claim heard, and (iii) a new 
automatic right of appeal from the federal district court to 
the federal court of appeals. 
9 • 
In sum, the purpose of the Committee's proposal is 
to advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system 
-- fairness. Where the death penalty is involved, fairness 
means a searching and impartial review of the propriety of 
the sentence. Fairness also requires that if a prisoner's 
claims are found to be without merit, society is entitled to 
have a lawful penalty carried out without unreasonable 
delay. 
* * * 
My invitation to appear before the Committee 
specifically asked that I also address the alternative 
proposal, S. 1757, introduced by your Chairman. Testifying 
on proposed legislation is an unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
role for a judge. But I will, of course, honor your 
request. 
S. 1757 is based on the structure of our proposal, 
which Senator Thurmond has introduced as S. 1760. But S. 
10. 
1757 contains several major alterations. Some of these are 
aimed at achieving admirable goals -- particularly the 
assurance that quality counsel is provided at both trial and 
appellate stages. 
-I nnte tkat s. 1757 also preposes clarifications 
·,J<' ~ f nm se<.HAR AARCeFRiRe vatvec n£ <.nnARe L '>hese med .__ 
I.ft' 
y • • fa P ...,,.,ln dut""' iaA~ t some of the changes proposed by 
~ c,lP}~ I ~ ~ 
S. 1757~ - if I understand them - could result~ in increased 
repetition and last minute appeals, not fewer. 
S. 1757 would provide uniform national standards 
for the qualification of appointed counsel both in 
collateral review and at trial. These are the same 
standards in the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988. The goal here 
is an admirable one. 
Our Committee considered including such 
standards. We concluded, however, that the States should 
have the first opportunity to devise standards. 
t: 
11. 
S. 1757 would not allow the States to regulate 
counsel fees, or fees for investigators and expert 
witnesses. This could impose an expense on the States that 
will make the reform legislation unattractive. 
S. 1757 expands the limitations period in our 
proposal from six months to one year. Six months is longer 
than the time for appeal in other areas of law. It was the 
Committee's judgment that six months was an ample period 
where counsel is provided. 
With respect to finality and repetition, there are 
three areas of some concern. First, S. 1757 expands the 
situations in which prisoners may bring repetitive 
petitions. 
t ~ 
Under our proposal, a prisoner can bring a repeat 
petition where there is ~n~ S}_lestion as to his innocence. 
This is fair and necessary. 
But S. 1757 would go well beyond this . 
12. 
. ~~ 
petitions would be allowed even where innocence was not an 
issue. Indeed, innocence of the crime rarely is an issue. 
(jtM( "----'(miscarriage of 
Its inclusion in the 
tatute could nd open the door___to ah 
As I understand S. 1757, it would allow repeat 
challenges to the sentence as well as to guilt of the crime. 
This would invite repetitive litigation. 
Our Committee concluded that it was fair to ask the 
prisoner, who has counsel, to raise all challenges to 
sentence the first time around. 
The Supreme Court has held that mitigating 
evidence, relevant to sentencing, can be virtually 
unlimited. In Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) we held that any 
relevant mitigating evidence may be admitted in determining 
13. 
the sentence in a capital case. In identifying types of 
such evidence, the Court that "evidence of a difficult 
family history, and of emotional disturbance", as an example 
of mitigating evidence.1J in a word, there would be no limit 
to evidence that arguably may be relevant with respect to 
the sentence in capital cases. Jh.io 
v\~~ CCU\ k (.(/Y\~wJeJ v~ ta,;~ ,~ 
M.ww.:> if-at- la!>+- ~f.e 
~ (/,{>€, 
Another area of concern is the law of procedural 
default. The rules of "procedural default" involve state 
requirements that a defendant raise an objection to errors 
at the time of trial, when the error may be corrected. If 
the defense does not raise the objection, the opportunity to 
raise it have been waived. Wainwright v. Sykes. 
This serves the purpose of seeing that errors are 
pointed out when something can be done, not years later in 
attempt to win a new trial. The changes proposed in S. 1757 
are contrary to several Supreme Court cases. (Ask Hew to 
f q-o !hwi-e j,_ 
/JJ(\~ k,sd-l~ , 
~ - LJ WJ,'l \v<l_p} ~ J, "~ ) 
~v- ~~-
14. 
hame Lhem . .,... They would make it easier for a prisoner to 
raise claims for the first time long after trial. 
Finally, s. 1757 adds a new section to our proposal 
that would overrule recent Supreme Court decisions that 
promote finality. See Teague v. Lane (1989) Penry v. 
Lynauth (1989). Under these decisions, the legality of a 
prisoner's sentence is usually determined by the law in 
effect at the time of his trial and direct appeal. 
S. 1757 changes this, and would allow prisoners in 
many cases to challenge their convictions and sentences on 
-ever. 
the basis of law that was not Aon the books when they were 
tried. 
As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing 
law proposed by our Ad Hoc Committee and by S. 1757 will 
become effective only in states that agree to the changes. 
My concern is that the provisions of S. 1757, I have briefly 
identified would discourage state acceptance. 
15. 
* * * 
Before closing, I do want to emphasize that it is 
clear from s. 1757, as well ass. 1760 ) that there is general V 
agreement as to the need for reform in this important area. 
The Supreme Court has stated that the justifications for 
capital punishment are retribution and deterrence. Neither 
purpose is served by repetitive review of every capital 
case. Delay robs the penalty of much of its deterrent 
value. 
As stated at the outset, some 20,000 murders are 
committed each year in our country. Your Committee 
recognizes the need for a critical reexamination of our open 
ended system of review, regardless of innocence. You are to 
be congratulated on undertaking this task. 
We hope we have made a contribution to the 
consideration of this extremely important problem. 
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1 HEARING 0~ HABEAS CORPUS REFORM 
2 II - - -
3 II WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 8, 1989 
4 II United States Senate, 
5 II Committee on the Judiciary, 
6 II Washington, D. C. 
7 II The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in 
8 II Room SD-226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. 
9 II Bi den, Jr. , Chairman of the Commit tee, presiding. 
10 Present: Senators Biden, Kennedy, Metzenbaum, DeConcini, 
11 II Leahy, Thurmond, Hatch, Grassley, and Specter. 
12 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Today 
13 II the Committee begins its hearing on legislation to reform the 
14 II habeas corpus proceedings. Because of the time of our first 
15 II and very distinguished witness, Mr. Justice Powell, is 
16 II limited, we will waive formal opening statements by my 
. 
17 II colleagues as they arrive today, but there are a few points I 
18 II would like to make before we begin . 
19 11 There is perhaps no legal action in our system of law 
20 II more venerated than habeas corpus. Chief Justice John 
21 II Marshall called habeas corpus "the great writ." It is the 
• 
22 II only writ expressly mentioned in our Constitution, a sign of 
23 II how important the framers regarded it. When we tamper with 
24 II the writ of habeas corpus, we touch one of the roots of our 
111LLER REPORTING co .. ~ II system of justice. Nonetheless, for some time now we have 
)07 C Succt, N.E. 




1 II heard complaints that th~ great writ is being abused. We 
2 II have heard that habeas corpus proceedings are being used to 
3 II gain delay and not justice. And as a result, last year's 
4 II drug bill set up a time table for this Committee to act on 
5 II habeas corpus reform, a time table set in motion by a report 
6 II of the Special Committee on Habeas Corpus chaired by Justice 
7 II Powell. 
8 II That report was released in late September , and pursuant 
9 II to our agree;nent from last year, I introduced habeas corpus 
10 II reform legislation on October 16. Today's hearing begins the 
11 II process by which this Committee will consider the Powell 
12 Committee proposal, my bill, as well as other legislative 
13 options. We have with us today a distinguished collection of 
14 II members of the federal judiciary. At future hearings, we 
15 II will hear from the organized bar, from state officials and 
16 II judges, and other interested parties. And before those 
. 
17 II hearings commence, I want to set out some principles that I 
18 II believe should drive our consideration on habeas corpus 
19 II reform. 
20 II Like the Powell report, the. bill I have introduced 
21 II accepts the fundamental premise that if states are willing to 
, 
22 II provide capital prisoners with competent counsel, they should 
23 ll be permitted to limit those prisoners to a single round of 
24 II federal habeas corpus legislation. But whi l e I am prepared 
111LLEA REPORTING co., 'P.) II to accept that premise, I can do so only if that single round 
)07 C Suen. N.E. 




1 II of habeas corpus is truly complete and comprehensive. Put 
2 II another way if we are going to make habeas corpus review 
3 II faster, we better make it fuller and fair as well. 
4 II This is particularly important to me given my own 
3 
5 II personal views on the death penalty. As I have said publicly 
6 II before, I do not oppose the death penalty as a matter of 
7 II morale principle. Rather I have voted against the death 
8 II penalty when I have voted against specific death penalty 
9 11 proposals because I believe the bills that I have voted 
10 II against pose undue risk of permitting the execution of 
11 II innocent persons. Speeding habeas corpus review of death 
12 II sentences without taking steps to make sure that such review 
13 II is full and fair exacerbates that risk in my opinion. If we 
14 II are going to speed up habeas corpus review, we must provide 
15 11 all capital prisoners with adequate counsel and provide 
16 11 standards to define what that means, what adequate counsel 
. 
17 II means, adequate counsel means . 
18 II In my view, we must remove procedural barriers that 
19 II prevent courts from hearing prisoners' claims. We must give 
20 II these men and women the full benefit of recent Supreme Court 
21 II decisions that may render their death sentences illegal. And 
22 II in some rare cases, we may even need to give these prisoners 
2 3 II a second round of habeas litigation. The point is this: we 
24 II should not support habeas corpus reform unless it is true 
MILLERREPORTiNaco .• ~ II reform, an improvement in the system for all who are involved 
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1 II from all perspectives. ~cceleration alone is not reform in 
2 II my opinion. Swapping existing guaranteed rights for uncertain 
3 II premises of legal assistance is not reform in my opinion. 
4 II Only a balanced set of modifications in habeas corpus 
5 II proceedings, protecting prisoners' rights to raise all legal 
6 II challenges the may have, while protecting the states' 
7 II interests in speed and finality can be called true reform . 
8 And only true reform deserves our support. In con-
9 II clusion, I want to thank all of our witnesses who will be 
10 II appearing today, and I will introduce them as they appear, 
11 II and I look forward to our continued debate and oiscussion on 
12 II these issues in the weeks ahead. And as I indicated at the 
13 II outset in the interest of Justice Powell's limited time, 
14 II Senator Thurmond is going to forego his opening statement, 
15 II and instead has a brief bit of testimony. He has been very 
16 II deeply involved in wanting us to change habeas corpus, 
. 
17 II although we have a different view, but he has been concerned 
18 II about this for many, many years, and he asked whether or not 
19 II he could be the first witness, and I yield now to the ranking 
20 II member of the Committee, Senator Thurmond, and then we will 
21 II move to you, Justice Powell. 
MIU.ER REPORTING CO., INC. 
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE STROM THURMOND, A UNITED 
STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 
Senator Thurmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. 
4 II Chairman and members of the Committee, today we are gathered 
5 II to hear testimony from several distinguished federal judges 
6 II including former Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
7 II regarding the important subject of habeas corpus reform. 
8 II Specifically, this hearing will focus on the recommendations 
9 II of the Ad Hoc Committee on Federal Habeas Corpus Review in 
10 II Capital Cases and legislation I introduced which embodies 
11 II these proposals . In addition, testimony will be heard 
12 II regarding the need for broader reform as encompassed in S. 88 
13 II which I introduced and Senator Biden's alternative to the 
14 II Powell Committee proposal. 
15 II Mr. Chairman, the Powell Committee was formed by Chief 
16 II Justice Rehnquist in June of 1988. It was given a limited 
. 
17 II scope of inquiry inquiring into the necessity and desirability 
18 II of legislation directed toward avoiding delay and a lack of 
19 II finality in capital cases in which a prisoner had or had been 
20 II offered counsel. Pursuant to the Chief Justice's request, 
21 II the Powell Committee has made its recommendations and has 
22 II proposed a legislative remedy to the problem of habeas corpus 
23 II review in capital cases. It is these recommendations which I 
24 II introduce as S. 1760 on October 16 which the Judicial 
111LLEAAEPOATINGco .• ~5 II Committee is considering today. 
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1 This nation is faci~g a crisis in its criminal justice 
2 II system. Federal habeas corpus and collateral attack proce-
3 II dures are in dire need of reform. The large increases in the 
4 II number of habeas corpus filings, many of which are frivolous 
5 II and used as a delaying tactic require that legislation be 
6 II enacted to address this problem. Without question, there is 
7 II a need for reform as habeas petitions have grown by vast 
8 II numbers in recent years. 
9 II Last year federal district courts received an incredible 
10 II $9,880 habeas petitions. The problem of these numerous 
11 II filings is compounded by the extraordinary delay in habeas 
12 II corpus filings, some of which are filed ten years after 
13 II conviction. The result is a criminal justice system which is 
14 II overburdened with piecemeal and repetitious litigation, and 
15 II years of delay between sentencing and a fine judicial 
16 II resolution of the criminal matter. It is no surprise that 
17 II the public's confidence in the criminal justice system has 
18 II been undermined. The issue of habeas corpus is not a new 
19 II one. In 1974, the Judicial Conference approved amendments to 
20 II habeas corpus law which are broader in scope than those 
21 II proposed by the Powell Committee . 
• 
22 II In fact, these amendments still remain the policy 
23 II position of the Judicial Conference. Mr. Chairman, as you 
24 II know, I have fought for habeas corpus reform legislation for 
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1 II duced legislation, as I ~ave since the 97th Congress, which 
2 II would appropriately address the need for reform. That bill, 
3 II S. 88, which I mentioned earlier, is a much broader bill than 
4 II the Powell Committee recommendations, as it applies to all 
5 II criminal cases, not just capital offenses. It also limits 
6 II the exercise of federal habeas jurisdiction to cases where a 
7 II prisoner is upable to secure a full and fair adjudication of 
8 II his claim in state court. The broader and more effective 
9 II proposal embodied ins. 88 would give proper deference to 
10 II state court judgments. Congressional support for broader 
11 II reform is evidenced by the fact that a bill identical to s. 
12 II 88 passed the Senate in 1983 by a vote of 67 to 9. I repeat 
13 II by a vote of 67 to 9. 
14 II In fact, the Chief Justice has expressed a belief that 
15 II the need for broad, effective habeas reform is urgently 
16 II needed. Mr. Chairman, although I believe broader reform 
. 
17 II which applies to all criminal cases is needed, swift Senate 
18 II action on legislation which fully embodies the Powell 
19 II Committee recommendations is vitally important. The Powell 
20 II Committee proposal as embodied in S. 1760 is aimed at 
21 II achieving the following goal: capital cases should be subject 
22 II to one complete and fair course of collateral review in the 
23 II state and federal system free from the time pressure of 
24 II impending execution and with the assistance of competent 
MILLERREPoRTiNoco .• ~5 II counsel for the defendant. Once this appropriate fair review 
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1 II is completed, the criminql process should be brought to a 
2 II conclusion after any exceptional developments in the case. 
3 In closing, we cannot continue to delay action on 
8 
4 II legislation to correct the growing problem in habeas corpus 
5 II cases. Criminal cases must be brought to a close. The 
6 II principles of justice upon which our criminal system is based 
7 II demand that we take action to address the habeas problem. 
8 II Yet, any habeas reform legislation which passes Congress must 
9 ll be real reform which will significantly reduce repetitious • 
10 II litigation, frivolous claims and limit federal intervention 
11 II in state proceedings. For Congress to do otherwise would be 
12 II a disservice to our criminal justice system and the American 
13 II people who expect finality in criminal cases . 
14 II For these reasons, I look forward to today's testimony 
15 II and wish to commend Justice Powell and these other distin-
16 II guished judges who are appearing here today as witnesses. 
17 II Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
18 The Chairman. Thank you. We will have plenty of 
19 II opportunity to question Senator Thurmond. 
20 Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I have an opening 
21 llstatement. 
22 The Chairman. We are not going to have opening state-
23 llments, just the ranking member and the chair. 
24 Senator Metzenbaum. Mr. Chairman, I will go along that 
MILLEAAEPOATiNoco .• ~'5 II decision today, but I want you to understand I protest that 
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t 1 llprocedure. We are equal.among equals. I do not think it is 
2 !!appropriate. I think others of us have something to con-
3 lltribute, and I do -not consider it an appropriate matter. 
4 II The Chairman. I understand that and respect it and 
5 lldisagree with you. There will be no opening statements. 
6 IIJustice Powell. Justice Powell, you, as they say and it is 
7 llrarely true--in this case it is--you need no introduction to 
8 llthis Committee. You have been one of the few justices that 
9 llthis Committee who probably in the recent past apprised 
10 llitself of everything that you have written, everything that 
11 llyou have said, and almost, and I am sure, every case you have 
12 llbeen involved in. You were one of the few justices that I am 
13 llaware of whose writings and actions on cases as a judge were 
14 llso thoroughly read by members of the Committee upon the 
15 llannouncement of your retirement. 
16 II But we are delighted to have you here, and I think the 
17 IIChief made obviously a very appropriate choice to head this 
18 llcommission, and I suspect you probably have been working as 
19 llhard or almost as hard as chair of the commission as you did 
20 llwhen you were on the bench. I am not sure you gained much in 
21 llretirement in terms of leisure time. But welcome, Mr. 
22 l!Justice. We are anxious to hear your opening statement, and 
23 llwe will proceed on a ten minute rule except when it gets to 
24 limy three colleagues who have not had an opportunity to have 
MILLER REPORTING co.·1S· llan opening statement, and they can each have 15 minutes. 
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, 
JR., ASSOCIATE JUSTICE, UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT, RETIRED, ACCOMPANIED BY ALBERT M. PEARSON, 
PROFESSOR, UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA SCHOOL OF LAW, AND 
HEWITT PATE, LAW CLERK 
Justice Powell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You made a 
7 II point that I am very much aware of. When Chief Justice 
8 II Rehnquist appointed me as chairman of this committee, I had 
9 II no idea how much time it was going to take. I saw him 
10 II recently and I said, Bill, I wish I were back on the Court. 




The Chairman. So do !--wish you were back on the Court. 
[Laughter.] 
The Chairman. That may be damning you. I apologize if 
15 II it hurts your reputation, but I wish you were back on the 
16 Ii Court as well. 
17 Justice Powell. Well, Mr. Chairman and members of the 
18 II Committee, on my left is Professor Al Pearson from the 
19 IIUniversity of Georgia, who served as the reporter for our 
20 llcommittee. He personally has tried a number of capital 




Dr. Pearson. I have just been involved in the defense. 
Justice Powell. Only on defense. 
The Chairman. Welcome, Professor Pearson. We are happy 
MILLEA REPORTING co. IIIC. II . . b 
'L~ to have you here and your expertise that you bring to ear on 
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1 II the issue. 
2 Justice Powell. And on my right is Hewitt Pate, who was 
3 lithe law clerk, my law clerk, who worked with the committee . 
4 !!Hewitt is a graduate of the University of Virginia Law School, 
5 liwhere he was number one in his class. 
6 The Chairman. Welcome, Mr. Pate, and the fact that you 
7 liwere number one we will not hold against you. I will not 
8 II hold against you. 
9 Justice Powell. Well, a major request I make is that 
10 Ii any tough questions they be addressed to Al Pearson or Hewitt 
11 liPate. I have a written statement, and I think the best thing 
12 II I can do is to go ahead and read it, and then of course, I 
13 llwould welcome any questions from members of the Committee. 
14 
15 
The Chairman. Please proceed. 
Justice Powell. I should say at the outset in accordance 
16 llwith your rules that my full statement was filed here on 
. 
17 IIMonday. My statement today, I hope, is somewhat briefer. 
18 The Chairman. Mr. Justice, we will see to it your 
19 llentire statement is placed in the record as if read, and you 
20 II proceed to go .as long or short a time as you like. 
21 Justice Powell. Thank you very much. I chaired the ad 
22 llhoc committee as the chairman has stated to consider the 
23 llproblem that has frustrated the enforcement of the laws of 
24 lithe 37 states that have capital punishment. Of course, the 
MILWIAEPORTINGco .• ~'s II Congress of the United States also in 1988 adopted a statute, 
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{ 1 lithe drug statute, providing for capital punishment. 
2 I should say that we had an experienced committee of 
l 3 Hable judges from both the trial and appellate level. The 
( 
( 
4 ll mernbers were Chief Judge Clark and Chief Judge Roney of the 
5 115th and 11th Circuits respectively. They are here today, and 
6 II perhaps you will hear from them later. And Dis.trict Judges 
7 IIHodges and Sanders from Florida and Texas respectively, all 
8 II from states in the 5th and 11th Circuits, the two circuits 
9 II that have the greatest number of capital cases. 
10 II I think California ranks high on the list, perhaps third 
11 llarnong the states in terms of capital cases. The Chief 
12 !!Justice has filed with your Committee the report and proposal 
13 !lof the ad hoc committee. It is a printed report with a 
14 II statement to begin with. I would ask that the report be 
15 II included in the record of the hearing. Our proposal would 
16 lladd a new chapter, a Sub-chapter B to Chapter 153 that deals 
17 llwith habeas corpus. We would add new sections, Section 2256 
18 !Ito 2260 inclusive. The text of these statutes are set forth 
19 llin our report. We particularly call attention to the 
20 llexplanatory comments added under _each section of the statute 
21 llthat explain its purpose and the way we would expect it to 
22 lloperate. 
23 The Chairman. Without objection, the report will be 
2 4 II entered in the record. 
MILLER REPORTING CO., ~!; 
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1 1 [The Ad Hoc Committ~e on Federal Habeas Corpus in 
2 l! Capital Cases report follows:] 
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1 Justice Powell. Contrary to what many people assume, 
2 II federal habeas corpus review of state convictions is not 
3 llrequired by the Constitution. The Constitution refers, as 
4 ll was suggested, to the ancient writ of habeas corpus but only 
5 llfor the purpose originally of challenging executive detention 
6 llin Great Britain without trial. Happily, we never had that 
7 llsituation in the United States. The habeas corpus procedures 
8 ll before this Committee by contrast were created by Congress in 
9 111867. 
10 Of course, Congress is free to alter or revise them. It 
11 ll is of interest to note the situation that exists here in the 
12 II District of Columbia. In 1970, the Congress eliminated 
13 ll federal court habeas corpus review in the District of 
14 II Columbia. Thus, while prisoners across the river in my state 
15 llof Virginia may bring multiple petitions for habeas review in 
16 llfederal court after exhausting state remedies, a District of 
17 IIColumbia prisoner has no such right. In 1982, Judge Carl 
18 IIMcGowan--some of you may have known him--he was a distin-
19 llguished member of the Court of Appeals of the District of 
20 l!Columbia. Unhappily, he is no longer living. He wrote a 
21 llscholarly article in a law review that reviewed the 12 year 
, 
22 llexperience of the District of Columbia without federal habeas 
23 llcorpus. He concluded that the D.C. system had worked well, 
24 !land that the redundancy of dual review existing in the states 
MILLERREPORTINGco., ~§ jj is not essential to the preservation of constitutional 
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2 II It also has been suggested that federal habeas jurisdic-
3 lltion should be exercised only where a prisoner is unable to 
4 !!secure, and here I quote, "a full and fair adjudication of 
5 !!his claim in state courts. " This is an approach pending 
6 llbefore the Committee, I think, in a bills. 88. I do not 
7 llmake any comments about that pending legislation. In any 
8 !!event, this was the only role of federal habeas corpus for 
9 !!many years prior to its expansion by the Supreme Court. 
10 Senator Thurmond. Excuse me, Mr. Justice. Would you 
11 !!pull your machine a little bit closer to your mouth so we can 
12 !!hear you better. 
13 Justice Powell. A little closer. Sorry about that. My 
14 llvoice is not anything like as good as most of you gentlemen's. 
15 
16 
The Chairman. It has never had to be Mr. Justice. 
Justice Powell. Our committee is not here today to 
17 lladvocate broad reforms. I do emphasize that our system of 
18 !!dual collateral review of criminal convictions is unique. 
19 l!Also, there are no time limits whatsoever on habeas corpus. 
20 IIA prisoner may challenge a conviction years after it has 
21 llbecome final, and after witnesses and perhaps necessary 
, 
22 llrecords no longer are available. Nor is res judicata 
23 !!available. Claims may be brought again and again. Neither 
24 lithe Constitution nor in my view common sense requires this. 
MILLER REPORTING CO., 15° 
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1 11 limited one. Also, I emphasize that it is optional for 
2 II states to choose it or reject it. It is aimed specifically 
3 llat the single area where the problem presented by repetitive 
4 II habeas corpus litigation is most acute, that is in capital 
5 11cases. 
6 II I can speak personaliy as to the way the present system 
7 llis abused. Each justice of the Supreme Court is designated 
8 llas circuit justice for a particular circuit. When I was 
9 llactive on the Court, I was circuit justice initially for the 
10 llold 5th that included all six of the southern, deep South 
11 llstates. When this circuit was divided, my responsibility 
12 II included Florida, Georgia and Alabama. Petitions for 
13 llemergency relief as contrasted with normal petitions for cert 
14 llare filed initially with the circuit justice. 
15 II Typically a capital case goes through the following 
16 llprocess, and I invite attention to this because I have 
. 
17 llexperienced it a number of times myself. State trial and 
18 llconviction occur, of course. That is reviewed by the state 
19 llsupreme court. This usually is followed by state collateral 
20 llreview. Again, through two levels of state court. Petitions 
21 llfor cert usually are filed with the Supreme Court. So that 
, 
22 llcould mean two trips to the United States Supreme Court 
23 llalready. Usually after substantial delay the prisoner will 
24 llfile a petition for federal habeas corpus. 
Mll.LERAEPoAnNoco.,1§ II This goes through the federal system, the District Court 
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1 lland the Court of Appeals,. and again, another petition for 
2 II cert is filed with the United States Supreme Court. At this 
3 llpoint the capital defendant has made claims of error in the 
4 llcourt that convicted him and also has been through appellate 
5 llreview at least eight times. Resourceful counsel, usually new 
6 !!counsel, may seek a new trial. When this is denied, appeal 
7 !land review process I have described will be repeated, often 
8 llfor a third time. More frequently than not, the Supreme 
9 IICourt will have considered a capital case three times. 
10 II The Chief Justice has described this present system as 
11 llchaotic. I emphasize, however, that no one doubts the 
12 llseriousness of execution. My own experience with state and 
13 llfederal judges enables me to say that they act on capital 
14 !leases with the greatest concern and care. Separate procedures 
15 llare appropriate for capital cases because the incentives in 
16 l~hese cases are exactly the opposite from those involving 
17 llimprisonment. 
18 II The prisoner serving a term of years seeks to have his 
19 !lease reviewed speedily in the hope of gaining release. For 
20 lithe condemned inmate, delay is the overriding objective. 




e have the highest murder rate in the civilized world. Only 
fraction of the worst murderers who are convicted are 
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1 Since the Supreme C~urt's decision in Furman in 1972, 
2 llonly 116, possibly 118--I am not exactly sure--executions 
3 llhave taken place. The average length of time between 
4 !!conviction and execution has been more than eight years. 
5 IIDelay of this magnitude is hardly necessary for fairness or 
6 ll for thorough review. I respect those who argue for outright 
7 II abolishment of capital punishment. Indeed, I have said 
8 llpublicly that if were in the legislature, I would vote 
9 !!against it. But it seems irrational to retain the penalty 
10 lland frustrate its fair implementation. 
11 II A major problem with the present system is the need for 
12 llqualified counsel to represent indigent prisoners at all 
13 llstages. The Constitution, of course, requires counsel for 
14 II trial and direct appeal. A nE:w federal statute requires 
15 llappointment of counsel on federal habeas in capital cases, 
16 llbut this leaves a serious gap in the state system in states 
. 
17 llthat do not provide counsel for state post-conviction review. 
18 IIThe objective of our proposal is this. Capital cases should 
19 llbe subject to one fair and complete course of collateral 
20 review through the state and federal systems. 
21 This review should be free from the time pressure of an 
22 impending execution, and, of course, with the assistance of 
23 competent counsel for the prisoner. When this review has 
24 llbeen concluded, we think litigation should end. It is 
IIILLERREPOATINGco.,~5 JJimportant to understand that this proposal is optional. 
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1 !!would not be binding on q state. It would allow a state to 
2 !!elect, to bring collateral litigation involving its capital 
3 !!prisoners within the scope of the new federal statute, but a 
4 !!state could do this only by providing competent counsel in 
5 !!state post-conviction remedies, where counsel no longer is 
6 !!required. 
7 II The reduction of unnecessary repetition would be one 
8 !!gain, we would hope. Enhanced finality certainly would be 
9 !!another that.would benefit the states in many ways. But a 
10 !!state would have to provide increased safeguards for the 
11 !!rights of prisoners. These safeguards would include, and I 
12 !!repeat, competent counsel throughout. Second, an automatic 
13 !!stay of execution so that the prisoner need not scramble for 
14 llhis life in order to have his claims fully heard. And third, 
15 Ila new automatic right of appeal from the Federal District 
16 !!Court to the Federal Court of Appeals, a right that does not 
17 l~resently exist. 
18 II In sum, the purpose of the committee proposal is to 
19 !!advance the fundamental requirement of a justice system. 
20 ltthat, of course, is fairness. Where the death penalty is 
21 !!involved, fairness means a searching and impartial review of 
' 
22 !~he propriety of the system. Fairness also requires that if 
23 I~ prisoner's claims are found to be without merit, society is 
24 l~ntitled to have a lawful penalty carried out without 
MLLER REPORTING co.,15. ltunreasonable · delay. 
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1 Mr. Chairman, that ~nds the part of the statement that I 
2 llhave here today that is affirmative in support of the 
3 llproposal that we have made. My invitation to appear before 
4 lithe Senate specifically included a request that I address 
5 llbriefly the alternative proposal ins. 1757 introduced by 
6 llyou, Mr. Chairman. I must say that I would not have volun-
7 ll teered to comment on any legislation proposed by any member 
8 II of the Senate, much less the distinguished chairman of the 
9 II Judiciary Committee. 
10 
11 
The Chairman. I have invited the criticism. 
Justice Powell. You did, sir, I must say. I add that I 
12 II thought when I became a federal judge I would not have to 
13 lltestify before anymore, but of course, I will honor your 




The Chairman. I expected you would . 
. 
Justice Powell. Although basically, and I think this is 
18 II important to emphasize, I do not think we are very far apart. 
19 III think our purposes are essentially -quite similar so it 
20 llcould be that after more consideration by all interested 
21 llparties there would be room for some very reasonable and fair 
' 
22 llcompromise. _I refer to your bill by its number, 1757, and sa 
23 llit is based on the structure of our proposal, which Senator 
24 IIThurmond has introduced as 1760. I think that is right, 
111UERREPORTIHGco .• ~'s l!Senator. I am sorry. But 1757 contains several major 
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1 llalterations. Some of these are aimed at achieving admirable 
2 II goals, particularly the assurance of competent counsel to be 
3 provided at both trial and appellate stages. 
4 Some of the changes proposed do seem to me to be costly, 
5 !land if I understand them correctly, it could result in 
6 !!perhaps in increased repetition and would permit last minute 
7 llappeals under certain circumstances. Section 1757 would 
8 llprovide uniform national standards for the qualification of 
9 llappointed counsel both in collateral review and at trial. 
10 IIThe standards in your bill, Senator, would be those in the 
11 111988 Drug Act. I personally think they are excellent 
12 llstandards. The only question in my mind is the ability of 
~ 
13 lithe states to compensate counsel in criminal cases varies 
14 livery widely depending on the weal th of the state and the 
15 l~illingness of the legislative bodies to make appropriations. 
16 II We think, therefore, that rather than go along with that 
17 llprovision of your legislation, it would best to give the 
18 llstates the first opportunity to devise standards for counsel. 
19 IIS. 1757 would not allow the states to regulate counsel fees 
20 l~r the fees for investigators and expert witnesses. As I 
21 llhave mentioned, this could result in an expense to states 
• 
22 llthat may make reform legislation unattractive. 1757 would, 
23 Ill et me see, would expand the limitations period in our 
24 l~roposal from six months to one year. Six months is con-
111LLEAREPOATINoco •• ~. llsiderably longer than the time for appeal in other areas of 
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1 lithe law. 
2 It was the committee's judgment that the six months is 
3 llan ample period where counsel is provided as would require. 
4 IIWith respect to finality and repetition, there are some areas 
5 llof concern. First, Section 1757 expands situations in which 
6 llprisoners may bring repetitive petitions. Under our proposal, 
7 Il a prisoner can bring a repeat petition where there is any 
8 II question as to his innocence. This we think is fair and 
9 llnecessary, but S . 1757 would go beyond this. Repetitive 
10 llpetitions would be allowed even where innocence is not an 
11 ll issue, and I think I can say from considerable experience 
12 llwith capital cases, 15-1/2 years that I was on the Court, 
13 llthat innocence, innocence of the crime is very rare. The 
14 llissue usually is whether or not there should be capital 
15 !!punishment. 
16 II As I understand S. 1757, it also would allow repeat 
17 !!challenges to the sentence as well as the guilt of the crime. 
18 IIThis would invite repetitive litigation. Our committee 
19 llconcluded that it was fair to require the prisoner who has 
20 llcounsel to raise all challenges .to the sentence the first 
21 lltime around. The difficulty with allowing subsequent 
, 
22 llchallenges to the sentence of death is that the statutes that 
23 llprovide for capital punishment use the term "mitigating 
24 llcircumstances." It identifies a number of circumstances that 
IIILLERREPOATrNaco.,fs. Jjwould be considered in mitigation of the offense when the 
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1 llcourt is considering, co~rt and jury, whether to determine 
2 ll that capital punishment should be ordered. 
3 II But in decisions of the Supreme Court, we held that 
4 llthere was no limit on the type of mitigating evidence that 
5 llcould be introduced at the sentencing hearing. In other 
6 llwords, especially unlimited and anything that an ingenious 
7 llcounsel or resourceful litigant can think of that might be 
8 l~iewed as mitigating can and should be presented to the 
9 llsentencing jury. What concerns us, Mr. Chairman, is that 
10 l~nder your bill, as I understand it, there would be no limit 
11 llto the evidence that arguably could be relevant with respect 
12 l[to the sentence--! cannot say that word very well. This 
13 l~eans that last minute claims could be constructed very 
14 lleasily in any case in view of the fact that any mitigating 
15 !!evidence is allowed for the sentence. 
16 Another concern is the law of procedural default. The 
17 llrules of procedural default involve state requirements that a 
18 lldefendant raise an objection to errors at the time of trial. 
19 t that time errors can be corrected. If the defense does 
20 l~ot raise the objection, the opportunity to raise it has been 
21 aived. This was the decision in Wainwright v. Sykes, ·now a 
22 llleading case. This serves the purpose of seeing that the 
23 l~rrors are challenged when something can be done, not years 
24 lllater in an attempt to win a new trial. 
MtLLERREPORTINGco.,_fs· II Also, the changes proposed in s. 1757 appear to me to be 
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1 !!contrary to several SuprE;me Court cases. I mention Wain-
2 llwright. There are several others that have followed Wain-
3 llwright. s. 1757 would make it easier for prisoners to raise 
4 llclaims for the first time years after trial. Finally, S. 
5 111757 adds a new section to our proposal that also would 
6 !!overrule recent Supreme Court cases that promote finality. I 
7 llhave in mind particularly the Teague case that was decided in 
8 111989, last spring. 
9 II Under its decision, the legality of a prisoner's 
10 !!sentence is determined by the law in effect at the time of 
11 llhis trial and direct appeal. If I understand 1757 correctly, 
12 ll this would change that and would allow prisoners in many 
13 !leases to challenge their convictions and sentences on the 
14 llbasis of law that was not even on the books when they were 
15 lltried. As I have noted earlier, the changes in existing law 
16 !!proposed by our ad hoc committee and by S. 1757 will become 
17 !!effective only where states agree to the changes. My 
18 llconcern is that the provisions of s. 1757 that I have briefly 
19 llidentified would discourage state acceptance. 
20 II Mr. Chairman and members of the Cornrni ttee before 
21 llclosing, I do want to emphasize that it is clear from s. 1757 
, 
22 llas well as from S. 1760 that there is general agreement as to 
23 lithe need for reform in this important area of the law. The 
24 !!Supreme Court has stated that the justification for capital 
MILLERREPORTiNoco .• ~s· llpunishment are retribution and deterrence. 
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1 llserved by repetitive rev~ew of every capital case. 
2 II Delay robs the penalty of much of its det errent value. 
3 II As stated at the outset, some 20,000 murderers are convicted 
4 !leach year in this country. Your Committee recognizes the 
5 ll need for critical reexamination of this open-ended system of 
6 llreview, a system that rarely concerns innocence. Members of 
7 ll your Committee are to be congratulated on undertaking this 
8 ll task. In the law, I have no more important task. We hope we 
9 ll have made a •ontribution this morning. We do appreciate the 
10 ll opportunity to do that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members 
11 ll of the Committee. 
12 [The statement of Justice Powell follows : ] 
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1 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Mr. Justice. Let me 
2 llmake two procedural comments before we begin the questioning. 
3 IIFirst, I would like to welcome our distinguished colleague 
4 llfrom Florida who is not a member of this Committee, but has 
5 llan intense and longstanding interest in habeas corpus, the 
6 IISenator from Florida, Mr.'Graham. And as I indicated to him, 
7 llwe always welcome members of the Senate who are not on this 
8 IICommi ttee to participate with us. But we will be delighted 
9 llif we have an opportunity to have you ask questions, Senator, 
10 llafter senators who do serve in this Committee have had an 
11 !!opportunity. 
12 II In the event you do not get an opportunity to ask 
13 !!questions because of time, any question you have we would be 
14 !!delighted to submit for the record. And secondly, to 
15 !!indicate that Senator Thurmond and I, although we have not 
16 l~iscussed this, will limit our questions to ten minutes in 
17 llthis first round and give everyone else 15 minutes to ask 





Senator Grassley. A procedural question. 
The Chairman. Yes. 
Senator Grassley. It is my understanding that the 
23 IIJustice is going to leave at 11:15; right? 
24 The Chairman. Well, it is the understanding we will try 
111LLERREPORTrNGco .. ~ . iito get him out of here at 11:15. 
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1 IIEveryone else will get 14 minutes because we essentially took 
2 llthree to five minutes for an opening statement. And you 
3 II should have a little more time. Let us move on. 
4 II There are three areas, Mr. Justice, that I have found 
5 !Isome difficulty with the Powell Commission report, and you 
6 llhave mentioned them each briefly. I do not know if I am 
7 llgoing to have an opportunity to go into all my questions 
8 !!relating to them. One obviously is the limit on success of 
9 llpeti tions. The other is appointment of competent counsel and 
10 lithe third is the scope of review. I would like to begin, and 
11 llas you indicated, either of your associates is welcome to 
12 llparticipate as well in the answers to the questions or 
13 llcomments. 
14 II One difference between the bill that I have drafted and 
15 lithe bill that the Commission has drafted is the standard 
16 !~overing the appointment of counsel, as you mentioned. In 
17 !!essence, the habeas corpus reform plan that you have drafted 
18 llcontains a quid pro quo, as I read it. And that is the 
19 llstates agree to appoint competent counsel to represent 
20 llindigent defendants in state collateral review proceedings, 
21 !land in return the defendant is limited to one bite out of the 
22 llapple when it come to federal habeas corpus review of the 
23 llstate death sentence. 
24 II Now in the commentary accompanying the draft bill, your 
•1LLER 11EPoRTINaco .• ~ . !!committee report says, and I quote, "Central to the efficiency 
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( 1 l!of this scheme is the de':'.'elopment of standards governing the 
2 !!competency of counsel chosen to serve in this specialized and 
3 lldemanding area of litigation." l 
4 But your proposed bill contains no standards governing 
5 lithe competency of counsel; Instead you say that the states 
6 !! should be given quote "wHie latitude" to establish the 
7 !!standards of competency to meet this requirement. Now you 
8 llalso said in your statement, Mr. Justice that that standard 
9 ay have to vary. By implication you indicated it may have 
10 ll to vary because of financial limitations that states may 
11 ll face. My question is this: should a man or woman be sentenced 
12 ll to death based upon the ability or inability of a state to 
13 llprovide for competent counsel, or the mere fact you get 
14 llsentenced and convicted in State A, which concludes not to 
15 llhave enough revenue base to provide for competent counsel, 
16 llyou go to death; whereas, you may very well if you were 
. 
17 llacross the border in State B, where they will provide for 
18 l~ompetent counsel because they will come up with the financial 
19 l~esources to do so, that person may go to death, be put to 
20 l~eath . Is that a reasonable standard for us to have in this 
21 llnation? 
22 Justice Powell. Well, we debated a long time whether we 
23 l~hould try to articulate a standard. We sort of gave it up 
24 l~s being very difficult. I think your bill would adopt the 
MILLER REPORTING co .. ~ . !!standard in the drug bill, and again as I recall, in that 
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1 llconnection you would req-qire, say , five years of experience 
2 llin certain types of litigation. I have practiced law long 
3 llenough to know that it is very hard to tell the difference 
4 llbetween able lawyers and lawyers who are not so able, and 
5 !!lawyers who have certain experience in particular areas of 
6 lllaw who are just no good when you put them in some other 
7 11area. 
8 The Chairman. Well, that is why, Mr. Justice, we added 
9 llthat there be three years' experience in this area, and is it 
10 llnot fair to say that it is almost always better to have 
11 llpeople with equal talent and ability take the one with more 
12 llexperience than the one with less experience? I know when 
13 llthey rolled me on the table, and I said, first question I had 
14 llto my doctor is how many aneurysms have you done. I do not 
15 llcare how they brilliant they are. I would like to know their 
16 llbatting average. 
17 II I suspect if I am rolled up on a dock and I would like 
18 !Ito know how many have you done, professor, and I want to know 
19 llthat. I am not going to ask you that direct question. So 
20 llthat is why we did put it in the .drug bill where we provided 
21 lifer death, sentence of death, and it seems to me that if the 
• 
22 lldevelopment of a standard for attorney competence is central 
23 !Ito the one bite out of the apple plan, would it not be better 
24 llto make those standards part of the bill itself rather than 
MILWIREPoRTiNoco.,~ . llleaving it to the state standards because on t he other hand, 
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1 ll if you leave it to the s~ates, will there not be--you are 
2 !!worried about litigation. Will there not be significant 
3 lllitigation on whether or not the standard is sufficient. Is 
4 Iii t not better just to lay it out straight at the top? Anyone 
5 llwho would like to respond, Mr. Justice. Professor? 
6 Dr. Pearson. Our thinking on this was to leave it to 
7 lithe states to develop plans on a statewide basis. Now we 
8 llhoped that that latitude would be sufficiently attractive to 
9 lithe states that they would want to opt in to the situation in 
10 lithe first place. And one of the key concerns is finding a 
11 llway to get the states to want to participate in the scheme 
12 ll that we have drawn up. Assuming a state wants to get in, 
13 llthen we foresee a step in this process where a district court 
14 llor ultimately a circuit court or even the United States 
15 IISupreme Court would review the adequacy of the proposed 
16 llsystem. It would be a one shot kind of litigation process 
17 llwhere we would get some definitive judicial determination of 
18 lithe adequacy of the system. 
19 The Chairman. Might that not, Professor, result in 50 
20 !lone-shots or 50 pieces of litigation? 
21 
22 
Dr. Pearson. No. I think it would all be--something 
, 
ould be consolidated. It would be a class action type 
23 lllawsuit, very similar to the one brought in Murray v. 
24 l~iarrantano, which resulted in a decision by the Supreme Court 
111
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( 1 llproceedings. 
( 
2 The Chairman. Is there any legal inhibition that is 
3 llthrust upon the Congress that would prevent us from being 
4 liable to do this? It may be a philosophic position you take, 
5 li but is it a legal position? 
6 Dr. Pearson. No, sir. I think that Congress could 
7 llappropriately devise standards. I think the key from our 
8 llperspecti ve would be to devise standards that would be 
9 liappropriately high to give adequate representation but not so 
10 li high or unattainable that the states may say we just cannot 
11 lido it; it is too expensive; we do not want to opt in. That 
12 liis a political call obviously, but that was something that 
13 liwas a part of our thinking. 
14 The Chairman. I have five minutes left, and I was just 
15 liasked by Senator Kennedy--! did not realize this--that my 
16 licolleague from both Massachusetts and Ohio have a bill on the 
17 lifloor. Senator Metzenbaum has to manage that bill on the 
18 llfloor beginning at 11 o'clock. With the permission of my 
19 llcolleagues, I would like to yield the remaining five minutes 
20 liof my time to the Senator from Ohio. So that when it came 
21 lldown to his turn again, whenever that would appropriately 
22 lloccur, I would have my remaining five minutes. I will come 
23 liback to this issue then. So if that is all right? Does 
24 llanyone object to that procedure? 
MLUR REPORTING CO.,~. 
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1 The Chairman. Senator. 
2 II Senator Metzenbaum. I thank the chairman, and I do have 
3 llto be on the floor at 11. I did want to say at the inception 
4 llthat I had some concern--first of all, let me say, Justice 
5 IIPowell, how pleased we are to see you here and see you 
6 II looking well and feeling well, I hope, and I hope you do that 
7 llfor many years in the future. And the Supreme Court lost one 
8 llof its greats when you stepped down. 
9 
10 
Justice Powell. Thank you very much. 
Senator Metzenbaum. I want to say that I have some 
11 llconcern about the procedures that we are operating under with 
12 li the accelerated time frame, and I guess it particularly 
13 lldisturbed me that after your report was made, it was sent 
14 llhere while the Circuit Court of Appeals judges were still 
15 llattempting to determine what their thoughts were on it. And 
16 III just have to say that the matter is so important. We are 
17 l~alking about the lives of individuals, and I certainly do 
18 llnot hold you responsible for this, for the fact it came to us 
19 llwithout the Circuit Court of Appeals judges having an 
20 llopportunity to consider it, that I do not think we serve the 
21 llinterest of justice best by being so anxious to get it to us, 
• 
22 l~o get this accelerated procedure. We are operating under 
23 !Isome time limits. 
24 II That does concern me considerably, and I hope that we 
MILLERREPORTINGco .• ~ . jjcan find a way around that because I think it is too important 
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1 llan issue to just run hell-bent for election. Let me just ask 
2 llyou a couple of questions. Your report identifies two 
3 llprincipal shortcomings with respect to current habeas 
4 llprocedures: unnecessary delay and repetition and a critical 
5 !!shortage of lawyers to represent habeas petitions facing the 
6 !!death penalty. Is there not a twofold problem? One is the 
7 !!shortage of lawyers capable of handling this kind of case, of 
8 !!qualified lawyers, and is that not part of the reason that 
9 llyou have so many delays, and you have so many rehashing of 
10 lithe same issues that the defendant really has a challenge to 
11 llget adequate counsel. 
12 II I am told that in some states there is a limit of a 
13 !!thousand dollars to pay legal counsel, and I would guess that 
14 llwould make a real problem. 
15 
16 
Justice Powell. Yes. 
Senator Metzenbaum. Perhaps Professor Pearson would 
17 l~are to respond to this instead of Justice Powell. Whichever 
18 llis fine with me. 
19 Justice Powell. I will just make a brief statement and 
20 llthen Al Pearson can respond specifically. We all know that 
21 lllawyers vary very widely. I tried only one criminal case. I 
22 as appointed to try to it when I came to the bar in Virginia. 
23 III had had zero experience trying criminal cases. Indeed, 
24 llzero experience at that time trying any case. I hasten to 
MILLERREPORTINGco.,fs. lllose the case. So I did not practice criminal law anymore• 
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1 II But I have seen some youJ}g lawyers who had had very limited 
2 llexperience who were quite brilliant in trial, · and I have seen 
3 !Isome elderly lawyers--indeed, I have opposed a various number 
4 llof lawyers because I was in litigation for years. It is very 
5 llhard to predict about what experience will do for a particular 
6 !! lawyer. 
7 II I would say this that in the southern states, the six 
8 llstates that I am quite familiar with because of my service on 
9 lithe Supreme Court as circuit justice, there are numbers of 
10 lllawyers--Al can correct me on this--who have had experience 
11 llin capital litigation, very substantial numbers. And the 
12 IIFlorida bar, Georgia bar, in particular that I happen to know 
13 llabout, make sure that the lawyers who do try criminal cases 
14 llhave been experienced. Al. 
15 Dr. Pearson. Well, Senator Metzenbaum, I agree with you 
16 l~hat the shortage of attorneys has been a contributing factor 
. 
17 llto the delay. I would add also that the changes of counsel 
18 llat the various stages of the litigation process also con-
19 lltributes to the delay because you may have a trial lawyer and 
20 !~hen a change of counsel on direct appeal. And then after 
21 llthat someone has got to come in and start up the state habeas 
22 l~rocess and then perhaps you have another change when you get 
23 llto federal court. And by fragmenting the litigation process 
24 llas I described, you have to get new lawyers and have them 
MILLER REPORTING co .• ~ . llreeducated in the litigation process, and that reeducation 
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l - 1 takes time, and sometimes it results in the dropping of 
2 issues or the overlooking of points just because you are 
3 ll passing off the baton to a new team of attorneys. 
4 II One of the things that we wanted to address was the 
5 II i ssue of continuity of representation. Get somebody in there 
6 llat the state habeas phase' who is capable and have that 
7 ll individual or team of individuals stay with the case until 
8 !l its conclusion. So you need good lawyers but you need 
9 llcontinuity of representation. 
10 Senator Metzenbaum. Is it the fact that some states 
11 ll have a limit of a thousand dollars for legal counsel? 
12 Dr. Pearson. As I understand it, in the state of 
13 !!Mississippi, a capital case is compensated at the rate of a 
14 II thousand dollars. It is a flat fee. In Georgia where I 
15 II teach and also do defense work, it is up to the local judges. 
16 II Sometimes they do not pay you very much at all, maybe $2500. 
17 Senator Metzenbaum. I think my t i me has expired. I 
18 llhave some other questions. I will try to get back. Thank 
19 11you. 
20 The Chairman. There are se_ven minutes reserved of your 
21 lltime when and if you are able to get back. I thank my . 
22 !!colleagues for allowing the departure in the procedure. 
23 IISenator Thurmond. 
24 Senator Thurmond. Mr. Chairman, I am going to yield to 
,.,LuR REPORTING co., f!s· lithe distinguished Senator from Utah. He has got to go to the 
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( 1 II floor right away. 
( 
2 Senator Hatch. I want to thank my ranking minority 
3 ll member for his courtesy because I am supposed to manage our 
4 II side on the floor on the very same legislation. So I 
5 ll appreciate that courtesy. I just want to welcome Mr. Justice 
6 II Powell. We are so glad to see you again and happy to have 
7 llyou here, and it is not very often we have had you before 
8 llthis Committee. So it is a real privilege and a rare one for 
9 II all of us, and we certainly appreciate the service that you 
10 II have given to this country through all these years. We have 
11 ll great admiration for you. I think everybody on this Commit-
12 ll tee. 
13 II But I just want to make sure that today's hearing is 
14 llextremely important for the attention it brings to the area 
15 II of statutory post-conviction remedies, both for state and 
16 II federal prisoners. I would just raise one caution, however, 
. 
17 ll which unfortunately seems to be necessary whenever the 
18 II general topic of habeas corpus is discussed. What we are 
19 lldiscussing today, I think you pointed out quite clearly, are 
20 llstatutory remedies. They are provided by two very specific 
21 llfederal statutes, 18 u.s.c. Sections 2254 and 2255. The 
22 II first provides a means whereby those held in confinement 
23 llunder state law can challenge the constitutional validity of 
24 II their confinement, and the latter provides essentially the 
111LLERREPORT1Naco .• ~~ jjsame remedy to federal prisoners. 
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1 The nature, scope a~d continued availability of these 
2 ll remedies are purely matters of statute within the power of 
3 IICongress to determine, as you have stated, Mr . Justice. They 
4 !!have no constitutional origin or basis. It is necessary, I 
5 ll think, to raise this reminder because of the unfortunate 
6 llcircumstance by which these remedies came to be called habeas 
7 ll corpus remedies, thus causing an understandable confusion 
8 llwith the constitutional guarantee that the writ of habeas 
9 llcorpus, the ,50-called great writ, shall never be suspended. 
10 IIThe constitutional right of habeas corpus was and still is a 
11 llsafeguard against detention without trial. It provides no 
12 ll rights whatsoever to an individual who has been properly 
13 lltried and found guilty. And I think that is important that 
14 llyou pointed that out, Mr. Justice Powell. 
15 II And I only raise this distinction so that we can be sure 
16 lithat today's hearing will not be characterized by the 
17 llmisleading references to post-conviction relief as a constitu-
18 lltional right that so often characterizes this subject. And 
19 III also notice that Judge Higginbotham points this out as well 
20 llwhere he says the modern writ is not the great writ of the 
21 IIMagna Carta and it is not the writ protected by the Constitu-
' 
22 lltion from suspension. It is essentially a body of case law 
23 1136 years old. Now I am impressed by the committee reports 
24 llrecogni tion of the importance of considerations of guilt 
MILLER REPORTING co.,f5· !Ivers us innocence in the habeas corpus area• 
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( 1 ll notes that Senator Biden~s bill, S. 1757, does not require 
2 ll any consideration of whether a prisoner's claim for review is 
3 ll related to innocence, but would substitute instead as a 
4 ll prerequisite for filing subsequent petitions, a requirement 
5 llthat the claim demonstrate a quote "miscarriage of justice. " 
6 II Now you state that that phrase may in this context quote 
7 ll"produce confusion," and be quote "an open door for abuse." 
8 l! Could I get you to comment on that? 
9 Justice Powell. Al, I would rather you comment on that. 
10 li lt is a very vague phrase. That is my own impression of it. 
11 IIA miscarriage of justice--it sort of lies in the eye of the 
12 llbeholder. I also repeat what I said earlier that for the 
13 llmost part innocence is not an issue in this cases. The 
14 llquestion is whether or not a death sentence was appropriate 
15 II and whether or not the trial was fair. Al, would you care to 
16 licomment on it? 
17 
18 
Senator Hatch. Professor Pearson. 
Dr. Pearson. Well, the inclusion of that language 
19 llappeared to me to provide a way to deal with the situation 
20 llwhere you have had complete review through state and federal 
21 llhabeas and then there was still some concern about the 
22 llvalidity of the sentence. And the reason we wrote the Powell 
23 l!Committee proposal as we did was because we wanted to try to 
24 lldesign a mechanism that would focus at the beginning, at the 
MIU.ER REPORTING co.,~ . jjfront end of post-conviction review and continue it throughout 
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1 li on the validity of the s~ntence since we see that as being 
2 lithe central issue that is, in fact, involved in death penalty 
3 llcapi tal litigation. 
4 II And our thinking was that in view of the fact that the 
5 ll issue of mitigating circumstances tends to be the focal point 
6 llthat capital defense counsel at the habeas phase ought to 
7 llchannel their energy and resources in making sure that the 
8 llsentencing phase has been handled properly. And if there is 
9 llanything that needs to be done to rectify that, you have an 
10 llopportunity in state habeas to have a hearing, if the record 
11 ll needs to be supplemented, and then under our scneme you would 
12 ll also have a second opportunity once you get into Federal 
13 IIDistrict Court to add further to the record if there has been 
14 llanything overlooked in connection with sentencing. 
15 II We hope with those opportunities coupled with the 
16 llpresence of counsel that that would give us enough assurance 
17 ll that after eight layers of post-trial revi ew, we would be 
18 liable to say one way or the other whether the sentence was 
19 Il legally and constitutionally appropriate. From the standpoint 
20 llof. the state ' s position, I think _ if you have to go back and 
21 llhave resentencing trials, that is essentially going to be a . 
22 llproceeding that is going to be equivalent to the full-blown 
23 ll trial. And it may be, the provision in Senator Biden's 
24 l~ersion of the bill, may be a provision that would cause the 
1111.1.ER REPORTING co.,:;rs. llstates to back off. 
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1 liability to restrict the ~rit through judicial interpretation 
2 llby litigation, litigation before the Supreme Court over the 
3 llnext four or five years. 
4 II They may feel they will be better off litigating the 
5 llissue under current law and trying to get some restrictions 
6 lljudicially. If they went'along with this, they may feel like 
7 llthey are opening up the door and that it is not advantageous 
8 !Ito them. So we are trying to come up with balance there so 
9 llthat the sentencing phase can have high assurances of 
10 llfairness and accuracy without opening up the door to the 
11 llpossibility of relitigation a second time through. 
12 Senator Hatch. That is good. Could you also elaborate 
13 lleither or both of you on why you object to s. 1757, Senator 
14 IIBiden's bill, waiver of procedural defaults for objections 
15 llraised at trial? 
16 Dr. Pearson. Well, again, our thinking in that regard 
. 
17 llis tied to the presence of counsel at the state habeas phase, 
18 !land it seemed to us that as far as the litigation of the 
19 llpost-conviction part of the capital case is concerned, if we 
20 llprovide an attorney there, then those decisions that are made 
21 llinto habeas litigation process ought to be considered final 
. 
22 lldecisions if made by competent and capable counsel. Now as 
23 llfar as procedural default at the trial is concerned, under 
24 llour statute we still leave Wainwright v. Sykes intact. But I 
11•uERREPoRTiNoco.,t5. !ithink Wainwright v. Sykes says that if the trial lawyer does 
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1 ll not raise an issue that }).abeas counsel believes should have 
2 II been raised, then you are going to have to show some impact 
3 li on the fairness of the trial before the issue will be 
4 lllitigable in post-conviction review. We find that to be an 
5 !! appropriate standard. Now, if the counsel is ineffective, 
6 llthen you can relitigate that issue. 
7 II And we feel like that there ought to be some finding of 
8 ll impact on the trial process before you can add issues to the 
9 llroster of issues that are lit igated during the post-conviction 
10 ll phase. 
11 Senator Hatch. Is it fair to say that if you grant the 
12 llwaiver, if you go with the Biden provision, then it is just a 
13 llwide open door again to walk through and it will be used in 
14 llevery case? 
15 Dr. Pearson. Well, I think most assuredly a skilled 
16 1;capi tal defense counsel is going to be able to go through the 
17 ll record and find matters that might well have been raised 
18 llwhich were not. And--
19 
20 
Senator Hatch. Even by skilled capital defense counsel. 
Dr. Pearson. Precisely. But from my standpoint if I am 
21 lldoing capital defense work I am going to raise those issues . 
22 ll if I have got the opportunity to do it. You can bet on that . 
23 II Now it is a policy question about whether those issues ought 
24 ll to be raised and we were persuaded that Wainwright v. Sykes 
111
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l 1 ll to be relitigated even tl}ough they were not raised at the 
2 lltrial level. And we felt that that was an appropriate 
t 3 llstandard, and we are not inclined to want to alter it. 
4 Mr. Pate. And again the point should be made that the 
5 IIWainwright series of decisions is on the books now and is 
6 llavailable to the states. 'The Powell bill is optional to the 
7 !!states so there is no reason to think that they will be 
8 ll interested in opting into a proposal if it overrules a series 
9 llof Supreme Court cases that is presently providing finality. 
10 II So if the statute lays on the books unused, it does not 
11 !!benefit either the states or the prisoners to whom it 
12 !!attempts to give the safeguards of counsel and the automatic 
13 llstay. 
14 Senator Hatch. That is a real good point. It may also 
15 llbe a tactical decision at trial as well the decisions that 
16 llare made to raise or not raise certain procedural motions; is 
17 llthat a fair comment? 
18 Dr. Pearson. Well, when you are looking at trial record 
19 llyou certainly want to find whether there is anything to 
20 llchallenge the competence of the initial trial counsel. 
21 
22 
Senator Hatch. Sure. 
Dr. Pearson. Or to challenge the tactical judgment. I 
23 l~ean that is just a part of just about every capital case 
24 l~nce it gets in post-conviction phase. 
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l 1 !land very interesting answers . And I want to thank again my 
l 
2 llcolleague from South Carolina for allowing me to go ahead of 
3 l~y time. Thank you . 
3 4 
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1 The Chairman. Than~ you. As we previously indicated, I 
2 II will now use the remainder of my five minutes and continue 
3 II where Senator Hatch left off, as you might guess from a 
4 II slightly different perspective. Justice Powell, your 
5 II committee report recommends that state prisoners be allowed 
6 !I to present a second or successive habeas corpus petition only 
7 II in one circumstance--to restate it and make sure we are all 
8 II talking about the same thing--and that is when the claim 
9 II raises an issue about the underlying guilt or innocence of 
10 II the prisoner, and even then only in some circumstances. 
11 II Now this means that no claim regarding the propriety of 
12 li the sentence imposed on a prisoner may be raised for any 
13 II reason once the first opportunity for habeas is complete. 
14 II And the committee report says that because the prisoner has 
15 II every incentive to raise issues regarding his sentence at the 
16 1: first opportunity, there should be no reason why quote "the 
17 II federal courts should have to consider a second petition 
18 II which challenges only the sentencing phase in a capital case. 
19 II Now it seems to me there may be possib~e circumstances, even 
20 llif they occur rarely, that might justify a second review of 
21 II sentencing issues. 
22 II For example, suppose a prisoner was prevented from 
23 II raising an issue because of illegal state actions such as the 
24 II state had concealed the fact that perjured testimony had been 
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t 1 llbeing a second bite of t~e apple? 
2 Justice Powell. I do not think we dea l t specifically 
3 llwi th what happened if there were perjured testimony or 
4 ll fraudulent action in other respects. It very rarely happens. 
5 
6 
The Chairman. I would acknowledge that. 
Justice Powell. Right. But corning back to whether or 
7 llnot you would have a second opportunity with respect to the 
8 lisentence to introduce new evidence or new mitigating evidence, 
9 llas you recall a capital case is bifurcated ·at the decision as 
10 llto whether or not capital punishment will be given. The 
11 lldefendant may offer any evidence in mitigation 6f his 
12 lloffense. It is a pretty broad rule. If you allowed repeti-
13 lltive review of the sentence, I suppose you could always think 
14 l~f some mitigating evidence. All of us have had excuses that 
15 e could rely on for doing this or that or failed to do this 
16 llor that. It just seemed to us that it would be endless, and 
17 llthat if counsel understood that they had one opportunity to 
18 ll introduce mitigating evidence that that shoul d be adequate. 
19 The Chairman. Well, my question is this. Would the 
20 llcornmission in your opinion, although I know you--or I do not 
21 llknow whether you can or cannot speak for the whole commission . 
22 !lat this point in terms of poss i ble amendments to its recom-
23 endation. But would there be any objection to there being a 
24 llsecond review of the sentencing issue if it was learned after 
1111
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1 il was perjured testimony a't; and relating to the sentencing 
2 II portion of the bifurcated trial? 
3 Justice Powell. I think where you would have perjured 
4 lltestimony, you have a very different situation. 
5 
6 
The Chairman. So there would be no objection to that? 
Mr. Pate. Well, the'question is how do you draw an 
7 llexception that would cover that case without opening the door 
8 llfor abusive claims in every case. So the important thing to 
9 II do if you are going to look at that is going to be how to 
10 lldraw a provision that is going to protect for the rare case 
11 ll you posit without completely undercutting the finality that 
12 II the proposal attempts to provide. 
13 The Chairman. But you would agree that we should 
14 ll attempt to do that, would you not? 
15 Mr. Pate. Well, I think the committee's judgment was 
16 I. that all challenges to the sentence should be raised the 
17 llfirst time around so I am certainly not going to go outside--
18 The Chairman. But how can you raise a challenge the 
19 llfirst time around if at the first time around you are unaware 
20 II of the fact that there was perjured testimony? 
21 Mr. Pate. Well, you cannot. So again I just have to 
22 II retreat to the point that do you want to leave an exception 
23 ll that is going to open up the door to delay in the wide range 
24 llof cases? Are there enough of these cases that you think 
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{_ 1 !!Cheney v. Brown and some _testimony we have seen from him. 
2 II But my understanding from that case is that the claim was 
3 ll raised on first federal habeas and would have been fully 
4 ll protected for under the Powell Committee proposal. 
5 So the question is are there cases that we know of? Do 
6 ll we think that this is a big enough problem that it merits 
7 ll drawing the exception? And if your conclusion is yes, then 
8 II it should be drawn carefully. 
9 The Chairman. It seems to me that if you could posit 
10 lithe notion that there may even be one-half of one percent of 
11 li the people who might not be put to death because of this, it 
12 ll seems it warrants our effort from my perspective . We have 





Dr. Pearson. May I make one comment on that? 
Justice Powell. May I comment first, Al? 
Dr. Pearson. Yes. 
Justice Powell. I do not care what we put in this 
18 llreport or what is put in any legislation , but if a trial 
19 ll judge is satisfied that there has been perjured testimony, he 
20 llor she is going to try to do something appropriate about it. 
21 IIBut we thought in preparing our legislation that we need not 
, 
22 ll go into situations that are quite remote. 
23 The Chairman. My time is up in this first round. Let 
24 li me just suggest that, aga i n, to put this in focus as, 
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1 llthat is that we are essentially giving the states a choice in 
2 llthis legislation. If they want to sign on to the new way of 
3 lldoing business or stick with the old say of doing business, 
4 !land it seems to me when you deal with that kind of tradeoff, 
5 ll there are certain tradeoffs everyone has to make. So we want 
6 llto make it clear here. We are not working from a circumstance 
7 llof first instance. 
8 II The criminal defendants in this country presently 
9 llpossess, presently possess, rightly or wrongly, this repeti-
10 lltive right at this moment. It may not be a right that should 
11 llbe sustained, but presently is possessed. So we are not 
12 ll starting off with writing it from the first get-go. Anyway, 
13 III thank you. I have some more questions. If I do not get a 
14 llchance to ask ·them, I will submit them in writing to you, Mr. 
15 IIJustice, but I yield now to my colleague from--oh, I am 
16 llsorry, Senator Thurmond. 
17 Senator Thurmond. Justice Powell, in your prepared 
18 llstatement, you note it has been suggested that federal habeas 
19 lljurisdiction should be exercised only where a prisoner is 
20 llunable to secure a full and fair adjudication of his claim in 
21 llstate court. This approach is included in S. 88 which I 
I 
22 llintroduced. Could you please discuss whether the committee 
23 llconsidered such a limitation, and why it was not included? 
24 IIAnd furthermore, what is your opinion regarding such a 
MILLEA REPORTING co.,1s· lllimi tat ion on review? 
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1 Justice Powell. I ~ould rather have my professor 
2 llcomment on that first and then I may add a comment? 
3 Dr. Pearson. Are you asking about the full and fair 
4 !! adjudication standard in your bill, Senator Thurmond? 
5 
6 
Senator Thurmond. That is right. 
Dr. Pearson. Well, bur thinking on that was that the 
7 ll full and fair adjudication standard, if I understand your 
8 llquestion correctly, puts the federal judiciary in position of 
9 llbeing more Of less a backstop to the states, deferring to the 
10 llstates as long as they handle const i tutional issues in a 
11 llprocedurally and formally correct way. Our view was that 
12 llsubstantive review by the federal courts in criminal cases, 
13 llparticularly capital cases, was appropriate in that the 
14 llbackstop type of standard that you have proposed is one that 
15 llwould be undesirable, and we made a judgment to basically 
16 ll subscribe to the scope of review that has evolved from Brown 
17 llv . Allen, and let that be the law of the land from our 
18 llperspective. 
19 Senator Thurmond. In your opinion since 1757 could 
20 llresult in more litigation rather than less, do you realisti-
21 l!cally foresee states voluntari l y adopting these procedures . 
22 lls i nce they may not be cost effective and cause further delay? 
23 Justice Powell. I have concern that I think I perhaps 
24 lla l ready indicated as to whether or not a state would adopt 
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( 1 ll our bill because both bills would make changes in state law, 
2 ll but they are both expressed in terms of options the states 
( 
( 
3 II may or may not elect. We try very carefully to provide 
4 ll enough benefits to a state that would encourage it to accept 
5 ll our bill, but we did not draft legislation that states have 
6 ll to adopt, nor did you. 
7 
8 
Senator Thurmond. Any further comment? 
The Chairman. Will the Senator yield for a point of 
9 llclarification? May I ask a point of clarification? Is it 
10 lithe testimony of--
11 
12 
Senator Thurmond. Not count against my time. 
The Chairman. Not account against your time. Is it the 
13 llposition of the witnesses that the adoption of the Biden bill 
14 llor the Powell Commission proposal would result in more habeas 
15 llcorpus legislation than now exists? Is that the position 
16 llbeing taken? Or more than you would like? 
17 Justice Powell. I would answer that by saying more than 
18 III would like. 
19 Dr. Pearson. I think there would be a proliferation, 




Senator Thurmond. Cannot hear you. Talk in your 
achine. 
Dr. Pearson. Excuse me. I think if your procedural 
24 l~efault rule were to be adopted, which I think overrules 
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1 llalso perhaps the retroactivity standard that you embrace 
2 ll might also proliferate issues, maybe not cases, but in some 
3 !!situations I think you might lead to second or successive 
4 II petitions. 
5 The Chairman. More than now exists though? Without any 
6 llchange in habeas corpus? 
7 Dr. Pearson. Yes. I think with procedural default 
8 llprovision you propose, my answer would be yes. 
9 
10 
The Chairman. Thank you . 
Senator . Thurmond. In your opinion under the Powell 
11 IICornrnittee recommendations, would it be more difficult for 
12 !!defendants to continue to delay the imposition of sentences 
13 II in death penalty cases than it is now and would the same hold 
14 II true for S. 1757? 
15 II Justice Powell. . I think the purposes of both of these 
16 II legislations, proposed legislations, would be to reduce 
17 llrepetitive habeas corpus petitions that now exist almost with 
18 II no limit. I have seen cases come to the Supreme Court four 
19 lltimes on federal habeas in the same case. So that although 
20 II as I have indicated, I have considerable reservations about 
21 II the chairman's bill with the extent to which it would reduce 
, 
22 Ila repetitive habeas corpus litigation, our bill is designed 
23 llwith that in mind, assuming it can be done with full fairness 
24 II in view of the nature of capital punishment. But I think it 
1o11LLER REPORTING co., ~'s II is very necessary to do something. 
,01 C Street . N .E. 





1 The situation we now have with no limit on habeas corpus 
2 lland none on capital habeas corpus cases, and lawyers being 
3 !!perfectly willing and able to exploit the opportunities they 
4 llhave for this sort of litigation, we have a system that 
5 II simply is not working. It brings the entire justice system 
6 llunder--it causes disrespect for the entire justice system. 
7 IIWe have got 2200 people on death row, only a few executed, 
8 1120,000 murders a year. Something has to be done. Now 
9 llwhether either one of these bills would have conspicuous 
10 llsuccess remains to be seen, but I am very glad your Committee 
11 llis undertaking to address a problem that I consider very 
12 II serious in the United States. 
13 Senator Thurmond. I thoroughly agree. We had a lady 
14 llwho testified here two weeks ago. This man killed four 
15 llpeople, and thought he had killed her. He disfigured her. 
16 llshe will be disfigured the rest of her life. He has gone to 
1 7 II the Supreme Court four times. He was sentenced ten years 
18 !Iago. His sentence has not been executed yet. That is 
19 !!perfectly ridiculous. It brings the criminal procedures in 
20 lldisrepute, as you say. Something has got to be done, and we 
21 llhope it will be made in the right way to get results. 
' 
22 II Now I have just one more question. S. 1757 also 
23 llincludes an additional new section 2262. This section would 
24 lloverturn the Supreme Court's ruling in the case of Teague v. 
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1 !!rulings which are decided after a defendant's trial and 
2 lldirect appeals must be retroactively applied. 
3 II In your opinion, does this essentially do away with the 
4 llgoal of the Powell Committee recommendations to ensure 
5 ll finality of litigation in capital cases? 
6 Justice Powell. You'mentioned the Teague case that was 
7 ll decided last spring. 
8 
9 
Senator Thurmond. Yes. 
Justice Powell. I thought that decision was correct. 
10 II So I would be disappointed if it were overruled here. It 
11 llwould seem to me to open up a good deal of l i tigation that in 
12 li my view perhaps is unnecessary. 
13 Senator Thurmond. Any further comment by either one of 
14 llyou? 
15 Dr. Pearson. Well, I do not think that the issue of 
16 ll retroactivity is a real major problem in this area, whichever 
17 llway we go on that is not the key, it seems to me, to the 
18 ll legislative proposal we are talking about. You can make a, I 
19 llthink, a defense of the approach of Teague v . Lane. On the 
20 llother hand, Section 2262 seems to me to be formulated in the 
21 llway in which the law existed prior to the Teague ruling, and 
, 
22 II I do not think we had a tremendous amount of difficulty with 
23 li the law on that. It would not affect my view greatly of the 
24 llbill. 
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1 Mr. Pate. Well, oniy to say that retroactivity is not 
2 ll an area that has traditionally been handled by statute, and 
3 ll it may be something that is best left to be worked out by the 
4 llcourts. It is clear that the change that Section 2262 makes 
5 llwould be perceived as unfavorable to the states and again the 
6 ll bottom line question, will the states opt into the proposal, 
7 lland if they don't, how can it benefit anyone. 
8 Senator Thurmond. I think my time is about up. Mr. 
9 IIChairman, thank you very much. 
10 The Chairman. Thank you very much, Senator. Senator 
11 II DeConcini. 
12 Senator DeConcini. Mr. Chairman, I am going to be 
13 llbrief. I know the senator from Pennsylvania wants some time 
14 llhere. I am only going to ask one question of Justice Powell, 
15 ll if I could, and I will submit some, Justice. Thank you for 
16 lithe fine work on your commission. I have some concerns with 
17 llhow far we approach the requirement of appointing competent 
18 llcounsel, and I wondered if you could comment? Senator 
19 IIBiden's bill, s. 1757, has adopted, as I understand, the 
20 II legislation that is in the drug .bill as to appointment of 
21 llcounsel, and it directs that such counsel have been admitted 
, 
22 llto practice in the state court of last resort for not less 
23 llthan five years, and have, must have at least three years of 
24 II appellate experience in felony cases. 
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1 II experience quotient here . and level. And in your view, are 
2 !! these standards reasonable, and do you believe that there is 
3 !! sufficient number of attorneys available who have several 
4 ll years experience with this type of appellate procedures to 
5 II fill this if this criteria was made into the law? 
6 Justice Powell. I also had trouble with that provision. 
7 II I think it would have to be interpreted in a very generous 
8 II way . There are not very many lawyers like Al Pearson here 
9 ll who have tri,ed a number of capital cases. In fact, I would 
10 ll have a hard time naming anyone at the Richmond bar who has 
11 ll tried a capital case. There are some lawyers there who have 
12 II done it. There are some very competent lawyers who would be 
13 II well qualified to try a capital case who have never tried one. 
14 II And also when you say a year's experience, does that 
15 llmean one case or five cases or whatever? 
16 Senator DeConcini. And then, excuse me, Justice, then 
17 li on top of that three years of applicable experience on taking 
18 llappeals of criminal cases. 
19 Justice Powell. I noticed that, and very few lawyers 
20 ll would have an opportunity to have any significant experience. 
21 Senator DeConcini. I would not think so. If I could, 
22 IIMr. Chairman, I would like to submit a question to Professor 
2 3 II Pearson and also to the Justice for later response, and I 
24 !! would be glad to yield the balance of time to the Senator 
1111.LERREPoRnNoco.,1~ llfrom Pennsylvania. 
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1 The Chairman. Withqut objection, and the Senator from 
2 II Pennsylvania has ten .minutes. 
3 Senator Specter. I thought we started off with 12, Mr. 
4 II Chairman. 
5 
6 
The Chairman. Excuse me. 12 minutes. 12 minutes. 
Senator Specter. I would be curious on a yielding of 
7 II time to come up with less. Mr. Justice Powell, I join my 
8 llcolleagues and welcome you here for your outstanding service 
9 lion the Court and on this important subject. Since the 
10 ll opening statements were limited in initial part, I would like 
11 llto make just a few comments before addressing some questions. 
12 II My own sense is that we have to be very, very careful on 
13 11 limitations on the death penalty because if we are not, we 
14 llmay lose the death penalty. 
15 II I believe the death penalty is very important in the 
16 llcriminal justice system, is an effective deterrent, and I 
17 llbelieve that we have to be very cautious if we are going to 
18 llavoid losing it. We have already seen in the Supreme Court 
19 !l and other courts efforts to abolish the death penalty under 
20 lithe provisions of the cruel and unusual punishment provision. 
21 II And as you say, Mr. Justice Powell, if you were a legislator, 
I 
22 llyou would vote against the death penalty, and there are many 
2 3 II in the Congress who have that point of view. 
24 II It is anomalous, I think, that since Furman v. Georgia 
MILLERREPoRriNoco.,~~ llin 1972, the Congress has not brought back the death penalty 
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1 II in any circumstance except for the Uniform Code of Military 
2 II Justice until 1988 on the drug bill, and then we passed in 
3 li the last month a penalty provision for death for terrorism, 
4 llwhich shows the difficulty of working through the legislative 
5 !! process. And when Senator Biden makes a comment about a 
6 llconcern of one-half of one percent, I think that is a very 
7 ll valid concern. And if we are not extremely careful in the 
8 ll use of the death penalty, then I believe we are going to lose 
9 ll it, and we should not lose it because it is an important 
10 ll weapon in the arsenal against crime. 
11 II When we come to the question of federal sta:ndards, and 
12 ll that goes all through our discussions here as to competency 
13 llof counsel and many, many other lines, it is my thought that 
14 ll we ought to craft as careful as we can what we think is an 
15 llappropriate system of criminal justice without leaving the 
16 ll states an option. The history of federal involvement in 
17 ll state criminal practice is a curious one, and many may not 
18 ll recollect that it has only been for the past 50 years that 
19 li the federal government has imposed limitations on state 
20 II criminal practice starting with .Brown v. Mississippi, when 
21 ll for the first time the due process clause regulated state 
22 ll criminal practice. 
23 II And not too many years ago when I started the practice 
24 ll of law in the state of Pennsylvania there was no requirement 
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1 llcapi tal cases a few year~ earlier, but in the late 1950 's 
2 lldefendants came into criminal courts and there was no 
59 
3 ll requirement for counsel. And it was only Gideon v. Wainwright 
4 llwhich imposed that obligation, and then we have seen a series 
5 llof cases and confessions and search and seizures and line-ups 
6 lland so forth where the feaeral government has imposed 
7 II standards. 
8 II My own sense is that we ought not to leave it up to the 
9 llstates to opt in or out on the system. That the adrninistra-
10 lltion of criminal justice in America requires to the extent we 
11 ll can that there be finality at the earliest point consistent 
12 llwi th the interest of justice on death penalty cases. As you 
13 llhave outlined, Mr. Justice Powell, it is an eight year delay 
14 ll and as Senator Thurmond has commented, that it brings the 
15 llsystem into disrepute, and we have got to find some answer. 
16 IIAnd there is really a sense of frustration. But as I listen 
17 ll to your teptimony, and as I hear the provisions of 1757 
18 llversus 1760, I really wonder if there any significant 
19 llimprovement over what goes on today, as hard as we may try, 
20 llbecause of the complexities of the issue and because of the 
21 llingenuity of counsel. 
22 II Judge Oakes in his prepared testimony--he could not be ' 
23 llhere today--raises the issue about challenging the competency 
24 l~f counsel in the first federal habeas corpus proceeding in 
1111LLER REPORTING co .. ~. lithe second habeas corpus proceeding, and how can we have 
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1 llassurances on that subje~t. So that my initial question, Mr . 
2 !!Justice Powell, really has as its takeoff on your comment in 
3 ll response to Senator Biden when he asks you about perjury on 
4 lithe penalty provision. Your proposal is that the second 
5 ll habeas corpus only go to the issue of innocence of guilt, and 
6 llnot to the question of penalty. Senator Biden says, well, 
7 llsuppose you have perjured testimony. And you said, well, if 
8 lithe trial judge is satisfied about perjured testimony, the 
9 lltrial judge will find a way. 
10 II And you talk about four times the same case having 
11 llgotten to the U.S. Supreme Court on a habeas corpus provision, 
12 \ and my question is would we not be better directed if we 
13 I tried to establish a time table of priority in the federal 
14 llcourts to give these death penalty cases priority status and 
15 lltry to deal with the adequacy of judicial personnel on the 
16 llfederal courts where we have grave shortages in many of our 
17 llfederal courts, to try to get these cases decided very, very 
18 llpromptly with priority attention being directed to them and 
19 llwe may want to improve the system with counsel and some of 
20 the provisions here. 
21 But would not our efforts be best served if we had 
22 ll sufficient resources and priority attention so that when a 
23 !lease come up for the second time, the judge would say, well, 
24 llwe have heard most of this before, let us see if there is 
MILLER REPORTING co .. 15 II anything new, or the third time, or the fourth time, and you 
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1 ll can have successive habe~s corpus petitions under a ny 
2 ll approach, 1757 or your approach 1760? Would we not be better 
3 !! directed if we tried to have more resources and faster 
4 II judicial attention to these issues? 
5 Justice Powell. It is not clear to me what you have 
6 ll suggested. Would you have all capital cases tried initially 
7 ll in federal courts? 
8 Senator Specter. No, I would not do that. I would have 
9 llall capital cases tried in state courts, as they are now · 
10 ll under state criminal proceedings. 
11 
12 
Justice Powell. Yes. 
Senator Specter. But I would say that when there is a 
13 llpetition for writ of habeas corpus in the federal court 
14 ll challenging the state proceeding that that be the priority 
15 ll item for the District _Judge. He clears all of those first. 
16 IIWhen the case goes to the Court of Appeals, they give 
17 llpriority attention and they dispose of that first. I do not 
18 llknow that a time table would be practical, but perhaps it 
19 llwould be. I would be interested in the judge's view on that. 
20 IIBut say that instead of letting them take their turn on the 
21 lldocket, they are handled first? 
22 Justice Powell. I do not think I can comment on 
23 llprecisely what you have in mind because I am not sure I 
24 l~nderstand it. Now of course you go to the state court 
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2 ll into federal court which seems to me to be what you are 
3 II anxious to bring about fairly early. I will make this 
4 ll comment. You spoke about the importance of deterrence. There 




Senator Specter. Not much. 
Justice Powell. Really not much. 
Senator Specter. No, I agree. I think it is a very big 
9 llproblem. An,p I share Senator Thurmond's sense of frustration 
10 II and like to see some way of dealing with it. This legislation 
11 ll is not going to affect what happens in the state collateral 
12 ll attack proceeding and state court habeas corpus. All we can 
13 li do is what is comprehended within federal habeas corpus. And 
14 ll we are now working at the periphery it seems to me as opposed 
15 llto working at the central point. 
16 II And if we got these cases decided earlier or earliest, 
17 limy thought is that we would be doing a lot more to advance 
18 lithe system, and if we paid particular attention to some of 
19 lithe federal courts where they have insufficient number of 
20 lljudges, and we have that legislation pending before us, we 
21 llwould be doing something more important on this problem. 
22 Justice Powell. Well, I think both the Biden bill and 
23 ll our bill would accelerate reliance on federal court and would 
24 lllimit the extent to which you could have repetitive review as 
MILLER REPORTING co., 1§ Jjthe present system now does not deter because, as I have said 
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1 II earlier, you have got peqple on death row who have been there 
2 II ten and 12 years, and you still have 2,200 people on death 
3 ll row, and only 116, 117 of them have ever been executed. 
4 
5 
Senator Specter. Well, Mr. Justice Powell--
Justice Powell. There is no deterrence I just want to 
6 ll make clear. I do not thihk there is any deterrence. 
7 Senator Specter. No, I quite agree with that, Mr. 
8 II Justice Powell, but the question in my mind. We are talking 
9 llabout the first petition. We are talking about the second 
10 ll petition. But we have to be aware that the second petition 
11 llmay have a third petition or a fourth petition or a fifth 
12 ll petition. There is nothing in either of these bills or your 
13 ll proposal to eliminate the repetitive petitions, and what 
14 ll lawyers will be searching for is, as you put it, something to 
15 ll attract that trial judge that there has been a miscarriage of 
16 I justice. And as I have seen the criminal justice system work 
17 II from being district attorney of a big city for eight years 
18 lland handling a lot of these cases on the federal courts in 
19 IIPhiladelphia and the Third Circuit is the delay that comes 
20 llin. And the judges hear a first petition, and they are not 
21 ll too patient with the first petition, but they look at it. 
' 
22 II And the second petition, they are a little less patient. 
23 II The third petition, even a little less patient. And if they 
24 ll had to push it to the center of their docket, and they had 
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1 ll by the judicial counsel, . take it first, then I think we would 
2 ll have the best chance of cutting into the delay . Let me ask 
3 II you one other question, Mr. Justice Powell . The yellow light 
4 ll is on. And that relates to the issue which has arisen about 
5 li the judicial counsel not having an opportunity to have 
6 ll submitted their recommendations. And as I have read through 
7 II the statements of the judges who appear here today, each one 
8 ll disclaims speaking for anybody but himself. And notwithstand-
9 !l ing the interest of speed, it is highly doubtful that the 
10 !I Congress of the United States is going to resolve this issue 
11 li very fast. ~-
12 II We do not do very well on speedy disposition ourselves. 
13 l! Do you see any significant problem in awaiting a judgment by-
14 II -well, let me ask you, what problem do you see, if any, on 
15 ll this Committee's awaiting a j udgment until March of next year 
16 ll when the judicial counsel wi l l have an opportunity to review 
17 II these issues? 
18 Justice Powell. I have no opinion on that. I had 
19 ll nothing whatever to do with the decisions that were made in 
20 llthat respect. I had hoped, I think all of us on our little 
21 llcommittee had hoped that t he Judicial Conference would have 
, 
22 II acted on it in September. But there was a good strong 
23 ll majority vote to carry it over until March. I think we have 
24 II said that our primary concern is to f i nd a fair way to end 
MILLER REPORTIENG co .. ~5 II the system that simply is not working now , and there are a 
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1 ii good many problems which~ver way you try. 
2 Of course, you had the good fortune, from my point of 
3 II view, of being a prosecuting attorney, and so I would be very 
4 !!interested in your views after you have studied these two 
5 llbills. 
6 Senator Specter. Well, I think they are very important 
7 !! issues, and on the subject of hearing from the Judicial 
8 !!Conference, it is my own sense that they will not be slowing 
9 llus up a bit, notwithstanding the mandates of our time table. 
10 !!There is a lot of experience there and the circuit judges 
11 II have seen them, and many of them have been district judges. 
12 !! And having been a prosecutor and having seen many of these 
13 II cases wind their way through the courts, it is a constant 
14 llbattle that the defense lawyers are waging, and I respect 
15 ll what they do. And we have to be very careful that they have 
16 II appropriate latitude, and they are always searching for that 
17 llkernel to try to appeal to some judge. And I think you put 
18 !!your finger on it, Mr. Justice Powell, that no matter what 
19 llbill you write, if somebody sees perjured testimony on the 
20 !!sentencing aspect, notwithstanding the limitation in the law, 
21 !!justice will be done. 
22 That is the great thing about our judicial system. So 
23 !!what I would like to do is find some way to help the judges 
24 !!make their decisions more promptly. 
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t 1 ll judges in the courtroom ~ere today, and they could perhaps 
2 ll cornment on your question as to what should be done before 
3 II March when the Conference reconvenes. I just have no 
4 II information on that whatever. 
5 Senator Specter. Six federal judges and many more 
6 !! potential federal judges in this room. 
7 
8 
Senator Leahy. Mr. Chairman. 
The Chairman. Let me make one comment before I yield to 
9 ll colleague from Vermont for his round of questioning. One 
10 ll thing I would point out, Mr. Justice Powell , is that there is 
11 !lone way in which refusal to withhold consideration of habeas 
12 llcorpus legislation until the Conference had an opportunity to 
13 ll cornment, we will have. And that is those, and I respect 
14 II their views, who think that even my proposal is a significant 
15 ll quote "give-away" of the rights of the criminal defendant, 
16 !l and there are those that feel that very strongly as you know, 
17 ll wi ll have been given some sustenance by the fact that there 
18 ll are a respected body of judges in this country who say they 
19 ll have not have had an opportunity to speak to it and therefore 
20 III suspect you are going to see a significant and legitimate 
21 · 11 argument made that we should not move and there will be 
• 
22 ll attempts to withhold moving based, if no other reason, than 
23 li on that. 
24 II I think it was unfortunate that it turned out this way, 
111LLER REPORTING co .. , 5 !! but it will have an impact, r predict. 
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Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
The Chairman. I would like to hear what he has to say. 
Senator Leahy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Justice 
II Powell, it is a delight to have you here and an honor for the 
II Commit tee . I am glad you'have been willing to take the time, 
!land you and your associates have taken so much time in 
llworking on this very important issue. I cannot help but 
9 llthink that when Senator Specter was referring to be a former 
10 llprosecutor--in fact, he and I served about the same time in 
11 lldifferent states, certainly in greatly different size 
12 lljurisdictions as prosecutors--but I found when I was a 
13 llprosecutor, I wrestled constantly with this issue of habeas 
14 llcorpus. And I felt then and still feel and share with many 
15 llmembers of this Committee the view that the rule on habeas 
16 llcorpus does need reform. 
17 II The delay in the finality of criminal cases caused by 
18 llfrivolous concerns, frivolous claims, concerns all of us. It 
19 llreally does impede the fair administration of justice, but I 
20 11am also concerned that we do not sacrifice in the name of 
21 llexpediency prisoners' rights to vindicate their federal 
' 
22 llconstitutional claims through habeas corpus review. We have 
23 llthat since 1867 and if we change the substance of the law, we 
24 llhave to do it very, very carefully, and I think we would all 
111LLERREPoRnNaco., r5· llagree with that. In fact, we worked quite hard during 1988 
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1 llwhen we were doing the d:r;ug bill to hold off consideration of 
2 ll this issue until after you and your commission had a chance 
3 ll to look at it. 
4 Many instances, habeas is the only way. Unjustly held 
5 ll state prisoner can ask a federal court to take a look at the 
6 !!constitutionality of the conviction. It is particularly 
7 ll important, of course, in capital cases. But we also have to 
8 ll find a way, as I said before, to bring finality. I feel as a 
9 ll former pros~utor if you are going to deter a crime, then 
10 ll people who commit a crime have got to have an expectation 
11 llthat they are going to be caught shortly after committing the 
12 llcrime, they are going to be tried expedi tiously. There is 
13 II going to be a sentence commensurate with the crime, and there 
14 lli s going to be a finality to that . 
15 II A lot of times when you have habeas going on and on, it 
16 ll does not deter much crime, and I have I m~st admit a view 
17 ll that very rarely does rehabilitation come about in our prison 
18 ll system. But in those instances where it does, delay does not 
19 llhelp. I have had cases where somebody was--somebody I 
20 ll prosecuted--serious murder case. Ignore the fact they 
21 llcommitted a heinous crime, no justification for it, people 
I 
22 ll are now dead, families have been destroyed by it, and they 
23 II are down there. That is not the issue facing them as they 
24 ll are in jail. What they are saying is, well, did my lawyer do 
MIU.£RREPORTINGCO., ,s lithe right thing on this particular instance. 
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1 !! petition, can I get out gnd all that. And after awhile, the 
2 !! only issue in their mind is if I file another petition or if 
3 II I add this next item, I will get out of here, not the fact 
4 II that I am in here because I committed a terrible crime . 
5 II You know, did my lawyer wear the right color tie the day 
6 ll of the summation or something of that nature, and not I am 
7 II here because I murdered somebody. I am here because I 
8 II committed a terrible crime. And so we have to balance, as I 
9 llsee it, some way to get finality with an understanding that 
10 !!mistakes still do happen in criminal cases. No matter how 
11 !!pure the hearts of prosecutors, judges and everything else, 
12 llmistakes do happen, especially in capital crimes. Somebody 
13 !!before you have that finality has got to make sure that the 
14 !!rights protected in our Constitution are followed through. 
15 !!But then at some point you got to close the door; you got to 
16 !!close the books; you got to say that is it. You have gone 
17 !! through everything. Now it is over. 
18 II I think it was about, Mr. Chairman, this time last year 
19 llwhen we had 12 of us locked up in the Majority Leader's 
20 !!office trying to figure out how we would hold off until you 
21 !!got done with what you were looking at, Mr. Justice. And I 
22 !!have supported a statute of limitations for the filing of 
23 l~abeas corpus petition. This has been my consistent position 
24 !before I was in the Senate. It has stayed that way since I 
MILLERREPORTINGco .. 15. jjhave been here. But I am wondering why you made the statute 
)07 C Suect. N.E. 






1 ll so short in your proposa~? Did you debate different lengths 
2 llof a statute of limitations? 
3 Justice Powell. Which statute of limitations are you 
4 II talking? 
5 Senator Leahy. Well, surrounding the filing, the six 




10 1 year. 
11 
12 
Justice Powell. The six months rather than the one year? 
Senator Leahy. Yes. 
Justice Powell. I think Senator Biden's bill has one 
Senator Leahy. And you have a six months.·· 
Justice Powell. But at that time, the defendant has 
13 ll counsel and also there has been a stay of execution, and it 
14 II seemed to us that any able-bodied lawyer with six months 
15 II available could do the necessary work to prepare a petition. 
16 Senator Leahy. Well, as I read it, that six months 
17 II applies for both state and federal. Let us assume a very 
18 ll complex case, again assuming the able-bodied lawyer, somebody 
19 llwho really understands it, but it is a complex case, and 
20 llafter about four months they file a state petition. That 
21 llgives them two months left to file a federal petition. Let 
, 
22 llus assume it is a death row case that counsel has been 
2 3 II appointed to handle the petition. He is going to review the 
24 llrecord, conduct the appropriate investigations, obtain the 
MILLER REPORTING co. ~~ II l h d ·~~ necessary expert reports, conduct the lega researc , o all 
)07 C Street , N.E. 
Wa.,hington , D.C. 20002 
(202) )46-6666 
vm 71 
1 II that, get it filed. May .want to file it in state court, but 
2 llknow that whatever time he is taking to get it filed in state 
3 llcourt, that time is running against him also in the federal 
4 II court. I am wondering if that six months gives him enough 
5 II time? 
6 Justice Powell. We thought it did, but I would like for 
7 II Professor Pearson to comment further on it. But it seemed to 
8 llus that where counsel had been appointed, and there was a 
9 !!stay so that there could not be any execution, that the 
10 !!lawyer should have the opportunity within six months to file 
11 Ila petition for collateral review or for federal habeas 
12 !! corpus. We had in mind the fact that petitions for certiorari 
13 !l at the United States Supreme Court have to be filed in six 
14 II weeks. So that six months seemed a fairly adequate time to 
15 llus, but I realize that reasonable people can differ .about 
16 !! periods of limitation. Would you care to add to that, Al? 
17 Dr. Pearson. I guess the consideration is compare what 
18 llwe propose with the situation which many capital defense 
19 !!lawyers face which is the necessity to get a habeas petition 
20 II filed after an execution date ha_s been set. And frequently, 
21 !!these petitions are filed under extremely tight time deadlines 
I 
22 !!with the worst possible pressure one can imagine. Our 
23 !!thinking was we needed to eliminate the necessity for the 
24 !!stay of execution process, and that is why we proposed the 
MILLER REPORTING co.,~5- JJmandatory stay of execution. The judgment call about how 
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1 ll much time you need to pr~pare your first petition, first 
2 ll habeas petition in state court, was based on what we thought 
3 llwould be reasonable under the circumstances. I would suggest 
4 ll to you that once a case is litigated through the state system 
5 !l and then you are ready to jump at the federal system, a good 
6 !Ideal of your material as rar a s your pleadings and so forth 
7 llwould be prepared in advance of any fina l judgment by the 
8 llstate supreme court. 
9 II I mean you can have that matter pretty well developed, 
10 !l and t he only issue you would be facing is whether there is 
11 llgoing to be the necessity of adding any issues once you get 
12 llinto federal district court that have not previously been 
13 ll part of the litigation. How much time i t would take to 
14 lldecide which additional issues needed to be worked into the 
15 llfederal habeas petition is going to vary with every case. I 
16 llthink we need to give the attorneys an ample amount of time 
17 ll and the kind of litigation support so that they can do the 
18 II job and do it right. I am cert ainly willing to be educated 
19 ll about what is an appropriate time period. 
20 Senator Leahy. Well, I think it is an issue that 
21 ll obviously we are going to have to grapple here, and I am 
' 
22 ll going to submit, Mr. Chairman, some questions for the record, 
23 !l and if you could take a look at that because it goes to the 
24 llstatute of limitations. I think this will be one of the 
•nLLERREPoRriNGco., 15 jj areas of debate here, and I am frankly looking for guidance . 
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1 II I also look at something. Chief Judge Oakes of the Second 
2 !! Circuit has a written statement that he has submitted for the 
3 !!record of these hearings, and he talks about the discretionary 
4 1160 day extension on the statute of limitations. And he says, 
5 !land I will quote from his statement, if I could, the granting 
6 !! of an extension should be'within the discretion of the 
7 lldistrict court as it is in cases that involve significantly 
8 !! less weighty issues than the life of a petitioner. Being 
9 ll closest to a particular case, the district court judge is in 
10 li the best position to assess a request for an extension to 
11 ll provide appropriate relief--a federal district judge. 
12 [The statement of Judge Oakes follows:] 
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t 1 Senator Leahy. How.do you feel about that? 
2 II Dr. Pearson. I think that you can make a showing to get 
3 llthat extension. Whether it is a 60 or 90 day extension is not 
4 llterribly important. But I think that under circumstances 
5 llwhere you have some reason to need the additional time, you 
6 llgot to go before a judge and make the showing for it. I 
7 think it is discretionary decision, and I think our proposal 
8 contemplates that. Some judge needs to pass on it so you 
9 know what thj? time table is going to be if it is going to be 
10 any longer than is provided by statute. But I have no 
11 llproblem with vesting that in a district judge, a federal 
12 lldistrict judge. I think that is where it should be, and I 
13 II think that is what we contemplate. 
14 Senator Leahy. There has been some discussion of this 
15 II already, but your committee decided against providing 
16 llstandards for counsel leaving that to saying the states 
17 llshould set that prerogative. But I think, for example, the 
18 llstate of Mississippi, in appointing trial counsel in capital 
19 !leases, it limits their fees, trial counsel fees, to a 
20 II thousand dollars. Well, if you have a complex case, you can 
21 llspend a thousand dollars very quickly just on telephone 
, 
22 llcalls. And if we allow states to set the standards without 
23 llat least putting some basic floor on it, I mean states can 
24 llcertainly exceed whatever might be in the federal law on 
IIILLERAEPoAriNoco.,1~ II standards that provide more or provide something, but if we 
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1 li do not set at least some . floor on the area of competence and 
2 llfees, do we run the risk in some states that the kind of 
3 !!relief we are talking about in here will be hollow relief at 
4 llbest? Justice Powell, how do you feel about that? Obviously 
5 llyou must have grappled it. 
6 Justice Powell. I have not read with any care Judge 
7 II Oakes' statement. I suppose he will testify here today. 
8 II Senator Leahy. He is, unfortunately his duties had him 




Justice Powell. So he will not be here. 
Senator Leahy. Yes. 
Justice Powell. I do not think I would comment on it in 
13 llview of the fact that I really am not familiar with it. 
14 Senator Leahy. What about the idea, though, of standards 
15 li on counsel? I mean do you really feel that we should not at 
16 !! least set some basic standards in here, some basic ideas of 
17 llwhat should be available to counsel in these habeas cases? 
18 Justice Powell. Well, as I indicated earlier, I have 
19 !Isome difficulty with the question whether, however one 
20 II undertook to define standards that they would operate very 
21 llmuch better than the present system. You can take a lawyer 
, 
22 llwho has been at the bar ten years and he could say perhaps 
23 lltruthfully that he has tried several cases in criminal court 
24 ll and he may not be half as good as a young lawyer well 
MtLLERAEPoRriNGco., fS- lleducated who had only been at the bar a year. There are 
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1 11 700,000 lawyers in the U~ited States, and ability varies very 
2 ll widely. 
3 
4 
Senator Leahy. Oh, I know. 
Justice Powell. So I have some hesitation about trying 
5 ll to prescribe standards, particularly when you have to talk in 
6 ll terms of three years or five years of experience in appellate 
7 ll litigation. As I indicated earlier, does that mean one case 
8 Il a year or more? 
9 Senator Leahy. What about limitation on expenses and 




Justice Powell. On fees? 
Senator Leahy. For example, Mississippi--
Justice Powell. You are talking about the $1000 
14 lllimitation in one of the states? 
15 
16 
Senator Leahy. Yes. 
Justice Powell. Well , I find it very difficult unless I 
. 
17 llwere appointed by the district judge to accept a client in a 
18 llcapital case where my fee was going to be limited to $1000 
19 llunless there was some other reason. I think it is most 
20 ll inadequate if that is what you are driving at . But I realize 
21 llthat states are different, and I know in my city of Richmond, 
• 
22 II Justice Merritt, at one point, because lawyers were being 
23 llreluctant to volunteer to t ry cases for indigent defendants, 
24 ll and Judge Merritt said I am going right down the list of 
MILLER REPORTING CO., .ltli:. 11 . h . f R . hm d d I . t . t 
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1 ll lawyers in an alphabeticql order. I may skip around in the 
2 llalphabet, but he said anybody I appoint is coming down here 
3 !land try this case. I do not know whether it went well or 
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1 The Chairman . Than ~ you very much. A point of clarifi-
2 ll cation, Mr. Pearson . When you were discussing with the 
3 !! Senator from Vermont the 60 day question, was it your 
4 II assertion that the Powell Commission's view was that it was 
5 ll discretionary of the judge up to 60 days, or were you talking 
6 ll about it being discretionary beyond 60 days? 
7 Dr. Pearson. No. Under our proposal, we would con-
8 ll template that an attorney who needs the extension would get 
9 ll it for not to exceed 60 days, but he would make some showing 
10 ll of need and necessity. But I think the trial judge is really 
11 ll going to be making a discretionary judgment there. I do not 
12 ll see that as being the kind of standard that ought to be 
13 II insurmountable to attorneys. If you got in and you had some 
14 !!investigation you need to do or there is some discovery at 
15 li the federal phase you would like to do, and you got track 
16 ll somebody down, then I do not see why any judge is going to be 
17 II hammering folks on a request like that. It is important to 
18 ll have judicial control of that so we know what kind of time 
19 lltable we are working in if it is going to be different than 
20 11180 days. I see that as being critical, whatever the time 
21 II period might be. 
22 The Chairman. Thank you very much. Now Justice Powell, 
23 ll we have trespassed on your time, and we have one more 
24 ll committee member, and possibly if you are willing to sit for 
Miu.ER REPORTING co.,1, jj another 12 minutes, and then maybe since he has been so 
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1 II patient, we would allow qur colleague who is not a member of 
2 lithe Committee at least to have one question before you leave. 
3 !! Would you be willing to do that? 
4 
5 
Justice Powell. I wi l l be glad to do that. 
The Chairman. I appreciate it very much. I know it is 
6 Il a long time. Senator Grass l ey from Iowa. 
7 Senator Grassley. Senator Graham, I am not going to 
8 ll take all of my time, I am sure. And I want to compliment 
9 IIJustice Pow~ll. Obviously , even though you have retired from 
10 II the Court, you have not re t ired, and obviously you are 
11 ll working hard to improve the administration and delivery of 
12 II justice, and we all thank you for that. You make a reference 
13 ll in your report of your ad hoc committee to the report of the 
14 II attorney general, Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State 
15 II Judgments, and you know this has several options for reform 
16 II from the elimination of habeas corpus in post-conviction for 
17 II state prisoners, and then it suggests a backup for the use of 
18 II federal habeas ·corpus for backup. 
19 II My question to you is I would like to have you explain 
20 llwhy your committee ' s report does not make similar recommenda-
21 lltions as reform options in this justice report? Just some 
I 
22 llsort of reflection of how you viewed this, and it does not 
23 II seem like you used their recommendations. So your reaction? 
24 Justice Powell. I do not think I can be very helpful. 
MILLER REPORTING co. 91(,. II . . 
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1 llthat we were proceeding along different lines, and that the 
2 II report would not be particularly helpful to us. I do not 
3 ll have a negative feeling about it. It just seemed different 
4 II from what we had in mind. 
5 Senator Grassley. So then basically you just feel you 
6 II went in a different direction and did not give this much of a 
7 llfoundation for you to launch from? 
8 Justice Powell. It may be that Professor Pearson did, 
9 llbut the committee itself did not; is that correct, Al? 
10 Dr. Pearson. Well, I had certainly looked at the 
11 II report, but we were trying to deal with rea 11 y the narrow 
12 II subject of capital cases and problems that we felt were 
13 llpeculiar to capital litigation, and I do not feel like that 
14 II report really addressed them. And so we proceeded along the 
15 II lines that we felt were a little bit more in tune with our 
16 II sense of the litigation process in capital cases. I think 
17 ll that is really about all I could say to reflect on it. 
18 Senator Grassley. On another angle, do you believe that 





Justice Powell. Is draconian? 
Senator Grassley. Yes . 
• 
The Chairman. I think the answer is yes. 
Senator Grassley. And that is not necessarily just 
24 ll based upon-- ~ do not mean just my colleagues, just generally. 
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1 report carefully said, nq lawyer would characterize it as 
2 draconian. It seems to me that the report is very careful to 
3 propose legislation to make sure that full and fair trials 
4 are held in capital cases . I do not think the extent to 
5 ll which you compare what we referred to briefly as Chairman 
6 11 Biden 's bill and our bill~ while there are differences, they 
7 llboth have the same basic objective. But the problem that, of 
8 ll course, you are quite familiar with is that in the United 
9 II States we have unlimited review, the only country in the 
10 ll western world that has anything comparable , and it has 
11 ll clogged up the entire system, and brings disrespect on the 
12 II entire system. 
13 Senator Grassley. On that point then, let us compare it 
14 II to some of your writings , how your opini ons and writings in 
15 ll this area of law of one complete and fair course of review in 
16 ll state and federal judicial systems is--anyway does it report 
17 ll digress? Just tell me how you measured up against your 
18 ll writings in this area previously, and whether or not you feel 
19 ll it does any justice to those, violence to those? 
20 Justice Powell. Do you have specific writings in mind? 
21 III have over the years--
22 Senator Grassley. Well, did I summarize you right? 
23 II When your views are basically expressed that capital cases 
24 ll should be subject to one complete and fair course of review, 
MILLER REPORTING co .. ~Ip. II d th h · · l d th · t · d ,~ an at once sue review is compete an e convic ion an 
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1 ll sentences are found to b~ appropriate, judicial proceedings 
2 llshould be concluded? Is that a fair analysis of--
3 Justice Powell. Well, I would rather not summarize our 
4 llreport in just two sentences, but I am in accord with the 
5 II report we have submitted. We worked on it very carefully. 
6 II We had a strong committee~ judges experienced in capital 
7 !l eases. We had a reporter who had tried a number of capital 
8 !l eases on the defense side, a distinguished professor at the 
9 IIUniversity of Georgia. And we received comments and recom-
10 ll mendations from major groups on both sides of the capital 
11 ll punishment issue. We had six meetings of our committee, and 
12 ll we worked for two years. 
13 Senator Grassley. Well, you were an outstanding Supreme 
14 IICourt Justice, and you had thoughts and writings on this 
15 ll while you were in the Court. Now you are off the Court, and 
16 ll you are making these recommendations, and I guess I want your 
17 llview on how this report compares to what your views were 
18 llexpressed on the Supreme Court? 
19 Justice Powell. Do you have a specific decision of the 
20 IICourt in mind? 
21 Senator Grassley. No, I do not. No, I do not. Just 
22 llyour general approach, your general approach. 
23 Justice Powell. Well, Professor Pearson just mentioned 
24 II to me an opinion I wrote in Stone v. Powell, which did limit 
MIU.ERREPORTINGco .• ,5 !l under some circumstances repetitive review. 
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1 !! personal view as a lawye1; and a judge has been that we have 
2 ll not only the fairest system in the ~orld. We started out 
3 llwith Great Britain's system, particularly the English, as a 
4 ll model, going all the way back to colonial days, but even they 
5 ll hung people and drew and quartered a few of them and put them 
6 llin the rack. But I thought the process of our committee was 
7 li very careful and very fair . I am not suggesting that our 
8 ll report is not subject to criticism. 
9 II Of course, there are areas, as the Biden report has 
10 ll suggested, that merit consideration. But if you have some 
11 ll specific position I have taken to the contrary. 
12 Senator Grassley. No , I am not here to pick . I just 
13 ll kind of trying to see how t his evolved from your own personal 
14 ll positions that you had taken previously to this report. That 
15 llwas my point. Let me clarify. I am not here to find fault. 
16 Justice Powell. Yes. Well, I never practiced criminal 
17 ll law, but I did have an extensive practice in civil law, and 
18 lion the Supreme Court we had a great deal of criminal law. So 
19 III have a feeling that there is a very real need for fresh 
20 ll legislation with respect to federal habeas corpus, and I 
· 21 ll repeat that I am very glad that your committee is giving it 
22 !!serious attention. You have some very able witnesses here in 
23 llcourt today. I know all six of the judges who are going to 
24 lltestify, and I do not think they agree, but basically they 
nLERREPoRnNoco .• ~ . llare all very able j udges. 
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Senator Grassley. ~hank you, Mr. Chairman. 






The Chairman. Than~ you very much. 
Dr. Pearson. May I add one thing? 
The Chairman. Please. 
86 
Dr. Pearson. We have talked about various aspects of 
5 li the bill and what effect that has on finality . I do not want 
6 llto lose sight of the fact'that we are very interested in 
7 l~ounsel, and we feel like that the presence of counsel is 
8 l~oth helpful to fairness and accuracy in the fact-finding 
9 l~rocess and jt really will promote finality to have a good 
10 lllawyer in these cases who raises the issues and gets them on 
11 l~he table and gets a ruling one way or the other on them. 
12 l~nd we think we have some balance in the bill. 
13 I might just make one other comment for the record. I 
14 !have worked a lot in habeas cases, but only until recently 
15 !have I been involved in the defense of capital cases at the 







ake sure that that was clear. 
Justice Powell. I misstated what? 
Dr. Pearson. Talking about my trial work in capital 
ases. I am not currently representing a number of people in 
apital cases at the trial level, but in the past I had 
. 
orked at the habeas level. I just wanted to make sure that 
23 l[s clear on the record. 
24 The Chairman. It is now clear, and it was, I am sure, 
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1 II colleague from Florida al}d thank him for his patience and 
2 II welcome him again, and if you could take your one best shot 
3 II here, and we can--
4 Senator Graham. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to 
5 ll express my appreciation to you for holding these hearings. I 
6 ll believe the 101st Congres~ should be the Congress that will 
7 II come to grips with this very difficult issue and your 
8 II leadership and expedited attention will be critical factors 
9 ll in achieving that goal. I also wish to commend Justice 
10 II Powell for deferring his retirement to undertake this 
11 II important task and to help move this process f<1rward. 
12 If I could, Mr. Chairman, you said one question. I 
13 ll would like to ask three short questions. One, Mr. Justice, 
14 li do you see your report as constituting any constraints on 
15 II state executive actions, which are typically woven through 
16 II judicial steps relative to the implementation of capital 
17 llpunishrnent, such as state clemency actions if a state requires 
18 Ila gubernatorial signature of a death warrant? Would there be 
19 II any required modifications of executive actions in order for 
20 a state to come into compliance with your procedures? 
21 Justice Powell. I do not think I have any pertinent 
22 views with respect to the exercise of clemency. That is 
23 entirely up to the governor, as I understand it. I think 
24 II that is true in Virginia. One thing that I think members of 
MILLER REPORTINaco., ~'s II the Supreme Court at times were concerned about was whether 
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1 II governors, and I do not ~imi t this to any particular state or 
2 ll states, but the states say in the deep South that had more of 
3 ll these capital cases than others would, the governors sometimes 
4 !!would defer setting an execution date when prisoners had no 
5 ll counsel and the setting of that date would trigger activity 
6 ll to be sure to get counsel'for them. If this legislation in 
7 lleither of these bills, however they may be modified or 
8 ll amended, is enacted, I think this problem will be resolved 
9 llbecause counsel will be provided. But we often saw situations 
10 ll where nothing happened after the trial and conviction and a 
11 ll sentence to death until you or one of the other governors had 
12 ll set a date for execution. 
13 II That has changed substantially in Florida because your 
14 IIFlorida bar has been very interested in providing procedures 
15 llthat would regularize the process in process. And so I 
16 ll commend you and the lawyers down there for undertaking it. 
17 Senator Graham . This should hardly count as a second 
18 llquestion because it is just an extension of the first . 
19 The Chairman. How you have gotten from one to four 
20 llquestions is beyond me, but go ahead, Governor . 
21 
22 
Justice Powell. Oh, I took up his time. 
. 
The Chairman. No, you did not . 
23 II Senator Graham. The question of the triggering process. 
24 !!What do you see as the event which would lead to the designa-
MtLLEcAsAEPOATINENGco.,,s lltion of counsel to start the process of state and potentially 
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1 II federal collateral review? 
2 Justice Powell. Well, of course, the Constitution 
3 II requires counsel at trial and appeal, and the big gap in 
4 llterms of providing counsel is for state collateral review. I 
5 II think you have solved that in Florida. 
6 Senator Graham. My concern is, as you have stated, 
7 lltypically very little if anything happened after the comple-
8 lltion of the direct appeal until a death warrant was signed, 
9 lland that was the triggering mechanism that caused these other 
10 II steps to then move in place. What do you see as the trigger-
11 II ing mechanism which will result in collateral counsel being 
12 II appointed through the processes of your--
13 Justice Powell. If the state chooses to accept our 
14 ll procedure which is optional with the state, it would be 
15 II necessary to appoint counsel. That would trigger the 
16 11 operation of our proposal. In other words, it would have to 
17 ll be the appointment of competent counsel as soon as there has 
18 ll been litigation on the first go round, conviction and appeal 
19 ll to the state supreme court. Also, one interesting provision 
20 II in our bill is that we would require new counsel be ap-
21 ll pointed, new competent counsel be appointed for collateral 
' 
22 ll review so that that new counsel would be free to charge the 
23 II trial counsel with ineffective assistance of counsel. That 
24 ll is a charge made so frequently, as you know. 
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1 II Leahy mentioned that he !}as favored a statute of limitations 
2 ll type approach within the federal habeas corpus law. I have 
3 II also, and that is embodied in legislation which has been 
4 ll introduced ass. 271. That approach of establishing a time 
5 llperiod within which habeas corpus claims could be brought in 
6 lithe federal court is not limited to capital cases, and it 
7 ll also contains a limitation for federal prisoners as well as 
8 llstate prisoners using the federal habeas corpus procedures. 
9 ll Could you comment as to the compatibility of that 
10 llapproach for those states which did not elect to utilize the 
11 llprocedure which you have outlined, or in those cases not 
12 llcovered such as non-capital cases or federal prisoners by the 
13 !!procedures that you outlined? 
14 Justice Powell. The problem that you have in mind is 
15 llthat there is no time limit on the filing of habeas corpus 
16 llpetitions, and I have not really thought about the extent to 
17 llwhich there could be some limit. I think one of the problems 
18 II is somebody is convicted. I am not talking about capital 
19 !leases particularly, but somebody is convicted and put in 
20 llprison, he does not have a lawyer, and he or she may stay 
21 llthere for several years serving out a term, and one of these 
, 
22 ll days wake up, and a jail-house lawyer will advise him to file 
23 Ila petition for habeas corpus. You see petitions filed 
24 llfrequently eight and ten and 12 years after conviction. I am 
MILLEA REPORTING co.,f~- JJnot talking about capital cases, but the availability of 
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1 ii habeas corpus, federal h~beas corpus, in our system is 
2 ll certainly something that I think all lawyers generally agree 
3 ll with. 
4 II The problem is it is abused substantially, and how you 
5 !l ean limit abuse without limiting its availability when 
6 llneeded. Senator, may I just say this. Personally, I am a 
7 II Virginian, always have been and always will be, but Florida 
8 llwas my second state. We had an apartment at Delray Beach 
9 ll until I was ,put on the Court, and then they reduced my salary 
10 ll so substantially I had to give up that apartment. But I 
11 ll think of Florida with a great deal of affection. 
12 Senator Graham. I appreciate that. I hope that with 
13 li the new affluence that has come by chairing this commission 
14 ll that you will be able to return to your previous lifestyle, 
15 !l and I will say that your physical and mental _acuities 
16 llindicate that Ponce de Leon did, in fact, discover the 
17 ll fountain of youth when he discovered Florida, and I hope that 
18 ll you will continue to draw on it . 
19 
20 
The Chairman. And vote there if possible. 
[Laughter.] 
21 II The Chairman. Mr. Justice and your colleagues, thank 
22 ll you very, very much. I appreciate your generous time you 
23 ll have given us and your continuation of your civic duties as 
24 ll you see them. You are a man who has always been guided by, at 
MILLER REPORTING co . .ltlC::. II . 
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1 ll what he believes his soc~al and civic responsibility to be. 
2 !!That obviously continues to guide you and we are lucky to 
3 II have you and have had you on the Supreme Court. We will work 
4 ll this out, as Professor Pearson, at least I thought, said or 
5 ll at least implied, there may be some room between the two 
6 ll bills. But we should not'misunderstand that there are 
7 ll certain of my colleagues and others who feel very, very 
8 !! strongly that any change in federal habeas corpus is a 
9 l! fundamental denial of rights that should not be in any way 
10 ll altered, and they do not view the present system as being 
11 ll abused. And so this will be a healthy and hardy debate that 
12 ll we will have. But I thank you for, if you will, sort of 
13 ll firing off the starting gun for us to for the first time in a 
14 ll long, long time to directly take on this issue and hit it 
15 llhead on. I truly appreciate all three of you being here, and 
16 ll again thank you, Mr. Justice, for coming and particularly for 
17 ll letting us go 45 minutes, an hour--! beg your pardon--an hour 
18 llbeyond the time that we had hoped to be able to let you go. 
19 II As you will soon find out, as no disrespect to the 
20 II f ollowing panel, two panels, madE;:! up of distinguished judges, 
21 lithe questioners will consist of me and me. And I should have . 
22 llknown that everyone would show up to question you and should 
23 llhave known that we could not possibly get out by a quarter 
24 llafter . But again, thank you very, very much. And we will 
MILLERREPoRnNaco .. ~ . llrecess for three minutes while the next panel assembles, and 
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1 lithe next panel will be CJ:!.ief Judge Lay, Chief Judge Holloway, 
2 II and Judge Reinhardt. Thank you very much, Mr. Justice. 
3 II Justice Powell. It has been a privilege to be here, and 
4 llthank you all very much. 
5 The Chairman. Thank you. We will recess for three 
6 llminutes. 
7 II [Recess.] 
8 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order, please. 
9 IIWe are pleased to have in our second panel · a group of 
10 lldistinguished jurists from all over the country representing 
11 lithe 8th, the 9th and the 10th Circuit. From the 8th Circuit, 
12 IIChief Judge Donald P. Lay. Your Honor, welcome. I know it 
13 llis an unusual circumstance to have someone sitting on a bench 
14 !land looking down at you instead of the other way around, but 
15 llwe are thankful you have been so gracious to come and 
16 lltestify. Chief Judge William J. Holloway, Jr., of the 10th 
17 !!Circuit. Mr. Justice--! have elevated you already--Judge, I 
18 llappreciate your being here as well, and Judge Stephen 
19 IIReinhardt of the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. We are happy 




Judge Reinhardt. No, Los Angeles. 
The Chairman. Los Angeles. So you did not have to face 
24 li the difficulty your friends from the northern part of the 
111
LLERREPoRnNaco.,1s llstate have had to. If I can indicate .to you and to your 
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1 llcolleagues who are also ~aiting to be part of the third 
2 II panel, Judges Clark, Roney, and Higginbotham, I hope the way 
3 llwe can proceed is as follows. And that is for each of you if 
4 II you have statements, we are anxious to hear them. Your 
5 llentire written statements will be placed in the record. I do 
6 llhave a number of questions, as you might suspect, and please 
7 II do not misunderstand the absence of my colleagues. 
8 II The problem with the Senate is that the business on the 
9 !!Senate floor begins to pick up in earnest around one o'clock 
10 llin the beginning of the year, around noon by mid-year, and 
11 llabout 9:30 or 10 o'clock in the morning as we are closing out 
12 II the year, attempting to adjourn sine die, and all of my 
13 !!colleagues are in circumstances that have them dealing with 
14 II floor duty or matters that are on the floor. And half the 
15 llreason why my colleagues are on the floor is that as you may 
16 llor may not know, in the Senate we do not have a rule requiring 
17 llthat amendments be germane. And it is always nice and 
18 !!important to be on the floor at this time of the year when we 
19 llare attempting to close out for you may find your state 
20 lllosing statehood. You never know what is going to be placed 
21 llin amendment on the floor. 
22 II So please understand it is not for lack of interest and 
23 !!concern in the issue or a desire to hear from such distin-
24 llguished panels, and I mean that sincerely. Senator Kennedy 
MILLERREPORTtNaco.,r5- llhas asked that his statement and questions to you all be 
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1 II placed in the record. He is managing a bill on the floor 
2 !! now. He is going to attempt to be here to ask questions. I 
3 li do not know whether he will be able to get back. 
4 
5 
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l 1 The Chairman. I say to the second panel that I expect 
2 II we will be about 45 minutes on this panel, or if you all want 
3 II to go get a quick sandwich downstairs. We will not be 
4 ll offended. If you would like to stay, we would be delighted. 
5 II And one last bit of procedural business. After the opening 
6 II statements of each of the' judges I am going to have to recess 
7 II for five minutes to head to that room for an appointment that 
8 II I hoped that I would be able to continue the hearing for 
9 ll because a very critical issue relating to the AIDS, pediatric 
10 II AIDS problem in this country, and I agreed to meet with 
11 ll someone who flew all the way from California representing the 
12 II coalition dealing with that issue. It will take literally 
13 llfive minutes. If someone shows up at that time, we will keep 
14 ll going. If not, I will recess for five minutes to conduct 
15 II that very brief meeting in the adjoining room. 
16 II Again, thank you all for being here, and without further 
17 ll cornrnent by me, Judge Lay, if you would begin, and then we go 
18 llto you, Judge Holloway, and then you Judge Reinhardt, and we 
19 ll are anxious to hear from you all. Thank you . 
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STATEMENTS OF~ PANEL, CONSISTING OF CHIEF JUDGE 
DONALD P. LAY, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 10TH CIRCUIT; 
CHIEF JUDGE WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR., U.S. COURT OF 
·, 
APPEALS, AND JUDGE STEPHEN REINHARDT, U.S. COURT OF 
APPEALS, 9TH CIRCUIT 
STATEMENT OF JUbGE LAY 
Judge Lay. Thank you, Senator Biden. It is indeed a 
8 II privilege for me to be here. I am Chief Judge Donald Lay of 
9 lithe 8th Circ;uit Court of Appeals. I appear here on my own 
10 II and not on behalf of my court. I am in almost my quarter of 
11 Ila century of service as a judge on the United States Court of 
12 II Appeals. I have been chief judge for the last ten years. 
13 II I think since 1966 I perhaps have been involved in over 
14 II three to 500 habeas corpus cases, and I have probably written 
15 !lat least a third of those, and this is an area of the law 
16 II that I have always been very interested in, and I do not hold 
17 llmyself out as an expert, but I simply state that as a going 
18 llconcern as to the problems that the Committee and the 
19 IICongress now face. 
20 11 Chief Justice Rehnquist in 1988 appointeq the Powell 
21 II Commit tee, and this committee reported back, and the commit-
22 tee, of course, was composed of not only Justice Powell but 
23 many of my distinguished colleagues and great friends. And I 
24 II can say on my behalf and although I do not speak for the 
MtLLERREPoRnNaco., ~«s jjJudicial Conference, I know that I am at liberty to say that 
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1 II the Judicial Conference ~s greatly indebted to that committee. 
2 They have done a great service in focusing upon a problem 
3 that deserves the attention of all of us. 
4 As a preamble to the report in September of 1989 this 
5 ll year, when the report was presented by Justice Powell, the ad 
6 llhoc committee recommended'that the Judicial Conference, and I 
7 II quote, 11 approve the statutory proposal referred in and 
8 ll attached to this report and authorize its transmittal to the 
9 II Congress as the legi slative recommendation of the conference. 11 
10 II By a vote of 17 to 7 we voted to defer that until March of 
11 111990 for the simple reason that we did not have sufficient 
12 ll opportunity to study the plan and to give at t ention to it, to 
13 ll get the input from some of our colleagues and it was solely 
14 II on that basis, certainly not as an affront to the committee. 
15 II But the committee should certainly be aware that the 
16 II reflective voice of all of us and of the Congress is so 
17 II important in carving out what is the final decision here 
18 II because Justice Frankfurter said many years ago that we just 
19 II do not solve these problems of federalism by simple, in-
20 II flexible rules. We may obviate some, but we can generate 
21 ll many more. So I think it is very important that w approach 
' 
22 ll these reforms in any kind of legislation with an exacting 
23 ll scrutiny of what we say so that we do not create more 
24 II problems than we have already got . 
MILLER REPORTING co., ~'s II And I would like to just say that parenthetically that 
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1 II all members of the Judicj,.al Conference understand fully that 
2 II Justice Rehnquist felt that he had, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
3 II felt that he had a duty under the statute to refer this to 
4 II Congress, and that was his interpretation of it. And he has 
5 II so transmitted it. But a good deal has been said about prior 
6 II judicial conference action, and although that is a policy 
7 II speaking body, it does not necessarily represent all the 
8 II voices of the federal judges of the United States and 
9 ll certainly that group is yet to be heard from. 
10 The Chairman. Excuse me, Judge, if I can--because it is 
11 II important at this point since you have raised i."t. It was my 
12 II view, as chairman of the Committee and one who was part of 
13 II that legislation, that the Chief Justice was not required to 
14 II do what he thought he was required to do. It was my full 
15 II understanding and expectation that we would wait for the 
16 !!Judicial Conference. And I want to make it clear that the 
17 II reason why I proposed the legislation that I did at the time 
18 ll that I did is that having Chief Justice having read the 
19 lldictate of the statute differently than I, having much more 
20 llexperience reading such statute~, I was then compelled as 
21 llchairman of this Committee to keep my part of the bargain, 
, 
22 II which was to introduce legislation having considered the 
23 ll recommendations made by the Powell Commission and faithfully 
24 II having done it. 
MILLER REPORTING co. -.c;. II . kl f ·~~ I quite fran y would have felt much more corn ortable 
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1 II doing it having had the .:[udicial Conference's input and I say 
2 llthat not as a criticism of the Chief Justice but just so to 
3 llmake sure that this seems to me the appropriate place to have 
4 II this dovetail with your comment about how you viewed the 
5 Hcommission and what you thought brought us to this point. 
6 II Again, I do not say that to be critical of the Chief Justice. • 
7 II I say that to explain my actions. I kept my commitment that 
8 II I made to my colleagues in the United States Senate that I 
9 llwould introduce quote "habeas corpus reform having fully and 
10 ll faithfully considered the recommendations of the Powell 
11 !!Commission . " I did that . I am happy with what I have put 
12 II forward, but quite frankly I was hoping to have had, and 
13 ll expecting to have had, the input of the Judicial Conference 
14 II before I did that. 
15 II I say that by way of explaining to the Judicial Con-
16 J ference why I moved when I did. Having said that, let me 
17 ll yield back to you, Judge. 
18 Judge Lay. Well, I mentioned it as well because I think 
19 llit is important if Congress still is studying this matter 
20 llthat they receive the institutional view of the Judicial 
21 IIConference. It may not be my view. I do not know what it 
' 
22 ll wi l l be, but it certainly is an important policy speaking 
23 llinstitution, and nobody can speak for it except the composite 
24 ll number. 
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1 !Isome have suggested that.the Chief Justice may have tried to 
2 ll obviate the conference view. I do not share that view, and I 
3 II do not think any member of the conference share that view. I 
4 II think the Chief Justice in good faith interpreted his own 
5 ll obligation under that statute. It may have been different 
6 llthan yours, Senator, and it may have been different than 
7 llmine, but at least I think that is why he transmitted it. 
8 II But we still do not have the Judicial Conference view, and I 
9 llhope there will still be opportunity although I appreciate 
10 II the need perhaps for urgency in this area that that can be 
11 ll voiced. 
12 II I would like to just make one or two just prefatory 
13 II statements about habeas corpus and then I would like to 
14 lladdress specifically four or five, and I will try to be as 
15 llbrief as possible, some of the concerns that I see in the 
16 II proposed legislation. First of all, I think the Supreme 
17 II Court has said this, and I am really quoting Justice Harlan, 
18 llwho was deemed to be a conservative back in the Warren Court 
19 lldays, that--
20 The Chairman. When you say the proposed legislation, 
21 llyou mean the Powell Commission recommendations? 
22 II Judge Lay. I am talking about all of the proposed 
23 lllegislation including your proposed bill. That conventional 
24 llnotions of finality of litigation really have no place where 
MILLER REPORTING co .• ~~ II live or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional 
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1 II rights are alleged. And.this is from the Sanders case in 
2 111 948. Justice Harlan said finality shall not repose where it 
3 II should not repose. When we try to balance human life, and 
4 ll now we are talking in the capital punishment, against 
5 II judicial efficiency, I think we are set about in a very 
6 ll delicate process. 
7 II We are looking in terms of trying to create a failsafe 
8 Ii system. It is not another appeal. It is guaranteeing us. 
9 li lt is vindicating our national conscience that we are not 
10 ll putting a man to death without due process of law. That is 
11 li the simple last question. And I do not think we should be 
12 ll apologetic to anyone if we painstakingly and we approach this 
13 ll problem with great scrutiny. And that is what I think the 
14 !! federal courts have been doing and are doing today. 
15 Much of the delay that is criticized today lies in, and 
16 II I am not criticizing the states, but it l i es as well in the 
17 ll state court procedures. Senator Thurmond points out in the 
18 !! Wormer case in his introduction of the Powel l bill that in 
19 II Wormer he was convicted in 1979, and it was not until ten 
20 ll years later that he was finally executed. I point out that 
21 !!Wormer's conviction was originally reversed by the State 
' 
22 II Supreme Court of South Carol i na. It was not until the late 
23 ll 1980's that the federal courts got a-hold of that problem, 
24 !l and it was not until 1988 that the only appeal went through 
MILLEAAEPOATINaco.,15 lithe Court of Appeals in the 4th Circuit. It was not the 
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1 ii fault of the federal courts. 
2 And I do not know if it was the fault of anyone. But 
3 II the procedure involves a state procedure as well as our 
4 ll procedure. I wrote a case out of Missouri, and it is the 
5 II first person, I think, that has been executed in our circuit 
6 ll in over 25 years. The nafne of the case is Mercer v. The 
7 II State, and this case processed through the federal appellate 
8 II court in a period of one year including the original habeas 
9 !lease, and t\j'O and a half months on a stay on the second 
10 ll habeas case where he attempted to set it aside. We granted a 
11 II stay the day before, I believe, that he was to be executed 
12 II after we had reviewed his first habeas petition and after the 
13 II Supreme Court had denied a cert. All of our judges were not 
14 ll enthusiastic about granting a stay again. The state certainly 
15 ll was not, and took us to task for saying that Mercer was 
16 I. actually abusing the writ. 
17 II We granted the stay on the date that we did simply 
18 ll because we were in court and holding court, and did not have 
19 Ila time or an opportunity to review all of these voluminous 
20 ll papers that new counsel had put before us. I wrote something 
21 llat that time, and I think it is apropos to this problem, and 
. 
22 llif I can just quote a couple of statements from it because I 
23 ll think it points up that what we are doing in these habeas 
24 ll cases is not attempting to coddle the guilty, not attempting 
MIU.EAAEPORTINGco .• ,-s Jjto let the guilty go free. But we are trying to make certain 
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1 II that no one is giving up.his life without the due process of 
2 II law. 
3 And I wrote this, and I would like to quote from it. 
4 II "Human life is our most precious possession. Our natural 
5 II instincts guide us from birth to sustain life by protecting 
6 II ourselves and protecting others. All notions of morality 
7 II focus on the right to live, and all of man ' s laws seek to 
8 ll preserve this most important right. When presented with 
9 llchallenges to a capital sentence, it would be easy to respond 
10 ll rhetorically by asking what about the victim whom the 
11 ll defendant had been found guilty of unmercifully killing. 
12 II But this approach fails to reflect on the ideal that a 
13 ll government founded by a moralistic and civilized society 
14 ll should not act as unmercifully as the defendant is accused of 
15 l! acting . If the original murder cannot be justified under 
16 !! man's laws, it is equally unlawful and inhumane to commit the 
17 llsame atrocity in the name of the state. What separates the 
18 llunlawful killing by man and the lawful killing by the state 
19 llare the legal barriers that exist to preserve the individual's 
20 llconstitutional rights and protect against the unlawful 
21 llexecution of a death sentence. 
22 If the law is not given strict adherence then we as a 
23 ll society are just as guilty as a heinous crime as the condemned 
24 ll felon. It should thus be readily apparent that the legal 
MtLLERREPORTINGco .• ~S l! process in a civilized soc i ety must not rush to judgment and 
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1 ii thereafter rush to execute a person found guilty of taking 
2 li the life of another." 
3 And then I concluded, "It is essential to remember that 
4 Il a counsel is appointed to ensure the preservation of the 
5 II defendant's constitutional rights, and to make certain that 
6 II unlawful executions do not occur. The procedural mechanism 
7 II for reviewing these petitions must strive to promote these 
8 II same principles. 
9 II The federal judiciary must therefore take particular 
10 II care in death penalty cases to give patient and thoughtful 
11 II review of claims presented by petitioners through their 
12 II appointed counsel. " And I simply say that the extra two and 
13 Il a half months for this court to take the time to review that 
14 II entire record, again, vindicated the nation's conscience that 
15 II the state did not deprive this person of due process of law. 
16 II If I may, Senator, I would like to move very quickly to some 
17 II of the concerns that I see in the proposed legislation. 
18 II First of all, I certainly want to compliment the Senator for 
19 II the provision in your bill that the Powell bill does not 
20 ll cover, and that is focusing upon competent counsel at trial. 
21 This is not in the Powell bill, and if there is default, 
22 ll if there is neglect, or if there is ignorance, it is because 
23 II of the incompetency of counsel at trial. Your bill in 1757 
24 II focuses upon the appointment not only of competent counsel at 
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1 II underlines and underscores the emphasis of the need of 
2 II competent counsel. 
3 And a good deal has been said here about that as to 
106 
4 II whether there are sufficient counsel, and I have no question 
5 II that the only candid answer to make in that regard as far as 
6 II capital punishment cases today is to simply say there are not 
7 II competent counsel in sufficient quantity to handle the 
8 II complex litigation that is required in the federal post-
9 II conviction proceedings. The arduous task that counsel has 
10 II faced involves the reinvestigation, the distilling from a 
11 II complex state court record, from all of the appellate 
12 !!procedures that have gone before, all of the post-conviction 
13 II procedurE;is that have gone before, and to take a volunteer 
14 II lawyer in most instances, and that is what they are, even if 
15 II they are compensated, they are volunteering their time, 
16 1, takes--and this is according to the American Bar Association 
17 l! Report--about 25 percent of the billable hours of a lawyer's 
18 II time to proceed in federal habeas corpus alone. 
19 II Now to put a lawyer under the gun of six months where 
20 llhalf of that time has probably been used up under circum-
21 !!stances where he cannot control because of the time having 
' 
22 II run back when the state process was going is just unreason-
23 II able. It is just totally intolerable. You cannot fairly 
24 llanalogize, taking an appeal where you simply file a notice of 
MILLEAAEPoATIHGco .• ~<s II appeal and filing a post-conviction proceeding where you are 
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1 II required to set forth ali of the grounds, all of the facts 
2 II that pertain to that particular case, and you cannot ac-
3 llcomplish that in a 60 day period, a 90-day period. 
4 II And I respectfully suggest that it is very, very 
5 lldifficult to say that you can accomplish that in a six months 
6 II period. · I thought Senator Specter made a very good point 
7 II today, and that is that why do we have options, and I know 
8 II both your bill and the Powell Committee report, why should 
9 II there be options? Do you really appreciate what kind of 
10 lldilemma that we are putting the legal community in by having 
11 ll an opt-in and an opt-out basis. We are going to have two 
12 II tiers of law as they apply to two systems, one where they opt 
13 ll in, one where they opt out, different rules, different cases. 
14 The law is so complex now. To try to say, well, this is 
15 lloption one and this is option two. I wonder about this 
16 llapproach of saying in a federal legislation that there will 
17 ll be no option, that competent counsel will be required on a 
18 II federal level in reviewing the state procedures, not only at 
19 lltrial, but on post-conviction, and they will be by federal 
20 II standards, and I think your bill certainly goes a long ways 
21 llin setting up certain standards . . 
22 II I know the ABA report that has not come out yet, and the 
2 3 II task force committee report, will go even further and ask 
24 llthat there be higher and greater standards assessed as to how 
MILLER REPORNr,ENG co., ~'s II and what are the conditions under which counsel should take 
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1 ll these cases. But what I am saying is that if we can say the 
2 II counsel shall meet these certain standards, now we have got a 
3 llnorm and that norm is a federal norm. But if that federal 
4 II norm is not met, then we simply say that all the procedural 
5 llstate bypass rules, all of the exhaustion rules, will not 
6 II apply. And so we have a mandatory national standard of what 
7 llwe view, at least in federal habeas corpus, as to how we 
8 llshould judge counsel's performance, and I suggest further 
9 lltban under the optional provisional that we have and par-
10 llticularly under Justice Powell's report, if we are going to 
11 ll leave this to the states to come up and show compliance with 
12 II this, we are going to end up with 50 different standards of 
13 II competency. 
14 This will be litigated. This will generate the litiga-
15 ll tion that Justice Frankfurter warned us about of obviating 
16 !l one point but creating others. We will be litigating in any 
17 II instance as to whether there is competent counsel. Let me 
18 llmove very quickly here. I think, and I sense, that most 
19 !!federal judges and most lawyers agree with the proposition 
20 llthat it is unfair to execute someone because a lawyer has 
21 llbeen ignorant or neglectful in making an objection. 
22 II Now we can talk about the presumption of competent 
23 ll counsel, but I can take the highest, most skilled criminal 
24 lllawyer today or the highes t and most skilled justice or judge 
111LLERREPoRriNaco •• ~5 Jjtoday and for them to sit down and to say that they understand 
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1 ilthe complexities of all qf the Supreme Court decisions that 
2 ll have gone on since Furman in 1972 is just a total impos-
3 II sibili ty . I read the other day the Teague case, the Penry 
4 II case, and the Steno v. Deno. It took me over a day and a 
5 ll half to really go through those opinions once again, and see 
6 11 all the nuances that apply. 
7 II Now you are taking counsel off the street, putting them 
8 llinto this important role of representation of a person that 
9 ll is sentenced- to death and say you must do this under the gun. 
10 !!You have six months, but three of them are already gone 
11 ll because over here on the state side they delayed in filing 
12 lithe petition for certiorari or for the petition for post-
13 II conviction review. That just simply is not realistic, and so 
14 III am suggesting that I think that if you do not go for what I 
15 !!would say the mandatory standards on a national basis, then 
16 ll at least we should adopt the provision that you have put in 
17 111757 that is absent in . the Powell bill that excuses a 
18 II lawyer's ignorance or his neglect. 
19 11 I would like to simply comment that there is great 
20 llcri tic ism of the delay in the federal courts, and I say this 
21 llin all due respect to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
, 
22 llbut I think every federal judge who deals with these problems 
23 II day in and day out would agree with this, and I was amused to 
24 II see that Judge Oakes, who I had not talked to about this 
MIUER REPORTING CO., MIIC. 
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1 ll that I have made. And I _believe Judge Reinhardt does in his 
2 II paper, and I know that Judge Holloway has mentioned this to 
3 li me from time to time. And that is that federal judges are so 
4 llbusy, so engaged in the questions of procedural bypass and 
5 ll procedural obstacles and questions of exhaustion, we cannot 
6 ll get to the merits. 
7 II We are not even allowed to dismiss a frivolous case on 
8 li the merits because we have to deal with the bypass provisions 
9 llfirst. We are told that as a predicate that we cannot reach 
10 Ila problem unless, if it has not been ra i sed below in the 
11 ll trial court or in the state court, and this arises now, we 
12 II have a case, and I have a case right here, a murder case out 
13 ll of Missouri, Stokes v. Armentrout, this is an opinion about 
14 11 20 pages long. Two-thirds of this opini on is about a 
15 II procedural bypass rule. And they final l y conclude that 
16 ll because in the first state habeas corpus proceeding because 
17 li the second lawyer did not appeal a provi sion of ineffective 
18 llcounsel in the first proceeding, he coul d not raise it in the 
19 II federal proceeding. 
20 And that is what this opinion is about. They do not get 
21 llto the merits of the question at all. And so we have a man 
, 
22 ll right now sentenced to death because a lawyer defaulted and 
23 II failing to raise a point on appeal. I simply say that there 
24 llare many areas of the law t hat we are procedurally enmeshed 
MILLEAAEPoAnNaco .• ~ . llin, but I do not know an area that more federal judges are 
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1 II not engaged in day in and day out in trying to decide under 
2 II the cause and prejudice standards of Wainwright v. Sykes as 
3 !I to whether we can even get to the problem. Now one other 
4 II thing, and that is on the successive petitions. You have, 
5 II Senator, in your bill a proviso that says not only guilt or 
6 II innocence, but also if there is a miscarriage of justice. I 
7 II think that should be amended to be more specific. I think 
8 II that is subject to ambiguity and litigation as to what 
9 II miscarriage of justice is. 
10 II Justice O'Connor has written in the case of Ramos v. 
11 II California that it is not guilt or innocence of the party 
12 II that is involved. It is in fact the procedure under which 
13 II the state imposes the death sentence that the court is 
14 II continually reviewing. And so I think any successive 
15 II petition or repetitive petition must give and provide 
16 II allowance not only when guilt or innocence is challenged, but 
17 II where there is any constitutional deficiency undermining the 
18 !! sentencing procedure. And I think that is so important to 
19 II put in there, and I think this should be the fail-safe system 
20 II that the lawyer, competent or not, simply failed to realize 
21 II when they prepared their first habeas petition. 
22 You know we send astronauts to the moon all the time. 
23 II We provide two or three fail-safe systems for them . Are we 
24 II going to let people lose their lives simply because a lawyer 
MILLER REPORTING co. IN.~ II · 1 h h 
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t _ 1 llthought of we would have.found that the person was going to 
2 be executed unfairly. 
3 Now very briefly I come to the question of the statute 
4 of limitations. I think the proposal to extend the statute 
5 llto a year is very important. But I make one other comment 
6 llabout that, and that is I'think realistically I do not know 
7 llany other area of the law that we say that the statute of 
8 lllimitations should commence running than now proposed where 
9 lithe cause of action is not ripe. In other words, under both 
10 111757 and 1760, the cause of action is going to commence from 
11 lithe time that the state at some point appoints counsel to 
12 llhandle the post-conviction appeal. Let me tell you what has 
13 llhappened in my circuit. In Arkansas they have abolished 
14 llpost-conviction review. In the state of Missouri, they have 
15 llsaid you have to change counsel now at the end of the trial. 
16 liYou have to get new counsel and include everything that you 
17 llwould put in there under post-conviction review . 
18 11 In effect, they have abolished post-conviction review so 
19 llwhere does the statute of limitations begin in those two 
20 llstates? I would respectfully submit, Senator, that I feel, 
21 !land I have talked to several judges about this, I think it is . 
22 llonly fair that the statute of limitations begins when the 
23 llstate process and the state procedure is ended. In other 
24 llwords, when the supreme court has denied certiorari in the 
MILLER REPORTING co.,1~ II state post-conviction process, then we ought to begin the 
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1 ii statute of limitations 01! appointment of federal counsel or 
2 II on the filing of the federal habeas bill. 
3 That is a definite time that will be recognized national 
4 lltime, and why should we care? We are interested here as to 
5 II about federal habeas corpus. We are really not here trying 
6 II to encroach upon the state's rights or the state's procedures 
7 !l as to how long they take in these cases. If some states want 
8 ll to take longer than others, that is fine. That is up to 
9 ll them. And I am sure that once any kind of reform legislation 
10 ll passes here on a statute of limitations, I am sure states 
11 llwill pass statute of limitations saying that you have to come 
12 llwithin 60 or 90 days and file a post-conviction relief. But 
13 ll if we focus upon the time that the state process is through, 
14 II then we have a time when the federal counsel has an issue 
15 llthat is ripe and he must engage himself accordingly. 
16 Ii And I think certainly your proposal of one year from 
. 
17 II that time would be much more realistic. And then when we can 
18 llobviate a lot of these problems as to when is this matter 
19 llbeing tolled in the state procedure because we toll in and we 
20 lltoll out, and so I simply say that. One last comment, and 
21 llthat is about retroactivity. I think retroactivity is 
. 
22 llanother area today which is causing a great deal of delay, 
23 llparticularly under the Teague case. And many people feel 
24 ll that Teague is really grossly unfair. Is it fair to execute 
MILLER REPORTING co., JIIIC. II h . . . 11 t 1 tt k d 
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1 II execute a person who rai~es it in his direct appeal. 
2 But this is causing a proliferation of litigation all 
3 llacross the country in habeas corpus, and I suggest to you 
4 llthat your proposal to make it retroactive and I would amend 
5 ll that with using the words "unless there is a demonstration by 
6 lithe state that this is something that has been relied upon in 
7 lithe state, and that it would otherwise create unjust results 
8 libecause that would allow the rule to go through as a condition 
9 llsubsequent and put the burden on the state to show that this 
10 Urule should not go through. 
11 Well, I will conclude with this statement. I know that 
12 llthere has been a long time effort by many to say that we 
13 ll should repeal the concept of federal habeas review. There 
14 II are arguments that the state courts are towing the mark, and 
15 II I certainly agree today they are towing the mark. But they 
16 ll are towing the mark because of federal habeas review, and I 
17 llthink that is a very simple statement to make and one that we 
18 ll should consider. Because if we preclude federal habeas 
19 llreview in this area, such as Senator Thurmond suggests, that 
2 0 II is a throw back to 1915 and the infamous case of Leo Frank 
21 lldown in Georgia. Frank was tried in a mob-dominated trial. 
, 
22 IIHe lost his life because the Supreme Court said we cannot 
23 llreview that at this time because the Georgia Supreme Court 
24 llhas given a full and adequate review to it. 
MILLERAEPOATtHaco., ~S II Federal habeas corpus is to review any arbitrary state 
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1 II action. To suggest that. that does not happen, I submit to 
2 II you the record of the Supreme Court decision since 1972 when 
3 II over half of the hundreds of cases that have come to them 
4 !! have been reversed because of improper state procedures. I 
5 !! thank the Senator for this time, and I will be happy to 
6 !! answer any questions at ahy time. 
7 [The statement of Judge Lay follows:) 
• 
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1 The Chairman. Thank you for your statement. If, and 
2 II this is an unusual and, we l l, I will just couch it as that, 
3 II request, if the remainder of the panel would not mind if we 
4 II took that five minute recess right now, and then we can come 
5 ll back and continue straight through without interruption. If 
6 II that is all right with you all, we will recess for five 
7 II minutes. Okay. 
[Recess.) 8 
9 The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. Ladies 
10 II and gentlemen, I apologize. I do want to assure you I was 
11 ll nowhere beyond that next room, and talking with a woman who 
12 II is heading up an effort to try to generate some support and 
13 II focus on the problem of pediatric AIDS in society, a woman 
14 II who had a blood transfusion, contracted AIDS. Her two 
15 II children in the process contracted it also. One has just 
16 Ldied and unfortunately we have very little research capability 
17 ll or knowledge about how the drugs that are hopefully going to 
18 ll mitigate the problem for adult AIDS population affect 
19 II children. We just do not know. And I am really sorry. I 
20 ll did not know, nor quite bluntly did I want to cut off her 
21 liability to make her case to me. So I know you guys understand 
, 
22 llbecause you are in the business, and again, nonetheless, I do 
23 ll apologize. 
24 No more interruptions. Judge Holloway, the floor is 
MILLER REPORTING co., 2'5 II yours . 
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STATEMENT OF JQDGE HOLLOWAY 1 
2 Judge Holloway. Mr. Chairman, I am pleased to accept 
3 II your invitation to testify at this important hearing. I am 
4 l!Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit and 
5 ll have been a judge of the court since September 1968. 
6 II However, as my reply to your letter inviting me to come 
7 II stated, my views are my own conscientious views as an 
8 II individual judge, not those of my court or my circuit nor of 
9 lithe Judicial Conference certainly, nor of any other individual 
10 II judges . With full deference to Justice Powell, and to his 
11 ll distinguished committee, which conscientiously iabored on the 
12 II report, and the statutory proposal, I must respectfully but 
13 II firmly disagree with important parts of that report. 
14 II It seems to me that in your discussions, Mr. Chairman, 
15 II today with Justice Powell, you came down to the very issue 
16 ll that troubles me. Justice Powell observed, if I remember 
17 llcorrectly, that in the vast majority of these cases, the 
18 !!question is not that of guilt, but of the death sentence and 
19 llwhether it validly was imposed, and yet the anomaly is that 
20 ll this proposal would deny jurisdiction on a successive 
21 !!petition to even consider the validity of the death sentence . 
22 II itself . That is the part of the proposal that really bothers 
23 li me, Section 2257. 
24 II The report of the ad hoc committee reasons that its 
~
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1 II successive petition dire~ted to the sentence, they say that 
2 ll if there is any doubt about the sentencing phase of a capital 
3 II case it should be raised during a state prisoner's initial 
4 II attempt to obtain post-conviction review. That is undeniably 
5 ll correct, and a very good principle with which I cannot 
6 ll disagree. The trouble is~ however, that the desirable 
7 llcircumstances for such early presentation of all constitutio-
8 ll nal claims do not always exist. The committee's report 
9 II overlooks appalling cases where consi tutional claims could 
10 II only be presented after the conclusion of a first post-
11 II conviction proceeding with the discovery that there was 
12 II concealed evidence withheld from defendant and his counsel 
13 II and not earlier discoverable, evidence which seriously 
14 II undermined the constitutional validity of the death sentences. 
15 II If such withheld evidence undermines the aggravating 
16 il circumstances that were considered during the penalty phase, 
17 ll or if such concealed evidence would establish mitigating 
18 llcircumstances that were not able to be shown before, then the 
19 ll entire death sentence should be allowed to be reviewed. I 
20 ll submit, Mr. Chairman, that what the committee has proposed 
21 ll really is at odds with what the Supreme Court held 26 years 
, 
22 II ago in Brady v. Maryland. There the Court held that the 
23 ll suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 
24 llaccused upon request violates due process where the evidence 
1i11LLERREPORT1Naco., 1~ llis material either to gui l t or to punishment, irrespective of 
)07 C Strttt . N.E. 
Washington. O.C. 20002 




1 II the good faith or bad f a,t th of the prosecution. 
2 The same principle is reiterated in the Agurs decision 
3 II of 1976. This is a real and distressing problem to me 
4 II because several cases with which I have been personally 
5 II involved have been of this very sort involving the skewing of 
6 II the death sentence but not of the underlying conviction. 
7 II They are cited in my paper and so I will not bore you with 
8 llgoing through the details. One of Chief Judge Bigg's of the 
9 1 3rd Circuit, the Almeida case, is one in which an officer sat 
10 II in the courtroom with evidence in his pocket that the 
11 llprosecutor knew could raise a serious question about whether 
12 II the death sentence should be imposed, and yet kept the 
13 II evidence concealed. 
14 II As was mentioned earlier, too, an equally distressing 
15 llcase comes from proposed Section 2257 if it were discovered 
16 II after a first federal habeas petition was denied that 
17 II perjured testimony had been knowingly used. These are not 
18 llimaginary cases. The Supreme Court's opinion in Miller and 
19 IIPate of 1967 was one where the prosecution's deliberate use 
20 II in a capital case of false evidence on guilt was not dis-
21 llcovered until the second habeas petition. If false penalty . 
22 llphase evidence skewed the death sentence by falsely picturing 
23 llaggravating circumstances or falsely negating mitigating 
24 llcircumstances, relief would nonetheless not be available 
111ueA AEP0Ar1Na co .• ~!i II under 2 2 s 7 as proposed. 
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1 It was observed ear~ier that, well, if there were 
2 II perjured testimony, surely the judge would find some way to 
3 II give relief. The trouble is this statute is a jurisdictional 
4 II bar. What can I do if someone comes in with affidavits and 
5 II proof asking for relief from me when a man is about to be 
6 II executed and the statute says I have no jurisdiction or 
7 ll authority to grant a stay or any habeas relief. And those 
8 ll are the words of the proposed statute in 2257. 
9 II To me it wo~ld be profoundly disturbing if statutory 
10 ll revisions were made that would strip the federal courts of 
11 ll jurisdiction in proceedings for relief -under the great writ, 
12 ll to grant stays or habeas relief in circumstances such as I 
13 ll have outlined. Surely in conclusion in the critical penalty 
14 llphase of a capital trial, the safeguards of the Constitution 
15 II should not be of diminished value or disregarded. It is 
16 llinstead at that crucial stage of the trial that those 
17 II safeguards may be of their paramount importance. The federal 
18 llcourts should not be closed to those challenging their death 
19 llsentences for constitutional wrongs occurring in the penalty 
20 II phase of their trials. 
21 II I appreciate the opportunity, Mr. Chairman, of being 
, 
22 II here to make this individual statement. 
23 [The statement of Judge Holloway follows:] 
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1 The Chairman. !I.'hank you vEry muchr Judge. Judge 
2 IIJieinbardt, welcome. 
411UER N:FON I MG CO., au:. 
,01 C Sattt. N.E. 












STATEMENT OF JQDGE REINHARDT 
Judge Reinhardt ~ Mr. Chai rman, I am here as an inade-
3 ll quate last minute substitute for Chief Judge Oakes of the 
4 II Second Circuit. My job is to round out the panel. I jotted 
5 II down my thoughts on a pad last night, and beg your indulgence 
6 II if they are somewhat disjointed. I ask leave to supply the 
7 II Committee with a polished copy after I return home? 
8 The Chairman. Without objection you will be allowed to 
9 li do that. 
10 Judge Reinhardt. Okay. I too speak for myself, of 
11 !! course, and not for the 9th Circuit, a court of many judges 
12 ll with many views. However, like my col l eagues on this panel I 
13 ll may be able to help all a northern or a western perspective 
14 II to the discussions. Perhaps also because I am not a chief 
15 II judge and I am less experienced in most matters than my 
16 !: esteemed colleagues, I will be less diplomatic and more 
. 
17 ll blunt. I have the greatest admiration for Justice Powell and 
18 II the contribution he has made to our judicial system and our 
19 II country. 
20 Because of that respect I am conf i dent he will forgive 
21 me for being as frank as I can with you. I thought it might 
22 be helpful for you to know how at least one federal judge in 
23 his tenth year on the appellate bench reacts to the commit-
24 ll tee's report. In my opinion, the report fails completely to 
MLLERREPORTINGco., ~'5 ll make a case for the fundamental reduct i ons in the use of 
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1 II habeas corpus proposed by that committee. If we are to 
2 II execute people we want to be sure we are right. And if we 
3 ll are going to limit the rights of capital defendants, the need 
4 II for doing so should be convincingly demonstrated. 
5 II We should not make significant changes in fundamental 
6 llrights based on unproven assumptions or in the absence of a 
7 II substantial, factual showing. Certainly not where life or 
8 II death is concerned. And make no mistake. By withdrawing 
9 II statutory habeas corpus protection, we wou·ld be making 
10 II constitutional rights unavailable to capital defendants. 
11 II With apologies in order to demonstrate that the· case for 
12 II limiting habeas corpus has not been convincingly made, I must 
' 
13 II start with the process followed by the Powell Committee. On 
14 II this point I will be brief. The committee met only one six 
15 lltimes and heard from no witnesses. It accepted only written 
16 II statements. 
17 II The report does not purport to make a factual showing in 
18 II support of any of its conclusions. The statistics it offers 
19 II are summary and not of any particular help. Let us examine 
20 llthose statistics. Capital cases take a long time, the 
21 llstatistics show. Perhaps longer than justified. Why? 
. 
22 IINeither the report nor the statistics provide us with any 
23 lluseful information on this question. What do they tell us? 
24 IIOnly that a large part of the time transpires while the case 
MILLER REPORTING co .. ~'s II is pending in the federal courts . 
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1 Again, why? It is probably because there are so many 
2 !! constitutional errors committed in the state court proceedings 
3 II that federal courts proceed slowly and with commendable 
4 ll caution. And we would not want to change that. In some 
5 II cases, the constitutional errors are manifold. The reversal 
6 II rate in the federal courts is extremely high, two-thirds 
7 ll during a recent ten year period. That is why it takes a long 
8 II time in federal courts. The high reversal and the undue 
9 ll length of time, if it is undue, is undoubtedly a result at 
10 II least in part of inadequate counsel. The Powell Committee 
11 ll makes an invaluable contribution when i t points out the need 
12 II for adopting a new procedure to ensure competent counsel in 
13 II collateral proceedings in capital punishment cases. But what 
14 ll about the competence of trial counsel? 
15 II At the trial stage, the need for competent counsel is 
16 ll even greater. The delay is also due in part to the remarkably 
17 II complex procedural rules which have been judicially prescribed 
18 !lover the past 20 years, rules that most federal judges have 
19 !I an inordinate difficulty comprehending , let alone applying. 
20 II Procedural default, exhaustion, Wainwri ght v. Sykes, Rose v. 
21 II Lundy, doctrines in cases designed to save time to curtail 
, 
22 !! abuses have instead complicated habeas corpus jurisprudence 
23 ll enorrnously, and have slowed down the process cons i derably. 
24 II As a result, cases bounce back and forth between the state 
MLLE" REPORTING co .. ~!> II a nd federal system . Were we to allow federal j udges to reach 
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1 II the merits of habeas cas~s more readily, we might eliminate 
2 II much of the delay the committee complains of . 
3 II Some of the reasons for the delay are quite apparent, as 
4 II I have suggested, and they have nothing to do with the 
5 II defendant's conduct. I would suggest to you two elementary 
6 II points. First, we should' conduct or await a study that 
7 llexamines the causes of delay, and then suggest how unnecessary 
8 II delay can be eliminated. To say there is delay without 
9 II telling us what the cause is or how much of that delay is 
10 II necessary does not tell us very much. For example, take 
11 llsuccessive petitions. There is not one word in the Powell 
12 II Committee report that tells us how much delay is due to 
13 II successive petitions or even how frequently or infrequently 
14 II those petitions result in the freeing of an innocent person, 
15 II or the setting aside of an unconstitutional death penalty. 
16 II Yet it is proposed to bar those petitions except in 
17 ll extraordinary circumstances. If we propose to limit drasti-
18 ll cally or abolish successive petitions, should we not at least · 
19 II know whether or not they have generally resulted in the 
20 llvindication of due process rights, whether they have served 
21 !I an invaluable purpose in our constitutional system, or . 
22 II whether they have been solely dilatory in nature. We have no 
23 ll facts offered us on any of those questions. There may be a 
24 ll study forthcoming shortly from the American Bar Association . 
MIU.ERREPORTINGco .• ~~ ll that sheds some light on some of these questions although I 
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1 II am not certain will help. us answer the question of how 
2 II successive petitions have been used thus far. 
3 II The ABA held hearings, took testimony, conducted a 
126 
4 II thorough, factual and legal survey. I understand it will 
5 II issue a report in the near future. Certainly, we should 
6 ll await its results as well
0
as the Judicial Conference's before 
7 II acting precipitously. Second, I would suggest that we take 
8 II affirmative steps first and not curtail fundamental rights 
9 II unless it prov-es necessary to do so. 
10 II Let us see what happens if we take those affirmative 
11 ll steps, if we adopt a system that provides for competent trial 
12 ll and appellant counsel, and competent counsel at the collateral 
13 II stage. It has been suggested today that some states may not 
14 ll be able to afford counsel at all stages or afford a system 
15 II which provides competent counsel at all stages. As far as I 
16 11 am concerned, that raises serious doubts as to whether those 
17 ll states should be able to impose the death sentence. It seems 
18 ll to me we have two choices. Our absolute minimum is to ensure 
19 !! that the there competent counsel. If we cannot do that, then 
20 llwe cannot comply with the Constitution or with fair proce-
21 lldures. 
22 Anyway, I think we can adopt a system. This Committee 
23 ll has before it a number of proposals. I ·think this country is 
24 ll capable of adopting a system of ensuring competent counsel at 
M1t.LERREPORT1NGco., ~!i !! all stages, and let us see what happens if we do that. Let 
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1 ll us see how much of the d~lay was due to our failure to 
2 !! provide counsel. Let us see what happens to all the procedu-
3 ll ral defaults once we have such a system? Before we rush into 
4 !! taking away basic constitutional rights, it seems to me we 
5 ll ought to make those affirmative changes, and I agree with 
6 II some of my colleagues that it should not be an optional 
7 II system. 
8 II It should be a national system with strong standards and 
9 !! with teeth,#and there are disincentives, some of which have 
10 ll been mentioned today, some of which have been proposed by the 
11 II American Bar Association Litigation Committee that will 
12 ll entice states or induce states to adopt those standards or 
13 !! forfeit some of the advantages they now have. I think we can 
14 !! have a national system that states will adopt and that will 
15 li do much to cure the unnecessary part of the delay without 
16 ll forfeiting constitutional rights. All this can be done by 
17 ll statute. 
18 II And I think if we also eliminate some of those procedural 
19 llproblems that we have in reaching the merits, if by statute 
20 llwe deal with a Wainwright v. Sykes problem and the Rose v. 
21 IILundy problem. If we have competent counsel, and we get to 
• 
22 lithe merits of habeas cases, I think those statistics would go 
23 !!down considerably. We are only guessing at the moment about 
24 li the cause of the delay. So my suggestion is basically we 
MILLERREPORTINGco .• _rg. jj take the affirmative steps, see what happens, and then only 
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1 II if necessary, do we have to abandon fair procedures in the 
2 II Constitution. 
3 I must say that I strongly disagree with the assumptions 
4 !land premises of the committee report. Finality and speed are 
5 II t he presumed objectives. They seem to outweigh the concerns 
6 II for fairness, justice, due process and compliance with the 
7 II Constitution. I am concerned that in these crucial delibera-
8 ll tions that this honorable body is undertaking proper weight 
9 ll be given to what should be our overriding concern, that we 
10 II not execute innocent people, that we not execute people when 
11 II the decision to do so has been arrived at by unconstitutional 
12 ll means. The sentencing decision is too important to be made 
13 ll in a manner that violates the Constitution. Few persons are 
14 II selected for the death penalty. The selection process is 
15 II arbitrary, and is questionable at best. 
16 II There are uncomfortabl e overtones of racism involved all 
17 II too frequently. The capital decision is one that in my 
18 llopinion must always meet strict constitutional standards, and 
19 llthat is a fundamental weakness in the Powel l Committee report 
20 ll and the bill introduced by Senator Thurmond . States are 
21 ll entitled under our Constitution to impose t he death penalty, 
22 ll but there is no more awesome function government performs 
23 ll than implementing the decision in an individual case. And at 
24 II a minimum we must be certain that in doing s o, government 
M1t.LERREPORT1Noco., ~~ II complies with fundamental principles of fai r ness and justice. 
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1 II If it takes time for the.courts to ensure constitutional 
2 II rights, so be it. 
129 
3 In my opinion, we should never prohibit federal courts 
4 II from stopping unconstitutional executions. We should not 
5 II allow concerns for finality or an administrative or bureau-
6 II cratic convenience to turn us into a society that condones 
7 llunconstitutional executions, and certainly not because a 
8 lldefendant had one bite at an apple. We should never become a 
9 llsociety that cares more about speed than about fairness or 
10 II justice. Nor do I believe we should ever permit an execution 
11 llsimply because our courts did not recognize thit the constitu-
12 II tion was violated until after the individual conviction 
13 II became final. 
14 II While I agree with the Powell Comrni ttee that enacting a 
15 II system for appointing competent counsel is the key to reform, 
16 II and that means for funds for investigation and experts, both 
17 llat trial and at collateral proceeding stage, I cannot agree 
18 llthat merely because counsel is appointed under such a system, 
19 II justice has been served. I agree that we should try to have 
20 llall issues raised in one habeas petition, and to have that 
21 II petition filed by competent counsel in a timely manner, and 
I 
22 lithe steps that I think we should take now will help accomplish 
23 llthat goal. 
24 I do not agree, however, that when fundamental errors 
Mn.LEA REPORTING co .• ,5 II occur, whether under such a new system governing appointment 
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1 llof counsel or otherwise, _federal courts should be barred from 
2 II addressing them, from redressing them simply because the 
3 II error was not discovered at the time of the first federal 
4 !!proceeding. Capital cases are hard on judges and hard on 
5 II lawyers. They are very complex. The factual and legal 
6 II issues can be extraordinari ly difficult. The best lawyers 
7 II and judges may err. They may not see an issue. They may get 
8 II it wrong. But the defendant should not pay for these errors 
9 II with their lives. 
10 II Let me close with an example, the recent case from our 
11 II court. The Supreme Court denied certiorari only two weeks 
12 !I ago. The state sentenced a young black defendant to die 
13 II under highly questionable circumstances. There were numerous 
14 llconstitutional questions presented including one relating to 
15 !!racial bias, one relating to the fairness of the sentencing 
16 llprocess, one to the weight of the evidence, and I might 
17 II mention incidentally that al though the defendant had no prior 
18 II record, his attorney, inexperienced in death penalty cases, 
19 ll put on no evidence whatsoever at the mitigation hearing at the 
20 !! sentencing proceeding. The panel voted two to one to affirm 
21 lithe conviction. Our court went en bane. We then voted ten 
22 II to one to reverse. The one dissenting judge complained only 
23 ll of the ground we chose for the reversa l because we selected 
24 II one among many that avoided all the complex factual inquiries. 
111LL£RREPORTINoco., !S II The important point about this story is that the judge 
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1 ii who wrote the majority opinion upholding the death sentence 
2 II the first time wrote the en bane opinion reversing his own 
3 II decision a year later. There were no intervening cases or 
4 II changes in the law. The judge simply did not see the issue 
5 II the first time. He made a mistake and was glad to have the 
6 II opportunity to rectify it'. Fortunately he did. Fortunately 
7 II there was no one bite at the apple rule that barred a second 
8 II chance in that case or that prevented the judge from changing 
9 II his course of action. If this learned judge could err, so 
10 !lean the average lawyer, and they frequently do, even the 
11 II competent ones. 
12 To me the lessons from our case are clear. The penalty 
13 II for a failure to raise an issue due to ignorance or neglect 
14 II of counsel should not be forfeiture of the right to habeas 
15 II corpus. Similarly, while successive petitions should be 
16 !; discouraged, they should not be barred if the interests of 
17 II justice dictate otherwise. While any deliberate attempt to 
18 II withhold issues from the first petition so as to get two 
19 II chances at habeas corpus should be cause for dismissal, I 
20 II urge you not to tie the hands of federal judges in cases in 
21 II which a legitimate issue was overlooked through counsel's 
22 II inadvertence or neglect. 
23 II I agree with Judge Lay that the miscarriage of justice 
24 II is too narrow a standard. I urge you to include in any 
MILLER REPORTING co., IN,~ II . . d l . · th · t · t · t · · ,o7 csu...,, . N.E. L.::, provision ea 1.ng w1. successive pe 1. ions, a a minimum, an 




1 II interest of justice exception. Thank you for allowing me to 
2 II appear here today. I greatly appreciate the opportunity you 
3 II have given me to express my personal views. 
4 II [ Statement of Judge Reinhardt follows:] 
5 II / COMMITTEE INSERT 
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1 The Chairman. Judg~ Reinhardt, if they are the jottings 
2 II of your random thoughts on the issue, I really look forward 
3 II to your polished paper. I mean that was a very, very good 
4 II statement. I am told by staff that percentage of reversal 
5 II from 1970 to 1980 was 70 percent, and from 1980 to 1988 is 40 
6 II percent, which comports with what you had to say. I found 
7 II that is worth noting for the record. I have a number of 
8 II questions for each of you, but I will try to keep them to a 
9 llminimum, an9 with your permission submit several to each of 
10 llyou in writing, if I may. 
11 II But Judge Lay, both the Powell report and my bill would 
12 II bar consideration in a federal habeas proceeding of most 
13 llclaims not previously raised in state court. This is the so-
14 II called procedural default rule, and the Powell report would 
15 ll bar any review of such default claims except in narrow 
16 ll circumstance while my bill would allow broader review but 
17 II retain some limitations. One of the assumptions underlying 
18 lithe procedural default doctrine is that the federal judges 
19 llcannot effectively dispose of habeas corpus claims if these 
20 llclaims have not been raised previously in the state court. 
21 And your written testimony challenges this view. Is it 
22 llin fact more efficient to exclude claims not previously 
23 ll raised or do federal judges have to spend so much time trying 
24 ll to determine whether a prisoner has defaulted on a claim that 
MILLEAAEPORTINoco.,!'S jjit would be more efficient simply to address the claim on the 
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1 llmerits right from the stqrt? Does the procedural default 
2 II doctrine make the federal courts more efficient or less 
3 II efficient? I know you have spoken to whether it is more or 
4 II less just, whether it dispenses justice, but just merely on 
5 lithe efficiency side, having handled so many of these cases? 
6 Judge Holloway. From the efficiency point of view, I 
7 llthink since the advent of the Wainwright doctrine, two things 
8 llhave happened in federal habeas, and I served from 1966 until 
9 III think 1974 when Wainwright came down. From 1966 to 1974 in 
10 livery habeas case, we could go direct to the merits unless 
11 II there was a deliberate knowing waiver under constitutional 
12 lldoctrine. In most of those instances we could go to the 
13 II merits. Now in just talking habeas general, I can say I 
14 II think it was the report of the Justice Department just two 
15 II years ago that only two percent of the federal habeas claims 
• 
16 II on an overall basis are successful . 
17 II That being so, it just does not make sense to me to have 
18 to waste so much time in trying to determine whether we can 
19 get beyond first base. So many of these c l aims can be 
20 disposed of on a simple basis without going through all of 
21 this procedural concern of whether there is cause for the 
22 reason that the person did not raise it. First of all, we 
23 II litigate did he raise it, and that gets to be ambiguous at 
24 lltimes as to whether or not he cited the constitutional case 
MILLERREPoRTINoco .• ~'s llor whether or not he real l y asserted this, an they argue that 
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1 II they did, but by implici ~ incorporation through some other 
2 II proposition. So we get into that. 
3 Once we decide that he did not raise it, then we must 
4 Ii decide is there cause, and Justice O'Connor's opinion in 
5 Ii Isaac's and some of the other cases that surround the 
6 II discussion of cause is quite involved. And we take a great 
7 II deal of time whether there was cause, whether the lawyer 
8 Ii knew, or whether there was a new constitutional rule, or did 
9 li it come about or whether there was legal precedent, I think, 
10 ll is one of the things from which a lawyer could predict that 
11 llhe should make an objection. We have cases in the Supreme 
12 Ii Court that tell us even those the law of the state--I think 
13 II this is the Patterson case out of Ohio--even if the law of 
14 li the state says that a certain presumption is valid, you shall 
15 Ii still make the objection to preserve your chance that maybe 
16 li the Supreme Court of the United States would reverse it. 
17 II So, and that is not cause, if you did not make your 
18 liobjection because of existing case law in the state. Once we 
19 ll get to cause, then we have to move to prejudice. Now mind 
20 liyou we have not reached the merits of the case yet. And so I 
21 Ii submit, and it is what I think Judge Oakes says and what 
, 
22 liJudge Reinhardt says, and I say this is all due respect to 
23 li the court, it is totally inefficient, the process that we put 
24 ll through. Senator Thurmond has a proposition ins. 88 that we 
111U.ERREPORTINGco.,!S JJcan reach these issues, we can deny them even though there 
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1 II has not been exhaustion we can deny them. Well, you see that 
2 II is from the urging of the Judicial Conference because we are 
3 II trying to say at least let us not put these people, the 
4 II prisoner, through this chore of corning to our court, raising 
5 II the question, our court saying you have not exhausted this, 
6 II sending them back to the state court, they exhaust the 
7 II remedy, go to the Supreme Court, come back to the district 
8 II court, come back to our court, and then we say the claim was 
9 II frivolous in the first place. 
10 That is exactly what we have to do today. We cannot 
11 II tell them that it is frivolous in the first place if they 
12 II have not exhausted it. So I do not think there is any 
13 II question. Rose v. Lundy should be overruled, and I think the 
14 II Supreme Court some day will do that, if it is not done. But 
15 ll in any event, I am just saying the whole system breaks down, 
16 II and we are so involved in this procedural problem, Senator, 
17 II that I think it does take all of our time. 
18 II The second point that I make, and a very quick one, is I 
19 II until 1974 when Wainwright came down, the claim of ineffective 
20 II assistance of counsel in a criminal case was minimal. 
21 II Wainwright caused all of the claims of ineffective assistance 
, 
22 llof counsel. It is the only way you can show cause anymore to 
23 II get a claim before the federal court, to show that your 
24 II counsel was inefficient. If counsel simply did not raise it 
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1 II cannot assert the claim q.nless you can show cause. One way 
2 ll to show cause counsel is inefficient. And I think that has 
3 II done more to deter and to cause concern among the bar 
4 llassociation, among lawyers, that they know now that when they 
5 ll are appointed in a criminal case in the state courts that 
6 llsooner or later they are going to be defending themselves as 
7 II to what they did. 
8 II Now maybe that has some deterrent principles to them and 
9 ll makes them keep on their toes. But I do not think that claim 
10 llwould be made in many, many cases if, in fact, the Wainwright 
11 llrule was overruled. And I particularly like your provision 
12 II in 1757 that says you do not have to show ineffective 
13 II assistance of counsel. All that you have got to show that it 
14 II was done either through neglect or ignorance. And it is 
15 II argued, well, that is going to cause a great many more cases 
16 ll to be brought and so forth, and we are going to have to 
17 II resurrect all these claims. I vigorously disagree with that 
18 ll because the time that we can spend on some of those claims 
19 llcan be done in a very short time, as compared to determining 
20 !!whether the counsel was ineffective in the first place so 
21 ll that they can get to the merit. So I simply add that it is 
, 
22 llnot only unjust but I think these procedural rules are 
23 ll certainly inefficient and are causing perhaps more delay in 
24 II the federal system than anything else, anything that I can 
MILLER REPORTING co .. ~'S II think of. 
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1 The Chairman. Eith~r of you gentlemen care to add 
2 ll anything? You indicated, Judge Reinhardt , that if a state 
3 II was not in a position or not willing to compensate counsel 
4 II ostensibly providing competent counsel, then the whole 
5 ll process should be brought in question anyway as to whether or 
6 II not that state should be able to impose the death penalty. 
7 II Did I read you correctly? 
8 
9 
Judge Reinhardt. Yes. 
The Chairman. So that at a minimum this notion of 
10 ll whether or not a state is willing to compensate counsel is 
11 Hfrom your perspective a bare minimum from which we should 
12 II start? I mean am I right about that? 
13 Judge Reinhardt. Yes, I think we should decide what we 
14 II expect of fairness before we are willing to impose the death 
15 II penalty. And if we believe that the proper process is to 
16 II have counsel at all stages so that the procedures can be fair 
17 !l at all stages, if that is what we believe is required for a 
18 II system and we are not willing to pay the price, then I think 
19 llwe cannot execute people. It seems we should first establish 
20 ll what is right, what is minimum, the minimum that should be 
21 llrequired, and I think in actuality once we establish that, 
, 
22 li the states will come up with the funds. 
23 But if someone is unwilling, if a state i s unwilling to 
24 II provide the minimum fairness , or meet the minimum fairness 
MLLEAAEPOAT1Naco .• ~'s ll standards, then I do not think it can ask that the death 
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1 II penalty be invoked. 
2 The Chairman. Judge Holloway, I asked Justice Powell 
3 II and his counsel--maybe that is not the proper--and his 
4 II colleagues, how you would deal with the circumstance as a 
5 II federal judge where under the Powell Commission's recommended 
6 II legislation you concluded'that there had been perjured 
7 II testimony at the sentencing hearing, and he said, well, the 
8 II courts would always find a way. I thought I understood from 
9 II your testimony that as you read the Powell Commission's 
10 II legislative recommendation, you thought as a sitting Circuit 
11 II Court of Appeals judge, you would not be able to deal with 
12 II that, notwithstanding the fact you were convinced that there 
13 II was perjured testimony at the sentencing proceeding in the 
14 II state court; is that right? 
15 Judge Holloway. Yes, sir. I think it is an absolute 
16 II jurisdictional bar in the bill as proposed by the committee. 
17 II In Section 2257(c)(3) if you show now way to overturn the 
18 II guilt determination, you have no authority to proceed. The 
19 II statute as proposed says shall not have authority. I take 
20 llthat as jurisdictional. 
21 
22 
The Chairman. Do you agree with that Judge Reinhardt? 
, 
Judge Reinhardt. It seems absolutely clear to me that 
23 ll we are barred from interfering, and I do not know how we are 
24 II permitted to issue orders when the statute says you are not 
111LLER REPORTING co.,~ II allowed to. 
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1 The Chairman. How about you, Judge Lay? Do you read 
2 II that thing differently? 
3 Judge Lay. I think that is true, and there is a case of, 
4 II the Dugger case, I think, of this last term that even holds 
5 II that Wainwright is not waived where there is undermining of 
6 II the sentencing process. So I think if the catch-all of the 
7 II miscarriage of justice is not sufficient to take care of the 
8 II situation that I think Judge Holloway raises although it 
9 II certainly could be by court interpretation, but it is 
10 II certainly subject to--
11 The Chairman. Excuse me one moment. I just want to 
12 ll make clear. I did not think that the Powell Committee 
13 II legislative recommendation used the phrase "miscarriage of 
14 II justice. " You are referring to my bill? 
15 
16 
Judge Lay. 1757, yes. 
The Chairman. Yes, o k ay. I just wanted to make sure 
17 II that I was correct in that. I should tell the panel that is 
18 II about to come up, one of the questions I am going to ask you 
19 II all is whether or not the section referred to by Judge 
20 II Holloway, you would view as a bq.r or whether you are going to 
21 ll be more inventive than your colleagues and come up with a way 
22 ll to see how you would not be barred in that circumstance . 
23 
24 
Judge Holloway. Senator, could I refer to this? 
The Chairman . Yes, please. 
MILLER REPORTING CO., ~<s 
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1 II asking about. It is in proposed Section C, and says if one 
2 llof the conditions in Subsection B has occurred, no federal 
3 II court shall thereafter have the authority to enter a stay of 
4 II execution or grant relief in a capital case unless, and then 
5 II the restrictive conditions are imposed, including that you 
6 II have to attack the guilt determination. So I read that as a 
7 II jurisdictional bar. 
8 The Chairman. As I must say I do, and that is the 
9 II reason why when I drafted the statute as I did, I used the 
10 llphrase "miscarriage of justice," and I attempt to go the 
11 II sentencing provision, not just on the basis of .the question 
12 llof guilt or innocence. As Judge Reinhardt pointed out in his 
13 II testimony, that is the only place under the Powell Commission 
14 II you can move, but--well, at any rate I do not disagree . I 
15 II read it the same way, but I was somewhat surprised when 
16 II Justice Powell indicated that the court would find a way to 
17 II deal with that, and I did not see how. It seemed pretty 
18 llexplicit, the language. 
19 11 Now let me ask a couple more questions, and do have 
20 II about a half a dozen questions for each of you. I do not 
21 llwant to make work for you. I know how busy you are, but the 
22 llway you jot down things, Judge Reinhardt, you will have them 
23 II all answered by the time you get back on the plane. But let 
24 lime, the issue of standards for appointment of counsel, now as 
MILLEAAEPoAnNoco .• ~"s II I understood it, at least two of you gentlemen were suggesting 
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1 II that whether or not we w4;re going to limit habeas corpus 
2 petitions to defendants, we should be thinking in terms of 
3 standards for counsel anyway; is that correct, or am I 
4 misstating your position? 
5 II Judge Reinhardt. That is correct as far as I am 
6 llconcerned, yes. 
7 The Chairman. Now I again was somewhat perplexed when 
8 II counsel for the commission answered my question I suggested 
9 II that we may very well spawn more, spawn more cases as a 
10 ll consequence of not having a single federal standard, and 
11 II allowing each state to come up with a standard, all of which, 
12 II I guess, would be, I would assume, would be challenged at 
13 !Isome point or another. And he said, no, you might be able to 
14 II do it in one fell swoop. Could you speak to that question? 
15 II Did you hear his response without my going through his 
16 II response? Any one of you if you would speak to that I would 
17 Happreciate it? 
18 Judge Holloway. Well, I think Professor Pearson said 
19 there could be a class action challenging the state standards 
20 in some way. That may be true, and yet you have got 50 
21 states, and there is a lot of problems. Frankly, it seems .to 
• 
22 me there is more delay built in there which is one of the 
23 concerns of all of us today. So that it seems to me that if 
24 you establish minimum standards that it may be better to do 
MILLERREPoRTiNaco .• ~~ ll so rather than to leave it to evolution and litigation. 
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1 Judge Lay. The additional factor can be as to whether 
2 II counsel appointed, and you cannot handle this in a class 
3 II suit, whether the counsel appointed actually lived up to the 
4 II standards, whatever they may be. 
5 The Chairman. Well, that is going to occur, in fairness, 
6 II regardless of whether or hot we set the standard or the state 
7 II sets the standard. 
8 Judge Lay. Well, I appreciate that but at least you 
9 llhave under a federal standard, you are going to have at least 
10 Ila common ground to look upon, and whereas in dealing with our 
11 II circuit, we would have to look at seven different circuits. 
12 II I might add, Senator, I think the states of Ohio and Califor-
13 ll nia, if I am not mistaken, perhaps one other, have incor-
14 llporated the ABA's more complete standard of competency of 
15 II counsel in this area, and these are being looked upon and it 
16 llis my understanding they are working very well. 
17 The Chairman. How do you gentlemen respond to the 
18 II assertion made this morning and that I have heard constantly 
19 II since we put the provisions of minimal standards in with 
20 llrelationship to the drug bill last year that there are just 
21 II not enough of those folks out there? There are not enough 
, 
22 II folks with five years' experience and three years' experience 
23 ll in criminal appellate work? They just do not exist so 
24 lleffectively my colleagues are saying to me, effectively, 
MtLLERREPORTtNoco., ~<s IIBiden, what you are doing is seeing to it that nobody is 
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1 II really going to meet that standard. Not no one. Very few 
2 ll are. Therefore, you are going to continue the process the 
3 ll way it is because we will not be able to provide adequate · 
4 ll counsel, et cetera. How do you respond to that as folks who 
5 llhave observed and passed on the bar, if you will, for a 
6 ll nurnber of years? 
7 Judge Reinhardt. Well, basically I would defer that 
8 II question to the American Bar Association. I think they have 
9 !!conducted extensive studies. They are more familiar with 
10 llthat issue. I would just be answering off the cuff. But I 
11 llassume that when the bar develops the standards after the 
12 II kinds of studies they have conducted, that they have con-
13 llsidered that question, and they feel that they have adopted 
14 II realistic standards. The bar is not ordinarily in the 
15 II business of adopting standard that is too high for their 
16 II members to meet. So I would think that is true. 
17 II I do not think in California we would have much difficul-
18 llty in finding enough competent, experienced counsel to handle 
19 lldeath penalty cases. We have very sophisticated systems 
20 lldeveloped there because we do a lot of death penalty business 
21 II just like the south. But I really do not know about other 
22 ll states. 
23 The Chairman. It has also been suggested to me as a 
24 ll criticism of my proposal, whether or not one agrees with the 
11
11.LEAAEPOATINGco .• ,5 llprecise standards that I suggest, but the notion of standards 
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1 llbeing set, is that I wil.l, be, if my legisiation or something 
2 !!similar to it were to pass relating to standards, that I will 
3 II be generating a whole new industry of those who handle death 
4 !leases. And my response to that was, well, that would not be 
5 llso bad if they were competent. I wonder what your response 
6 II to that would be if you feel it is appropriate to make one? 
7 Judge Lay. I am sure the Senator knows of the project 
8 ll of the American bar, and I have participated in this in a 
9 llminimum way,, at least in our circuit, of the establishment of 
10 Ila death resource centers. And I think I certainly encourage 
11 lithe establishment of those in every state that can quality in 
12 ll numbers. The success of those around the country is self-
13 llevident. This is saving counsel's time. I think there are 
14 llample numbers of lawyers out there in every circuit who have 
15 llpracticed the five years or the three years. And in these 
16 I! cases where we have the death penalty resource centers, these 
. 
17 llare going to help the lawyers who are busy--they are not just 
18 llhandling one case--tremendously in processing these cases. 
19 II But you know our federal public defender told me just 
20 lllast month, he said I am assigned to handle now three federal 
21 llhabeas corpus cases on capital death in Missouri, and he said 
I 
22 limy office cannot take anymore. He said that, and we have, I 
23 llthink, three or four assistants there, he said with all the 
24 II cases we have to try, we simply cannot, we do not have the 
111..LER REPORTING co .. ~5 II manpower to get into any more. 
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1 II appointments at this time. · So through the death penalty 
2 llresource center now, we are expanding that in Missouri to go 
3 II out to the large firms and to get their cooperation to serve 
4 llin these cases, and I sense that this going to have a great 
5 llbeneficial result. 
6 II But I certainly feel· that the ABA standards and those 
7 !!standards that you have incorporated are not unrealistic, and 
8 Ii that there are lawyers there. 
9 The Chairman. The last question I will ask you all, 
10 ll this whole notion, and I am, I must acknowledge as I said at 
11 li the outset, I am much more inclined to share your view, Judge 
12 II Reinhardt that speed is not the issue. It is doing justice 
13 II that is the issue. But to stick with the argument most made 
14 llby those who say a change is badly needed in the law--they 
15 llalways put it in terms of speed, efficiency. Failure to have 
16 II speed and efficiency provides the opportunity for the system 
17 llto become a mockery of justice as the argument goes. 
18 II Now the Powell bill says that whatever standards are 
19 llset, whatever standards that states may devise, will apply 
20 llonly to the post-conviction phase. I suggest that those 
21 llstandards need apply both to the post-conviction phase and to 
, 
22 lithe appointment of counsel at the trial phase. My argument 
23 ll is that if there were competent counsel at the trial phase, 
24 ll we would be in a position to move with more rapidity and 
MILLERREPORTINGco.,215 II speed at the post-conviction phase than otherwise. I may be 
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1 II singing to the choir her~, preaching to the choir I should 
2 llsay, but am I correct in that? Or do you think that it really 
3 llwould not matter much in terms of dealing with not the 
4 ll question of justice being done, but in terms of whether or 
5 llnot there would be greater rapidity with which decisions 
6 llwould be reached and made'? Anyone of you. 
7 Judge Holloway. I think that the effect if you adopted 
8 II it at the post-conviction stage, it seems to me it is going 
9 !Ito be infectious. The states will realize· that this is the 
10 ll thing that really ought to be done, and these standards, I 
11 llthink, will become more widely accepted than you may realize. 
12 IISo it would have beneficial effect. 
13 Judge Reinhardt. But I think certainly it would be 
14 ll better if it were done at both stages and it would avoid all 
15 ll of the kinds of questions--it would not avoid all--it would 
16 ll substantially reduce the kinds of questions that Judge Lay 
17 llhas been talking about and Judge Holloway. Many of these 
18 llproblems arise, the delays arise because of lack of competent 
19 llcounsel. The reason the records are so bad, the procedural 
20 llissues are so bad, the failure to raise questions, the 
21 llfailure to recognize issues, is because of lack of counsel. 
22 There would be far fewer errors, far less work to do, if 
23 li the cases were handled properly the first time . I mean I 
24 llthink it is inevitable that if you adopted those standards 
MILLERREPORTINGco., ~!3 JJfor the trial, it would shorten the process substantially. 
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The Chairman. Than~ you. 1 
2 Judge Lay. I would just say one thing along that line, 
3 II Senator, and I think I emphasized this, that we need to 
4 llunderscore competent counsel at the time of the trial. This 
5 llis where all the defaults take place. This is where the 
6 llcontemporaneous objection'rule takes effect, and this is 
7 llwhere the concerns about exhaustion of problems are concerned. 
8 IIThat is so important, and yet let me say whether we appoint 
9 llcounsel who have three or five years, even those counsel 
10 llbecause of the pressure of business, simply because of 
11 llneglect, can overlook procedural defects. It is no assurance, 
12 !land I am still troubled by the idea of the busy public 
13 lldefender who easily qualifies as competent counsel who does 
14 llnot have time to investigate the case. 
15 II And simply because he meets federal standards or state 
16 llstandards that that should not preclude the attack and 
17 llchallenge upon his performance. I think that is a very 
18 !!important thing. One last comment, and I think the Powell 
19 II Committee addresses this as does yours. And that is I think 
20 lithe Powell Committee focuses upon the fact that there should 
21 llbe one automatic stay in these cases, and I think that is 
22 llexcellent, and your bill adopts such same. So that we do not 
23 llhave these recurring. And one automatic stay until the 
24 II process is done. 
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1 ll way, and I think everybody and every federal judge across the 
2 II country stands for the concept that we should have an 
3 ll expedient and efficient process. This is not just something 
4 ll that Judicial Conference of 1974 endorses. We work on this 
5 II problem in our judicial administration constantly. We are 
6 llall for that. And I endorse the concept of one full and fair 
7 llhearing, and I think most judges do. We want to get away 
8 II from piecemeal litigation. I think the issue and the hang-
9 ll up is what is the full and fair hearing? 
10 II And if we are still going to apply under a one-shot 
11 II litigation, a full and fair hearing means only those issues 
12 ll where there has not been procedural bypass or non-exhaustion 
13 II and so on. I have a lot of trouble with that particularly if 
14 llwe are going to put a person to death because of that kind of 
15 II default. 
16 The Chairman. Gentlemen, I have, as I said, many more 
17 ll questions. I will submit in writing to you about a half 
18 lldozen each and the longer that I am chairman of this Commit-
19 lltee, the more respect I have for those of you who sit on the 
20 llbench hour after hour after hour. after hour after hour after 
21 II hour. In my case, I always get to hear very interesting and . 
22 II informative witnesses. That is not always the case where you 
23 !!are concerned, I know. But I have great respect for not only 
24 !! your ability to sit there, but I mean this very sincerely, 
MILLERREPORTINGco., _2'~ !l your willingness to be on the bench and stay on the bench . 
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1 II It is harder and harder ~veryday to do that, and unsolicited, 
2 III hope, if I have anything to do with it, I hope we begin to 
3 !l at least raise the salaries to the point where you are making 
4 llat least as much as the first year graduate out of law school 
5 ll in the Second Circuit and probably the Ninth Circuit. So I 
6 llthank you for what you do: You make a significant contribu-
7 ll tion, and I appreciate your taking the time to come here. It 






Judge Reinhardt. Thank you so much. 
Judge Lay. Thank you, Senator. 
Judge Holloway. Thank you, sir. 
[The written questions of Senator Biden follow:) 
/ COMMITTEE INSERT 
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1 The Chairman. Senator Thurmond also has submitted 
2 II questions for the record. 
8 3 
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1 The Chairman. Our Qext panel made up of Chief Judge 
2 II Charles Clark, U.S . Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit; 
3 II Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, U.S. Court of Appeals, the 11th 
4 II Circuit; and Judge Patrick E. Higginbotham, U.S . Court of 
5 II Appeals, Fifth Circuit . Gentlemen, welcome. Thank you for 
6 II your patience. And I am anxious to hear what each of you 
7 II have to say. If we could begin in the order in which you 
8 II have been called, it seems to me to make the most sense, and 
9 II hopefully your trips up here will be worthwhile. It is good 
10 II to see you again, Judge Clark. You may not recall, but we 
11 II met on one occasion. 
12 
13 II that. 
14 
Judge Clark. Senator, I certainly I would not forget 
The Chairman. And I am delighted to have an opportunity 
15 II to hear what you have to say. 
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STATEMENTS OF ~ANEL, CONSISTING OF CHIEF JUDGE 
CHARLES CLARK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH CIRCUIT; 
CHIEF JUDGE PAUL H. RONEY, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 
11TH CIRCUIT; AND JUDGE PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, 
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, 5TH CIRCUIT 
STATEMENT OF JUDGE CLARK 
Judge Clark. Thank you, sir. I will start off with the 
8 II same disclaimers as the other judges. I speak only for 
9 II myself. In some respects I would say that' I speak as a 
10 II member of the Powell Committee, but the product of that 
11 11 committee is before you. And I certainly do not mean to 
12 II temporize with it or anything else. I will answer your 
13 II questions very frankly about what the committee intended. I 
14 II think I could do that. The beginning point with me after 
15 II having spent the day as you h~ve listening to comments about 
16 li the Powell Committee report, about your bill, is that I think 
17 II a good bit of the conversation has been somewhat misdirected. 
18 l!We are not talking about trial. As far as the object of 
19 II these bills, we are not talking about trial or trial counsel. 
20 Your bill does. The Powell Committee bill does not. We 
21 II focused on what we perceived to be a large gap in the process 
, 
22 llof assuring justice in death penalty cases, and that was that 
23 II there is no constitutional right, and the Supreme Court of 
24 lithe United States this very year has said so. There is no 
111
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1 II to represent him in collateral attacks . Now in the federal 
2 II court, we do have counsel in these cases that are provided at 
3 II government expense. The states are not required to. Some 
4 li do. Most do not. 
5 II We perceived this l ack of counsel for collateral review, 
6 II the time after the sentence is pronounced, the time after the 
7 II direct review has affirmed that sentence, the time after the 
8 II Supreme Court of the United States has either refused 
9 II certiorari or has granted certiorari and affirmed the 
10 II conviction. The collateral attack that takes place then in 
11 II the state court is not counsel. Many times it is very 
12 II perfunctory. We think that it turns federalism on its head 
13 II as well as orderly process on its head to leave out counsel 
14 ll at that stage of collateral review and then insert counsel in 
15 II the federal forum. 
16 II This causes a dislocation not only of the prisoner's 
17 II rights, but we think of states' rights. And this is why we 
18 II suggested that a bill should be tailored that would attract 
19 II states to do voluntarily what they do not have to do constitu-
20 ll tionally , and that is insert competent counsel at the habeas 
21 II stage. We thought it would be more attractive to the states . 
22 ll if we did not tell them precisely what size l awyer, what 
23 II experience he should have, how able he should be. We thought 
24 II we should leave it to the states just as it i s left to the 
MILLEAAEPORTtNGco .• ~<"s II states today to appoint competent counsel for trial. 
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1 There is a federal ~ight to enforce that competency, and 
2 II if the person that the state puts into that trial setting is 
3 II not competent, then federal courts frequently do set aside 
4 lithe conviction or they take other steps to correct the 
5 II constitutional deficiency. This was the system that the 
6 II Powell Committee proposed'. We would require the states, if 
7 II they wished to get certain advantages in the orderly process-
8 II ing of collateral review to furnish counsel, hopefully so 
9 II that we would shift the burden in collateral review from 
10 II where it now reposes on federal courts into the state system. 
11 II The second thing that I would say that occurs to me, and 
12 II I hope you will not take this wrong, Senator, because the 
13 II words you used in introducing this legislation were that we 
14 II had to look to see what this one bite out of the apple would 
15 lido. We focused in the Powell Committee on the fact that 
16 II there was not one review but eight reviews before anything 
17 II final comes about, before any right is lost. After a death 
18 II sentence is pronounced, there is a direct review in at least 
19 !lone court, and in many states in two appellate courts of that 
20 II sentence. There is frequently a right of review in the 
21 II Supreme Court of the United States. 
22 I guess they have taken as many death penalty cases as 
23 II they have ariy other single category of cases in the Supreme 
24 II Court. So that is either two or three reviews before you 
IIILLERREPORnNaco .• •~ jj leave the direct case. In addition to that, you have got the 
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1 II trial in the habeas proc~eding , collateral proceeding. Some 
2 II states do not call it habeas . But you have got the trial in 
3 II the habeas proceeding . You have got t he appeal in the habeas 
4 II proceeding. Right now you have got the right to go to the 
5 II Supreme Court of the United States a second time. Then you 
6 II have got federal · habeas ih the trial court , federal habeas on 
7 II appeal, and review by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
8 II And I can count before we woul d cut off any right for the 
9 II state to have to appoint counsel into t his process that 
10 II collateral review, it would be eight proceedings, eight bites 
11 II at the apple. 
12 The Chairman. You understood then and you understand 
13 li now the reference was made to federal habeas corpus? 
14 Judge Clark. To the federal habeas corpus . I mean it 
15 II is not--
16 The Chairman. So you are a good advocate. You knew 
17 II what I meant then and you know what I mean now? 
18 Judge Clark. And I know what you mean except to say 
19 II that I think that the language , it assures me to know that 
20 II thi s is what you mean. But the language could misleading 
21 II from the standpoint of saying that you are going to take a 
. 
22 II man's right away when he has only one chance to complain . 
23 The Chairman . There is no question . We are taking an 
24 II existing right away; is that not correct? 
MILLER REPORTING CO., "5 
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1 II from saying that. Senatqr Specter says that there is nothing 
2 II here that affects state collateral review, and I could not 
3 II differ more with the honorable Senator. It seems to me that 
4 II everything that this bill is aimed at affects collateral 
5 II review in the states. This is where we think that the real 
6 II reform ought to take place. There has been references to a 
7 II statute of limitations, and it concerns me that this is the 
8 II nomenclature that is used with regard to the six month period 
9 II that the copunittee recommended be a period of bar. 
10 II It is a statute that operates only on counsel, only on 
11 II counsel at habeas corpus in the state proceedings. It has 
12 II nothing to do with how long state courts take to act on the 
13 II merits of collateral procedures. It does not begin to 
14 II operate. There is a trigger in the bill, and that trigger is 
15 II the appointment of counsel under a plan approved by the 
16 II state. That plan is subject to attack in the federal courts. 
17 II It is a plan that must be in writing, and it must be approved 
18 llby the state court system that is going to use that counsel. 
19 II But all it says to that competent attorney is that six 
20 II months from the time, you cannot use more than six months of 
21 II time when you are not in any court, and if you do, then you 
, 
22 II have barred yourself from a federal remedy. And it is a bar. 
2 3 II And I do not shy away from that either. But it is a bar that 
24 llwe think is easily complied with based upon the experience 
MILLER REPORTING co.,~ II that we have had. 
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1 Our court has in the last two years, January of 1988 to 
2 II date, our court has handled 6 6 cases that involve the death 
3 II penalty. There are ten pending now. This is a matter that 
4 II happens in the 5th Circuit with some regularity unfortunate-
s II ly. So it is not a matter that we know nothing about. It 
6 II was a matter that a number of lawyers or a number of judges 
7 lion the committee were well informed about, and the bar itself 
8 II contributed to our information. 
9 II The question of whether you fix federal standards for 
10 II lawyers in trials and collateral review, direct and collateral 
11 II review, is a substantial question. I think it is one that 
12 II cannot be answered but one way if you hope to make the theme 
13 II of your bill and our bill successful, and that is to leave it 
14 ll to the states in the first instance with review by the 
15 II federal courts. I am far from convinced that anyone in the 
16 II federal system should criticize in a general way the lawyering 
17 II in death penalty cases. It is a bitter experience, I speak 
18 II from personal knowledge, to shoulder the responsibility for 
19 II defending a person in a capital case. 
20 II I do not know of any lawyer that takes the duty lightly 
21 llor that discharges it without the very best of his ability, 
, 
22 II and I know of no lawyer, and I speak of the president of the 
23 II American Bar or any lawyer you might want to name, yourself 
24 II included sir, who could try a case so perfectly that another 
MILLERREPoRTINoco .• ~ II lawyer could not pick up that record and second-guess you 
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1 II about substantial parts of what went on in that trial, 
2 !! particularly if you have been unsuccessful, if you have not 
3 II gotten the life sentence, or if you have not gotten your 
4 !!defendant acquitted. There is always something that a lawyer 
5 !l ean go over and pick up. 
6 II But I think for the preponderant number of cases and the 
7 II records that I have read, I see lawyers who just pour their 
8 II guts out in the courtroom in these cases. And I do not think 
9 !! that they are shying away from their responsibility whether 
10 !! they are paid a thousand dollars in Mississippi or $50,000 in 
11 II California. That is not the issue. It is just a question of 
12 II whether they contribute more of their own time, but none of 
13 II them fail to contribute that ability. Thank you, sir. 
14 [The statement of Judge Clark follows:] 
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The Chairman. Than~ you very much. Judge Roney. 
STATEMENT OF CHIEF JUDGE RONEY 
Judge Roney. Mr. Chairman, Senator, if I could, I would 
4 II like to take just a few minutes and tell you how I went into 
5 II this committee report, and what is the basis of my concurrence 
6 II in the committee report which I endorse. If I had time to 
7 II f i le a written statement, I would have filed essentially the 
8 II introduction to the committee report. I have been a circuit 
9 II judge for 19 years , Chief Judge at the 11th Circuit for three 
10 II years, and took senior status on October 1 . I am still doing 
11 II a substantial judicial duties. And I just want to emphasize 
12 II to you the extreme importance to our circuit of the work that 
13 ll you are undertaking. 
14 II Our circuit c l erk Monday reported to me that there are 
15 II more than 509 persons on death row in our circuit. Presently 
16 II pending in the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals there are 42 
17 II capital cases. 21 cases are pending in the federal district 
18 II courts . Four of our cases are in the Supreme Court of the 
19 II United States. As for my own experience in handling these 
20 II cases, the clerk advises me that in the last nine years, I 
21 II have participated as a panel member on 64 non-emergency 
, 
22 II cases. Now that is a case that is brought in the regular 
23 II appeal process where no execut i on date is imminent when we 
24 11 get it. 
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1 II is a case where there was a date of execution set when we got 
2 li the case. I do not know how many of our non-emergency cases 
3 II were triggered by the setting of an execution date, but I 
4 II would suggest that probably the vast majority did not start 
5 II the collateral attack until an execution time had been set. A 
6 II general rule, state collateral and federal collateral relief 
7 II is not sought until the case is set for execution. This 
8 II makes it quite often those stays have been entered either by 
9 II the state court. Quite often by the federal district court 
10 II before it gets to us. And that is why it is a non-emergency 
11 II case. 
12 II In addition to that, I have participated in the en bane 
13 II consideration of another 26 cases heard by all 12 judges of 
14 II our circuit, and have considered and voted on an additional 
15 lj 140 suggestions for rehearing en bane. Now this experience 
16 l! is unique in the country, but it is not unique in our circuit 
17 II and not unique in the 5th Circuit. We have a system of blind 
18 II assignment of cases, and each judge is supposed to receive an 
19 II equal number of cases. So that my experience is really the 
20 llexperience of every other judge _in our two circuits. 
21 I entered the work of the committee with certain 
22 II precepts. First, United States Constitution does. not prevent 
23 II state governments or any government from imposing the death 
24 llpenalty for certain crimes. Regardless of how I would vote 
MILLER REPORTING co .• ~'s II if r were on the Supreme Court, I accept that• 
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1 II legislatures of the thre~ states in our circuit and as in 
2 II some 34 other states and now the United States Congress have 
3 II established the death penalty as the appropriate punishment 
4 II for certain criminal conduct. Regardless of how I would vote 
5 II were I in the legislature, I accept that. 
6 II Third, the United States Congress has given to the 
7 II federal courts the jurisdiction to review state court 
8 II criminal decisions for constitutional error. Regardless of 
9 ll how .I would vote on the imposition of the death penalty in an 
10 II individual case, I accept the fact that my jurisdiction is 
11 II limited by Congress to a decision as to whether the state 
12 II proceedings were f l awed by constitutional error. I remain 
13 II neutral on the death penalty. Unlike you and unlike Justice 
14 II Powell and others who may have spoken, I do not have a 
15 II position as to how I would vote if I were in the legislature, 
16 II nor do I have a position as to how I would vote if the 8th 
17 II Amendment question was put to me . 
18 II So I approach this work in a neutral position, neither 
19 II for nor against the death penal ty. Somewhat reluctantly 
20 ll because it so disparages the state courts in my judgment, I 
21 II accept the common federal judicial wisdom now present that 
• 
22 II every capital defendant is going to get a full federal court 
23 II consideration of his constitutional claims regardless of how 
24 II frivolous they may be, and that the state cannot act unless a 
MUEAREPORTINGco., ~<s II federal court has after ful l consideration held the conviction 
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1 II and sentence are free of constitutional error. 
2 II Fifth, and I think this is the basis and where we maybe 
3 II part with some of my colleagues, I am convinced that any 
4 II criminal justice system should be able to provide a final 
5 II answer to any issue within a reasonable time, a deliberate, 
6 II careful, procedurally protected final decision. I think the 
7 II litigants are entitled to this. If the defendant is entitled 
8 llto relief, he should get it within a reasonable time, not 
9 II after a doz~n years on death row as a recent case in Florida, 
10 II which I participated in. 
11 II In fact, in Georgia, they had a case of high profile 
12 II called the "All Day Case" in which our court granted relief 
13 II ten years after the people entered death row. I think they 
14 II are entitled to sooner justice than that. If he is not 
15 II entitled to relief, it seems to me like the states ought to 
16 II be able to get a decision within a reasonable time that they 
17 II have a right under the Constitution to execute the defendant. 
18 II Now we are all caught up in a system which does not 
19 llprovide a final decision within a reasonable time. High 
20 II profile case in Florida was Ted Bundy. As I recall, it took 
21 Ila week to try Mr. Bundy on the case for which he was executed. 
I 
22 lilt is hard to explain to the public how it takes ten years 
23 II for 24 or less people to decide that that trial and sentence 
24 II were free of constitutional error. People just do not 
1111
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1 There is no finality in death sentence litigation now. 
2 II The only time anybody gets executed is during a lull in 
3 II litigation. And I call it a lull because it comes up, a stay 
4 llwould not be granted, the denial of relief would be affirmed 
5 II all the way to the Supreme Court, and then a man is executed. 
6 II If he were not executed then, I can assure you that at the 
7 II point that the next execution date was set, there would be 
8 II another petition for writ of habeas corpus. In undertaking 
9 lithe committee work, I was hoping that we could develop some 
10 ll way that would avoid that. 
11 We have not avoided it in this report. I am not sure we 
12 !lean do it. I do not think there is any single thing that the 
13 II Senate can do in my judgment that is going to solve all the 
14 ll procedural problems. I do think that the passage of the 
15 II basic concept of the ad hoc committee report would be a 
16 1l partial solution to the problem. And what does it do? It has 
. 
17 ll been accused of doing a lot of things, but what it really 
18 llsays is the litigant is entitled to one full-blown hearing 
19 ll through federal court of his writ of habeas corpus claims. 
20 IIHe is entitled to have counsel to represent him when he does 
21 11 that. 
22 And the report requires that that procedure be triggered 
23 ll by something other than the death warrant. This is where the 
24 ll public gets upset about it. A death warrant is issued. All 
IIUERAEPoATINoco .• ~!5 II the publicity about somebody going to be executed, and the 
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1 II federal court comes in and enters a stay, · or the state court 
2 II enters a stay. And if there is any way to trigger that 
3 II litigation and move it through in an orderly process so that 
4 II it is not conducted under the cloud of an execution date, then 
5 ll it seems to me like the system, we owe that to the system to 
6 II try to develop a system that can decide those things in an 
7 II orderly way and reach some finality. 
8 II I concur in everything that Justice Powell said and 
9 II Professor Pearson, Judge Charles Clark. I" have read the 
10 II remarks that Judge Higginbotham is going to make, and I 
11 II concur in those. Much has been, as far as the ·trial counsel 
12 llis concerned, mechanisms are now in place for adequate state 
13 II counsel. The Constitution requires that counsel be appointed 
14 !l at the trial. The Constitution requires that you have 
15 II effective assistance of counsel, and we review them all the 
16 II time on that basis. 
17 II Rarely have I had a case in which effective assistance 
18 ll of trial counsel is not made an issue, and we review the 
19 II competence. The problem I have with your minimum standards 
20 llis that the minimum standards become reasonable standards, 
21 II and I do not think that someone that has just one two years 
, 
22 llof experience or five years of experience is necessarily 
23 II competent to handle these cases. They are complicated cases. 
24 II And it seems to me once you set that standard, then a judge 
MILLEAAEPOATINaco .• ~ II will say, well, I appointed somebody with those qualifications 
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1 II so that is all right. 
2 It seems to me that those qualifications that you have 
3 II set also might exclude some people that handle these cases in 
4 II an extremely able way. We have lawyers out of New York and 
5 II Washington law firms that donate their lawyers for this. I 
6 II am sure those lawyers have never handled a felony case. They 
7 llmay have never appealed a felony case. It is our view, it 
8 ll has always been our view in Florida, that a competent trial 
9 II counsel and a civil advocate can competently handle habeas 
10 II corpus cases. Some of the best arguments we have had were 
11 !l out of large firms in Fl orida where competent, the ex-
12 II perienced, well-experienced lawyers came in to handle these 
13 !! habeas corpus cases. 
14 II The one I referred to where two defendants just got 
15 II relief in Florida were represented by a lady out of New York. 
16 II I think she was a single practitioner. I cannot remember her 
17 !! name. I do not know her experience. She got relief. They 
18 llare not out of jail. Their convictions and their sentences 
19 !! were set aside. 
20 
21 
The Chairman. How long had they been in jail? 
Judge Roney. Well, they had been in jail about 12 
22 II years, I think, much too long. They shoul d have been out a 
23 ll long time before, and I have looked at that case to see 
24 II precisely where the delays were. The delays are not all in 
• ILL£RREPOAT1Noco.,215 lithe federal system. They are not all in the state system. 
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1 II We are all in this thing .kind of together, and we are trying 
2 II to work out way out, and we need your help. We need your 
3 II help. And that is about where I come down. 
4 The Chairman. Thank you, Judge Roney. I do appreciate 
5 II it. You are right we are in this al together, and Judge, you 
6 II are the last one in. Please, thank you. 
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STATEMENT OF JQDGE HIGGINBOTHAM 1 
2 Judge Higginbotham. Hopefully I will be the last one 
3 II out . Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your patience. I appreciate 
4 II your reference to the fact that as a senator the longer you 
5 Ii sit here the more you acquire the skills of a judge, but I 
6 11 must caution you about that claim. Judge Brown of our court 
7 11 says--
B The Chairman. Oh, no, I did not say I acquired the 
9 II skill. I said I have empathy for a skill you have. I have 
10 llmuch too much respect to compare myself to you all. 
11 Judge Higginbotham. I was going to suggest to you, 
12 II Senator, that Judge Brown of our court says that the first 
13 llprerequisite of a great judge is the ability to look a lawyer 
14 II straight in the eye for two years, and not hear a darn thing 
15 II he says . That may be the ability of survival. I am in 
16 II charge of the Court of Appeals of the 5th Circuit, and I am 
17 II here at the request of the committee. And while I am also an 
18 II adjunct professor of constitutional law at the Southern 
19 II Methodist University School of Law, my work and experience 
20 II has been predominan~ly in the courtroom. 
21 II I devoted the first 14 years of my practice exclusively 
22 II try trials and appeals with an emphasis on complex cases in 
23 lithe area of antitrust, securities and civil rights. This is 
24 limy 14th year on the federal bench, and I will be out on 
11•LLEAAEPOATINGco.,~~ II senior status in the year 2004. I served on the United 
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1 II States District Court for the Northern District of Texas in 
2 II 1975 to 1982, when I was appointed to the Court of Appeals. 
3 II I am presently the chair of the Appellate Judges Conference of 
4 lithe American Bar Association, the American Bar Association 
5 II home of state and federal appellate judges. I am also a 
6 ll member of the Federal-State Relations Committee of the 
7 II Judicial Conference of the United States. But I mention 
8 II these simply to emphasize that I do not represent their views. 
9 II I struggle with habeas corpus and capital cases both as 
10 Il a trial judge and as an appellate judge. I have lectured to 
11 lithe judicial workshops of every circuit with current death 
12 II cases in the United States. I welcome the interest in reform 
13 II demonstrated by the very fact of this hearing. It is 
14 II particularly welcome because the reform has been slow in 
15 II arrival despite a remarkable consensus that federal habeas 
16 II review of state convictions is in need of complete overhaul. 
17 II There are significant differences in views on this 
18 II subject, but I am encouraged by the fact that there is also 
19 llmuch common ground. I have great respect for this committee 
20 II and each of the persons testifying before you today. We 
21 II share the task for striking out for a fair and a just system 
, 
22 II all bound to administer fairly our courts and to protect the 
23 ll rights of the state and the accused. This is not hyperbole. 
24 II It is simply a bedrock statement of our devotion to our 
MILLER REPORTING co., ~ II . . l h d h 1 f 1 · t · f · t 
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1 II that we sit down in the }}alls of Congress. The federal writ 
2 II of habeas corpus in its present form is primarily the 
3 II creature of the judiciary. 
4 Our case by case efforts have failed to yield guiding 
5 II principles freed of confusion. We are p l ott i ng through mire 
6 llof our own doing. The language of procedure and process runs 
7 II through these issues, but as often the case, the choices 
8 II reflect constitutional va l ues of visions of fairness. Behind 
9 II the nigh arcane language of the law of habeas corpus lie 
10 11 limiting principles of our federalism. They inform not only 
11 II outcomes of questions we might ask but the distinct and the 
12 II earlier question of who decides. 
13 II I am persuaded that the roads from here are best cut by 
14 II you, the representative branch. I support the recommendation 
15 llof the Powell Committee. In this opening, I want to make two 
16 ll points. First, when put in perspective, the Powell bill is 
17 ll by no means radical in its restriction of federal review of 
18 llstate imposed capital sentences. To the contrary, the bill 
19 II concedes the reach of the writ in its present full flower. 
20 IISecond, the Powell bill is far reaching in its effort to 
21 II provide competent counsel to indigent prisoners. 
22 In my opinion, the fundamental contribution of the 
23 II Powell bill is its linkage of competency of counsel and 
24 ll control over successive writ while keeping the writ of 
111LL£RREPoRTINoco .• ~'S !I federalism. There are many questions, but they are subsidiary 
)07 C Suttt , N.E. 






vm 11 171 
-
1 to the ultimate issue before us, the definition of limits 
2 upon the pursuit of a second federal writ of habeas corpus in 
3 capital cases. In turn, competency of counsel is critical to 
4 II the decision to limit federal courts from reviewing twice in 
5 II a single case the decision of federal issues by state courts. 
6 Let me turn first to'the historical perspective. The 
7 II reason doctrinal history of federal habeas corpus petitions 
8 II brought by state prisoners describes a continuing quest for a 
9 II golden equilibrium, a finality and certainty. The modern 
10 II history of habeas law dates from the Supreme Court's 1953 
11 II decision in Brown v. Allen. A series of decisions took the 
12 II writ created by reconstruction legislation enacted in 1867 
13 II from a narrow means of relief for those detained without 
14 Il legal process and transformed it into a much broader remedy 
15 II that would protect federal constitutional rights left 
16 II unvindicated by the state process. 
17 II In essence, the body of law controlling the federal writ 
18 llwas created by the court upon a narrowly stated statute. It 
19 ll is this reformed write which has generated the vast flow of 
20 II habeas cases not handled by the federal court and which has 
21 II instigated the debate about habeas reform. The modern writ, 
22 llas Justice Powell, has pointed out, is the not great writ of 
23 li the Magna Carta and it is not the writ protected by the 
24 II Constitution from suspension. It is essentially a body of 
111LLEAAEPOAT1Naco .• ~<s !l ease law 36 years old. 
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1 II important to the question of reform. I suggest that several 
2 II cross currents have contributed to this phenomenal change in 
3 II function, a shift such that the writ today functions largely 
4 II as a means of federal review of state decisions of federal 
5 ll questions . 
6 II These changes in the' character of the habeas writ are 
7 II procedural manifestations of two much more comprehensive 
8 II currents in American legal history: the expansion of constitu-
9 ll tional rights particularly with respect to the states, and 
10 II the effort to achieve equality in the promise of process in 
11 II criminal cases. The modern habeas writ shares its history 
12 llwith these two great substantive movements. The 14th 
13 II Amendment and the federal habeas statutes were both children 
14 II of Reconstruction. It is not surprising that their develop-
15 ll ment should run parallel. It is not to say, however, that 
16 Ii the writ was intended to serve anything like the purpose it 
1 7 II serves today. 
18 II The federal judiciary' s efforts to vindicate in court 
19 lithe constitutional promise of equality rei nvigorated the old 
20 II federal distrust of state courts. The states were perceived 
21 llas unfriendly fora for freshly announced constitutional 
, 
22 ll rights, and as potential instruments of the discriminatory 
23 ll animus which those rights aimed to extirpate. The habeas 
24 llwrit was seen as a saving mechanism by whi ch supervision of 
111LLERREPORT1Naco., , 5 lithe state judiciary was to be had. 
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1 The Court's constit~tional protections for those within 
2 II the criminal process, black Americans in particular, and 
3 II those with small purses in general, in many instances 
4 II informed general rights designed to ensure the accuracy of 
5 II the criminal process for all. The habeas writ became the 
6 llmeans for challenging convictions that did not meet this 
7 II general idea of neutrality in the criminal process. By still 
8 II further but equally natural evolution, many of the most 
9 II recent developments in habeas law proceed from one more 
10 II particular concern: the rights of prisoners convicted without 
11 II the benefit of adequate counsel. Ineffective assistance of 
12 II counsel is a problem that may dog a litigant up through the 
13 II appellant process. The same lawyer who represents a defini-
14 lltive trial might do so on appeal. The possibility of the 
15 II collateral attack not subject to the time limits governing 
16 II appeals permits a prisoner to correct counsel's errors later 
17 II on, when whether by dint of new counsel, the prisoner's own 
18 llpersistence or sheer good fortune these errors become 
19 II apparent. 
20 II The state habeas docket of the federal courts today is 
21 lithe product of these overlapping themes and problems. The 
, 
22 llquest for equality, the expansion of individual constitutional 
23 II rights, concern with ineffective counsel and distrust of 
24 II criminal processes and the resulting pressure upon the 
MILLER REP0AT1No co., ~<s II Supreme Court, s appellate docket. 
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1 II deal with today. One who believes that the Section 2254 
2 II habeas writ simply reflects our society's concern that 
3 II innocent people not be incarcerated is met with a glaring 
4 II difficulty. As Judge Friendly has observed with special 
5 II clarity, the writ neither requires nor in many instances 
6 II provides a forum for a simple claim of factual innocence. 
7 II The federal courts do have significant factf inding 
8 II powers that may be invoked to investigate the factual 
9 II predicate for constitutional claims, al though the habeas 
10 II statute now requires deference to the states absent exceptio-
11 II nal circumstances. A prisoner might be able to challenge 
12 II conviction of factual grounds through a motion based on newly 
13 II discovered evidence or on other state law grounds, but 
.14 II Section 2254 for the most part simply does not aid an 
15 II innocent prisoner who is simply the victim of a jury's 
16 ll equally innocent but nonetheless damning mistake . 
17 II Simply put, the modern habeas writ only offers appellate 
18 llrelief. We tend to forget that arguments to retain the trump 
19 !Icard role of habeas, that is of process that is freed of the 
20 llusual rules of preclusion, are asking that the petitions 
21 llretain their expanded appellate character without losing the 
• 
22 II preclusive rules that attend the appeals. The arguments 
23 II accept the evolution to an appellate function while urging 
24 11 the retention of the writ ' s open-ended character despite the 
1o111.LERREPoRT1Noco .• ~~ lihistorical fact that its testing of executive power did not 
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1 II include review of criming.! trials. 
2 There is substantial criticism of the judicial expansion 
3 II of the writ. Nevertheless the Powell Bill accepts the 
4 II developed writ. It makes no change in its substantive reach. 
5 II Rather its direction is to give prisoners access to the 
6 II federal court for one review of state decisions of federal 
7 II issues with competent counsel and without the pressures of an 
8 II outstanding warrant of execution. Its premise is that so 
9 II long as the. petitioner is competently represented, the 
10 II balance between finality, fairness and efficiency has been 
11 II properly struck. 
12 When we turn to the reforms that have been proposed in 
13 II earlier years, the Powell bill appears modest. Indeed, the 
14 II current recommendations fit comfortably with earlier positions 
15 II of the Judicial Conference of the United States. 15 years 
16 ii ago the Judicial Conference of the United States approved and 
17 II sent to the Congress a proposed bill reforming federal habeas 
18 II procedures. That bill required complete exhaustion of state 
19 II remedies unless state processes were shown to be inadequate 
20 II and would be bar habeas relief absent application within 120 
21 II days of certain stated triggering events. 
22 II As you know, that bill was drafted by a committee 
23 II comprised of Judges Wade Mccree, William H. Webster, Frank M. 
24 II Johnson, Jr., Alfonso Zirpole and Walter Hoffman . This 
MILLERREPoATrNaco •• '5 II committee of the Judicial Conference listed its defined 
)07 C Strttt , N .E. 






1 II objectives. They includ~d the elimination of restrictive 
2 II petitions, the avoiding of piecemeal applications by requiring 
3 II that all grounds for relief subject to stated exceptions be 
4 II included in one petition and in general sought to achieve a 
5 II reasonable degree of finality to criminal sentences. 
6 II This language certainly suggests that we are playing 
7 II today on a worn field. Far more restrictive proposals have 
8 llbeen proposed in the past, and at least one twice passed the 
9 II House of Representatives. The Powell bill, unlike many 
10 llearlier efforts, leaves the writ in its present form as I 
11 II have stated rather than turning the clock back to 1953. Now 
12 II my point is not the wisdom of narrowing its scope. My point 
13 llis that the Powell bill does not do so. As I have explained, 
14 llwith the federal writ today functioning virtually as the 
15 llright of appeal aided by factfinding functions, it is simply 
16 !:difficult to see why a prisoner with competent counsel should 
17 llas a matter of fairness require two appeals into the federal 
18 II system. 
19 II At least it is difficult so long as one accepts the 
20 liability of our adversary system unblemished by incompetent 
21 II counsel to produce fair results. With competent counsel, 
, 
22 !!errors of constitutional magnitude will be brought forward 
23 II for review. Unquestionably, the system proposed by the 
24 IIPowell Committee with its linchpin of competent counsel 
MtuERREPORTIHaco.,215 jjassures greater federal protection of constitutional rights 
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1 II than the present system that tolerates multiple writs filed 
2 II on the eve of execution and weakened by the absence of 
3 II mechanisms to assure competent and fresh counsel. -
4 II Under the Powell bill, a person charged with a capital 
5 II offense has all, of course, the constitutional rights of 
6 II trial, as Chief Judge Clark has pointed out. His conviction 
7 II will be reviewed by the courts of his state, usually its 
8 II supreme court, and it will go through the process until we 
9 !l end up with a count of eight as Chief Judge Clark has 
10 II outlined. If unsuccessful, of course, he will be given new 
11 II and competent counsel as he proceeds through collateral 
12 II attack. The problem of the Powell Committee, of course, at 
13 II this juncture the federal courts' role in all except these 
14 II extraordinary cases usually involving factual innocence will 
15 II come to an end. And this procedural scheme offers sig-
16 II nif icantly greater attention than we give virtually to all 
17 II major disputes. This care, in my judgment, is proper because 
18 II death is a different punishment in many ways. Nonetheless, 
19 II there is a point at which the criticism is so insistent on 
20 II perfection that it becomes little more than a surrogate 
21 II argument for the abolition of the death penalty. 
, 
22 II Your bill, Senator, and the Powell bill, in essence, in 
23 limy judgment differ in the main over the conditions under 
24 II which a petitioner may obtain a second federal review. Both 
111
LLER REPORTING co.,~ II allow a second review to avoid an injustice. 
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1 llnot define its term "misc;arriage of justice." The Powell bill 
2 II effectively defines "injustice" to exclude any constitutional 
3 llviolations that do not implicate factual innocence. The 
4 Ii Powell bill rests on the assertion that at this late juncture 
5 li the price of instability and absence of finality is too great 
6 II for the further review of'claimed constitutional violations 
7 ll that do not implicate actual innocence. 
8 II Your approach would allow these claims to be pursued, 
9 II but in my judgment a miscarriage of justice standard would 
10 li not be a significant limit on the obtaining of a second 
11 Ii federal review. I do not share the view that miscarriage of 
12 II justice is a sufficiently defined term to provide meaningful 
13 II guidance. 
14 The Chairman. You say you do or do not share the view? 
15 II I am sorry. I did not hear you. You do not share the view? 
16 Judge Higginbotham. My view is that miscarriage of view 
17 li is inadequate standard to provide a meaningful limit, yes, 
18 II sir. On the other hand, we have long been of the view that 
19 II finality in repose must give way to prevent the punishment of 
20 li the person actually innocent of the crime itself. We must 
21 llnot forget, and when we talk about these possibilities that 
, 
22 li the federal habeas is not the sole remedy. The state system 
23 ll is there. The state system provides both for commutation by 
24 Ii governors , through other parole, other mechanisms, an awful 
MLLEcRsREPORTINNEoco., ~'s II lot of relief. Throughout these discussions, the adequacy of 
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1 lithe bar's performance, a:ryd I want to make this plain, has 
2 II been an issue. I share the view that competent counsel was 
3 II critical but like Judge Clark, I am also persuaded that the 
4 II quality of presentation has often been much less than it 
5 II should be and sometimes below the constitutional minimum. 
6 II But I think it would'be most unfair to ignore the 
7 II extraordinary performance of so many of the lawyers that are 
8 II handling death cases. There are many lawyers working very 
9 II hard for very little compensation, and in the highest 
10 II traditions of the bar. I have been puzzled by criticism 
11 II leveled against these lawyers. Their frustrations of the 
12 II system with its multiple writs and last minute requests have 
13 II led some to the view that the lawyers are the culprits. With 
14 II rare exception, this is not so. I appreciate the opportunity 
. 15 II to appeal. The Senate has judgments to make, and I am 
16 II persuaded that the Powell bill is the best judgment that it 
1 7 II can make . 
18 [The statement of Judge Higginbotham follows:] 
MILLER REPORTING CO., INC. 
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1 The Chairman. Than~ you very much, Judge. I indicated 
2 II that there are similarities between this job and yours in 
3 llterms of our requirement to sit. I should also indicate that 
4 II I have observed over today there are similarities between 
5 II your job and this in that you are all asked to limit your 
6 II statements to five minute~ , and you all qualify as senators, 
7 II every one of you. And I want you to know that I understand 
8 ll that and appreciate it because it is very difficult to keep 
9 this anywhere close to five minutes. Let me raise a few 
10 points. First, a question for all of you in any order you 
11 ll would like to respond. 
12 How do you respond to the question of whether or not in 
13 lithe circumstance where there is evidence of perjured testimony 
14 llat the sentencing proceeding, as your three colleagues before 
15 llyou read the Powell Commission recommendation, they would in 
16 Ila federal habeas corpus petition not be able to stay the 
. 
17 II execution notwithstanding the fact they found there to be 
18 llperjured testimony, not as of the guilt of i nnocence, but as 
19 llto the imposition of the death penalty? Is there reading 
20 llcorrect that you would, the judge would be bound not to stay 
21 lithe execution or is there another remedy? 
22 Judge Clark. The literal words of the statute that we 
23 llpropose and the comments in the report state emphatically 
24 II that that is correct. I can tell you that--
IILI..ER REPORTING CO., 1'5 
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1 Judge Clark. That your assumption and the assumption of 
2 li the other judges is correct. The comment is perhaps the 
3 II clearest in the committee's view if there is any doubt about 
4 II the sentencing phase of a capital case, it should be raised 
5 II during the state prisoner's initial attempts to obtain post-
6 II conviction review. As Subsection C reflects, the only 
7 II appropriate exception is when the new claim goes to the 
8 llunderlying guilt or innocence of the state prison in the 
9 II capital cas~. So there is no doubt about what the committee 
10 II proposed. I would tell you that I do not back away from that 
11 ll proposal in any ways because it only comes after these eight 
12 II different reviews have taken place . 
13 The Chairman. Notwithstanding that there could be a 
14 II circumstance where the perjured testimony was not available? 
15 Judge Clark. Senator, I am convinced from the work that 
16 II I have done in the courts, from the work that I have done on 
17 II the bench, that there is no such thing as a perfect trial. 
18 The Chairman. I am not suggesting that. No one is. I 
19 11am not arguing. I am just asking the question. I just want 
20 ll to make sure that we are saying the same thing. 
21 
22 
Judge Clark. Yes, sir. 
, 
The Chairman. That notwithstanding the fact there may 
23 llbe perjured testimony at a sentencing that came to light 
24 ll after the eight bites of the apple have been taken that the 
MLLERREPORTiNaco .• ~<s jjperson still should be put to death. 
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1 II saying. I just want to make .sure I k now what you are saying. 
2 Judge Roney. If I could speak to that. I think that 
3 lithe report, out of the over 100 cases I have handled, I have 
4 II never had that sort of a claim. The claim on sentencing 
5 II generally is that there are mitigating factors that should 
6 11 have been put before the :jury or judge that were not put 
7 II there . 
8 
9 
The Chairman. I understand. 
Judge Roney. Now what you call mitigating is open, you 
10 II know. Some people say it is mitigating because he had a hard 
11 II childhood and the mother beat him and he never got to Sunday 
12 II School and so on. And then other persons will think, well, 
13 ll he attended Sunday School all his life and that is mitigating. 
14 II So--
15 The Chairman. In the interest of time, Judge, I do not 





Judge Roney. Okay. 
The Chairman. I am asking a very precise question. 
Judge Roney. Yes. 
The Chairman. Not whether or not you had the experience. 
21 III do not doubt that you have not had the experience or maybe 
22 li no judge has had the experience. I ask the question. 
23 Judge Roney. Well, my answer would be if there is any 
24 ll way to craft an exception that does not open up just simply 
MILLEA REPORTING co .• ~ II bare allegations of perjury which we get all the time, it 
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1 II might be worth trying to.modify. 
The Chairman. Judge? 2 
3 
4 
Judge Higginbotham. No, I cannot add that to, Senator. 
The Chairman. Now the testing of the competency 
5 II standards, the standard that is placed in, that is suggested 
6 llby the Powell Commission,'the report, the committee says that 
7 II prisoners will have an opportunity to contest state standards 
8 llof competency that they consider inadequate. My question is 
9 II this. How will such suits be brought? In· other words, will 
10 II each prisoner sentenced to death in a case covered by this 
11 II new procedure as recommended by the Powell Commission have a 
12 II standard to attack, excuse me, have standings to attack the 
13 II competency of his appointed counsel? 
14 Judge Clark. Shall I proceed? The words of the comment 
15 !Ito that section say the committee believes it is more 
16 II consistent with the federal-state balance to give the states 
17 II wide latitude to establish a mechanism that complies with 
18 II Subsection B. The final judgment as to the adequacy, 
19 II underlined, of any system for the appointment of counsel 
20 II under Subsection B, however, res.ts ultimately with the 
21 II federal judiciary. And if I can put words in Professor 
22 II Pearson's mouth because I do recall these discussions in the 
23 II course of our committee, what we envisioned was that a 
24 ll prisoner or a group of prisoners, a class of prisoners, can 
MIU.ER REPORTING co .• ~ II attack the adequacy of the written state plan to provide for 
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1 II counsel. 
2 It did not contemplate that each prisoner could say my 
3 II counsel is inadequate and get a federal test out of it. I 





Judge Roney. I have nothing to add to that. 
The Chairman. I beg'your pardon, Judge Roney? 
Judge Roney. I have nothing to add to what he said. 
The Chairman. So that under the recommended legislation 
9 llby the Powell Commission, an individual prisoner would have 
10 II to attack the way in which, the standards by which, or t he 
11 II mechanism by which his individual counsel was appointed and 
12 II not the competency of the individual counsel; is that correct? 
13 Judge Clark. That is my understanding, and I think it 
14 llis reinforced by what I have read to you from the report of 
15 II the committee. I am bound by the report of the committee, 
16 II but that is my personal understanding. 
17 The Chairman. Do you all understand it to be the same 
18 llway? Yes . Now will that suit be filed in federal court 
19 II before state collateral review begins on that issue or will 
20 II the prisoner have to wait to make it part of his federal 
21 II habeas petition? 
22 Judge Clark. I do not know the answer to that except 
23 II that I know it is a federal question and so indicated by the 
24 II committee. 
lln.LER REPORTING CO., ~ 
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1 II inclusion of a standards .of competency in this legislation 
2 II avoid that problem? 
3 Judge Clark. Senator, it may avoid that problem, but 
4 II the trouble is you are going to avoid the state opting for 
5 li the whole system. That is the problem that we had. 
6 II The Chairman. Do you think if there is that standard, 
7 li do you all have any reason to believe that to be the case, or 
8 II is it just your political instinct? I am not being smart 
9 II when I ask that question. I mean is there any reason for you 
10 II all to believe that the state legislators would not opt into 
11 II this system or, I mean, I know--
12 II Judge Clark. One thing if I may, sir? 
13 II The Chairman. Yes. 
14 II Judge Clark. There are now 308 people on death row in 
15 li the State of Texas. The New York State public defender's 
16 II study showed that for trial direct review, all collateral 
17 II reviews, that the case of a death penalty case on the average 
18 II would cost $1.8 million. I do not think it would cost that 
19 II much in Texas with fully compensated counsel. But let me 
20 II surmise that it would cost $500,000, and I will ask you to 
21 II assume that you are a legislator in the State of Texas 
, 
22 II working with a much smaller budget than what you have to work 
23 II with here, say that someone wants you to spend a half million 
24 II dollars per case to provide counsel for those 308 prisoners 
111LLERREPORTiNoco •• ~ II that are now on death row. That is $150 million. 
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1 The Chairman. Well,. the argument is i t is extremely 
2 II costly now. 
3 Judge Clark. No, sir. What I am sayi ng to you is that 
4 II I just wanted to tell you why I had the idea that imposing 
5 II additional obligations that the Constitution does not require 
6 II be imposed on the State or Texas, that you must look at what 
7 II costs are involved. 
8 The Chairman. Does not require it but gives us the 




Judge Clark. Sure, yes. 
The Chairman. There is no doubt about that. 
Judge Clark. I mean you put it on them. You may pass a 
13 II federal statute that says you shall do so whether you like or 
14 II not. But as long as this an opt in piece of legislation, I 
15 II think you do have to take into account what the state is 
16 II going to look at £rom the standpoint of just practicality . 
17 II Can they afford to opt in? 
18 The Chairman. I told you a long time ago, Judge, you ar 
19 Il a politician. You have got this all figured out. It is a 
20 II political judgment, and I cannot argue with that. For the 
2 1 II record, the Judge and I had a discussion a long time, I 
' 
22 II kidded him about being a politician. He is not a politician. 
23 III am the politician. He is not. 
24 II Do you all agree with that? Do you all just assume 
MLLERREPoRTINoco.,~<"s II states will not opt in if that were in? 
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1 Judge Roney. Well, _I do not know. Let me just tell you 
2 II the experience we have in the states in setting up the 
3 II resource centers, and you are familiar with that. 
4 
5 
The Chairman. Yes. 
Judge Roney. And that is where the states contribute 
6 II money and the federals cohtribute money. At least when we 
7 II went into Alabama, the state legislature says let the federal 
8 II government up with the whole thing. Your federal judges are 
9 lithe ones wh9 created the whole problem anyway. Why should we 
10 II pay for all this? They did not make a contribution. But 
11 II that is their attitude to some extent, and whether that would 
12 II bind them I do not know. 
13 The Chairman. Let me ask you one more question, and as 
14 III said, I have at least a half a dozen questions for each of 
15 llyou, but I have really trespassed on your time too much. You 
16 I! have been here since 10 o'clock, straight through lunch, and 
17 II that is more than anyone should ask. Comment made by one of 
18 II your colleagues who testified before you on the previous 
19 II panel was that he was concerned that there was no evidentiary 
20 II basis upon which these recommendations were made. That is 
21 llyou had not as a commission come forward and offered any 
. 
22 II factual data to sustain the fact that this was such a, the 
23 II present system was so cumbersome and time consuming, and 
24 II there is a lot of anecdotal evidence. But the assertion was 
1i11LLERA£POATINGco.,'15 II made that no body of evidence was laid before the Commission, 
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1 II and in turn laid before ~he Congress, to sustain the arguments 
2 II that this delay is so intolerable and costly, so on and so 
3 II forth. Is that correct, and if it is, why was that not done? 
4 II Why did the Commission choose not to go that route? 
5 Judge Clark. Let me take a shot of it. The Commission, 
6 II the Powell Committee debated seriously about when we should 
7 II respond to the Chief Justice's request for us to study and 
8 II act. We did call on a number of organizations that we 
9 II thought would have, could make a contribution, to make a 
10 II written contribution, because we thought it was important 
11 II that we have something before the Judicial Conference 
12 II promptly. We considered that the months that we spent in 
13 II this endeavor to be months in which we had given adequate 
14 II attention both to the statistical bases on actual cases that 
15 II had gone to execution. And there is a summary of those 
16 1: cases, and just a summary in the committee's work. We think 
17 II that we did have an adequate statistical basis on which to 
18 II act. 
19 Judge Roney. At least act for what we did. We know 
20 II that we get continued petitions asserting the same grounds as 
21 II were before. If there is no res judicata ef feet at all at 
22 li the petition, then there is nothing to keep the lawyers from 
23 II doing it. And we know about that. 
24 The Chairman. You know that , but can you tell us what 
MR.LEA REPORTING co., "fs II percentage of capital cases have, in fact, had more than a 
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1 II single habeas corpus pet3= tion in federal court? 
2 Judge Roney. Everybody who has been executed in our 
3 II circuit has had a second petition. 
4 II The Chairman. How many have been executed relative to 
5 II the total number? Not many, have they? 
6 Judge Roney. No, not very many. So you know you are 
7 II going to get a second petition from anybody. Nobody gets 
8 II executed on a first petition, no matter even if its denied 
9 II all the way up. You know you are going to get another 
10 II petition on the eve of the date of execution one way or 
11 II another, and it is just--
12 The Chairman. I understand that, but that does not seem 
13 II to answer the question. I mean it begs the question. 
14 Judge Roney. Well, it ought to limit. What this does 
15 llis limit the grounds upon which that second petition can be 
16 11 brought. 
17 The Chairman. Oh, I know what the effect of what you 
18 II recommended. I am asking the antecedent question is what 
19 II percentage of those who, in fact, have been found guilty and 
20 II sentenced to death have, in fact, made more than a single 




Judge Roney. I do not know those percentages. 
The Chairman. Do you know that? 
Judge Clark. I think Judge Roney's answer is the best I 
MILLERREPORTINaco., ~'s II could give that there is nobody in the 5th Circuit that I can 
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1 II recall that has ever been executed on the petition. 
2 Judge Roney. The information you are asking is very 
3 II difficult to get. The attorneys general do not have it. 
4 The Chairman. But it seems to me it would be awfully 
5 II easy to get. There are all, with all due respect, Judge, 
6 II there are how many people'sitting on death row? 20,000 
7 II people? 
8 Judge Roney. I thought it would be easy to get, too, 
9 II but it just was not that easy. 
10 The Chairman. I mean in our experience, I mean the way 
11 II you do that is you pick up the phone and you contact the 
12 II attorney general in the state in question and figure out how 
13 . II many of those people on death row by name, you know. 
14 II Judge Roney. With all respect you would have to talk Al 





The Chairman. My understanding is there is no such data. 
Judge Roney. Yes. 
The Chairman. And that is why it makes it kind of hard 
20 !I to make the case other than anecdotally make the case. 
21 II Senator Thurmond makes the case anecdotally, and my colleagues 
, 
22 II who oppose changing it make the case anecdotally by pointing 
23 II out they would argue, Judge Roney, that your example of the 
24 II two cases which in fact after ten years were found to not be 
MIU.ERIIEPORTINoco., ~ II worthy of being put to death is reason why we should not 
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1 II speed the process up. 
2 So we have a lot of anecdotal evidence. I have yet to 
3 II see a compilation of any of the hard data that any social 
4 II scientist would consider constitutes a data base upon which 
5 ll to make hard judgments and that is the only question I ask. 
6 II I do not criticize anyone'for it. I just ask the question 
7 ll whether it is there or not there. 
8 Judge Clark. I would say that we went into the matter 
9 llexactly as you have outlined in the first paragraph of your 
10 ll remarks on the floor of the Senate when you introduced your 
11 llbill. 
12 The Chairman. Which was what? Would you refresh my 
13 II recollection? I usually have instant recall, but--
14 Judge Clark. That both sides of the aisle had been 
15 II worried with regard to the question of delay and with regard 
16 ll to the question of adequacy of counsel. And we took those 
17 ll two premises to be the guidelines that we ought to use for 
18 llaction, and we tried to blend the two in the bill we came up 
19 ll with, which I think is what you have done. 
20 The Chairman. I understand that. Everybody is worried 
21 about that. But some of us wonder about whether or not the 
I 
22 worry is legitimate or illegitimate, well-founded or not 
23 well-founded . That is all. That is the only reason for the 
24 question. 
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1 II from a standpoint of per~onal knowledge because when Professor 
2 II Pearson began to have a great deal of difficulty in assembling 
3 II statistics, I said, well, I will just call the attorneys 
4 II general in the three states in the 5th Circuit and I know I 
5 II can get it, and I found out that the information was not 
6 II readily available. 
7 
8 
The Chairman. Did that not worry you a little bit? 
Judge Clark. Yes, sir. Certainly. I would much prefer 
9 II that we had absolute statistics on all of the 118 people that 
10 ll have gone to death so far in this country since Furman. I 
11 II would like to have every one of them catalogued by what 
12 II caused the delay, how long it was, what court it was in. But 
13 ll we did not assemble that information. 
14 The Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you for your indulgence 
15 II and your input. It has been extremely valuable. Senator 
16 II Thurrnond has submitted some questions for the record. 
17 [The questions of Senator Thurmond follow:) 
IIIUER REPORTING CO., ltC. 
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1 The Chairman. Also .Senator Humphrey has submitted a 
2 II written statement which will be included in the record. 
12 3 
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Judge Clark. Thank.you, Senator, for listening to us. 
Judge Roney. Do we have permission to submit written--
The Chairman. Oh, yes, of course. 
Judge Roney. There were a lot of questions raised that 
5 llwe could not possibly cover in our testimony. 
6 The Chairman. Surely. And also I will submit to you 
7 II and leave open for my colleagues who also may have written 
8 II questions. We will not inundate you. I know you have enough 
9 II to do in your capacity as sitting judges or senior status, 
10 II but we will submit to you questions in writing. 
11 II [Written questions and responses follow:) 
12 / COMMITTEE INSERT 
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1 Judge Roney. Well, .you have a hard job and we want to 
2 llbe of any help we can to you. 
3 The Chairman. Well, you have been of great help. And I 
4 II appreciate it very much. Thank you. The hearing is ad-
5 
6 
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journed. 
[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the Committee adjourned.] 
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November 16, 1989 
Dear Senator Biden: 
Thank you for your letter of November 13, delivered 
to me this afternoon. 
I will be happy to reply to the questions you sub-
mitted, and will do so before December 15, the date you sug-
gested. 
Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. 
Chairman 
Sincerely, 
Senate Judiciary Committee 
221 Russell Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20510 
lfp/ss 




November 16, 1989 
Dear Al: 
I enclose a copy of Senator Biden's letter and 
questions, and would appreciate your suggesting appropriate 
answers. There seems to be . a considerable overlap in the 
questions. 
Mrs. Powell and I plan to leave Washington the 
weekend of December 15, and to spend the Christmas holidays 
in our Richmond home. It would therefore be helpful if I 
could have your suggested answers by Monday, December 4. 
We are having a hard time putting the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee to rest. 
Sincerely, 
Professor Albert M. Pearson 
School of Law 
University of Georgia 
Athens, Georgia 30602 
lfp/ss 
+ cc: R. Hewitt Pate, Esquire 
(,. 
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November 13, 1989 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
U.S. Supreme Court 
1 First Street 
Washington, D.C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powells 
I want to thank you once again for taking the time to 
testify before the Judiciary Committee on November 8, 1989, 
regarding the reform of federal habeas corpus procedures. 
Enclosed please find questions that I and other Senators 
did not have an opportunity to ask at the hearing. Your 
written responses to these questions will be ~ncluded in the 
hearing record. 
If possible, answers should be filed with the committee by 




, Q.lestions from Senator Dennis DeCbnciirl 
QUESTIONS FOR JUSTICE POWELL 
STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
YOUR PROPOSED BILL CONTAINS NO "STANDARDS GOVERNING THE 
COMPETENCY OF COUNSEL." INSTEAD, YOU SAY THAT THE STATES 
SHOULD BE GIVEN "WIDE LATITUDE" TO ESTABLISH STANDARDS OF 
COMPETENCE THAT MEET THIS REQUIREMENT. 
Q. HOW CAN CONGRESS DETERMINE THAT THE TRADE-OFF SET FORTH 
IN THIS PLAN ADEQUATELY PROTECTS THE RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 
SENTENCED TO DEATH IF WE DON'T KNOW HOW A CENTRAL ELEMENT 
OF THE SCHEME -- THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY -- WILL BE 
IMPLEMENTED BY THE STATES? 
THE BILL I INTRODUCED SETS FORTH STANDARDS OF COMPETENCY 
FOR COUNSEL APPOINTED TO REPRESENT AN INDIGENT DEFENDANT AT 
TRIAL, ON DIRECT APPEAL, ON REVIEW BY THE SUPREME COURT, AND ON 
STATE COLLATERAL REVIEW. NEITHER THE POWELL COMMITTEE'S BILL 
NOR MINE INCLUDES STANDARDS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON 
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW BECAUSE CONGRESS_ ENACTED STANDARDS 
GOVERNING THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN THOSE CASES LAST YEAR. 
Q. GIVEN THAT STANDARDS FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IN 
FEDERAL HABEAS CASES ALREADY EXIST, WOULDN'T IT MAKE SENSE 
TO HAVE THE SAME STANDARDS APPLY THROUGHOUT THE 
PROCEEDINGS AT THE STATE LEVEL? 
Q. IF THE STATES WERE FREE TO SET THEIR OWN STANDARDS AS 
PROVIDED IN THE POWELL COMMITTEE BILL, AND THOSE STANDARDS 
TURNED OUT TO BE LESS RIGOROUS THAN THE FEDERAL STANDARDS 
THAT ARE ALREADY LAW, WOULDN'T THAT MEAN THAT IN SOME 
CASES COUNSEL REPRESENTING THE DEFENDANT ON STATE 
COLLATERAL REVIEW WOULD HAVE TO BE REPLACED BEFORE FEDERAL 
HABEAS REVIEW COULD BEGIN? 
Q. WOULDN'T THIS BE THE CAUSE OF THE KIND OF DELAY THAT 
YOUR PROPOSAL SEEKS TO AVOID? 
YOUR REPORT STATES THAT "THE ADEQUACY OF ANY SYSTEM FOR 
THE APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ••• RESTS ULTIMATELY WITH THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY." YOU SUGGEST, IN OTHER WORDS, THAT STATE 
PRISONERS WHO FEEL THAT THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE ESTABLISHED 
BY THEIR STATE ARE INADEQUATE CAN LITIGATE THAT QUESTION IN 
FEDERAL COURT. 
Q. DOESN'T THAT MEAN THAT BEFORE THE SCHEME ENVISIONED BY 
THIS BILL CAN BE IMPLEMENTED, THE FEDERAL COURTS WOULD 
HAVE TO LITIGATE THE STANDARDS OF COMPETENCE ESTABLISHED 
BY EVERY STATE? 
. ' 
Senator Dennis DeConcini 
Q. IF EACH STATE ESTABLISHED DIFFERENT STANDARDS, THAT 
WOULD MEAN 50 SEPARATE LAWSUITS WOULD HAVE TO MOVE THROUGH 
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY BEFORE THIS PLAN WOULD BE FULLY IN 
EFFECT. WOULDN'T THAT JUST CONTINUE THE KIND OF 
UNNECESSARY DELAY THAT THIS BILL IS INTENDED TO AVOID? 
Q. IF WE ADOPTED A UNIFORM FEDERAL STANDARD, ON THE OTHER 
HAND, WOULDN'T THE REFORM PLAN YOU RECOMMEND TAKE EFFECT 
IMMEDIATELY? 
. ' 
Senator Dennis DeCon~ini 
SUCCESSIVE PETITIONS 
JUSTICE POWELL, YOUR COMMITTEE REPORT RECOMMENDS THAT A 
STATE PRISONER BE ALLOWED TO PRESENT A SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE 
HABEAS CORPUS PETITION IN ONLY ONE CIRCUMSTANCE -- WHERE THE 
CLAIM RAISES AN ISSUE AS TO THE UNDERLYING GUILT OR INNOCENCE 
OF THE PRISONER. 
AT THE HEARING I SUGGESTED THAT THERE MAY BE CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT MIGHT JUSTIFY A SECOND REVIEW OF SENTENCING ISSUES. FOR 
EXAMPLE, I SUGGESTED THAT A PRISONER MIGHT BE PREVENTED FROM 
RAISING AN ISSUE BECAUSE OF ILLEGAL STATE ACTION -- SUCH AS 
WHERE THE STATE HAO CONCEALED THE FACT THAT PERJURED TESTIMONY 
HAD BEEN USED AT THE SENTENCING HEARING. 
Q. IF THE PRISONER DIDN'T LEARN ABOUT THIS UNTIL AFTER THE 
FIRST HABEAS REVIEW WAS COMPLETE, SHOULDN'T HE BE ALLOWED 
TO RAISE IT IN A SUCCESSIVE PETITION? 
Q. DOESN'T YOUR REPORT ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SUCH THINGS DO 
HAPPEN WHEN IT PERMITS THE FEDERAL COURT, IN THE CASE OF 
THE FIRST PETITION, TO REVIEW A CLAIM NOT PREVIOUSLY 
PRESENTED IN PRECISELY THESE CI RCUMSTANCES? 
Q. WHY SHOULD A PRISONER BE ALLOWED TO RAISED SUCH A CLAIM 
IF HE FINDS OUT ABOUT IT BEFORE FILING HIS FIRST PETITION, 
BUT NOT IF HE DOESN'T FINO OUT ABOUT IT UNTIL AFTERWARDS? 
Q. YOU STATED IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION THAT THE TRIAL 
JUDGE WOULD "FIND A WAY" TO AVOID A MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE 
IN SUCH A CASE. HOW WOULD THE JUDGE DO THAT? 
SUPPOSE, AFTER THE FIRST HABEAS REVIEW IS COMPLETE, THE 
SUPREME COURT HOLDS, IN ANOTHER CASE, THAT SOME ASPECT OF THE 
PRISONER'S SENTENCING HEARING WAS IMPROPER. FOR EXAMPLE, THE 
COURT MIGHT HOLD THAT A CERTAIN JURY INSTRUCTION IS ILLEGAL. 
Q. IF THAT SAME JURY INSTRUCTION HAO BEEN GIVEN IN THE 
PRISONER'S CASE, SHOULDN'T THE PRISONER HAVE AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO RAISE THAT ISSUE IN A HABEAS PETITION? 
Q. WOULD IT BE RIGHT TO EXECUTE A MAN WHOSE SENTENCE --
ACCORDING TO THE SUPREME COURT -- WAS ILLEGAL, JUST 
BECAUSE HIS LAWYER HADN'T RAISED A PARTICULAR ISSUE IN HIS 
CASE? 
• I Senator DeC.Oncini 
FOR ALL WITNESSES 
2) Concerns have been expressed regarding the limits 
placed on the availability of federal writs on successive 
applications. Specifically, Judge Lay has suggested that the 
language of S. 1757 allowing "manifest injustice" as a ground 
for successive petitioning be included in legislation 
addressing habeas reform. 
My question is this: Wouldn't the use of broad and vague 
language such as "manifest injustice" allow for excessive 
petitioning? If the goal of habeas reform is to limit the 
excessive use of the petitioning process, would inclusion of 
this language fly in the face of reform? 
3) The Powell proposal provides for a 180-day limit for 
filing of a federal habeas petition, and permits an extension 
up to 240 days upon the showing of good cause. In your opinion 
is 240 days an adequate amount of time for filing? tf not, is 
365 days? What period of time would be adequate for filing a 
federal habeas petition? 
. 
~ P : 
Questions from Senator ~nnis ~C.Oncini 
QUESTIONS FOR PANEL I 
1) S. 1760 REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COUNSEL. 
I AM CONVINCED THAT IN ORDER TO ENSURE FAIRNESS THROUGHOUT THE 
PROCEEDING, COMPETENT COUNSEL IS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY. BUT I 
WOULD BE INTERESTED IN KNOWING YOUR OPINION OF THE CRITERIA 
THAT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. ARE THERE SOME MINIMUM STANDARDS BY 
WHICH APPOINTMENT OF COMPETENT COUNSEL COULD BE GUARANTEED? 
WHAT MIGHT THOSE STANDARDS BE? 
WHAT IF COUNSEL IS RETAINED, BUT PROVES INCOMPETENT? DOES 
THIS NOT IMPLY THAT ADEQUATE REVIEW HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN 
DENIED? 
SECTION 2256(E) OF S. 1760 ALLOWS FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF 
DIFFERENT COUNSEL IN THE EVENT THAT PREVIOUS COUNSEL IS 
INEFFECTIVE. WITH REGARD TO THE PROPOSED STATUTE OF 
LIMITATIONS, WOULD THE NEW COUNSEL BE BOUND BY THE 6 MONTH 
FILING PERIOD? 
2) S. 1757 (SEC. 2261) REQUIRES THE APPOINTMENT OF 
COMPETENT COUNSEL, AND DIRECTS THAT SUCH COUNSEL HAVE BEEN 
ADMITTED TO PRACTICE IN THE STATE COURT OF LAST RESORT FOR NOT 
LESS THAN 5 YEARS, AND MUST HAYE AT LEAST 3 YEARS OF APPELLATE 
EXPERIENCE IN FELONY -CASES. I~ c-AM CONCERNED THAT OUR 
EXPECTATIONS AS TO rHE EXPERIENCE OF ATTORNEYS IN APPELLATE 
CAPITAL PROCEEDINGS BE REASONABLE. 
IN YOUR VIEW, ARE THESE STANDARDS REASONABLE? 
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF 
ATTORNEYS AVAILABLE WHO HAVE SEVERAL YEARS EXPERIENCE WITH THIS 
TYPE OF CASE AT THE APPELLATE LEVEL? 
3) WHILE I AGREE THAT CURRENT HABEUS CORPUS PROCEDURE 
REQUIRES REFORM, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT 
PEOPLE'S LIVES ARE AT STAKE. THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE 
REPORT SUGGESTS THAT THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN CURRENT HABEUS 
CORPUS PROCEDURE ARE 1) PIECEMEAL AND REPETITIOUS LITIGATION, 
AND 2) YEARS OF DELAY BETWEEN SENTENCING AND JUDICIAL 
RESOLUTION AS TO WHETHER THE SENTENCE WAS PERMISSIBLE. 
I SUPPORT THE NEED FOR EXPEDITING HABEUS CORPUS APPEALS. 
BUT I ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT SAFEGUARDS ARE NECESSARY TO ENSURE 
FAIR AND PROPER REVIEW. WITHOUT CASTING ANY ASPERSIONS, I 
WOULD LIKE TO HEAR YOUR COMMENTS ON THE REQUIREMENT OF ONE 
THOROUGH REVIEW. DO YOU BELIEVE THAT, ASSUMING COMPETENT 
COUNSEL, ONE REVIEW IS SUFFICENT TO ASSURE THAT THE SENTENCING 
WAS IN FACT REASONABLE? 
\ 
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FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA TO: 
C1ID ____ ,,,, __ _ 
The University of Georgia 
School of Law 
The Honorable Lewis F. Powell 
Associate Justice, Retired 
United States Supreme Court 
Washington, DC 20543 
December 11, 1989 
DEC 11, 1989 2:05PM P.02 
Re: Response to Biden Committee's 
Follow-up Questions 
Dear Justice Powell, 
Enclosed is a draft of the proposed answers to the questions 
formulated to you by Senator Biden and other members of the 
Judiciary Committee. I am sorry for the delay in getting this 
material to you, but I had trials last week and could not get a 
stretch of time to complete my work.,, I_ 7m clear for the balance 
of this week and can assist you and #Y8)'Ji in editing and otherwise 










Professor of Law 
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FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA TO: DEC 11, 1989 2:05PM P.03 
MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Lewis F. Powell 
From: Al Pearson 
Re: Proposed Responses to Senate 
Judiciary Followup Questions 
l. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
Dece~ber 11. 1989 
Several factors went into the Committee's consideration of 
this issue. First, there is no constitutional right to counsel 
during either state or federal post-conviction review. Whether or 
not this is wise, it is a factor that will influence the 
willingness of the states to support habeas corpus reform. Second, 
if habeas corpus reform in capital cases is to be achieved, 
substantial support at the state level would seem to be both 
desirable and politically necessary. Third, considerable weight was 
accorded to the fact that, subject to federal review, reeponsbility 
for providing competent counsel at the critical stages of criminal 
cases has always resided at the state level. 
allowing states the choice of either remaining under the present 
system--~which many find undesirable--~or opting in to the scheme 
proposed by our Committee (S. 1760), there is an important element 
of flexibility. 
cases, their burden will be to propose ~ 
competent habeas c~ y can sustain financially and can 
&';!.ff t,~ _f a-scheme d,oesn-' t m1HS-sure up-,- t-e--<tera • --··- ' 
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do to meet the legal wi 11 mBke clear what more a 
requirements of section 2256. ew, this process 
of time the necessary 
states to follow if they wish to opt in 
should produce within 
to the special habeas scheme for capital cases. 
But far more important, the Committee's scheme embodies an 
incentive structure that is likely to stimulate the interest of 
states willing to consider seriously change in the way capital 
habeas litigation is conducted. Unless there is a good reason for 
the states to opt in to the Committee's proposal, they will take 
their chances with the status quo which means taking the chance 
that the courts will eventually clarify the habeas corpus finality 
rules in ways that are appropriately attuned to the states' 
perception of their own in tereets. The issue of state ha beae 
counsel in capital cases will remain where it was left in Murray 
v. Giarrantano. 
To allow the states to take the initiative in .l!_ropoaing 
representational schemes for state habeas proceedings may seem to 
be a legislative abdication on a central issue. But I would suggest 
that the process contemplated by the Committee's proposal---which 
involves ultimate judicial oversight---would work well, Not only 
would it attract state interest, it would reveal how 1erio!sly that 
interest is to be taken. A federal court would have before it 
detailed information that will not be readily available to 
2 
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Congress, including data about the number of attorneys in a state 
willing to undertake capital defense representation, those skilled 
enough to do it in some capacity, where such attorneys live and 
practice in the state and what it would take financially to make 
it feasible to get these attorneys involved in capital defense 
work, It is probably unfair to state legislatures and courts to 
suggeat that they might try to opt in under section 2256 by 
proposing a representational scheme without objective criteria for 
determining the competency of counsel. It is probably equally 
unfair to federal courts to suggest that they would not inquire 
seriously about the need for at least some objective criteria by 
which to make a threshhold judgment about attorney competency. 
In any event, after hearing testimony from all interested 
parties and consideration of local factors unique to a particular 
state, a federal court under the Committee's proposal could say 
authoritatively whether a state's proposal is reasonably calculated 
to insure the appointment of competent counsel in state habeas 
proceedings. Until now, this type of judgment has almost 
universally been the kind of fact specific determination that 
courts do far better than legislatures, We should not forget that 
federal courts are constantly asked to award attorney's fees under 
statutory provisions which set no specific guidelines, Nor should 
we forget that the competency of defense counsel is one of the most 
common questions that federal courts face in post-conviction 
litigation. Standards of attorney competency, of course. have 
3 
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developed entirely on a case-by-case basis. Litigation under the 
Committee's proposal no doubt would be the cause of some delay, but 
largely such delay would occur on a one time basis. The value of 
the litigation process would lie in the refinement of state 
proposals to promote compliance with section 2256. 
If a state acts in response to the incentive structure 
contemplated by the Committee, the status quo will change at least 
in that state end perhaps in others. Capital defendants will obtain 
representation which they now have no right to demand. Objective 
standards for promoting competent representation may vary ~t least 
initially from state to state, but that should not militate against 
the Committee's proposal es long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is reasonably 
calculated to produce competent counael in capital cases at the 
state habeas phase. 
The notion of uniform natio»al standards of competency has a 
A4'\ IA t (-c:>t a,'-4.. 
surface appeal but it is a "te·p de,n\" solution that actually 
obscures the many detailed considerations that are crucial to the 
development of an effective system of habeas representation in 
capital cases. An examination of the standards for counsel in S. 
1757 illustrates why. Section 2261 of S. 1757 requires 3 years of 
"experience" in the handling of felony trials. It doesn't specify 
what that experience includes, such as the number of cases tried 
to verdict, whether the attorney must have served as lead counsel 
4 
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or whether the trials inv~lved felonies of a serious and complex 
nature. A similar "experience" requirement is applicable to the 
handling of appeals. 
Even if all attorneys who have less than the necessary 3 years 
experience are presumptively incomptent to handle capital caaes, 
the converse is not true. All attorneys with at least 3 years 
felony trial experience cannot be judged presu'!_Ptively competent 
as a class. Thus, under section 2261 the experience rules would 
function in an operational sense as little more than threshhold 
screening tools in the attorney appointm~nt procedure. To promote 
attorney competency in capital cases, many details would have to 
be filled in and presumably S. 1757 leaves those details---which 
would be decisive to the efficacy of s statewide representational 
scheme---to be worked out at the state level. Viewed in this light, 
the notion of uniformity expressed in S, 1757 is extremely limited. 
In another sense, these "experience" provisions would be 
counterproductive even if they served only aa screening devices, 
In addition to the 3 year trial and appellate "experience" 
requirements, section 2261 also requires that the attorney must 
have acquired that experience in the trial and appellate court in 
which the capital case is to be heard. Section 2261 also requires 
that each attorney subject to appointment must have been admitted 
to practice in those specific courts for 5 yeara prior to 
5 
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appointment. Instead of viewing each state as a general talent pool 
from which to attract attorneys to handle capital cases, section 
2261 seems to require each state to subdivide itself into numerous 
local talent pools. What does time of admission to practice before 
a particular court have to do with cape bi 1 i ty to represent a 
capital defendant? Why does felony trial experience have to be 
essentially "local" e:xperience? Under section 2261, an attorney 
with extensive federal Cl"iminsl trial experience could not be 
appointed unless he or she possessed the requisite state trial 
experience in the relevant trial court. Similarly, an attorney in 
Virginia who acquired his criminal experience in Richmond could not 
def end a capital case in Nor£ olk unless he or she met section 
226l's local admission and local experience rules. It plainly ie 
not easy to find attorneys willing and able to make the 
extraordinary commitment needed to serve es lead counsel or even 
to part ic i pate in a capable case. But sect ion 2261 ref lee ts an 
outmoded view of attorney 11\0bility that will make the task of 
finding capital defense counsel even harder than it already is. 
Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory or 
voluntary, the states will be loath to accept them unless the 
standards are reasonable in light of local conditions. In view of 
these considerations, the Committee believes that its approach will 
encourage the development of 9tatewide representational schemes to 
which the proposing states would be genuinely comm! t ted and it 
further believes that these schemes would be effect 1 ve, 
particularly in light of thei~ federal reviewability. The absence 
6 
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of so-called unifor:-m federal standards of competency is not a 
shortcoming in the Committee's proposal. Such standards will evolve 
as states attempt to opt in. The atstes will not have a free hand 
to pay lipservice to the ideal of effective assistance of counsel 
and yet, at the same time, secure the benefits of increased 
finality in capital cases. 
protected consti tional most particularly the 
was handed down and it can 
habeas corpus 
<!fa t p t e i f i.t 1 a-i:: e fern, e d tu t lr e= C om DI i t"t'~ e 15Y"op"os-n-t·n S • 1 7.i • I f 
the states are allowed some flexibility in taking the initiative, 
the end result in the Committee'a view would be a material, 
generally beneficial and lasting change in the way capital caeea 
are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the more specific questions concerning 
the Committee's recommendations, the standards for judging 
competency of counsel should be compatible throughout state and 
federal habeas corpus proceedings. But as indicated earlier, the 
competency standards in section 2261 of S. 1757 are neither uniform 
nor particularly exacting and they authori~e virtually open ended 
departure when an attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. 
The same is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 USC$ 
848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the hands of the 
trial judge in both instances. The Committee, however, believes 
that th;is is inevitable. There is no wtJy to make any serious 
7 
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advances in this area without substantial delegation of 
responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital defendant 
et the state phase ought to continue to handle the case once it 
reaches federal court unless there is clear reason to believe thet 
the case has been mishandled. At that juncture. performance in the 
context of the specific case ought to override adherence to more 
generalized standards of competency. The object of this proposal 
is to find lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and 
aggressive efforts on behalf of capital defendants. If that 
performance is preeerit, blind adherence to supposedly more 
demanding federal standards of competency would be a disservice to 
the client and would discourage future lawyers from heeding the 
call to provide a perhaps unpleasant but desperately needed service 
to the criminally condemned. 
Ae far as the litigation process is concerned, it would be 
inevitable even either under S. 1757 or s. 1760. The suggestion 
that a uniform federal competency standard would produce immediste 
reform is not plausible. There are simply too many issues to be 
worked out through general legislation. The enhancement of fairness 
and finality in capital cases requires a collaborative effort on 
the part of the states and the federal government. While it vould 
take time for a judicial consensus to develop concerning the 
adequacy of atate representational schemes• the delay involved 
8 
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would occur on a one time basis for each state. Presumably, each 
state would be in the beat position to judge whether this one time 
delay would be worthwhile in light of the benefits to be derived. 
The real issue is not how to design a scheme that provides 
competent representation for capital defendants. It is whether the 
states which have the death penalty see it as in their interest to 
undertake to devise one. In the Committee's view, the incentive 
structure inc or pora ted in to S. 1 760 is calculated to stimulate 
state interest in this issue and it contemplates immediate judicial 
review as the best mechanism to test the good faith and 
reasonableness of the states seeking to opt in. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to encourage habeas 
counsel to inquire aggressively into all legal and factual issues 
concerning the capital sentencing procedure. The vast majority of 
death penalty cases do not focus on guilt-innocence, but rather are 
concerned with the avoidance of the death penalty. After a verdict 
of guilty, a jury in a capital caae can impose the death penalty 
only if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravating 
circumstances were present. If the jury cannot reach unanimity on 
that issue or if a single juror finds mitigating circumstances to 
be overriding, then life imprisonment is the sentence by default. 
An understanding of this makes the state intereat in 
9 
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sentencing finality clearer, It is just as burdensome to retry a 
capital case completely as it is to have a new trial limited only 
to sentence. A second jury in 8 capital case must still hear all 
the evidence relevant to sentence before it decides whether to 
impose the death penalty. From the state's perspective, challenges 
to the sentence really do not rest on the argument that the first 
jury would have decided the death penalty i saue differently. 
Instead, they rest on the premise that a second and differently 
composed jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose the 
death penalty. If a conviction in a capital case is reversed, the 
state almost always retries the case. If the reversal is limited 
to the death sentence, the state is not ss invariably inclined to 
go through a resentencing trial because the possibility of 8 
default verdict is such an unpredictable factor. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are permissible 
in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-innocence 
determination because there is necessarily doubt about the 
imposition of the death penalty. Where there is no question in a 
capital case about guilt, S. 1760 limits a capital defendant to one 
opportunity for federal habeas review on the validity of sentence. 
Of course, it is highly significant that this would be a counseled 
opportunity. An experienced criminal attorney knows the types of 
issues that can be raised in post-conviction proceedings in 
addition to those raised at trial and on direct appeal. The 
identity of the state's liitnessea and their testimony at the 
10 
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sentencing hearing would be a matter of record. Under S. 1 760 • 
habeas counsel is expected to undertake the necessary steps to 
investigate all such anticipatable iaaues, including BradJ 
violations and the possibility of perjured testimony, and do it in 
connection ~1th the first petition, Discovery procedures are 
available at the federal level to assist in this procesa and should 
be liberally available. 
If, after all the efforts of habeas counsel, perjured 
testimony or a Br,a,d,: violation is not discovered, S, 1760 would 
remit the capital defendant to state court for a remedy at that 
point, If the claim has substance and raises questions about the 
propriety of the sentencing procedure, there is no reason to 
believe that a state court judge would hesitate to act in a clear 
case, The fact that federal habeas review of sentencing would come 
to an end at some point does not mean that a capital defendant hes 
no forum at all for late emerging theories of relief. 
3. Retroactivity 
Under S. 1760, the Supreme Court would take its most serious 
look at a death penalty case after all state and federal post-
conviction review has been concluded. If it determines that one of 
its decisions ought to be retroactively applied, it will have the 
opportunity to do so at that point. After the Supreme Court has 
taken its final look at a capital eaae and has upheld the 
11 
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conviction and sentence, the death penalty will probably be carried 
out within weeks. If a capital defense attorney thinks that another 
case pending before the Supreme Court for decision might have an 
impact on his client's case, he is obligated to advise the Court 
of that fact so that action on his client's certiorari petition can 
be ~ithheld until a decision on the potentially controlling case 
is handed down. Apart from these circumstances, retroactivity 
issues won't be a problem under S, 1760. 
4, Manifest Injustice Stsndard 
If that language is the only limit on second or successive 
petitions, there is no limit on such petitions. Adoption of that 
standard would in essence mean that all previoua judicial efforts 
to review the case count for virtually nothing if a later judge's 
conception of justice differs from that of his predecessors. 
5. Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
' 
If sn attorney accepts appointment in a capital case, the 
state would have reason to expect the case to be his or her top 
priority, Since Furman, many death penalty caees have been 
litigated at the habeas phase under fer greater initial time 
constraints than the 180 day period proposed under S. 1760. This 
happens because the state has set an execution date after the 
conviction and sentence heve been upheld on direct appe&l. One of 
12 
I,. - -~ ••• 
.. •• •• •• L• < z "•:~•.'_;:-:::.:::. ~~,.~/:~':- •• ~-i: ~ .. ::~=;i::~~~!-... ~-;.~-'~---
FROM:LAW SCHOOL -UGA TO: DEC 11, 1989 2: 10PM P.15 
the advantages of S, 1760, in the Committee's view, is that it 
would eliminate the time and energy that sometimes has to be put 
into securing stays of execution. 
But apart from that, is 180 days otherwise adequate to prepare 
a state habeas corpus petition which will in turn become the basis 
for the federal habeas corpus petition? The Committee believes that 
this time period is reasonable since new counsel would already have 
a full trial transcript to work from plus the benefit of all briefs 
and motions prepared by predecessor counsel. Frequently, trial 
counsel will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar ~1th the 
case as !tis their ethical obligation to do. Four months would be 
a sufficient amount of time to evaluate the records and file a 
state habeas petition which would stop the 180 day time period from 
running any longer. Bear in mind here that if investigation 
thereafter turns up any new issues, counsel for the capital 
defendant could seek leave to amend the petition to add those 
issues, a request that ought to be granted as a matter of course 
prior to any state evidentiary hearing and thereafter upon a 
showing of cause as long as the habeas trial court still retains 
jurisdiction over the case. 
The point of the 180 day filing requirement is to place some 
deadline pressure on capital defense attorneys to formulate a 
habeas petition in a prompt manner, Otherwise, in a capital case, 
· there is literally no incentive to file~ habeas corpus petition 
13 
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un ti 1 it becomes absolutely necea sa ry. If a cs pi tal defense 
counsel works diligently from the day of appointment, he or she 
will get the state habeas petition filed with time to apere. 
The 180 day clock stops upon the filing of the state habeas 
petition and remains stopped throughout state habeas litigation. 
It begins to run again only after the state high court has rendered 
a final judgment in the case which usually comes after the denial 
of a motion for rehearing in the event of a judgment adverse to the 
capital defendant. If there is continuity of representation as S. 
1760 contemplates, the jump from state to federal court should not 
require much additional time. The better practice would be to heve 
all federal habeas pleadings pre-drafted and finalized during the 
time when a motion for rehearing is pending before the state 
supreme court. If the motion for rehearing is denied, the federal 
habeas petition could then be filed on the same day of this deniel 
with no additional running of time. Thia is a worst case seenario 
premised on the filing of a state habeas on the 180th day. The 
other option would be to seek a 60 day extension of time to file 
the federal habeas petition. If unusual problems arise in advanee 
of the filing of either a state or federal habeas petition, 
competent counsel have ways to avoid default. Bot the expeetation 
is that they will get the job done within the time prescribed and 
the Committee sees the task as manftgeable. 
6. Objective Criterie for Appointment of Counsel 
14 
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Probably the most important determinants of effective 
representation in capitsl cases (at the trisl, appellate and habeas 
phases) are the extent of previous jury trial experience, 
demonstrated knowledge and research ability in the field of 
criminal law based on both motion practice and appellate experience 
and finally the maturity and temperament of the individual 
attorney. Bright line rules don't work in this ares and may in fact 
be counterproductive. As is well known, many young. highly 
motivated but objectively inexperienced attorneys have gotten 
excellent results in death penalty cases in every jurisdiction. 
Competency standards serve a purpose, but we must keep in mind that 
each state needs to expand the pool of attorneys who are willing 
to represent capital defendants. If competency standards are so 
high that only a very few sttorneys can qualify for appointment, 
the states will not find it very attractive to opt in under S. 1757 
or some variation of it. 
The criteria for appointment of counsel in S. 1757, as 
indicated earlier, don't have the relevant objective content to be 
asse9sed as either too high or too low. They can't even serve as 
JDeaningful guidelines to the states. This ia why S. 1757 would 
allow the states to take the initiative to aet attorney competency 
standards that are geared at least in pert to local conditions. 
Permit the federal courts thereafter to review these plans before 
final approval of any state's plan and hence their right to opt in 
15 
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under S. 1757. The aim should be to develop a pool of legal talent 
in each stste that is ava:l.lable for habeas representation in 
capital cases. If a uniform national standard of attorney 
competency is mandated as a condition of opting in, few states, if 
any, will do so. 
As far as retained counsel is concerned. the most plausible 
time for replacement would be when the case arrives in federal 
court. But it could very well be done earlier, In my view, the 
state mechanism for appointment of counsel ought to have someone 
assigned to monitor the progress of all attorneys---whether 
appointed or retained---working under the 180 day filing 
requirement. If no progress is shown after three or four months, 
the state on its own motion ought to take the initiative to seek 
a replacement even in cases where counsel is retained. If a state 
appoints a replacement within the 180 day period, the time period 
ought to start egain for the replacement counsel. Otherwise, if a 
replacement is made after the case reaches federal court. the 180 
dey filing period is no longer applicable. The federal judge can 
give the new attorney however much time he or she needs to prepare 
to carry the case forward from that point. 
7. Is One Federal Review Sufficient? 
Given the focus on continuously counseled representation 
throughout all post-conYiction revie~. the scheme proposed in S. 
16 
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1760 would be far superior to the chaotic system now in place. 
Piecemeal litigation is to some degree the result of several 
different teams of attorneys working at different phases of a death 
penalty case. Continuity of representation will eliminate piecemeal 
litigation due to changes in counsel and it will also promote 
fairness to the capital defendant, Finally, the issue in capital 
cases is not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the 
capit8l litigation process and the lack of clear agreement vhen the 
federal role in this process comes to an end. Now the courts are 
grappling with this issue on a case-by-case basis, S, 1760 is an 
attempt to produce a balanced solution to the present deadlock, It 
offers major enhancements in terms of fairness to the ce.pital 
defendant and requires in return a clarification of the rules of 
finality. It leaves the substantive scope of habeas corpus review 
intact, 
If thie proposal doesn't succeed politically, the states will 
continue to try to devolop the case law in ways that further limit 
federal habeas corpus review. This strategy has been relatively 
successful in recent years. If the states achieve through the 
litigation process what they would like in terms of finality, they 
will have no incentive to compromise along the lines suggested in 
either S. 1757 or S. 1760. The time is ripe to act. 
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;, ~~~· 1. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
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~ Several factors went into the Committee's consider-
ation of this issue. First, there is no constitutional 
right to counsel during either 
conviction review. Whothor of 
state or federal post-
~ 
not this is wise. itAis a 
factor that will influence the willingness of the states to 
support habeas corpus reform. Second, if habeas corpus re-
form in capital cases is to be achieved, substantial support 
w;I) ct 
at the state level~ would ~eem to be both desirable and eo -
Htieallv necessary. Third, considerable weight was accord-
ed to the fact that, subject to federal review, responsibil-
ity for providing competent counsel at the critical stages 
of criminal cases has always resided at the state level. 
-+H-the Committee's 1 v ew, 1::-n-e-- crucial · . issue is how 
~ 'jet tho i.tates to undertake an obligation that they du 
a-et -presently have to perform. provide counsel in state 
-.habeas ~reoeodioq_s. By allowing states the choice of either 
remaining under the present system - which many find unde-
sirable - or opting in to the scheme proposed by our Commit-
tee (S. 1760), there is an important element of flexibility. 
"ntl~{i ~ 
For the states seeking greater £leuib~ iey in capital cases, 
their burden will be to propose a mechanism for providing 
2 . 
competent habeas counsel which they can sustain financially 
~ t\deq,,-v~~ ~ ~ f t:e~•~
0
£ flNls--t<MA ivitl 
and can staff f~l}y ~ If a sche!me d'oesn ~. 
fe't'II a.iA vv'7 ~ Jo ~ cav<l revi-e,..AJ ~ 
al eourtiew will make clear what more a state mYst do to 
meet the legal requirements of section 225&. In the Commit-
tee's view, this process should produce within a reasonable 
period of time the necessary legal benchmarks for other 
states to follow if they wish to opt in to the special habe-
as scheme for capital cases. 
But far more important, the Committee's scheme e1n 
aodies aA inceotiJze strY.cture that is likely to stimulate--
the interest of states willing Lo consider seriously change 
~n the way capital habeas ii Ligation is conducted. Unless 
there is a etood reason fur the states to opt in to the Comec-
.mittee's proposal, they will take their chances with the "' 
sta.tu.s quo which means taking the chance that the court"s 
... will eventYally clarify the habeas corpus finality rules in 
ways that are appropriately attuned to the states' percep-
tion of their own interests. 1'he issue of state habea-s-
counsel in capital cases will remain where it was left in 
Murray v, Giarraotano 
'Fe allow the states to take the initiative in oro-
posiog represeotational schemes for state habeas proceedings 
may seem to be a legislative abdication on a central issu~. 
But I wo.u.ld suggest that the process contemplated by the 
Committee's ~roposal which involves ultimate judieia.J. 
G>Versigh-t, would work well. Not only would it attract 
3 . 
state interest, it would reveal how seriously that interest 
,Ls to be taken. z•,. federal eourt would have be fore it de 
tailed information that will not be readily available to 
C~ogress, including data about the number of attorneys in & 
s•tate williag to undertake capital defense representation,-
those skilled enough Lo do it in some eapaeity, where sueh 
attorneys live ar:id practice in the state and what it would" 
t-ake financially to make it feasible to get these attorneys 
i-nvolved in eapi tal defense work. It is probably tmfa it to 
state legislatures and courts to suggest that they might try 
t-o opt in under section 2256 by proposing a representational 
acheme without objeotive criteria for determining the compe-
-t-ency of eounsel. It is probably equally unfair to federa~ 
courts to suggest that they would not inquire seriously 
about the need for at least some objective criteria by which 
t-0 make a threshold judgment about attorney eompetency. 
I-~ any event, after hearing testimony from all in-
t..e;r-ested parties and consideration of loeal factors nnique 
t-0 a partieular state, a federal coart under the Committeets 
p~osal could say authoritatively whether a state's propos 
al is reasonably calculated to insure the appointment of 
oompetent counsel in state habeas proceedings. until now, 
this type of judgment has almost universally been the kind 
of fact specific determination that courts do far bett-e-r 
t.han le'j"islaturcs. We should not forqet that federal coar-ts 
a+e coft"Stantlv asked to award attornev's fees under statu 
4 . 
t...or:y pr:c;w· . ?ls Jons ···h. h ff 1G s L ,:; no s "' . f. .l,ottld ~ e> >o guidol" 
we forget th t ines. wor 
a theom t one cpe ency ef do of the most e fense eounsel i 
OIIHllOA quest" s ions that f 
'!'O&t eonv ic tion lit. . ederal cettrts face . rgatrun St u, 
ey f . andards of t • • eon, se 
I 
a torney comp-•--
, lave a-el -~u-
,:; y oped e1 t· 
basi•. Litio . , rrely o11 
at1on under th e Committee's orooosal no doub~ 
.would ee the cause of some delay, but largely such delay 
~ould occur on a one time basis. The value of the litiga 
t-4-on process would like in the refinement of state proposals~ 
to pr:omotc compliance with section 2256. 
If a state acts in response to the incentive struc-
ture contemplated by the Committee, the status J;:; will 
change at least in that state and perhaps in others. Capi-
tal defendants will obtain representation which they now 
have no right to demand. Objective standards for promoting 
competent representation may vary at least initially from 
state to state, but that should not militate against the 
Committee's proposal as long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is rea-
sonably c~lculatcdf?o Producc comp~f cn~ coun~~l , }n capital 1 
L,h~h<M 0'1€.< ~ 1.tclerJ~ ~ i~~ ~1!.k.,,,, lavic,.. p~ 111,~?Af ~ , W 'fKi.d ww/J A..e. a 
cases at the state habeas phase. " ~e - ~14'\.t, el~½, w«J-~hh~ "'l t4 g«M11 
'" ~c,~ a,;.J.. ~i'r"-W 10 ~ AJSH«i 7v a wMk 
-IJ!he notion of g niform national standards of compe-
tency kas a c1:1r:fac0 apf)eal but it is a "top down" soltition 
-t:-l=tt:t-t~~~ually obscurc/t-hc many detailed considerations that 
arc crucial to the development of an effective system of 
habeas representation in capital cases. An examination of 
5. 
pf'(r{}Jas iwt 1Uvshh~. 
the standards for counsel in S. l 757~ ill1.1str:at.es , ~th¥ Sec-
tion 2261 of S. 1757 requires 
handling of felony trials. ~~ 
~ 




[ pecify what that 
the 
ex-
perience includes• s-ueh as the number of eases tried to ve-£-
diet, whether the attorney must have served as lead counsel 
of wl)-€L±:her the trials involved felonies of a serious and -
4'-0mplex natunL I ..'\ similar "experience" requirement is apw 
( / C. c. C. L t.. t.. c.--- c.. ~ G- " -- a::-- -- _ _, 
,plicable to the handling of appeals. < _ _ 
Even if till attorneys who have less than the neces 
sary 3 years experienee are presumptively incompetent to 
-a-andle caoital cases. the converse is not true. All attof-
oeys with at least 3 years felony trial experience cannot be 
-3-11dged presumptively competent as a class. Thus, under s~~ 
tion 2261 the experience rules would function io ao opera: 
t.ional sense as little more than threshold screening tool-s 
m the attorney appointment proeedure. l To promote attorney 
competency in capital cases, many details would have to be 
filled in_-a..n.d presumably S. 1757 leases those details -
-
which would be decisive to the efficacy of a statewide rep-
resentational scheme - to be worked out at the state level. 
Viewed in this light, the notion of uniformity expressed in 
s. 1757 is extremely limited. 
CuJ(& c;<.{5A -:::=- "experience" provisions 
wo1:1l0- be counterproductive, 9¥0n if they se cved only as 
screeojng device..s.. In addition to the 3 year trial and ap-
pellate "experience" requirements, section 2261 also re-
S--fE'r 
6. 
quires that the attorney must have acquired that experience 
in the trial and appellate court in which the capital case 
is to be heard. Section 2261 also requires that each attor-
ney subject to appointment must have been admitted to prac-
tice in those specific courts for 5 years prior to appoint-
ment. Instead-of viewing each state as a general talen--t 
pool from which to attract attorneys to bandle capit~ 
cases, section 22gl seems to require each state to subdivid~ 
i:--tself into numerous local talent pools, What does time et 
admissio11 Lo practice before a patticular court have to d& 
with capability to represent a capital defendant? Why do~ 
f&lony trial experience have to be essentially "local" expe 
-F;P11rr? Under section 2261, an attorney with extensive fed-
eral criminal trial experience could not be appointed unless 
he or she possessed the requisite state trial experience in 
loc~I 
the relevant tria± court. Similarlv, an attorne11 in Vitoin 
.i-a who acquired his criminal experience in Richmond could 
'fl-Ot defend a capital case in Norfolk unless he or she met 
section 2261 1 s local admission and local experience ral-e-s-.-
It plainly is not easy to find attorneys willing and able to 
make the extraordinary commitment needed to serve as lead 
~p·,~\ 9-
counsel or even tq._ participate in a c-pabl~ case. ~ sec-
$0 c<Nld.. ,; -\.\c:r :;. 
tion 2261 AEQflects an outmoded view of attorney mobility> 
that will make the task of finding capital defense counsel 
even harder than it already is. 
7 • 
Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory 
Uhlik4.~ 
or voluntary, the states will be Loath to accept them unless 
the standards are reasonable in light of local conditions. 
In view of these considerations, the Committee believes that 
its approach will encourage the development of statewide 
representational schemes to which the proposing states would 
be genuinely committed and it further believes that these 
schemes would be effective• ~a~ticularly in light of their 
f.&deral Fewiewabilit-v-. The absence of so-called uniform 
federal standards of competency is not a shortcoming in the 
Committee's proposal. S'l:leh . staRdards will euolve as states. 
attempt to gpt in. ':Phe states will not have a free hand Lo 
pay Jipservice to tbe ideal of effective assistance of cgun 
sel and yet, at the same Lime, secure the benefits of iR -
creased finality in capital cases. Th=e federal iudiciarv 
has faithfully protected constitutional rights iacladin-g 
,-most particularly the right t o counsel .. Al.-since arown v • 
~ was handed down aRd it can be expected to continne to do 
~ts dutv under the habeas corpus statute if it is reformed 
-as the Cororoittee proposes in S. 17~. If the states are 
allowed some flexibility in taking the initiate, the end 
result in the Committee's view would be a material, general-
ly beneficial and lasting change in the way capital cases 
are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the more specific questions 
concerning the Committee's recommendations, the standards 
8 . 
for judging competency of counsel should be compatible 
throughout state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. But 
as indicated earlier, the competency standards in section 
2261 of S. 1757 are neither uniform nor particularly exact-
ing and they authorize virtually open ended departure when a 
attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. ~h~ same 
is true of the attorney competency standards is onavailable. 
The same is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 
USC §848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the 
hands of the trial judge in both instanGes. The Committee, 
however, believes that this is inevitable. There is no way 
to make any serious advances in this area without substan-
tial delegation of responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital 
defendant at the state phase ought to continue to handle the 
case once it reaches federal court unless there is clear 
reason to believe that the case has been mishandled. At 
that juncture, performance in the context of the specific 
case ought to override adherence to more generalized stand-
ards of competency. The object of this proposal is to find 
lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and aggres-
sive efforts on behalf of capital defendants. If that per-
formance is present, blind adherence to supposedly more de-
manding federal standards of competency would be a disser-
vice to the client and would discourage future lawyers from 
9. 
heeding the call to provide a ~rhaps unpleasant but de~per 
...e-tely needed service to the criminally condemned. 
As far as the litiaation oroaess is concerned, i-t-
-w-ouJd be inevitable even either uodec s. 1757 or S. 1760 . 
The su9gestion that a uniform federal competency standard 
weuld produce immediate r~f-0rm is not plaosible. ~here ace 
simply too many issues to be worked out through general leg 
islation. ~he enhancement of fairness and finality in eapi 
t:'al eases requires a collaborative effort on tho part of the.-
.... statos and the federal governm~nt. While it would take time 
for a judicial consensus to develop concerning the adequacy 
~f state representational schemes , the delay i11vol?ed would 
o-ecur oo a one time basis foe eacb state Pr esumably, eac:t.. 
fH:ato would be in tho best position to jud9e whether Ui.i s_ 
one time delay would be war thwhile in light of the benefits-
to be derived. The real isstte is not how to design a scheme 
A-bat provides competent representation for capital defend-
ant,-. It is whether the states which have the death pena-lty 
<See it as in tbeit interest to undertake to devise one. In 
t:he Committee's view, the incentive strpcture incorporated > 
iflto s. 1760 is calculated to stimulate state interest in 
e-his issue and it contemplates immediate judicial re~iew as 
the best mechanism to test the good faith and reasonableness 
ef the states seekina to oot in. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to en-
courage habeas counsel to inquir~ aggressively into all 
In~ 
legal and factual issues concern~ the capital sentencing 
10. 
procedure. The vast majority of death penalty cases do not 
focus on guilt-innocence, but rather are concerned with the 
avoidance of the death penalty. After a verdict of guilty, 
a jury in a capital case can impose the death penalty only 
if it finds beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravat-
ing circumstances were present. If the jury cannot reach 
unanimity on that issue or if a single juror finds mitigat-
ing circumstances to be overriding, then life imprisonment 
is the sentence by default. 
An understanding of this makes the state interest 
in sentencing finality clearer. It is just as burdensome to 
retry a capital case completely as it is to have a new trial 
limited only to sentence. A second jury in a capital case 
must still hear all the evidence relevant to sentence before 
it decides whether to impose the death penalty. From the 
state's perspective, challenges to the sentence really do 
not rest on the argument that the first jury would have de-
cided the death penalty issue differently. Instead, they 
rest on the premise that a second and differently composed 
jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose the 
death penalty. ~fa convictioH in a capita l case is re 
¥ersed, the state almost always retries the case. If the-
t:h state is not 1 . limited to the death sentence,e ~ euersa 1s 
11. 
a-s invariably inclined to go through a resentencing trial 
because the possibility of a default verdict is such as 1:1n 
predictable facto£. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are 
permissible in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-
innocence determination because there is necessarily doubt 
about the imposition of the death penalty. Where there is 
no question in a capital case about guilt, S. 1760 limits a 
capital defendant to one opportunity for federal habeas re-
view on the validity of sentence. Of course, it is highly 
significant that this would . be a counseled opportunity. An 
experienced criminal attorney knows the types of issues that 
can be raised in post-conviction proceedings in addition to 
those raised at trial and on direct appeal. The identity of 
the state's witnesses and their testimony at the sentencing 
hearing would be a matter of record. Under S. 1760, habeas 
counsel is expected to undertake the necessary steps to in-
vestigate all such anticipatable issues, including Brady 
violations and the possibility of perjured testimony, and do 
it in connection with the first petition. Discovery proce-
dures are available at the federal level to assist in this 
process and should be liberally available. 
If, after all the efforts of habeas counsel, per-
jured testimony or a Brady violation is not discovered, s. 
1760 would remit the capital defendant to state court for a 
remedy at that point. If the claim has substance and raises 
12. 
questions about the propriety of the sentencing procedure, 
there is no reason to believe that a state court judge would 
hesitate to act in a clear case. The fact that federal ha-
beas review of sentencing would come to an end at some point 
does not mean that a capital defendant has no forum at all 
for late emerging theories of relief. 
IINS~T A] 
3 . Retroactivi@ 
Hilde r l)'j>t?tf, ~ the Supreme Court would take its 
most serious look at a death penaltv case after all state 
Mld federal post conv iction . r ev iew has been concluded. If 
it determines that one of its decisions ought to be retroac-
tivelv aeelied, it will have the oooortunitv Lo do so at 
that ooint. After the Supreme court has taken its final 
look at a capital case and has uphold the convictjon and 
sentence , the death penalty will probably be carried ou t.-
within weeks. If a capital defense attorney tbinks that 
another ease pending before the Supreme Court for deeisio.n 
might bave an impact an his clien t's case, be is obligated 
~o advise the Court of that fact so that action 011 his cli 
~nt's certiorari petition can be withheld until a decisioR 
en the potentially controlling case is handed down. Apai.:t. 
from these ci r cumstances, retroactivity issues won't be a -
.problem under S. 1706. 
, A Mani~~tr rrrrjju~stti'-eerittttn-(~ci-, '- L- '- L- - n u ic  Sta dard _ 5",t;--







that language is the only limit on s 
a later 
of his predecessors. 
petitions. 
mean that all 
count for vir-
of justice dif-
~q· Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
If an attorney accepts appointment in a capital 
case, the state would have reason to expect the case to be 
his or her top priority. Since Furman, many death penalty 
cases have been litigated at the habeas phase under far 
greater initial time constraints than the 180 day period 
proposed under S. 1760. This happens because the state has 
set an execution date after the conviction and sentence have 
been upheld on direct appeal. One of the advantages of S. 
1760, in the Committee's view, is that it would eliminate 
the time and energy that sometimes has to be put into secur-
ing stays of execution. 
But apa rt fr om tha t. is 180 days o t he r wi se adequa t e -
t Q.... ptepare iil state habe as c o r pus pe tit ioA wh ich wil l in tuHl 
beeome ----th e bas i s for t he f ederal habeas c orpus pc ti t i oA? 
+k. (fQ-~ 
The Committee believes that --t-h-±-5 time 'J?eri ~d i R reasonable 
~ ~+,'+-k 
since new counsel would already have ~a full trial transcript 
to wo r k f r om4lus t he be1:::u~ fi t oJ-'all briefs and motions pre-
pared by predecessor counsel. Frequently, trial counsel 
14. 
will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar with the 
case a.sit is their gthicaJ obli~ation to do so. Four • 
months would be a sufficient amount of time to evaluate the 
records and file a state habeas petition which would stop 
the 180 day time period from running any longer. -sear in ....... 
~ .!_f investigation ~ hereaf~ rns tte anT new 
-issues, counsel for the capital defendant could seek leave 
to amend the petition to add those issues , a request that 
&\,\ght to be grante-d as a matter of course prior to any state 
evidentiary hear i<'ng and thereafter upon sho~ing of eattse as 
1:,ong as the habeas trial court still retains jurisdictio& 
over the ease. ~:.:..:.-----------------
The point of the 180 day filing requirement is to fft]Y)lfi-
-place some geadline pressure on capital defense attorneys to .. 
formulate a habeas peti tion. J:.n a prern.~ mann m Otherwise, 
in a capital case, there is literally no incentive to file a 
habeas corpus petition until it becomes absolutely neces-
sary. If a capital defense counsel works diligently from 
the day of appointment, he or she will get the state habeas 
petition filed with time to spare. 
The 180 day clock stops upon the filing of the 
state habeas petition and remains stopped throughout state 
habeas litigation. It begins to run again only after the 
state high court has rendered a final judgment in the case 
which usually comes after the denial of a motion for rehear-
ing in the event of a judgment adverse to the capital de-
15. 
fendant. If there is continuity of representation ass. 
1760 contemplates, the jump from state to federal court 
should not require such additional time. The better prac-
tice would be to have all federal habeas pleadings pre-
drafted ~and finaligeXu"ring the time~ motion for re-
hearing is pending before the state supreme court. If the 
motion for rehearing is denied, the federal habeas petition 
could then be filed on the same day of this denial with no 
additional running of time. ~his is a worst ease scenario 
~£emised on the filing of a state habeas on the 180th da¥ 
The other option would be to seek a . 60 day exte11sion of time 
to file the federal habeas petition. If unusual problems 
arise intldv~ t~~n~ i t e~ t D~~ at~~~eJrl,~ 1~ 
habeas petition, f\. eG-mpetent counsel have ways ~ a avoid de- t.,,./~ w ~k 
fault. But the eKpeotation is that they will get the job 
-e:lone within the Lime orescribed and the Committee sees the 
~ask as manaaeable. , 
<6. Objective Criteria for t-.ppointment of Counsel -
P.£obably the most impo£taot determinants of effe.c-
~ve £ep£esentation in capital cases (at the trial, appei: 
J.Jite and habeas phases) are the extent of previous jury 
~rial exeerience. demonstrated knowledae and researcl1 abili 
~yin the field of criminal law based on both motion prac "-
tice and appellate experience and finally the maturity and 
ts:e:mperament of the individual attorney Bright line rules 
work in this area and may in fact be counterprod 
As is well known, many young, highly motivate 
ely inexperienced attorneys have gotten 
results X'-J1 death penalty cases in every jurisdi Com-
petency 
expand the pool o attorneys who 
ndards serve a purpose, but wt mu keep in mind 
are willing to capital defenda ts. If competency 
standards are so high that only a very/tew attorneys can 
qualify for appoin ent, the states /;11 not tinct it very 
attractive to opt in ~ nder S. 175y or some variation of it. 
The criteria \ or appoi rJment of counsel ins. 1757, 
as indicated earlier, 
tent to be assumed as 
can't even serve as 
This is why S. 1757 
tiative to set 
at least in part to 
e the relevant objective con-
high or too low . They 
guidelines to the states. 
the states to take the ini-
standards that are geared 
Permit the federal 
courts thereafter 
al of any 
s. 1757. 
s before final approv-
plan and hence thei ~ ight to opt in under 
should be to develop a\ ool of leqal tal-
that is available for ha~ s representa-
If a uniform nationa \ standard of 
_ is mandated as a 
if any, will do so. 
As far as retained counsel is concerned, 
usible time for replacement would be when the cas 
most 
lier. 
federal court. But it could very 
view, the state mechanism for 
counsel ought ~ have someone assigned to 
of 
progress of all att~ rnevs - whether aoooi-n ted or retained -
filing If no 
the state on 
a re-
working under the 
progress is shown after 
its own motion ought to 
placement even in cases is retained. If a 




a replacement is made 
court, the 180 day filing 
The federal judge can give the 
time he or she needs 
from that point. 
a1/ Is One Fede r al Review Sufficient? 
case 
no long-
Given the focus on continuously counseled represen-
tation throughout all post-conviction review, the scheme 
proposed in S. 1760 would be far superior to the chaotic 
system now in place. Picemeal litigation is to some degree 
the result of several different terms of attorneys working 
at different phases of a death penalty case. Continuity of 
representation will eliminate piecemeal litigation due to 
changes in counsel and it will also promote fairness to the 
capital defendant. Finally, the issue in capital cases is 
18. 
not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the capi-
<S)'t. 
tal litigation process and the lack of clear agreement t when 
the federal role in this process comes to an end. Now the 
courts are grappling with this issue on a case-by-case 
basis. S. 1760 is an attempt to produce a balanced solution 
to the present deadlock. It offers major enhancements in 
terms of fairness to the capital defendant and requires in 
return a clarification of the rules of finality. ~ 
't-b e subs t an tive s e ope o f habeas co rpus review inta c t. 




the states achieve 
would like in 
to 
try to develop the case law· 




The time is ripe to act. 
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WASHINGlON. D.C. 20544 
December 20, 1989 
Honorable Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Associate Justice, Retired 
Supreme Court of the United States 
1 First Street, N. E. 
Washington, D. C. 20543 
Dear Justice Powell: 
2 'lDEc 198!J 
WIWAM R. BUROfllL. JR. 
GENERAL COUNSEL 
I thought that you and the members of the former Ad Hoc Committee would be 
interested in seeing the relevant excerpts from the draft report of the Judicial 
Conference's Federal Courts Study Committee regarding habeas corpus issues. I am 
enclosing the same herewith. 
I should emphasize that this report remains in draft form, but it has now been 
released for public comment and reaction. As you may be aware, the report is due to 
be formally adopted and submitted in April to the Judicial Conference, the President, 
and Congress, following a schedule of nine public hearings on the report which will be 
held in January 1990. 
With kindest regards and very best wishes for the Holiday season, 
Sincerely, 
Enclosure 
cc: Honorable Charles Oark 
Honorable Wm. Terrell Hodges 
Honorable Paul H. Roney 
Honorable Barefoot Sanders 




The purpose of these tentative recommendations is to 
stimulate debate and comment prior to final resolution 
of Committee recommendations. As such, this tentative 
listing does not necessarily reflect unanimity of 
opinion among Committee members on each and every 
recommendation. 
Tentative Recommendations For Public Comment 
THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
December 22, 1989 
Federal Courts Study Committee 
22716 United States Courthouse 
Independence Mall West 
601 Market Street 





HABEAS CORPUS REFORM 
• Congress should make no change regarding the stan-
dards for hearing the successive habeas corpus peti-
tions of state prisoners under 28 D.S.C. 5 2244. 
The present rules governing the hearing of succes-
sive petitions were established by the D.S. Supreme Court in 
Sanders v. United States.601 Dnder Sanders controlling weight 
may be given to the deniarof a prior habeas corpus applica-
tion only if (l) the same ground was presented and decided 
adversely to the petitjoner, (2) the prior decision was on the 
merits, and (3) "the ends of justice" would not be served by 
reaching the merits of the subsequent application.61/ When 
grounds could have been but were not raised in an earlier 
petition, the merits must be reached unless the petitioner has 
deliberately abused the writ or motion remedy.!£/ 
These rules have been controversial from their in-
ception. Some think that the "lax" standards espoused in 
Sanders resulted in a flood of successive petitions that need-
lessly undermined the states' interests in the finality of 
convictions. Early efforts to convince Congress to overrule 
Sanders failed, and instead the Court's result was codi-
fied.63/ A later effort to overrule Sanders by rule was simi-
larly repudiated.64/ Efforts from within the Court have 
failed to obtain amajority.65/ -
The Committee believes that no change is needed in 
this area. Many prisoners file more than one petition, but 
the chief source of these successive petitions -- changes in 
law that give rise to new claims or strengthen or revive old 
!Q/ 373 O.S. l (1963). 
.ill Id. at 15. 
ill Id. at 17-18 • 
63/ 28 o.s.c. S 2244; Larry w. Yackle, Postconvict:!on 
Remedies S 154 at 560 (1981). 
64/ See Rule Governing 5 2254 Cases in the United States 
o!'strict Court 9(b) (1976). 
ill Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 D.S. 436 (1986). 
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ones -- was recently eliminated by the Supreme Court's hold-
ings in Teague v. Lane66/ and Penry v. Lynaugh.§1./ 
Of greater importance is the fact that the federal 
courts appear to have little difficulty disposing of those 
successive petitions that do come before them. The absence in 
the reports of decisions applying the Sanders criteria sug-
gests (and anecdotal evidence confirms) that successive peti-
tions are usually disposed of summarily and without reported 
opinion. In fact, the rules governing successive petitions 
appear to be applied-in practice as if they incorporated a res 
judicata principle, so that successive .petitions are turned 
aside routinely without significant expenditure of judicial 
effort. At the same time, the broad formulation in terms of 
•abuse of the writ• and "the ends of justice" provides judges 
with sufficient flexibility to reach the merits in those cases 
that do appear to warrant further examination. 
• Congress should make no change in the law respecting 
fact-finding procedures in babeas corpus cases. 
The Committee also examined proposals that would 
have restricted further the power of district courts to hold 
evidentiary hearings. Here, too, we recommend no change. 
There are very few habeas corpus cases in which such hearings 
are held -- indeed, the rate of hearings is lower than for 
other classes of civil litigation. We believe exis.ting stan-
dards are sufficiently strict. 
In Townsend v. Sain,68/ the Supreme Court estab-
lished when evidentiary hearings must be held to make indepen-
dent findings of fact in habeas corpus cases. Soon thereaf-
ter, Congress amended 28 o.s.c. S 2254 and established new 
guidelines for when state court findings should be presumed 
correct. Considerable dissension over the law in this area 
has erupted: the chief impetus for reform seems to be the 
belief that federal courts should not waste valuable time 
reassessing something that has already been done in the state 
courts. Thus, advocates of reform have proposed restricting 
the availability of federal evidentiary hearings to those few 
cases in which the state court hearing was not "full and 
fair." Other reformers propose abolishing federal fact-
finding altogether and making habeas corpus review a purely 
appellate procedure. 
§!/ 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
67/ 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
!!/ 372 o.s. 293 (1963). 
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The Committee regards reform in this area as unnec-
essary at this time. Evidentiary hearings are held in very 
few habeas corpus cases. In both 1987 and 1988, only l.l\ of 
the petitions filed were terminated after a trial.69/ One 
reason so few hearings are held is that, in practice, most 
judges grant a hearing only if the state court proceedings 
were not full and fair. As a result, habeas corpus cases are 
less likely than other civil cases to go to trial. The data 
suggest that this is a direct result of the 1966 amendments. 
Accordingly, we see little need for congressional intervention 
at this time. 
• Congress should enact legislation regulating when a -
prisoner can -base a habeas corpus petition on legal 
decisions rendered after bis or her conviction be-
came final. This legislation should provide that 
the federal courts entertain a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus only if it presents a claim that 
was either controlled or •clearly foreshadowed• by 
existing Supreme Court precedent. The district 
court should have discretion to address the merits 
of the claim if that is necessary to determine 
whether a proper claim is presented. In addition, 
the legislation should recognize exceptions to this 
principle if the petitioner's claim is (l) that 
certain conduct or a certain kind of punishment is 
beyond the power of the criminal law to proscribe: 
(2) that the absence of a particular procedure sub-
stantially increases the likelihood of an erroneous 
verdict: or (3) the kind of claim that is not feas-
ible to raise in an appeal from the judgment under 
which the applicant is in custody. 
The question of retroactivity70/ has been a particu-
larly sensitive issue in habeas corpus aebate: if the state 
provides a trial that protected a defendant's constitutional 
rights as then understood, but a federal court later decides 
that the Constitution requires new or different procedures, 
should the state be required to release the prisoner and hold 
69/ Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative 
olfice, 1987-88. 
70/ Last Term, in Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989), the 
Supreme Court held that a prisoner cannot seek habeas corpus 
relief based on changes in law occurring after his or her 
conviction. But the Court defined "new law" in extremely 




a second trial that complies with the new law? The Supreme 
Court addressed this issue last Term in two important cases, 
Teague v. Lane71/ and Penry v. Lynaugh.72/ Although the Court 
was split in both cases, the plurality agreed that "new con-
stitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable 
to those cases which have become final before the new rules 
are announced."11/ 
Furthermore, a majority appears to agree that a rule 
is •new" if it was not •dictated by prior precedent" -- even 
if the rule was already followed in every state.74/ A •new 
rule," in other words,_ is ·any rule that has not oeen expressly 
ratified by the Supreme Court at the time the petitioner's 
conviction becomes final. The Court also held that retroac-
tivity is a threshold inquiry that must be addressed before 
the court considers the merits. 
Finally, the Court recognized two exceptions to this 
general prohibition: a petitioner may base a claim on •new 
law" if the claim is (1) that certain conduct or a certain 
kind of punishment is beyond the power of the criminal law to 
proscribe, or (2) that the absence of a particular procedure 
substantially diminishes the likelihood-of an accurate ver-
dict.ll/ 
Teague and Penry have-dramatically changed the law 
of habeas corpus. One might perhaps argue that Congress 
should leave the courts to flesh out these issues before con-
sidering legislation. But Congress successfully codified 
several then-recent Supreme Court decisions in 1966; con-
gressional action in this context will be equally helpful. 
Teague and Penry are based on the premise that the 
interests of the prisoner are at their weakest, and those of 
the state at their strongest, when the state court correctly 
applied law that has since been changed. In those cases, 
habeas corpus does not deter state courts from ignoring feder-
al constitutional rights, since the failure to predict a 
change cannot realistically be deterred. The state court has 
1!/ 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
ll/ 109 s. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
73/ 109 s. Ct. at 1075, O'Connor, J. (plurality opinion), 
I'o80, Stevens, J., joined by Slackmun, J. 
74/ 109 s. Ct. at 1070, O'Connor, J. (plurality opinion); 109 
57' Ct. 2944. 
ll/ 109 s. Ct. at 1075-77 (plurality opinion). 
.. 
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done all that can fairly be asked of it by properly applying 
the law as it stood during the trial and appeal. 
The desirability of limiting habeas corpus to claims 
based on law existing at the time a conviction becomes final 
depends on how one distinguishes between "misreading existing 
law" and •making new law." These categories blend together, 
yet this blurred line determines the scope of the state 
courts' duty to faithfully interpret and enforce the ~onstitu-
tion. There will often be sufficient uncertainty about tbe 
implications of particular Supreme Court decisions to insulate 
some state interpretations from federal habeas corpus review 
under Teague and Penry. Enough ambiguity will remain to insu-
late some state decisions from federal habeas corpus review. 
Therefore, we suggest that Congress direct federal 
courts to hear a habeas corpus petition only if it presents a 
claim that was either controlled or "clearly foreshadowed" by 
existing Supreme Court precedent. This standard should re-
quire state courts to attend to caselaw developments without 
penalizing them for failing to be prescient. At the same 
time, we believe that this standard will not be too difficult 
to administer. Its precise contours will require further 
development through adjudication. 
Second, it will often be difficult to separate the 
retroactivity issue from the merits. In addition, because the 
pleadings in habeas corpus cases are usually prepared by the 
inmate, they often require considerable interpretation by the 
reviewing court: issues that have been formulated cleanly when 
the case reaches the Supreme Court were seldom so in the lower 
courts. Therefore, we recommend that the decision whether to 
address the merits be left to the court's discretion. 
Exercising of this discretion should depend on whether the 
merits can be separated from the retroactivity question. 
Finally, we agree with the two exceptions recognized 
in Teague and Penry, but we believe that Congress should cre-
ate a third exception as well. Some claims are unlikely to be 
raised on direct appeal (e.g., ineffective assistance of coun-
sel claims and claims that turn ~n facts that are discovered 
after appeal, such as Brady claims). After Teague and Penry, 
however, such claims can no longer be raised in habeas corpus 
proceedings if they argue for & change in the·law. An excep-
tion to the rule of retroactivity is thus needed here for the 
same reason the Supreme Court has recognized an exception to 
the mootness doctrine for claims that are "capable of repeti-
tion yet evading review:• 
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1. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
Several factors went into the Committee's consider-
ation of this issue. First, there is no constitutional 
right to counsel during either state or federal post-
conviction review. This is a factor that will influence the 
willingness of the States to support habeas corpus reform. 
Second, if habeas corpus reform in capital cases is to be 
achieved, substantial support at the state level will be 
necessary. Third, considerable weight was accorded to the 
fact that, subject to federal review, responsibility for 
providing competent counsel at the critical stages of crimi-
nal cases has always resided at the state level. 
The Committee's proposal has the important ele-
ment of flexibility. It allows the States the choice of 
remaining under the present system of multiple reviews with-
out regard to innocence, or of adopting the proposal of our 
Committee (S. 1760). For the States seekin9 greater finali-
ty in capital cases, their burden will be to propose a mech-
-~ 2. 
anism for providing competent habeas counsel which they can 
sustain financially and can staff fully. The adequacy of a 
State's provisions will remain subject to federal court re-
view. In the Committee's view, this process should produce 
within a reasonable period of time the necessary precedents 
for other States to follow if they wish to choose the spe-
cial habeas scheme for capital cases. 
If a State acts in response to the incentive 
structure contemplated by the Committee, the status quo will 
change at least in that State and perhaps in others. Capi-
tal defendants will obtain representation which they now 
have no right to demand. Objective standards for promoting 
competent representation may vary at least initially from 
State to State, but that should not militate against the 
Committee's proposal as long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is rea-
sonably calculated to produce competent counsel in capital 
cases at the state habeas phase. Litigation over the ade-
quacy of the state system could produce initial delay, but 
this would be a one-time delay, well-justified by the gains 
in efficiency and fairness in the system as a whole. 
Uniform national standards of competency of counsel 
could obscure the many detailed considerations that are cru-
cial to the development of an effective system of state ha-
beas representation in capital cases. An examination of the 
standards for counsel in S. 1757 provides an illustration. 
3. 
Section 2261 of S. 1757 requires 3 years of "experience" in 
the handling of felony trials. But it does not specify what 
that experience includes. A similar "experience" require-
ment is applicable to the handling of appeals. To promote 
attorney competency in capital cases, many details would 
have to be filled in. Presumably S. 1757 leaves those de-
tails - which would be decisive to the efficacy of a state-
wide representational scheme - to be worked out at the state 
level. Viewed in this light, the notion of uniformity ex-
pressed ins. 1757 is extremely limited. 
These "experience" provisions also could be coun-
terproductive. In addition to the 3 year trial and appel-
late "experience" requirements, section 2261 also requires 
that the attorney must have acquired that experience in the 
trial and appellate court in which the capital case is to be 
heard. Section 2261 also requires that each attorney sub-
ject to appointment must have been admitted to practice in 
those specific courts for 5 years prior to appointment. 
Under section 2261, even an attorney with extensive federal 
criminal trial experience could not be appointed unless he 
or she possessed the requisite state trial experience in the 
relevant local court. It is not easy to find attorneys 
willing and able to make the extraordinary commitment needed 
to serve as lead counsel or even to participate in a capital 
case. Section 2261 would make the task of finding capital 
defense counsel more difficult than it is at this time. 
4 . 
Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory 
or voluntary, the States will be unlikely to accept them 
unless the standards are reasonable in light of local condi-
tions. This includes the need for reasonable flexibility as 
to the amount of compensation for counsel. The absence of 
so-called uniform federal standards of competency is not a 
shortcoming in the Committee's proposal. If the States are 
allowed some flexibility in taking the initiative, the end 
result should be a material and beneficial change in the way 
capital cases are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the more specific questions 
concerning the Committee's recommendations, the standards 
for judging competency of counsel should be compatible 
throughout state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. But 
as indicated earlier, the competency standards in section 
2261 of S. 1757 are neither uniform nor particularly exact-
ing and they authorize virtually open ended departure when a 
attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. The same 
is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 USC 
S848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the hands 
of the trial judge in both instances. The Committee, howev-
er, believes that this is inevitable. There is no way to 
make any serious advances in this area without substantial 
delegation of responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital 
defendant at the state phase ought to continue to handle the 
s. 
case once it reaches federal court unless there is clear 
reason to believe that the case has been mishandled. At 
that juncture, performance in the context of the specific 
case ought to override adherence to more generalized stand-
ards of competency. The object of this proposal is to find 
lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and aggres-
sive efforts on behalf of capital defendants. If that per-
formance is present, blind adherence to supposedly more de-
manding federal standards of competency would be a disser-
vice to the client and would discourage future lawyers from 
heeding the call to provide a needed service. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to en-
courage habeas counsel to inquire into all legal and factual 
issues concerning the capital sentencing procedure. The 
vast majority of death penalty cases do not focus on guilt-
innocence, but rather are concerned with the avoidance of 
the death penalty. After a verdict of guilty, a jury in a 
capital case can impose the death penalty only if it finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravating circum-
stances were present. If the jury cannot reach unanimity on 
that issue or if a single juror finds mitigating circum-
stances to be overriding, then life imprisonment is the sen-
tence. 
6. 
An understanding of this makes the state interest 
in sentencing finality clearer. It is hardly more burden-
some to retry a capital case completely than it is to have a 
new trial limited only to sentence. A second jury in a cap-
ital case must still hear all the evidence relevant to sen-
tence before it decides whether to impose the death penalty. 
From the State's perspective, challenges to the sentence 
really do not rest on the argument that the first jury would 
have decided the death penalty issue differently. Instead, 
they rest on the premise that a second and differently com-
posed jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose 
the death penalty. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are 
permissible in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-
innocence determination. Where there is no question in a 
capital case about guilt, S. 1760 limits a capital defendant 
to one opportunity for federal habeas review on the validity 
of sentence. Of course, it is significant that this would 
be a counseled opportunity. An experienced criminal attor-
ney knows the types of issues that can be raised in post-
conviction proceedings in addition to those raised at trial 
and on direct appeal. The identity of the State's witnesses 
and their testimony at the sentencing hearing would be a 
matter of record. Under s. 1760, habeas counsel is expected 
to undertake the necessary steps to investigate all such 
anticipatable issues, including Brady violations and the 
7. 
possibility of perjured testimony, and do it in connection 
with the first petition. Discovery procedures are available 
at the federal level to assist in this process and should be 
liberally available. 
If perjured testimony or a Brady violation is not 
discovered by habeas counsel, S. 1760 would remit the capi-
tal defendant to state court for a remedy at that point. If 
the claim has substance and raises questions about the pro-
priety of the sentencing procedure, there is no reason to 
believe that a state court judge would hesitate to act. The 
fact that federal habeas review of sentencing would come to 
an end at some point does not mean that a capital defendant 
has no forum at all for late emerging theories of relief. 
Provision of a loophole in the federal successive 
petition rule for alleged Brady violations or perjured tes-
timony, moreover, would invite abuse through last-minute 
filings. The Committee's research indicates that such facts 
rarely exist. But they are easily alleged. The claim may 
require time to investigate even where it appears to be 
without merit, affording an opportunity to seek a stay of 
execution and further delay. Moreover, the successive peti-
tion provisions of s. 1757 are not limited to situations 
involving Brady violations or perjured testimony. Rather, 
S. 1757 provides a broad exception for any challenge to the 
sentence. This provision will destroy the enhanced finality 
that makes reform attractive to the States. If the Congress 
8. 
decides that any exception for successive petitions beyond 
factual innocence is appropriate, it should be narrowly con-
fined to situations involving Brady violations or perjury. 
3. Retroactivity 
S. 1757 incorporates a section that would amend by 
legislation the Supreme Court's rules with respect to retro-
activity. The provision specifically overrules recent 
cases, including Teague v. Lane, 109 s. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
Retroactivity has traditionally been an area subject to~-
dicial administration, not $pecific legislative rules. This 
is appropriate due to the Court's greater expertise in the 
area. Moreover, the current law of retroactivity ensures 
that a prisoner's conviction and sentence will be proper 
under the law in effect at the time of trial, but does not 
allow challenges on the basis of law not even on the books 
at the time of the initial trial. The provision of s. 1757 
reverses this rule, making it far less attractive to the 
States. This disincentive for state participation would 
impede reform. 
4. Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
If an attorney accepts appointment in a capital 
case, the State would have reason to expect the case to be 
his or her top priority. Since Furman, many death penalty 
cases have been litigated at the habeas phase under far 
9. 
greater initial time constraints than the 180 day period 
proposed under s. 1760. This happens because the State has 
set an execution date after the conviction and sentence have 
been upheld on direct appeal. One of the advantages of s. 
1760, in the Committee's view, is that it would eliminate 
the time and energy that sometimes has to be put into secur-
ing stays of execution. 
The Committee believes that the 180-day time period 
is reasonable since new counsel would already have the bene-
fit of a full trial transcript plus all briefs and motions 
prepared by predecessor counsel. Frequently, trial counsel 
will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar with the 
case. Four months should be a more than adequate amount of 
time to evaluate the records and file a state habeas peti-
tion which would stop the 180 day time period from running 
any longer. If investigation reveals new issues, counsel 
for the capital defendant could seek leave to amend the pe-
tition to add those issues. The point of the 180 day filing 
requirement is to prompt capital defense attorneys to formu-
late a habeas petition. Otherwise, in a capital case, there 
is literally no incentive to file a habeas corpus petition 
until it becomes absolutely necessary. If a capital defense 
counsel works diligently from the day of appointment, he or 
she will get the state habeas petition filed with time to 
spare. 
10. 
Under the Committee's proposal, the 180 day clock 
stops upon the filing of the state habeas petition and re-
mains stopped throughout state habeas litigation. It begins 
to run again only after the state high court has rendered a 
final judgment in the case which usually comes after the 
denial of a motion for rehearing in the event of a judgment 
adverse to the capital defendant. If there is continuity of 
representation ass. 1760 contemplates, the move from state 
to federal court should not require additional time. The 
better practice would be to have all federal habeas plead-
ings pre-drafted during the . time a motion for rehearing is 
pending before the state supreme court. If the motion for 
rehearing is denied, the federal habeas petition could then 
be filed on the same day of this denial with no additional 
running of time. If unusual problems arise in advance of 
the filing of either a state or federal habeas petition, the 
Committee proposal provides for a 60-day extension of time 
in which to file. 
5. Is One Federal Review Sufficient? 
Given the focus on continuously counseled represen-
tation throughout all post-conviction review, the scheme 
proposed in S. 1760 would be far superior to the chaotic 
system now in place. Piecemeal litigation is to some degree 
the result of several different teams of attorneys working 
at different phases of a death penalty case. Continuity of 
11. 
representation will eliminate piecemeal litigation due to 
changes in counsel and it will also promote fairness to the 
capital defendant. Finally, the issue in capital cases is 
not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the capi-
tal litigation process and the lack of clear agreement on 
when the federal role in this process comes to an end. Now 
the courts are grappling with this issue on a case-by-case 
basis. s. 1760 is an attempt to produce a balanced solution 
to the present deadlock. It offers major enhancements in 
terms of fairness to the capital defendant and requires in 
return a clarification of the rules of finality. 
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1. Standards for Competency of Counsel 
Several factors went into the Committee's consider-
ation of this issue. First, there is no constitutional 
right to counsel during either state or federal post-
conviction review. This is a factor that will influence the 
willingness of the States to support habeas corpus reform. 
Second, if habeas corpus reform in capital cases is to be 
achieved, substantial support at the state level will be 
necessary. Third, considerable weight was accorded to the 
fact that, subject to federal review, responsibility for 
providing competent counsel at the critical stages of crimi-
nal cases has always resided at the state level. 
The Committee's proposal has the important ele-
ment of flexibility. It allows the States the choice of 
remaining under the present system of multiple reviews with-
out regard to innocence, or of adopting the proposal of our 
Committee (S. 1760). For the States seekin9 greater finali-
ty in capital cases, their burden will be to propose a mech-
2. 
anism for providing competent habeas counsel which they can 
sustain financially and can staff fully. The adequacy of a 
State's provisions will remain subject to federal court re-
view. In the Committee's view, this process should produce 
within a reasonable period of time the necessary precedents 
for other States to follow if they wish to choose the spe-
cial habeas scheme for capital cases. 
If a State acts in response to the incentive 
structure contemplated by the Committee, the status quo will 
change at least in that State and perhaps in others. Capi-
tal defendants will obtain representation which they now 
have no right to demand. Objective standards for promoting 
competent representation may vary at least initially from 
State to State, but that should not militate against the 
Committee's proposal as long as the federal judiciary is 
authorized to review each scheme to assure that it is rea-
sonably calculated to produce competent counsel in capital 
cases at the state habeas phase. Litigation over the ade-
quacy of the state system could produce initial delay, but 
this would be a one-time delay, well-justified by the gains 
in efficiency and fairness in the system as a whole. 
Uniform national standards of competency of counsel 
could obscure the many detailed considerations that are cru-
cial to the development of an effective system of state ha-
beas representation in capital cases. An examination of the 
standards for counsel in 5. 1757 provides an illustration. 
3. 
Section 2261 of S. 1757 requires 3 years of "experience" in 
the handling of felony trials. But it does not specify what 
that experience includes. A similar "experience" require-
ment is applicable to the handling of appeals. To promote 
attorney competency in capital cases, many details would 
have to be filled in. Presumably S. 1757 leaves those de-
tails - which would be decisive to the efficacy of a state-
wide representational scheme - to be worked out at the state 
level. Viewed in this light, the notion of uniformity ex-
pressed ins. 1757 is extremely limited. 
These "experience" provisions also could be coun-
terproductive. In addition to the 3 year trial and appel-
late "experience" requirements, section 2261 also requires 
that the attorney must have acquired that experience in the 
trial and appellate court in which the capital case is to be 
heard. Section 2261 also requires that each attorney sub-
ject to appointment must have been admitted to practice in 
those specific courts for 5 years prior to appointment. 
Under section 2261, even an attorney with extensive federal 
criminal trial experience could not be appointed unless he 
or she possessed the requisite state trial experience in the 
relevant local court. It is not easy to find attorneys 
willing and able to make the extraordinary commitment needed 
to serve as lead counsel or even to participate in a capital 
case. Section 2261 would make the task of finding capital 
defense counsel more difficult than it is at this time. 
4 . 
Whether attorney competency standards are mandatory 
or voluntary, the States will be unlikely to accept them 
unless the standards are reasonable in light of local condi-
tions. This includes the need for reasonable flexibility as 
to the amount of compensation for counsel. The absence of 
so-called uniform federal standards of competency is not a 
shortcoming in the Committee's proposal. If the States are 
allowed some flexibility in taking the initiative, the end 
result should be a material and beneficial change in the way 
capital cases are litigated in this country. 
In answer to some of the more specific questions 
concerning the Committee's recommendations, the standards 
for judging competency of counsel should be compatible 
throughout state and federal habeas corpus proceedings. But 
as indicated earlier, the competency standards in section 
2261 of S. 1757 are neither uniform nor particularly exact-
ing and they authorize virtually open ended departure when a 
attorney meeting those standards is unavailable. The same 
is true of the attorney competency standards in 21 USC 
S848(q)(7). Considerable discretion is placed in the hands 
of the trial judge in both instances. The Committee, howev-
er, believes that this is inevitable. There is no way to 
make any serious advances in this area without substantial 
delegation of responsibility under general standards. 
In my view, the attorney who represents a capital 
defendant at the state phase ought to continue to handle the 
5. 
case once it reaches federal court unless there is clear 
reason to believe that the case has been mishandled. At 
that juncture, performance in the context of the specific 
case ought to override adherence to more generalized stand-
ards of competency. The object of this proposal is to find 
lawyers who will put forth intelligent, informed and aggres-
sive efforts on behalf of capital defendants. If that per-
formance is present, blind adherence to supposedly more de-
manding federal standards of competency would be a disser-
vice to the client and would discourage future lawyers from 
heeding the call to provide a needed service. 
2. Successive Petitions 
The object of the Committee's proposal is to en-
courage habeas counsel to inquire into all legal and factual 
issues concerning the capital sentencing procedure. The 
vast majority of death penalty cases do not focus on guilt-
innocence, but rather are concerned with the avoidance of 
the death penalty. After a verdict of guilty, a jury in a 
capital case can impose the death penalty only if it finds 
beyond a reasonable doubt that certain aggravating circum-
stances were present. If the jury cannot reach unanimity on 
that issue or if a single juror finds mitigating circum-
stances to be overriding, then life imprisonment is the sen-
tence. 
6. 
An understanding of this makes the state interest 
in sentencing finality clearer. It is hardly more burden-
some to retry a capital case completely than it is to have a 
new trial limited only to sentence. A second jury in a cap-
ital case must still hear all the evidence relevant to sen-
tence before it decides whether to impose the death penalty. 
From the State's perspective, challenges to the sentence 
really do not rest on the argument that the first jury would 
have decided the death penalty issue differently. Instead, 
they rest on the premise that a second and differently com-
posed jury might have one member who is unwilling to impose 
the death penalty. 
Under S. 1760, second or successive petitions are 
permissible in cases where there is doubt about the guilt-
innocence determination. Where there is no question in a 
capital case about guilt, s. 1760 limits a capital defendant 
to one opportunity for federal habeas review on the validity 
of sentence. Of course, it is significant that this would 
be a counseled opportunity. An experienced criminal attor-
ney knows the types of issues that can be raised in post-
conviction proceedings in addition to those raised at trial 
and on direct appeal. The identity of the State's witnesses 
and their testimony at the sentencing hearing would be a 
matter of record. Under S. 1760, habeas counsel is expected 
to undertake the necessary steps to investigate all such 
anticipatable issues, including Brady violations and the 
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possibility of perjured testimony, and do it in connection 
with the first petition. Discovery procedures are available 
at the federal level to assist in this process and should be 
liberally available. 
If perjured testimony or a Brady violation is not 
discovered by habeas counsel, S. 1760 would remit the capi-
tal defendant to state court for a remedy at that point. If 
the claim has substance and raises questions about the pro-
priety of the sentencing procedure, there is no reason to 
believe that a state court judge would hesitate to act. The 
fact that federal habeas review of sentencing would come to 
an end at some point does not mean that a capital defendant 
has no forum at all for late emerging theories of relief. 
Provision of a loophole in the federal successive 
petition rule for alleged Brady violations or perjured tes-
timony, moreover, would invite abuse through last-minute 
filings. The Committee's research indicates that such facts 
rarely exist. But they are easily alleged. The claim may 
require time to investigate even where it appears to be 
without merit, affording an opportunity to seek a stay of 
execution and further delay. Moreover, the successive peti-
tion provisions of s. 1757 are not limited to situations 
involving Brady violations or perjured testimony. Rather, 
S. 1757 provides a broad exception for any challenge to the 
sentence. This provision will destroy the enhanced finality 
that makes reform attractive to the States. If the Congress 
8. 
decides that any exception for successive petitions beyond 
factual innocence is appropriate, it should be narrowly con-
fined to situations involving Brady violations or perjury. 
3. Retroactivity 
5. 1757 incorporates a section that would amend by 
legislation the Supreme Court's rules with respect to retro-
activity. The provision specifically overrules recent 
cases, including Teague v. Lane, 109 5. Ct. 1060 (1989). 
Retroactivity has traditionally been an area subject to~-
dicial administration, not $pecific legislative rules. This 
is appropriate due to the Court's greater expertise in the 
area. Moreover, the current law of retroactivity ensures 
that a prisoner's conviction and sentence will be proper 
under the law in effect at the time of trial, but does not 
allow challenges on the basis of law not even on the books 
at the time of the initial trial. The provision of 5. 1757 
reverses this rule, making it far less attractive to the 
States. This disincentive for state participation would 
impede reform. 
4. Adequacy of 180 Day Filing Requirement 
If an attorney accepts appointment in a capital 
case, the State would have reason to expect the case to be 
his or her top priority. Since Furman, many death penalty 
cases have been litigated at the habeas phase under far 
9. 
greater initial time constraints than the 180 day period 
proposed under s. 1760. This happens because the State has 
set an execution date after the conviction and sentence have 
been upheld on direct appeal. One of the advantages of s. 
1760, in the Committee's view, is that it would eliminate 
the time and energy that sometimes has to be put into secur-
ing stays of execution. 
The Committee believes that the 180-day time period 
is reasonable since new counsel would already have the bene-
fit of a full trial transcript plus all briefs and motions 
prepared by predecessor counsel. Frequently, trial counsel 
will assist habeas counsel in making them familiar with the 
case. Four months should be a more than adequate amount of 
time to evaluate the records and file a state habeas peti-
tion which would stop the 180 day time period from running 
any longer. If investigation reveals new issues, counsel 
for the capital defendant could seek leave to amend the pe-
tition to add those issues. The point of the 180 day filing 
requirement is to prompt capital defense attorneys to formu-
late a habeas petition. Otherwise, in a capital case, there 
is literally no incentive to file a habeas corpus petition 
until it becomes absolutely necessary. If a capital defense 
counsel works diligently from the day of appointment, he or 
she will get the state habeas petition filed with time to 
spare. 
10. 
Under the Committee's proposal, the 180 day clock 
stops upon the filing of the state habeas petition and re-
mains stopped throughout state habeas litigation. It begins 
to run again only after the state high court has rendered a 
final judgment in the case which usually comes after the 
denial of a motion for rehearing in the event of a judgment 
adverse to the capital defendant. If there is continuity of 
representation as S. 1760 contemplates, the move from state 
to federal court should not require additional time. The 
better practice would be to have all federal habeas plead-
ings pre-drafted during the . time a motion for rehearing is 
pending before the state supreme court. If the motion for 
rehearing is denied, the federal habeas petition could then 
be filed on the same day of this denial with no additional 
running of time. If unusual problems arise in advance of 
the filing of either a state or federal habeas petition, the 
Committee proposal provides for a 60-day extension of time 
in which to file. 
5. Is One Federal Review Sufficient? 
Given the focus on continuously counseled represen-
tation throughout all post-conviction review, the scheme 
proposed in S. 1760 would be far superior to the chaotic 
system now in place. Piecemeal litigation is to some degree 
the result of several different teams of attorneys working 
at different phases of a death penalty case. Continuity of 
11. 
representation will eliminate piecemeal litigation due to 
changes in counsel and it will also promote fairness to the 
capital defendant. Finally, the issue in capital cases is 
not delay per se; it is the lack of structure for the capi-
tal litigation process and the lack of clear agreement on 
when the federal role in this process comes to an end. Now 
the courts are grappling with this issue on a case-by-case 
basis. s. 1760 is an attempt to produce a balanced solution 
to the present deadlock. It offers major enhancements in 
terms of fairness to the capital defendant and requires in 
return a clarification of the rules of finality. 
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